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INTRODUCTION  
Why the Mixed-Up Dog Tags of Private Leonard Shapiro  
Matter for Twentieth-Century American History 
 
The letter was a shock. It made no sense, really. Learning that her son had been killed in 
France on August 20, 1944 was bad enough, but the follow-up letter devastated Rose Shapiro. It 
stated that her child’s “remains received respectful and reverential care,” and then informed her that 
his grave was “marked with a modest Christian cross.” Moreover, the note disclosed, “last rites of 
the Church were held, his grave was blessed, and Masses were being said regularly for him and the 
others who have made the supreme sacrifices for their country.”1 How could it be that her son, a 
Jewish soldier from Chicago, was treated as a Catholic? 
In the midst of World War II, the Army instructed its chaplains to write condolence letters 
to the families of men killed or missing in action. Intended to offer comfort to families on the 
homefront, these missives often achieved their purpose. One wife, for example, thanked Chaplain 
William Larsen (Lutheran) for his “kind letter.” This personal contact was a boon as she requested 
“a picture taken of my husband’s grave. And any personal things belonging to Robert.”2 Larsen 
worked hard to write individualized letters, reaching out to friends in the unit who could provide 
specific information to make his words sound more familiar and thus comforting. He found that 
families often wanted pictures of graves and did his best to accommodate their pleas.3
                                                
1 Kenneth C. Martin to Mrs. Shapiro, October 9, 1944, I-249, Box 10, Folder 60, AJHS. 
2 Mrs. Robert de Yoe to William Larsen, August 1945, COLL/201, Box 1, Series I, Folder: Correspondence 
with Killed Marines’ Families, Navy Yard. 
3 William Larsen to Inga Larsen, July 1945 and June 6, 1945, COLL/201, Box 1, Series I, Folder: 
Correspondence to Family, Navy Yard. Other chaplains also mentioned photographing graves for families. See, for 
example, Abe Gordon to Samuel Sandmel, October 29, 1944, MS 101, Box 1, Folder 5, AJA. 
 2 
But these messages were, like many of the military’s protocols for handling death, also 
expected to be religious in tone and substance. When battlefield bluster was insufficient, the military 
turned to faith as solace for the wounded, the dying, and the relatives left behind. “Make men 
courageous and unafraid,” blared one pocket-sized manual designed to aid laymen help their 
buddies. “Upon finding a seriously wounded man,” the pamphlet instructed, “inquire at once as to 
the religious faith of the man concerned” and then recite the appropriate Protestant, Catholic, or 
Jewish prayers and, as necessary, follow the proper procedures for temporary burials. Written by the 
chaplains of the Antiaircraft Artillery School at Camp Davis, NC, the manual granted laymen access 
to religious rites in times of crisis. Even when a chaplain, the military’s sanctioned religious leader 
was unavailable, it was imperative to provide the wounded and dead “spiritual comfort.”4  
And when soldiers could not speak, dog tags—or military identification tags that included 
names, serial numbers, and religious affiliation—declared their faith for them. Or that was one of 
their intentions, albeit one stymied by the subversion of standardization and efficiency. Technically, 
personnel were supposed to select one of three initials to indicate their religion: P for Protestant, C 
for Catholic, and H for Hebrew. But rules could be broken. Mormons, for example, asked to use 
“LDS” in place of a “P” because “we are in no sense Protestants.”5 While the military did not 
generally accommodate their requests, on rare occasions, a few intrepid Mormons managed to find 
“a commanding officer that maybe didn’t know the rules or the regulations and he would permit 
LDS men to have LDS on their dog tags.”6 Periodically, printed dog tags contravened War 
Department policy and substituted a J (for Jewish) instead of the H (for Hebrew). Indeed, less than a 
                                                
4 “Brief Rituals: For Emergency Use by Laymen on the Field of Battle,” 1, RG 247 (1920-1945), Box 262, 
Folder 350.001 (Lectures, Vol. III), NARA II. 
5 Harold B. Lee to Gustave A. Iverson, June 8, 1944, quoted in Joseph Boone, “The Roles of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints In Relation to the United States Military” (Brigham Young University: PhD 
dissertation, 1975), 571. 
6 Lyman C. Berrett, interviewed by Richard Maher, October 24, 1974, p. 13, Charles Redd Center for Western 
Studies/LDS Chaplains Oral History Project, MS-17096, LDS-CHL. 
 3 
month after the United States entered World War II, American Jewish leaders began protesting this 
use of the archaic racial category “Hebrew” and plead for a religiously associated “J” as an apt 
replacement.7 While Jews, like Mormons, often failed to receive the letter they preferred, sometimes 
individuals found a helpful commander or quartermaster, and made themselves the dog tag of their 
choice. As one civilian Jewish leader remarked, “we have been into this subject of H and J on the 
dog tag so frequently, it is beginning to come out of my ears. There is nothing we can do about it to 
obtain uniformity.”8 
Uniformity was scarcely the most conspicuous or challenging issue Jewish soldiers and 
sailors faced as they registered their faith and procured identification during World War II. Many 
Jewish soldiers deliberated whether or not to include their religion on their dog tags, fearing that if 
sent to Germany, they might be treated as Jews—and singled out for punishment—rather than as 
Prisoners of War. When asked how Jewish soldiers should resolve this choice between 
understandable trepidation and religious identity, Chaplain Charles S. Freedman (Jewish) explained 
that he remained unsure about the best option. On the one hand, “for many men and their families 
back home, it would be of the greatest importance that, should death come on the field of battle, a 
Jewish burial be given the deceased.” On the other hand, “expediency and practicality teaches the 
desirability of being a live dog rather than a dead lion.”9 Martyrdom by dog tag was not necessarily 
ideal, yet mortality loomed over the difficult decision, no matter what choice soldiers made. And 
whether soldiers discussed their selection with their families was rarely clear. 
Imprecision frequently characterized the state of dog tags, which made the work of graves 
                                                
7 David de Sola Pool to Aryeh Lev, January 2, 1942, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 72, Folder 080 (JWB, Vol. II), 
NARA II. On state’s racial categorization of Jews, see Eric Goldstein, “Contesting the Categories: Jews and 
Government Racial Classification in the United States,” Jewish History 19, no. 1 (2005): 79-107.  
8 Samuel Silver to Philip Bernstein, March 31, 1944 and Isaac Toubin to Samuel Silver, April 5, 1944, I-249, 
Box 10, Folder 59, AJHS.  
9 Charles S. Freedman to Philip S. Bernstein, April 28, 1944, I-249, Box 10, Folder 52, AJHS. 
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registration chaplains even more difficult. In charge of ensuring proper religious burials, the officers 
first had to determine whether the dog tag signified the correct person. As Chaplain Lyman Berrett 
(LDS), who was stationed at Okinawa, recalled “When we would bury men…we would not always 
go by the name on the dog tags” because superstitious soldiers believed that their dog tags marked 
them as targets for bullets. To address this prospect, they exchanged dog tags with one another, 
which led Berrett and other chaplains to develop additional layers of verification, most often by 
confirming the religious mark on dog tags with other records, lists, and forms of identification. 
When he encountered men with “the C or the P on their dog tags and…identified them as being 
who the dog tag actually said they were or after we got our direct identification of the body, then we 
would write to the parents and tell them that they had had a Christian burial service.”10 This was 
standard operating procedure and yet many chaplains were forced to maneuver through far more 
tacit signs of religious identity. 
When Army Chief of Chaplains William R. Arnold (Catholic) received word of Rose 
Shapiro’s consternation, then, he set about trying to untangle exactly what circumstances had 
produced the insensitive and distressing letter. Was it a case of mistaken identity, a matter of 
religious opacity, or an instance of bureaucratic blunder? Addressing these questions began with a 
factual discovery: what was marked on the private’s dog tag? This was important because, as Arnold 
wrote to the chaplain who penned the condolence letter, “Mrs. Shapiro is, as the name so strongly 
suggests, Jewish. She is no little distraught that her son received a Catholic rather than a Jewish 
burial.” He posed several additional questions in an attempt to elicit what had happened and why 
had procedures gone awry. Was it possible the soldier had converted overseas, he wondered? Was 
there uncertainty or doubt about his religious preference, but if so, “could not his buddies have 
                                                
10 Lyman C. Berrett, interviewed by Richard Maher, October 24, 1974, p. 14, Charles Redd Center for Western 
Studies/LDS Chaplains Oral History Project, MS-17096, LDS-CHL. 
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supplied the necessary information?” Finally, was this incident merely a mix-up, a letter sent in 
error?11  
Upon receiving Arnold’s query, the chaplain deployed “somewhere in France” apologized 
profusely and hastened to clarify his actions. As it turned out—and as Chaplain Berrett experienced 
in the Pacific Theater—confusion reigned, and there were few mechanisms through which to 
corroborate religion in the field. In the absence of a clearly designated religious preference, the 
chaplain “selected names that I thought were of a Catholic faith. Inadvertently I selected the name 
Shapiro to be an Italian name, and one that was a Catholic.”12 Unfamiliar with Jewish names, the 
chaplain saw a surname that ended with a vowel and deemed it Italian and thus Catholic. Enforcing 
religious clarity through dog tags and personnel lists would preclude such mistakes, he asserted. The 
state, in other words, needed to collect and maintain clear information. Insisting that soldiers 
designate religion on dog tags would prevent mishaps and mix-ups, thus enabling chaplains to honor 
the dead and comfort families. 
After unraveling the enigma of Private Shapiro’s battlefield burial, the Chief of Chaplains 
sent his regrets to the soldier’s mother. Through the Jewish Welfare Board (JWB), the civilian 
organization that endorsed Jewish chaplains and mediated Jewish personnel needs with the state, 
Arnold apologized. He also promised to rectify the situation by directing the Theater Chaplain to 
replace the grave’s cross with a Star of David and to locate a Jewish chaplain to “conduct a proper 
memorial service.”13  
This eight-month exchange among Rose Shapiro, the chaplain in the field, the Chief of 
Chaplains, and the JWB was both anomalous and routine. For the Shapiro family, the effort to trace 
                                                
11 William R. Arnold to Kenneth C. Martin, January 9, 1945, I-249, Box 10, Folder 60, AJHS. 
12 Kenneth C. Martin to William R. Arnold, February 11, 1945, I-249, Box 10, Folder 60, AJHS. 
13 William R. Arnold to Isaac Toubin, March 7, 1945, I-249, Box 10, Folder 60, AJHS. At the time, Rabbi Judah 
Nadich was serving in the Office of the Theater Chaplain, based in Paris, and was the most likely candidate to fulfill 
these instructions, though he may have secured the services of a chaplain closer to the grave to do the memorial service. 
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the circumstances of Leonard’s burial was a singular moment, a one-time problem that brought 
them into close contact with representatives of the state. In contrast, for the Office of the Chief of 
Chaplains, interfacing with the public represented standard and daily duty. Implementing the state’s 
religious vision necessarily meant navigating between military and civilian spheres and negotiating 
religious disjunctures. Religions differ, and war brought Americans into contact with new, different, 
and sometimes-unrecognizable faiths. Chaplains could know this and still err because, prior to 
military service, most clergy had limited interaction with members of different faiths.14 Thus arose 
the predicament of a chaplain who simply did not know that Shapiro was not an Italian name and 
was, in fact, a Jewish name. As the intense familial reaction and the diligent pursuit of a solution to 
Leonard Shapiro’s burial indicate, death gave the American state purchase over religion in the 
military. Precisely because the state waged war, war led to death, and death is handled distinctly by 
different faiths, the armed forces needed clergy who could comfort the dying, officiate funerals, and 
console the living.  
But the military is also a total institution,15 and arming men with the faith to die fighting 
opened a vast arena of military ministry. The chaplaincy became the vehicle through which the state 
mediated military necessity and religious obligations, public ceremonies and private faith. Because 
the United States has neither a state church (like England) nor a consistorial system (like France), the 
military offers one of very few spaces in which the state formally authorized religious leadership. 
                                                
14 Roland Gittelsohn (Jewish), a Marine chaplain in World War II, estimated that during his seven years as a 
rabbi before entering the chaplaincy, 90 percent of his interaction with clergy was with rabbis, “that is to say, almost 
exclusively with clergymen of my own faith. My contacts with Christian ministers, while friendly and cordial, were 
limited rather narrowly to an occasional interchange of pulpits, a joint religious service now or then, or an infrequent 
community problem….Much the same must be said of my Christian colleagues.” Roland Gittelsohn, “Pacifist to Padre,” 
24, MS-704, Box 64, Folder 7, AJA. 
15 Sociologist Erving Goffman defined a total institution as “a place of residence and work where a large 
number of like-situated individuals cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time together lead an 
enclosed formally administered round of life.” This applies as much to the military as it did to the mental institutions 
Goffman studied. On total institutions, see Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and 
Other Inmates (New York: Doubleday, 1961), xxi. 
 7 
The work of the military chaplaincy in the twentieth century underscores both the evolving religious 
commitments of the state and the ways in which chaplains served as brokers between military 
operations and civilian society. 
“God, War, and Politics: The American Military Chaplaincy and the Making of a Multi-
Religious Nation” reveals how the modern American state wielded power over and through religion, 
transforming the spiritual landscape of American society as well as using faith to support military 
and foreign policy goals. Steeped in the reality of American religious diversity, the military chaplaincy 
enabled the state to define theological ideals and innovate ritual practice. Against the backdrop of 
constitutional separation of church and state, the military created the religious state and intertwined 
religion and democracy as the ideological center of American values and empire. 
This project thus asks: How did religious groups agitate and advocate for themselves as 
American religions? How did religion both serve and challenge the state? How did national needs 
mold religious beliefs and rituals, and how did military innovations in religious life contribute to 
shifts in the identities of religious groups in the United States? I argue that the state quietly molded 
American religion into an entity different than a single totalizing faith, but nevertheless contingent 
on a nationally exclusive set of ideas and praxis. The military recast religious faith from personal 
belief and universal aims to a religious vision of what I call “moral monotheism” which directed 
men to believe in a single God and behave ethically.16 By reimagining religion as a value system 
outside of but drawing upon extant religions, the state not only recognized but also legitimized 
multiple claims to truth. Soldiers needed simply pick a religion and behave according to its ethical 
standards. Promulgated by the state, moral monotheism built on both Christian Republicanism and 
the moral establishment, but differed from former iterations in deriving power from federal 
                                                
16 The military was almost entirely male in World War I and remained a predominantly male organization 
through the Vietnam War. While moral monotheism certainly extended to the tiny (but growing) fraction of women in 
the service, I use men because it describes the population with which the military was most concerned. 
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authority.17 Theologically loose and ritually pliant, moral monotheism made the mottos “unity 
without uniformity” and “cooperation without compromise” possible, if also vague and unwieldy.18 
As ordained clergy serving as military officers, chaplains melded religious authority and state 
power; more specifically, they exemplified diffuse state power.19 Operating autonomously within the 
policy framework set by an administrative bureaucracy, chaplains made daily decisions that expanded 
or restricted the religious lives of Americans serving in the armed forces. The chaplain who wrote to 
Rose Shapiro, for example, interpreted both the religious information he possessed and the 
conventions of standard operating procedure. Religion and state converged in the military 
chaplaincy, where clergy possessed both political and religious prerogatives within an institution 
regulated by civilians. As they brokered religious accommodations within military space, chaplains 
molded and challenged religious, racial, and gender norms. When they left the service, they often 
used their military experiences to shape civilian debates about religion as well as race and gender.  
“God, War, and Politics” is therefore a socio-political history of religion and the state from 
World War I through the Vietnam War. Drawing on material from over 25 military, state, and 
religious archives, this project places myriad faith groups—including mainline and evangelical 
Protestants, Catholics and Christian Scientists, Jews and Mormons, and Seventh-Day Adventists and 
                                                
17 On Christian Republicanism, see Mark Noll, America’s God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003). On the moral establishment, see David Sehat, The Myth of American Religious 
Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
18 Wendy Wall has convincingly argued that a coalition of politicians, liberal clergy, intellectuals, corporate 
managers, and civic leaders “worked to blunt domestic intolerance and to broaden the bounds of national inclusion by 
promoting both cultural pluralism and a unifying American Way.” This study extends her argument by examining the 
ways in which the military chaplaincy modeled and molded religious pluralism through bureaucratic mechanisms and on-
the-ground rituals. Wendy Wall, Inventing the “American Way”: The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights 
Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7.   
19 Other examples of diffuse state power include immigration agents, welfare workers, marriage clerks, public 
health advocates, and federal lawyers. See: Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Margot Canady, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-
Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Peggy Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and 
the Making of Race in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics nad 
Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Michael Willrich, Pox: An American Story 
(New York: Penguin, 2011); and Risa Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2010). 
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Buddhists—within the same frame. This comparative approach illuminates the experiences of 
multiple faiths within military space and shows how religious groups fared in contrast to one 
another. It also connects religious groups in the United States to their co-religionists abroad, thereby 
situating American religious change in a global context.  
The history of the mid-twentieth-century chaplaincy also offers a new perspective on the 
military, which is often viewed as an authoritarian and conservative institution. True, the military’s 
religious division was, like the rest of the armed forces, hierarchical and often coercive, but it was 
also progressive, innovative, and pragmatic, frequently using its power to press for more equitable 
treatment of religious and racial minorities. Because the military can enforce its commitments, a 
handful of key individuals, such as Episcopalian Bishop Charles Brent, World War II Army Chief of 
Chaplains William Arnold, and Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt, exerted an outsize and 
profound impact on the chaplaincy and, through it, on American religious culture. Examining how 
the state mobilized for war demonstrates that religion was rarely separate from the workings of the 
state. At times the state co-opted religion to advance its imperial goals. But religious believers also 
pushed back, challenging the state to live up to the moral standards it claimed to uphold. 
By examining the politics, practice, and provision of religion in the armed forces, “God, 
War, and Politics” integrates religion into and amends the burgeoning historical literature on 
citizenship, civil society, and the modern state in mid-twentieth-century America. As historians Jon 
Butler and David Hollinger noted separately in 2004, despite religion’s enduring presence in the 
United States, it has rarely figured rigorously into the historiography of modern America.20 More 
recently, Kevin Schultz and Paul Harvey have argued that religion remains “everywhere and 
                                                
20 Jon Butler, “Jack-in-the-Box Faith: The Religion Problem in Modern American History,” Journal of American 
History 90, no. 4 (March 2004): 1357-1378; David Hollinger, “Jesus Matters in the USA,” Modern Intellectual History 1, no. 
1 (2004): 135-149. See also, David Hollinger, “The ‘Secularization’ Question and the United States in the Twentieth 
Century,” Church History 70, no. 1 (March 2001): 132-143, and “Why is There So Much Christianity in the United States? 
A Reply to Sommerville,” Church History 71, no. 4 (December 2002): 858-864.  
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nowhere,” quite remarkable in its “simultaneous presence in American history and absence in recent 
American historiography.21 Often subsumed—or assumed—under ethnicity, culture, or class, 
religion frequently lingers on the periphery as an unmarked or seemingly unremarkable feature of 
American society. Yet scholarship on religion in twentieth-century America has significantly 
increased in the past decade.22 Nevertheless, histories focusing on religion and politics tend to trace 
this coupling as an artifact of Cold War containment23 or see religion primarily as a signal of postwar 
conservative or liberal enterprises.24 Histories of the Christian Right, for example, imply that 
twentieth-century religious politics and political religion were necessarily evangelical, right-leaning, 
and wholly grassroots or church-leader built. This assumption distorts the relationship between 
                                                
21 Kevin M. Schultz and Paul Harvey, “Everywhere and Nowhere: Recent Trends in American Religious 
History and Historiography,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78, no. 1 (March 2010): 134. 
22 See, for example: David L. Chappell, A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Wallace Best, Passionately Human, No Less Divine: Religion and Culture in Black 
Chicago, 1915-1952 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Leigh Schmidt, Restless Souls: The Making of American 
Spirituality from Emerson to Oprah (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2005); Matthew A. Sutton, Aimee Semple McPherson and the 
Resurrection of Christian America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Barbara Savage, Your Spirits Walks Beside Us: 
The Politics of Black Religion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Lila Corwin Berman, Speaking of Jews: Rabbis, 
Intellectuals, and the Creation of an American Public Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Joseph Kip Kosek, 
Acts of Conscience: Christian Nonviolence and Modern American Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Tisa 
Wenger, We Have a Religion: The 1920s Pueblo Indian Dance Controversy and American Religious Freedom (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2009); Sharon Davies, Rising Road: A True Tale of Love, Race, and Religion in America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010); Kathryn Lofton, Oprah: Gospel of an Icon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); 
Edward Blum and Paul Harvey, The Color of Christ: The Son of God and the Saga of Race in America (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2012). 
23 On religion and the Cold War, see: Andrew J. Rotter, “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and US-
South Asian Relations, 1947-1954, Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (2000): 593-613; Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in 
Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); 
David S. Fogelsong, The American Mission and the ‘Evil’ Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); William 
Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008); Jeremy Gunn, Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging of an American National Religion (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 2009); Jonathan Herzog, The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America’s Religious Battle Against Communism in the Early 
Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in 
American War and Diplomacy (New York: Knopf, 2012), 411-496.  
24 E.g.: Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002); Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Women’s Crusade (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005); Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009); Daniel Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sun Belt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of 
Evangelical Conservatism (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2012); Elesha Coffman, The Christian Century and the Rise of the 
Protestant Mainline (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Matthew Hedstrom, The Rise of Liberal Religion: Book 
Culture and American Spirituality in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
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religion and politics in the United States and belies the role government has played in sanctioning 
some forms and types of religion over others.25 In a comparable vein, even the work attending to 
religious pluralism tends to examine ecumenical efforts outside governmental purview.26 Hence 
although religion structures personal decisions and private lives, the state’s participation in evolving 
religious identities and affiliations remains underdeveloped.27 
Current work on modern state formation has produced fruitful and illuminating studies of 
sexuality, law, and war.28 A tremendous volume of scholarship on citizenship has likewise explored 
contours of race, gender, and class but generally ignores religion as constitutive of or implanted in 
citizenship, politics, and state administration.29 To the extent that historians have parsed religion in 
                                                
25 Scholars of law and religion have been more attentive to the issue of government preferences. See: Shawn 
Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights Revolution (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2002); Winnifred Sullvan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Kent 
Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Winnifred 
Sullivan, Prison Religion: Faith-Based Reform and the Constitution (Princeton: Princeton: University Press, 2009); Sarah 
Barringer Gordon, The Spirit of the Law: Religious Voices and the Constitution in Modern America (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010); Kathleen Holscher, Religious Lessons: Catholic Sisters and the Captured Schools Crisis in New Mexico 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
26 A good example is Kevin Schultz, Tri-Faith America: How Catholics and Jews Held Postwar America to Its Protestant 
Promise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Although the latter half of the book parses sites like courtrooms and 
the census, state formation is not a central component of the argument. 
27 As Brian Balogh argued in 2003, the state is most present in work on gender, race and ethnicity, the 
American West and the environment. Since then, work on the state’s role in labor, business, and capitalism has increased 
as well. Balogh, “The State of the State Among Historians,” Social Science History 27, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 455-63. 
28 Margot Canady, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009); James Sparrow, The Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011); Joanna L. Grisinger, The Unwieldy American State: Administrative Politics Since the New Deal 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Much of this work builds on American Political Development, a 
political science subfield focused on institutional change and development. As Julian Zelizer has argued, a key 
foundational text in the history of the state development is Stephen Skowronek’s Building a New American State: The 
Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). See: Zelizer, 
“Stephen Skowronek’s Building a New American State and the Origins of American Political Development,” Social Science 
History 27, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 425-41. On the legal origins of the regulatory state, see William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: 
Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).   
29 Over the past decade, the literature on the making of the modern United States and the modern American 
citizenship has proliferated. See, for example: Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation on the Twentieth Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Nancy Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2002); Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002); Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar 
America (New York: Knopf, 2003); Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic 
Citizenship in Twentieth Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Jennifer Klein, For All These Rights: 
Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America's Public-Private Welfare State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Meg 
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the military, state administration fades from view.30 Work on the military chaplaincy tends to 
examine the experiences of particular religious groups or specific wars.31 Yet citizenship required 
men to defend the nation, and military service demanded that Americans live, fight, and worship 
with men from a variety of backgrounds and faiths. The obligations of citizenship thereby required 
men to experience religious difference within the nation. And because the military, like religion itself, 
is at once local and global, compulsory military service on occasion also produced encounters 
between Americans and less familiar religions abroad. In these ways, religion was bound up with the 
rights and responsibilities of citizenship within the modern state.  
The military proved to be an ideal lab for the state to experiment with religion. While the 
chaplaincy was not new in 1917,32 the demographics of the nation it served and the reach of its 
efforts changed significantly with the United States’ entrance into World War I. Over the next half-
century, restrictive immigration policies limited the arrival of outsiders while the draft brought 
                                                                                                                                                       
Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); 
Sarah Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2007). One exception that considers religion and citizenship is Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I 
and the Making of the Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
30 Anne Loveland, American Evangelicals and the U.S. Military, 1942-1993 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1996); Christopher Sterba, Good Americans: Italian and Jewish Immigrants During the First World War (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Jonathan H. Ebel, Faith in the Fight: Religion and the American Soldiers in the Great War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).  
31 Studies of chaplains from particular religious groups include Donald Crosby, Battlefield Chaplains: Catholic 
Priests in World War II (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994) and Albert Isaac Slomovitz, The Fighting Rabbis: Jewish 
Military Chaplains and American History (New York: New York University Press, 1999). Studies of chaplains during 
particular wars include Lyle W. Dorsett, Serving God and Country: United States Military Chaplains in World War II (New 
York: Berkley Books, 2012) and Jacqueline E. Whitt, Bringing God to Men: American Military Chaplains and the Vietnam War 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). There are also organizational and sociological studies of the 
chaplaincy such as Richard Budd, Serving Two Masters: The Development of the American Military Chaplaincy, 1860-1920 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002) and Kim Hansen, Military Chaplains and Religious Diversity (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Deborah Dash Moore’s G.I. Jews: How World War II Changed a Generation (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2004) discusses chaplains and demonstrates how the military influenced religious identities but not how 
religion transformed the state. 
32 There have been military chaplains in the United States since the American Revolution. For histories of the 
early chaplaincy, see Budd, Serving Two Masters; Clifford Drury, History of the Chaplain Corps US Navy, 1778-1939, Vol. 1 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948); Roy J. Honeywell, Chaplains of the United States Army (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1958); Parker C. Thompson, From Its European Antecedents to 1791: The United States 
Army Chaplaincy, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978); Herman A. Norton, Struggling for 
Recognition: The United States Army Chaplaincy, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977). 
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together Americans from an array of class, ethnic, religious, and, after 1948, racial backgrounds. This 
era also witnessed two significant debates about pacifism and religion, in the 1930s and 1960s, both 
of which challenged the validity of military interventions abroad. Mid-twentieth-century Americans 
also confronted two major ideologies—Nazism and Communism—in conflict with democracy and 
opposed to religion.  
“God, War, and Politics” argues that the state actively managed religious groups and shaped 
the religious experiences of the men under its control. It re-periodizes the political history of 
American religion by showing that this state project began in earnest during World War I and 
continued to evolve over the twentieth century. During this time, the military operated 
simultaneously on local, national, and global scales, and military chaplains presided over religion in 
tight, closed quarters continually touched by defensive and imperial contact with difference. Thus 
“God, War, and Politics” identifies how a multi-religious military chaplaincy built a multi-religious 
nation over six decades of the twentieth century through three intersecting and interlocking stories.  
This is a story of religious change over the twentieth century. When the United States 
entered World War I, its chaplaincy corps consisted of Protestants and Catholics. The Protestants in 
uniform affiliated exclusively with mainline denominations. They were Baptists (North and South), 
Congregationalists, Disciples of Christ, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Methodists (AME, North, and 
South), and Presbyterians. Mid-war Congressional legislation enabled Christian Scientists, the 
Eastern Orthodox, Jews, Mormons, and the Salvation Army to accept military commissions. Over 
the twentieth century, the diversity of denominations and religions continued to increase, propelled 
by Americans who wanted the state to recognize their clergy as legitimate religious representatives of 
the nation. By the end of the World War II, quotas for military chaplains delineated numbers for 38 
denominations. An additional “miscellaneous” category offered positions to 31 more groups, 
primarily representing evangelical, fundamentalist, and charismatic Protestants. Although the armed 
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forces did not acquire its first Muslim, Buddhist, and Hindu chaplains until the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries, the chaplaincies nevertheless grappled with how to serve personnel from 
these faiths beginning in World War II and throughout the postwar period. 
It is also a story of state regulation, albeit regulation of an arena rarely considered within 
government purview: religion. The regulatory state could operate directly and indirectly, and the 
military afforded the opportunity for both. The state set parameters for religion in the armed forces 
through standards, policies, and operating procedures that framed the chaplaincy’s dimensions. In 
turn, these requirements exerted indirect pressure on religions and denominations to conform to 
guidelines—or, at times, to bend and stretch to meet them while advocating changing them. In this 
sense, the military attracted religions through both carrot and stick. It beckoned with possibilities—
to serve one’s country, to reach young men, to be recognized as legitimate, to imprint God on 
nation, and to access state power. (And, in the case of proselytizing faiths, to acquire souls.) For 
many denominations and religions, the military represented an irresistible opportunity. But as a 
coercive institution, the military also demanded adherence to specific norms—by soldiers, by 
officers, by chaplains, and, ultimately, by religion too. And each new inclusion, whether religious, 
racial, or gendered, yielded additional exclusions and limits. The military could force many things: it 
acted with force, it took with force, it claimed with force, and it ruled with force. But it could not 
force faith. It could, however, strongly encourage and build structures to fortify faith, and that it did. 
Finally, it is a story of faith—of faith in God and faith in country as well as faith in law and 
constitutional promises. At times, these instincts harmonized and at times they conflicted. It is, 
therefore, a story about the trials of faith: the challenge of adhering to religious faith in secular space, 
the trouble of retaining faith in inconsistent institutions, and the difficulty of equitably managing 
multiple faiths in a constitutional system that tries to separate religion and the state. Strains of 
resistance were common, but rarely uniform in voice or goal. Some religious groups, like Adventists, 
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objected to any valence of state religion, while others, such as evangelical Protestants, were 
frustrated by insufficiently militant faith. At the same time, onetime stalwarts of the chaplaincy, such 
as mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, reconsidered the comingling of the sword and the spirit 
during Vietnam.  
The dissertation moves from World War I through the end of the Vietnam War and the 
abolition of the draft in three parts. Part I, God, examines World War I through the 1930s. Chapter 
1, “Mobilizing Faith: World War I and the Emergence of the Modern Chaplaincy,” focuses on the 
military’s consolidation of ethnicity into three faith groups—Protestantism, Catholicism, and 
Judaism—and initial attempts to cultivate moral monotheism. Chapter 2, “‘Christ is the Melting Pot 
for All Our Differences’: Interwar Visions, Alliances, and Experiments,” examines the military’s 
ongoing efforts to use moral monotheism to define ideals of religious pluralism and set limits for 
religion within the armed forces.  
Part II, War, revolves around the experiences of chaplains in World War II through the 
Korean War. Chapter 3, “The Gospel of Chaplain Jim: Boundaries of Religious Citizenship in the 
Warfare State,” underscores the importance of religion to the state’s wartime project while 
juxtaposing the rhetoric of national pluralism with the reality of its clear racial and religious limits. 
Chapter 4, “A Global God: The Military-Spiritual Complex in a Covenant Nation,” highlights the 
central role religion played in shaping American identities and worldviews as the United States 
became a global power in the early postwar period.  
Part III, Politics, probes religion, protest, and political change during the Cold War and the 
Vietnam War. Chapter 5, “‘Maybe God is an American’: Governing Religion Through the Cold War 
Chaplaincy,” concentrates on the military’s response to friction between religious groups seeking 
validation as American faiths and highlights how foreign policy, rather than domestic pressure, 
propelled attention to Buddhism. Chapter 6, “Claiming Conscience: Moral Objection and Religious 
 16 
Obligation in the Vietnam War,” demonstrates how moral turmoil over the Vietnam War reordered 
the relationship between religious groups and the state, redefined the meaning and role of religion, 
and reshaped the religious politics of the nation.  
Undoubtedly a state religious project, the military chaplaincy was also a political project, 
invested and intertwined with domestic life and foreign affairs. From a constitutional perspective, 
the long shadow of establishment hovered over the chaplaincy; yet the greater challenge lay in the 
more quotidian effort to enable daily free exercise.33 “God, War, and Politics” probes the processes, 
conflicts, and exchanges through which the military chaplaincy transformed the politics and culture 
of American religion. It therefore renders the obvious visible, showing that interaction between 
religion and state is not only regular, but vigorous, dynamic, and powerful. 
 
                                                
33 The first legal challenge to the chaplaincy did not arise until the late twentieth century in Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 
F.2d 223, 337 (2nd Cir. 1985). The court held that the chaplaincy passed constitutional muster. For an analysis of the case 
and its legacy, see Richard D. Rosen, “Katcoff v. Marsh at Twenty-Two: The Military Chaplaincy and the Separation of 
Church and Sate,” University of Toledo Law Review 38, no. 1137 (2007). As will be discussed in chapter 6, the Supreme 
Court discussed and sanctioned the constitutionality of the chaplaincy in Abington v. Schemmp (1963). 
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CHAPTER 1 
Mobilizing Faith:  
World War I and the Emergence of the Modern Chaplaincy 
 
Joseph H. Odell’s career took many turns. He was a minister by training, an education 
reformer by conviction, and a writer by trade. In 1917-18, these roles merged: the former army 
chaplain traversed the United States as a war correspondent to inspect the environment in and 
around War Department outposts. Along the way, he attended “the most remarkable meeting.” He 
had stopped by a number of army camps, forts, and cantonments by the time he reached Atlanta in 
November 1917, generally impressed by what he had encountered. But he showed up in the South 
expecting to be disappointed. Fort McPherson and Camp Gordon, four and fourteen miles away 
from city center, respectively, housed high percentages of foreign-born men, black men, and 
illiterate southern white men.1 The combination appeared more combustible than placid, more 
prone to problems than collaborative. Yet when Odell spoke with soldiers and attended the weekly 
meeting of the executive board of the local Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA), he 
was taken aback. As he reported first to readers of The Outlook, a liberal religious weekly that 
supported the war effort, and then to other national and local papers that reprinted his column, in 
Atlanta he unexpectedly discovered “a unique spirit of cooperation.”2 
                                                
1 John Dittmer, Black Georgia in the Progressive Era, 1900-1920 (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 
1977), 12-3, 123-31, 194-7; Nancy Gentile Ford, Americans All! Foreign-Born Soldiers in World War I (College Station, TX: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 67-87. 
2 Joseph H. Odell, “Making Democracy Safe for the Soldier: An Account of What Atlanta, Georgia is Doing 
for a Cantonment,” The Outlook, November 28, 1917. The Outlook started as The Christian Union, under the editorial 
leadership of Henry Ward Beecher, in 1870. Lyman Abbott became co-editor in 1876, editor in 1881, and renamed the 
weekly magazine The Outlook in 1893. Abbott was progressive, dedicated to social reform and a supporter of evolution.  
The Outlook’s advocacy of military preparedness led to Abbott’s expulsion from the American Peace Society in 1913. 
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Odell heard the CTCA leaders report on the past week’s activities and outline plans for the 
future: Atlanta women mended soldiers’ clothing, organized a glee club, and planned a Christmas 
pageant, the Transportation Committee furnished automobiles for sick soldiers, and the 
Entertainment Committee arranged for concerts and readings. The Federated Women’s Club taught 
men how to sew and the Daughters of the American Revolution taught black women to knit. The 
Hebrew Association and the Knights of Columbus lauded the Young Men’s Christian Association 
for lending them space for their services, dances, and lectures.3 Odell was far from objective. He was 
undoubtedly a booster for the moral, religious, and educational work of the War Department and its 
affiliated civilian entities. He appreciated the quotidian integration of religion into military order, 
remarking that “there is nothing remote or separate or esoteric about this religion; it fits into the 
order of the day as naturally as the meals in the mess-room; it interweaves itself with the common 
occupations of his leisure hours.”4 His reportage also showed—whether or not he recognized it—
that endeavors supporting the religious and moral welfare of soldiers could be coercive, patronizing, 
and authoritarian. But he was correct to express wonder at the “common sense” efforts to de-
emphasize difference among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. 
After all, early twentieth-century Atlanta was not the most obvious place to witness this type 
of interreligious coordination and fledgling, if condescending, multiethnic and multiracial  
discussions. Eleven years before Odell’s visit, racial violence erupted in the southern boom town as 
the gubernatorial candidates debated how to disenfranchise black men and newspaper headlines 
alleged black violence against white women. Four days of street violence destroyed black bodies and 
black businesses. While nascent conversations between white and black elites emerged in the wake 
of the 1906 Atlanta Race Riot, racial tension did not dissipate. The city remained heavily segregated, 
                                                
3 Joseph H. Odell, “Making Democracy Safe for the Soldier.”  
4 Joseph H. Odell, The New Spirit of the New Army: A Message to the “Service-Flag” Homes (New York: Fleming H. 
Revell Company, 1918), 23. 
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and overtly racist legislation entrenched Jim Crow policies. Even as African Americans comprised 
almost one-third of the population, they had few avenues to political power in a city controlled by a 
ward system dominated by working-class white supremacist politicians. By late 1915, the Ku Klux 
Klan re-emerged on a ridge outside Atlanta, and capacity crowds broke attendance records at the 
opening of the racist movie Birth of a Nation.5 Religious minorities faced less hostility than the city’s 
African Americans, but as the rejuvenation of the Klan suggests, Atlanta did not welcome Jews and 
Catholics. The 1915 lynching of Leo Frank—a B’nai Brith president and factory manager falsely 
accused and convicted of the murder of Mary Phagan—weighed heavily on the city’s Jewish 
population, many of whom fled from the area after the hanging.6 Catholics, despite comprising a 
small population in a largely Protestant city, still faced the Klan’s wrath. Despite these racial and 
religious tensions plaguing Atlanta, the war years provided an opportunity to work together to meet 
the needs of men sent to local training camps.  
Listening to the reports of Atlantans’ service in heavily-immigrant and segregated but 
multiracial army posts compelled Reverend Odell to volunteer a war story of his own, or at least one 
he had recently read. The setting was the June 1917 Battle of Messines Ridge, a major British 
offensive that successfully recaptured a Belgian strategic outlook from German hands at the cost of 
about 25,000 Allied lives. There, about three miles from the French border, he told the Atlanta 
volunteers, “a Catholic soldier lay dying, blown almost to pieces by a bomb. No Catholic chaplain 
happened to be near, and no Protestant chaplain was available; but a Hebrew rabbi, acting as a 
chaplain to the Jewish troops, bent over the dying Catholic and held the crucifix to his lips while he 
breathed his last.” The committee members listened to Odell in captivated silence, then applauded 
                                                
5 John Dittmer, Black Georgia in the Progressive Era, 1900-1920 (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 
1977), 12-3, 123-31, 185-6. 
6 On the Leo Frank case, see: Leonard Dinnerstein, The Leo Frank Case (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1968) and Steve Oney, And the Dead Shall Rise: The Murder of Mary Phagan and the Lynching of Leo Frank (New York: 
Pantheon, 2003). 
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in unison. They too valued “religious comity,” expressing it in their service to soldiers and their 
response to Odell’s vignette. That the story was of British origin, as only a trickle of American 
soldiers and chaplains had arrived in Europe by the early June battle, mattered little. It reflected 
American values and war priorities. As Odell reassured his readers, “some of the by-products of this 
war may be worth all the sacrifices of men, money, and strength we are making so freely.”7 
Odell joined a small but growing chorus of chaplains and military officers who viewed 
religious cooperation as an important and positive consequence of the United States’ participation in 
World War I. Lee Levinger, a rabbi who served as a chaplain with the American Expeditionary 
Force (AEF) in France, returned from Europe extolling the virtues of an ecumenical chaplains 
corps. “Religious unity,” he insisted, and “cooperation between the denominations, is more than a 
far-off ideal. We know…just how it deepens and broadens the religious spirit in both chaplain and 
soldier.”8 In his final report on the war, General John Pershing agreed, “Chaplains, as never before, 
became the moral and spiritual leaders of their organizations, and established a high standard of 
active usefulness in religious work that made for patriotism, discipline, and unselfish devotion to 
duty.”9 Pershing’s casual intermingling of religious and moral work was typical, for the separation 
between them was blurry—in both civilian and military life. 
Immediately after President Woodrow Wilson declared war and prepared for the first-ever 
nationwide draft, he and Secretary of War Newton Baker received a torrent of letters from 
concerned citizens. They worried not about the prospect of death or the righteousness of the cause 
but about the temptations of vice—alcohol, prostitution, gambling—and the scourge of impure 
                                                
7 Joseph Henry Odell, The New Spirit of the New Army: A Message to the “Service-Flag” Homes (New York: Fleming 
H. Revell Company, 1918), 103-5. 
8 Lee Levinger, “Christian and Jew at the Front,” The Biblical World 53, no. 5 (September 1919): 477. 
9 John Pershing, Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces 
(Washington: GPO, 1920), 93. 
 
 
 21 
behavior reputed to fester at military encampments.10 Within two weeks of entering the war, the 
federal government created the Commission on Training Camp Activities to organize recreation and 
entertainment provided for soldiers and, implicitly, to oversee the behavior of newly drafted men. 
Led by Raymond Fosdick, a noted urban reformer and brother of the leading liberal minister Harry 
Emerson Fosdick, the CTCA pledged to maintain moral purity and discharge virtuous, unstained 
men back to their home communities. As Wilson wrote, the organization “represented the 
government and the government’s solicitude that the moral and spiritual resources of the nation 
should be mobilized behind the troops.”11  
While the CTCA directed men’s eyes away from liquor, ladies of the night, and card games 
toward wholesome athletics, uplifting shows, and clean magazines, the military also began to build a 
robust religious program of its own. By war’s end, as Pershing indicated, religion had become a clear 
aid to the nation’s success, a crucial weapon in the U.S. military’s arsenal. But at war’s beginning, this 
conclusion could not be anticipated.  
In April 1917, the religious division of the United States military, the chaplaincy, contained 
just 146 Army chaplains and 40 Navy chaplains. As such, it was ill-prepared to serve the millions of 
Americans, many of whom were recent immigrants, about to be called into service. Over the course 
of the war, the Army’s total population increased 1700 percent, from a little over 200,000 available 
men to more than 3.5 million, while the Navy expanded from about 95,000 men to 533,000 men and 
women.12 The chaplaincy multiplied as well, with the Army reaching 2230 military ministers and the 
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Navy chaplaincy quintupling to 201.13 These changes reflected more than simple numerical 
proliferation; they indicated the state’s interest in providing soldiers with regular and effortless 
access to religion. As Joseph Odell reminded his readers, “A man can work in a mill or factory for a 
lifetime and never see an authorized representative of Christianity about the plant; in the army the 
chaplain is one of his officers.”14 By commissioning chaplains, the state insisted on religion as an 
essential component of the military; by making chaplains officers, the state vested clergy with 
authority and power. As the numbers of chaplains rapidly escalated, the need to regulate the 
appointments, deployment, and activities of military clergy intensified. 
While World War I precipitated the rapid development and restructuring of the military 
chaplaincy, quick growth and effective management did not come hand in hand. Despite the surge 
of chaplains commissioned to serve at home and on the western front, the quickly ballooning 
number of clergy available for battle did not reflect a particularly organized approach to wartime 
religious service. As the war began in earnest for Americans, soldiers in the United States 
encountered official military chaplains, CTCA war workers, and civilian camp pastors at posts and in 
ports. For spiritual comfort and ritual guidance abroad, AEF soldiers could turn to a commissioned 
military chaplain or to any number of civilian religious clergy—Red Cross chaplains, Young Men’s 
Christian Association (YMCA) ministers, Knights of Columbus priests, Salvation Army “lassies,” or 
Jewish Welfare Board war workers—who made their way to France to assist American troops.15 
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Access to religious services abounded, but inefficiency and insufficient oversight troubled military 
leaders who preferred more controlled approach to religious provision and supervision. Over the 
eighteen months of active American participation in the Great War, the state mobilized faith to 
sustain its martial goals.  
As the institutional locus of military religion, the chaplaincy offered a venue through which 
the state encouraged belief in one God, regulated ritual and moral behavior, and stimulated 
belonging to the American nation. Invigorating the chaplaincy demanded more than simply 
requisitioning additional chaplains. Building a chaplaincy suitable to the new American fighting 
forces—larger and more diverse than ever before—demanded altering the contours of the 
chaplaincy: who the military commissioned as chaplains and what expectations the military held for 
its religious officers. In delineating education requirements for chaplains, privileging non-
denominational religion, and foregrounding morality, the military began to cultivate an ethos of 
moral monotheism. This principle, which stressed a belief in one God and respectable conduct over 
religious particularity, allowed the state to streamline its diverse and ethnically fragmented citizenry 
into larger, more manageable groups. It also created a guide for religious decision-making within the 
confines of the Army and Navy and helped set boundaries of acceptable religious accommodation. 
Even as the state attempted to distance itself from religious particularity, disputes, and discord, 
however, it could not remain isolated from religious schism and racial strife. As minority religious 
groups—Christian and Jewish, white and black—lobbied for inclusion in the chaplaincy and 
arrangements for their soldiers, the military erected new standards of American religion by holding 
fast to a strongly held but unarticulated commitment to moral monotheism.  
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Drafting Men, Demarcating Religion 
Across the nation on June 5, 1917, ten million young men arrived at city halls, post offices, 
high schools, and public libraries to register for the draft. Passed barely a month earlier, the Selective 
Service Act of 1917 required American men between 21 and 31 to present themselves, complete 
questionnaires, and await classification by local draft boards. Introduced and celebrated by parades 
and festivals in many towns, this new ritual of registration asked young men to supply information 
and tick the boxes on Form 1001 to classify themselves as fitting into one of five groups that would 
separate the draftable from the exempt. Aside from names and addresses, additional sections 
collected information about schooling, employment history, military experience, language abilities, 
criminal history, physical fitness and deficiencies, and citizenship.  
Military manpower needs were vast, but regulations distinguished husbands and fathers from 
single men; the former registered and earned exemptions to protect their families while the latter 
garnered trips to newly created army camps, naval stations, and, in 2 million cases, overseas. Those 
with supporting affidavits could claim exemptions for working as legislative, executive, or judicial 
officers, being ministers or divinity students, holding religious conviction against war, engaging in 
industrial or agricultural enterprise necessary for the war effort, or caring for a number of 
dependents. Immigrants and resident aliens, technically eligible for military service only if they 
intended to make the United States their permanent home, nonetheless endured further scrutiny 
about their loyalty, language use, and legitimacy. Local draft boards received nationally identifiable, if 
not exactly standardized, draft cards containing registrants’ names, addresses, birth dates, citizenship 
status, occupations, marital status, and physical appearances. “Few programs,” John Chambers has 
written, “could coincide better with the progressive era’s emphasis upon social efficiency than this 
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idea of classifying much of the nation’s manpower.”16 
This categorization of more than 24 million young American men determined who served, 
where they served, and how they served their nation in war. It sorted conscripts into definable 
categories, organized draftees into units, and systematized the mobilization of manpower. The 
taxonomy was new because military service, historically a volunteer enterprise, had become 
mandatory. Yet leaders and citizens alike reluctantly accepted this new relationship between the state 
and society, between Washington and local communities, between coercion and obligation.17 A small 
but significant number resisted. Even President Woodrow Wilson, who as Commander-in-Chief 
initially preferred offering economic aid and sending only a small number of men to join the Allies, 
capitulated to the need for a national draft mere days before entering the United States into the 
Great War. 
The men who donned army khakis or suited up in navy blues for a war “over there” were a 
varied lot. They were white and black. They hailed from Alabama and New York, California and 
Illinois. They were born in Cleveland and Kielce, Salt Lake City and Salerno. Some had graduated 
from high school, others could barely write their names. Some spoke only in English, while others 
conversed in Polish, Italian, Russian, Yiddish, German, Czech, Norwegian, Spanish, or Japanese. 
Some felt at home on farms, others forged their way in cities. They were rowdy and quiet, skilled 
with rifles and scared of shotguns. They were restless and excited, worried about death and 
determined to return as heroes.18 
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But most of all, they were usually young—sheltered and inexperienced, unaccustomed to 
discipline and unfamiliar with war. Or so the military assumed. As Secretary of War Newton Baker 
asked, “What are those soldiers going to do in the towns, and what are the towns going to do to the 
soldiers?”19 To assuage fears about the men in their care, the CTCA provided entertainment and 
recreation, attempting to keep impressionable new soldiers away from vice. But the CTCA also 
reflected Wilson’s insistence on an organization that operated as a joint venture among Americans 
of all backgrounds: “To cloud it by special denominational self-seeking or by insidious distinctions 
based on religious prejudice would be as unfortunate as it is unjust…the national interest – the 
supreme need of the hour – has brought together in closer union men and women of all 
denominations.”20 Fosdick, an elite social reformer who shared Progressive-era reform credentials 
with Baker, oversaw a civilian agency dedicated to promoting morals in the military. But maintaining 
a non-sectarian moralizing agency was not, however, as easy to do as Wilson asserted.21 
The millions of men who made their way to army camps and naval installations in 1917 and 
1918 arrived with their own sense of moral standards. They may have liked a nightcap or a dance 
with the ladies, but more often than not, they also knew the hard edge of a church pew or the 
rhythm of Sabbath prayer. They entered the military as Presbyterians and Methodists, Episcopalians 
and Baptists, Catholics and Christian Scientists, Jews and Mormons, Unitarians and Disciples of 
Christ. The Selective Service never asked their religious affiliation or preference, except as it 
pertained to exemptions on grounds of conscientious objection. But the military knew its ranks 
consisted of men with diverse religious affiliations—far more diverse than in previous wars.22 Thus 
the CTCA’s moral mission notwithstanding, the Army and Navy also commissioned and employed 
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chaplains as religious leaders within the armed forces. As religious personnel, chaplains oversaw the 
religious lives of soldiers, a task that also included—or could include—moral instruction and 
leadership. In fact, promulgating morality enabled chaplains to eschew religious particularity, or 
pernicious sectarianism, in favor of religious generality, or unity, a war goal unto itself. 
Chaplains represented a very particular type of religious war worker: those vetted and 
approved by the state to perform three specific duties: to “hold appropriate religious services for the 
benefit of the commands to which assigned,” to “perform appropriate burial services,” and to “give 
instruction to the enlisted men in the common English branches of education.”23 While Congress 
had not specifically delegated moral tasks to chaplains, moral instruction nonetheless permeated 
much of their work. As Bishop William Lawrence told the Senate’s Committee on Military Affairs in 
September 1917, the increased size of the military during war demanded more chaplains to support 
“the character—the moral character, as well as the religious sentiment—of the men.”24 In particular, 
chaplains stood as a bulwark against the sexual depravity and venereal disease the military feared 
would infect its corps. Handbooks and reports alike enjoined chaplains to provide social hygiene 
lectures and to teach soldiers and sailors how to avoid venereal disease. Navy chaplain John Frazier, 
who became the first Chief of Chaplains for the Bureau of Navigation, advised his fellow clergy that 
the service drew men from rural areas and small towns who “have not been exposed to the pitfalls 
of seaport cities and consequently are unaware of the dangers, physical and moral, that attend 
association with lewd women.”25 Being a chaplain meant more than saving souls or blessing the 
dead; it required teaching as well as preaching, inspiring as well as inhibiting. 
To ensure that the men dispatched as chaplains were up to the task of serving men across 
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religious faiths and instilling in them moral principles deemed central to the military mission, 
Congress delimited the qualifications for chaplains: a qualified applicant had to be (1) a “regularly 
ordained minister of some religious denomination”; (2) a minister “in good standing” in his 
denomination; “recommended for appointment by some authorized ecclesiastical body”; and (3) 
under 45 years old. In addition, chaplains had to (4) satisfactorily pass the same “moral, mental, and 
physical” exams required of all officers; these exams not only tested knowledge of writing, math, 
geography, and history but allocated points for academic background, theological training, teaching 
qualifications, and pastoral experience. Finally, prospective chaplains also had to submit five letters 
of recommendation from ministers in their denomination attesting to their skills in ministry.26  
These standards represented more than bureaucratic measuring sticks. They epitomized the 
Progressive-Era push toward professionalization, which in turn signified the development of the 
American military as modern institution and heralded an effort by the government to enlist religion 
as an instrument of statecraft and nation-building. The clamor for a well-trained military chaplaincy 
had begun in the early twentieth century when commissioned Navy chaplains sought to improve 
their standing within the military by establishing and enforcing clear standards for the military’s 
religious officers. Army chaplains quickly followed suit, advocating for stiff credential requirements 
as well.27 The timing was not accidental. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, Elihu 
Root—who would win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1912 and instigated the reform of legal education in 
the 1920s—began his five-year tenure as Secretary of War. Serving under Presidents William 
McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, Root focused his attention on modernizing the U.S. Army 
through reorganization, centralization, and education. In particular, officers would undergo 
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continuing education, moving from West Point through postgraduate training courses that 
culminated in classes and degrees coordinated by and offered through the newly established Army 
War College.28  
The impetus toward a professionally-trained officers’ corps echoed the late-nineteenth 
century drive toward standardization, legitimization, and credentialing in a multitude of 
occupations.29 Law, medicine, and religion—historically realms of the educated elite—modernized 
their training significantly in this era. In medicine, the 1910 Flexner Report fundamentally altered the 
training of doctors by consolidating medical schools, eliminating proprietary training schools, 
increasing admissions standards, intensifying clinical experience, and regulating licensing. Lawyers, 
who like doctors had long trained through apprenticeship, began learning in accredited classrooms 
and, as a result of Christopher Columbus Langdell’s innovations at Harvard Law School, took core 
classes that emphasized inductive reasoning through Socratic dialogue.30  
Religion presented a slightly different case, as the imperfect alignment between seminaries 
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and universities both grew and narrowed in the late nineteenth century. On the one hand, academic 
study of religion prospered, attending to both the venerable study of the Bible and embracing fresh 
approaches offered by the scientific (often sociological) study of religion.31 On the other hand, while 
university presidents such as Charles Eliot and William Rainey Harper—himself a biblical scholar—
argued that modern society required better and more diverse training of ministers, leaders of more 
conservative theological seminaries such as Princeton’s Charles Hodge vehemently disagreed. While 
Eliot and Harper, whose roles included the oversight of divinity schools at Harvard and Chicago, 
respectively, viewed non-sectarian (Protestant) theological education as the ideal, seminaries had 
long been the province of specific religions and particular denominations.32 Moreover, charisma and 
dedication had carried many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century evangelical preachers farther into 
successful careers than the scholarship and erudition of classically-trained ministers.33 Late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century seminaries and divinity schools became the proving ground 
and standard bearers for, in the sociological language of H. Richard Niebuhr, status as churches 
rather than cults. But not all religious leaders needed or wanted the sanction or warrant of school.34 
Nevertheless, for Protestants on both sides of the modernist-fundamentalist divide, credentials 
could attest to authority and legitimacy. In this regard, seminaries and theological schools engaged in 
licensing practices more commonly associated with the fields of law and medicine, and by the early 
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twentieth-century, booming new arenas like social work, urban planning, and journalism.35  
Thus starting in World War I, applicants to the Regular Army and Navy chaplaincy had to be 
more than just clergymen; like the rest of the military’s new officer class, they had to demonstrate 
their professional credentials. While Congress would allow exams to serve as proxies for college 
degrees and ordination, in practice—in part by pitching the tests at the level of graduate education—
neither the Army nor the Navy would commission a non-credentialed minister.36 To the 
government, these standards seemed objective and even scientific. They ensured soldiers would 
enjoy the support of qualified, professional clergy but also removed the state from verifying religious 
competence. The checkboxes of age, fitness, and employment status represented clear, 
understandable, and verifiable measurements, albeit qualifications sometimes difficult to meet. 
Indeed, quite a few ministers found themselves needing to lose weight or grow a few inches to 
emerge from medical scrutiny unscathed. And many an applicant failed the physical, for reasons 
ranging from hernias and heart conditions to allergies and sickled feet. The advent of war in 1917 
brought forth more than a few men considered elderly by military policy: ever eager to serve soldiers 
and sailors, more than one thirty-five year old found himself relegated to the Reserves, if not 
rejected altogether. 37 
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The educational benchmarks for chaplains linked the chaplaincy to the modern university in 
two additional and important ways. First, just as “nonsectarianism became a point of orthodoxy 
among education reformers” in the late nineteenth century,38 so too did it become the mantra of the 
chaplaincy in the early twentieth century. Chaplain George Waring (Catholic), the author of one of 
the War Department’s guides to the chaplaincy, told the New York Times “that while a Chaplain 
could not be expected to hold services successfully for denominations other than his own, he could 
always hold a general service…and he should preach such sermons as would be spiritually helpful to 
every one, without discussing dogmatic or controversial doctrines.”39 Not everyone could or would 
abide by this worldview, for framing religion as a common good no matter the form required setting 
aside doctrinal and ritual differences. As a result, the military used educational background as a 
proxy for openness and toleration.  
Second, through the recruitment and commission of well-educated chaplains, the military 
imported the assumptions and ethos of liberal Protestantism central to the modern university: that 
non-dogmatic religion was best, that religious ideas could evolve, that voluntary prayer encouraged 
spiritual development, and that morality and ethics could unify disparate theological creeds.40 These 
ideas permeated the mission of the Chaplain Schools, the space in which the military attempted to 
shape the chaplains’ future work among troops. As Episcopalian Bishop Charles Brent described it, 
“we feel that there must be a distinctly religious atmosphere, where ‘interdenominationalism’ will be 
the watchword, so that no one will be subjected to the proselyting spirit.”41 Of course, not everyone 
liked this interdenominational effort. When Monsignor James Connolly, the Military Vicar of the 
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Catholic Church, disparaged GHQ Chaplain Francis Doherty (Catholic) as “altogether too military 
and YMCA and not enough sacerdotal to suit me,” he illuminated the tension between the expansive 
and non-specific religion favored by the military and the more distinct and rigorous religion 
preferred by many religious groups.42 Both Doherty and Connolly were Catholic, but the military 
expressed a clear preference for Doherty’s catholic Catholicism, much to the dismay of more 
parochial officials in the Church. Moreover, even after philosopher John Dewey argued that religion 
and ethics could be disentangled, the military assumed a tight link between religion and morality, 
seeing the former as the latter’s foundation.43  
The emphasis on professionalization underscored the military chaplaincy’s adoption of the 
framework of the Progressive-Era regulatory state, with its combined focus on social efficiency and 
social control. Specifying age limits, professional standing, education credentials, health standards, 
and civilian endorsement likewise appeared objective: a set checklist of competencies that candidates 
either achieved or missed. Reality, however, was different. 
What, for example, did it mean to be a “regularly ordained minister”? Congressional 
legislation about chaplains did not define the phrase, and ordination standards for the ministry 
varied wildly among denominations and religions. Because clergy earned automatic exemptions from 
the draft, the Selective Service guidelines—created by Congress at the same time the chaplaincy 
expanded during war—offered some parameters. The Selective Service recognized two types of 
ministers as eligible for draft immunity: those who were “duly ordained ministers of religion” and 
those who were “regular ministers of religion.” In many ways, the two were quite similar: both 
engaged in preaching and teaching as their “customary vocation.” Formal ordination and the 
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administration of sacred rites separated the former from simple recognition as ministers held by the 
latter. Distinguishing between two types of ministry hinted at some differences among American 
religious groups. The government officially acknowledged that not all religions require or even allow 
for ordination even as it missed that those same religions could include ceremonies and rites 
administered by non-ordained leaders. In the end, however, the Selective Service did not care 
whether a religious group expected their ministers to experience a call to serve or to graduate from 
licensed seminaries. What mattered most was the daily work of worship, sermons, instruction, and 
rituals.44 
Education requirements restricted the Selective Service’s more lax definition, but the military 
nevertheless embraced the standard of “customary vocation.” When applicants indicated that they 
also stood on an assembly line or sowed fields or taught in high school, they received rejections.45 
The required civilian endorsement ensured that the military—and by extension, the state—would 
not render decisions on the religiosity of any particular individual. Instead, denominational bodies 
determined the spiritual aptitude and eligibility of their clerics. Yet education and professional 
standing requirements nonetheless meant that the state preferred and sanctioned some forms of 
ministry over others. In practice, these requirements forced civilian religious organizations to sift 
through candidates using metrics they may not have otherwise applied or to lobby for 
accommodations.  
Protestants were by far the most variegated religious group recognized—and clustered 
together—by the military. By the early twentieth century, a number of Protestants had gathered 
together to overcome acrimony and unite in pursuit of social reform. When thirty Protestant 
denominations met at the Interchurch Conference on Federation in 1905, their focus was on 
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ameliorating gruesome working conditions, not engaging with the chaplaincy. The Federal Council 
of Churches (FCC) emerged in 1908 to cooperate in the promotion of Christian fellowship, unity, 
service, and influence in the United States. However, it became the most significant (though not 
exclusive) vehicle for Protestant engagement with the military chaplaincy during World War I.46  
In 1917, the FCC’s constituent denominations met with other interdenominational groups 
such as the YMCA and the American Bible Society to create the General War-Time Commission of 
the Churches as a “temporary and emergency body” devoted to coordinated religious war work. 
Dedicated to providing the “ministrations of religion” to the men and women “suddenly taken from 
their accustomed surroundings and plunged into an unfamiliar life,” to engaging churches and 
congregations in supporting a more far-reaching ministry, and to “Christianize the ideals of the 
nation and so to promote that consciousness of the world-wide brotherhood without which true 
democracy is impossible.” This lofty rhetoric connecting Christianity to democracy meshed well 
with Wilsonian ideals of making the world safe for democracy. Yet the General War-Time 
Commission’s work more often lay in the mundane and everyday tasks of surveying manpower 
needs, distributing pamphlets, building chapels, restricting liquor sales, allocating automobiles, and 
facilitating communication between war workers. If the work was often routine, it nevertheless 
opened access to state power. Its secretaries regularly met with War Department officials, its 
subcommittees studied servicemen’s morals and morale, and its leaders reviewed and assessed 
applications from clergy interested in ministering to the armed forces.47  
The collaboration between the military and civilian religious groups such as the FCC 
reflected the state’s commitment to civilian participation in the war effort. When civilian religious 
groups vetted applicants to the chaplaincy, relayed ritual objects such as Bibles and holiday foods to 
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soldiers, and funneled money to chaplains through discretionary funds, they participated in a 
burgeoning government-industry-citizen operational matrix. Much as a civilian Secretary of War 
oversaw the planning and action of military generals, so too did civilian religious groups seek to 
influence the moral and spiritual work of the army and navy. But just as Newton Baker initially 
resisted the creation of the War Industries Board to oversee wartime production and stem labor 
disputes, so too did he, together with General John Pershing, limit the oversight allowed to the FCC, 
the National Catholic War Council, and the Jewish Welfare Board.48 These organizations had access 
to the ear of military officials and played a significant role in endorsing chaplains, but once chaplains 
earned commissions in the service, their allegiance turned to the state and its servicemen, not the 
churches and associations that had ordained and recommended them.  
Yet in screening and approving chaplains, civilian religious groups sometimes altered the 
military more than either party might have anticipated. From its inception, the FCC attempted to 
institutionalize inclusion by incorporating African-American church bodies in its membership. It was 
a fraught arrangement, as African-American representatives operated under the aegis of white 
organizational executives. Nevertheless, it allowed black churches to leverage the power of the FCC 
to secure positions for black chaplains.  
The FCC’s Committee on Negro Churches began discussing the prospects for black 
chaplains in October 1917, six months after the United States entered the war. By then the group 
knew that war would not overcome or lessen the segregationist policies of the state. The African 
Americans who served their country in the war would not serve as equals to white soldiers, either in 
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the roles allotted, the status accorded, or the opportunities afforded to them. Prewar military 
preparedness efforts included the cultivation and training of officers, but explicitly prohibited black 
officers from the Reserve Officer Training School in Plattsburgh, New York. Much to the 
consternation of the black community and press, which chafed at the thought of supporting a 
segregationist model, the army sent black officer candidates to Fort Des Moines, Iowa—over 1100 
miles away from the white training school. And this unsatisfactory arrangement emerged only after 
Joel Spingarn, the white Jewish chairman of the NAACP, lobbied Major General Leonard Wood to 
build a training camp for black officers on the promise that he would find 200 willing and able 
candidates.49 Well aware of the harsh realities of a segregated military, the committee focused on 
molding the segregated system to create openings for black leadership within the army and navy. 
The FCC’s committee argued that “the direction of religious and social activities among the negro 
soldiers can be managed most successfully by negroes,” thus contending that whites could not 
effectively oversee either the religious or social lives of black soldiers and sailors.50 In contrast to the 
army and navy, both of which remained skeptical of black capacity for leadership, the FCC’s 
Committee on Negro Churches championed the appointments of black officers as the best men for 
the job, especially in a military opposed to integration. 
With regard to black chaplains, then, the Committee resolved “that there be negro chaplains 
appointed at once to serve…in the same proportion to the number of troops as in the case of white 
chaplains.”51 Their resolution could only go so far. The War Department employed complementary 
racial and religious logics to limit the presence of racially or religiously minority chaplains. The 
approximately 300,000 African-American soldiers in service by the spring of 1918 would have 
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merited several hundred chaplains. But because the men often served in small groups of 50 to 100 
men, the War Department found it easy to exclude them from needing their own chaplain.52 And the 
General War-Time Commission did not complain, even if the Committee on Negro Churches 
advocated for equal treatment. 
Instead, the group focused on opening the chaplaincy to black ministers. Charles H. 
Williams formulated the argument for black chaplains by appealing the military’s strong and 
consistent interest in promoting morale. Williams portrayed white chaplains as “sincere, 
conscientious men” who may have appreciated the problems and challenges faced by black soldiers 
but were, in the end, “unable to influence largely the colored soldiers in a religious sort of way.” In 
contrast, he asserted, “the negro units, particularly the service battalions, that have gone to France 
with the clearest conception of their mission and with the finest spirit, have been those accompanied 
by colored chaplains.”53 The strength of black chaplains rested not only in their ability to rouse and 
motivate their men, but also in their mastery of chaplain training. Indeed, Clyde Armitage, the FCC’s 
Assistant Secretary, confided to his General War-Time Commission counterpart that “while ten out 
of 55 candidates in the last session [of chaplain training school] were rejected as unsuitable for the 
military ministry, the negro candidates who were there were accepted and now in service.”54 
The one hundred percent success rate of African-American chaplain candidates was not 
accidental. Nor did it mean that their absolute numbers were high. While the FCC clamored to send 
African-American ministers to the military, it insisted on scouring the nation for “suitable” men, 
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“those who could handle men well.”55 This was not an easy task, for age limits and education 
requirements set by the War Department eliminated many otherwise viable options. Furthermore, 
the War Department accepted the Congregational, Presbyterian, and Episcopal clergy the committee 
had found but simultaneously expressed a preference for chaplains from “the regular negro 
denominations, especially the National Baptists.”56 But black chaplain candidates successfully 
completed training courses at rates higher than white candidates for one very clear reason: the FCC 
would only offer “the very best” applicants to nation’s armed forces. The financial and human cost 
was high, but Clyde Armitage insisted that the organization “[could] not afford” any other course of 
action, even, he acknowledged, “if it does mean a drain on the ministry and on the faculty of some 
of the better educational institutions.”57 Black chaplains were an aristocracy of sorts, they 
represented African-American sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois’ “talented tenth.” With the appropriate 
education and comportment, they could and would succeed amidst white elites. But obstacles to 
entry—the combination of War Department criteria and white and black Protestant perception of 
excellence—conspired to keep the numbers of black chaplains low. By February 1918, only 10-12 
African-American chaplains, out of set quota of 70, made it into the service. The number expanded 
to 26 by June 1918, and ultimately to 63 by November 1918, a miniscule proportion of the 
thousands of chaplains commissioned to serve the American fighting forces during the war. 
Even as the army accepted the presence of black chaplains, the color line pervaded policy 
decisions. Hence when African-American soldiers served under white officers—either 
commissioned or non-commissioned—the War Department elected to fulfill the predilections of 
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those officers rather than the men they commanded, politely noting that “they [did] not desire to 
place negro chaplains with these [white-led] regiments.”58 This policy did not go unnoticed, but it did 
remain unchallenged by Protestant leaders. Multiple FCC subcommittees agitated for more black 
chaplains, but refused to insist on their placement in units led by white officers. However 
insubstantial numbers did not equate to inconsequential experiences.  
Unacknowledged and perhaps unrecognized at the time, the FCC’s advocacy of African-
American chaplains—whether they reached equal proportion to white chaplains or not—tested the 
War Department’s commitment to segregation and radically altered a tiny sliver of the Jim Crow 
military. The simple fact was that no Chaplain School—neither the training space in the United 
States nor the initiation course in France—was segregated. Chaplains entered the military as officers, 
and black clergy trained aside white clergy, sometimes even supplanting the latter’s efforts. That a 
chaplains’ training school existed at all resulted from the General War-Time Commission’s advocacy 
of a means through which to introduce trained ministers to military life. Moving from Fort Monroe, 
Virginia to Fort Hamilton, New York, and ultimately to Camp Zachary Taylor, Kentucky, the 
domestic school brought together recently commissioned chaplains as well as approved but not yet 
commissioned applicants. Passing the course meant appointments as First Lieutenants while failing 
the course sent men back to civilian pastorates. Ignominious dismissals were not uncommon. One 
white Catholic nominee, for example, earned his dismissal for “not being a good mixer and…being a 
poor preacher.”59 Chaplains who made it to France received further training from a ten-day course 
designed by Bishop Brent intended to ready clergy for battle conditions and life on the front.60 No 
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matter the location—in the United States or in France, in the south or in the north—black and 
white clergy learned how to be chaplains together. 
The tiny quotient of black chaplains thus exerted an outsized impact on the army as an 
institution. Whether they—or military leaders—recognized it, chaplains initiated the glacial, decades-
long process of desegregating the U.S. armed forces. Integrated chaplain schools represented an 
unintended consequence of wartime decision-making in which unanticipated needs and limited 
numbers colluded to make unified training possible and even quietly acceptable. Field-ready 
chaplains became essential while building a separate school for a few black chaplains was 
impractical.61 That black chaplains were ordained ministers helped in immeasurable but 
impressionable ways. Few in number, they represented the well-educated, black religious elite, and 
some of their white liberal religious counterparts were similarly invested in integration. The 
constrained conditions of emergency, the status of religious leaders in American society, and the 
relatively peripheral role chaplains occupied within the military infrastructure created the opening 
through which African Americans slowly began to dismantle segregationist policies within the 
military. The integration of the Chaplain Schools remained limited to the demarcated space of 
Chaplain School; it did not alter the assignments of black chaplains to black units, but it did 
demonstrate that integration would not damage and could simplify and even enhance operations. 
 
Over There: The Chaplains of the American Expeditionary Forces 
In response to the sprawling, decentralized, and uncoordinated nature of the military 
chaplaincy and its concomitant religious welfare organizations in France, General John Pershing 
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asked Episcopalian Bishop Charles Brent to devise a more systematic approach to the provision of 
religion to AEF soldiers. Like many Pershing appointees, Brent was a personal friend with whom 
the general had worked in the Philippines as well as a religious advisor who presided over Pershing’s 
confirmation and comforted him after the death of his family in a 1915 fire.62 Although tapped to 
serve as the bishop of the District of Columbia in 1908, Brent preferred to advise Washington from 
his perch in Manila.63 He served as a trusted confidante to both President Theodore Roosevelt and 
then-Secretary of War William Howard Taft, a position that secured his status as the most politically 
influential bishop of the period.64 Canadian by birth and American by naturalization, Brent worked 
with soldiers and sailors as a civilian minister throughout his career and, in the winter of 1917, 
served as a consultant to the Canadian government on the condition of military posts and war 
production factories in Europe. In Brent, nepotism and merit merged, providing the AEF with a 
well-connected and well-qualified man to craft and manage a new American chaplaincy. But first he 
had to accept the job. 
After the United States entered the war in April 1917, Pershing spoke with Brent about 
handling the chaplains. But neither Brent, who was still shuttling between Britain, the Philippines, 
and the U.S. to fulfill his ministerial obligations, nor the army was ready to create a new chaplaincy 
system. Yet Brent’s activities between spring 1917, when Pershing first approached him, and fall 
1917, when he arrived in France as a special representative of the YMCA, highlight his perspective 
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and worldview on which he would draw as he designed a more orderly army chaplaincy.  
Around the same time Pershing asked Brent to consider an assignment to streamline the 
AEF chaplains, the Bishop of London asked Brent to write and publish a collection of sermons for 
Lent 1918. Written in the Philippines in the summer of 1917, The Mount of Vision reveals Brent’s 
religious ideals as articulated for a British Anglican audience in the midst of war. In “The Wholeness 
of Holiness,” Brent emphasized the importance of and need for church unity and fellowship that 
rejects sectarian influences and promotes understanding. “Holiness,” he proclaimed, “is wholeness 
as applied to God and those made in His image. It is in God's wholeness that our wholeness 
consists. He is all in all. What a rebuke this is to small or sectarian views of God and His purposes!” 
Diversity, rather than similarity, animated Brent’s religious project. Recognized as “one of the 
outstanding pioneers in the modern ecumenical movement,” Brent’s commitment to Christianity 
devoid of division extended beyond rhetoric into practice. As the first Episcopalian bishop in the 
Philippines in 1901, he prohibited his missionaries from proselytizing among Filipino Catholics. The 
religious imperialism at the heart of the missionary enterprise need not threaten the unified church 
for which he longed.65 
As a representative of the YMCA in World War I France, Brent carried with him more than 
the calling of a Protestant organization. The YMCA, like Brent, embodied a particularly ecumenical 
approach to religion rooted in the Progressive-era social gospel. Central to religious life on college 
campuses in the years preceding the war, the “Y” turned away from apologetic evangelism and 
toward muscular Christianity. This new outreach abandoned messages focused on personal belief, 
                                                
65 Charles H. Brent, “The Wholeness of Holiness” in The Mount of Vision (New York: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., 1918), available online, http://anglicanhistory.org/asia/brent/mount/07.html; Eugene Bianchi, “The Ecumenical 
Thought of Bishop Charles Henry Brent,” Church History 33, No. 4 (December 1964): 448-461. In her more recent 
article, “The Theological Discussion Group and Its Impact on American and Ecumenical Theology, 1920-45,” Heather 
Warren classifies Brent as one of the exemplars of first generation ecumenicists, alongside John Mott, William Adams 
Brown, and Marc Boegner. Warren, “The Theological Discussion Group and Its Impact on American and Ecumenical 
Theology, 1920-45,” Church History 62, No. 4 (December 1993): 528-543. On Mott as “the greatest symbol of evangelical 
entanglement with the postwar politics of the state,” see Tyrell, Reforming the World, 198-208 and 242-45. 
 
 
 44 
biblical ideas, and immediate conversion in favor of a mission premised on manliness, moral 
character, and service to others. Character-building, an enterprise the military chaplains would 
embrace under Brent, constituted a significant dimension of the YMCA’s goals. The emphasis on 
work rather than piety, and religion rather than theology, led to “the elimination of hard boundary 
lines between religious groups.” As David Setran observes in his book on the early-twentieth-
century YMCA, “the elevation of character and service over conversion meant that doctrinal 
nuances were left in the background.” Through service activities, college students encountered 
people from a variety of religious backgrounds to the extent that they developed multi-faith service 
initiatives. More importantly, non-evangelical Protestants, non-Protestants, and even non-believers 
participated in activities sponsored by the YMCA. The YMCA actively encouraged this practice.66 
Bishop Brent’s reflections in his notes about the burgeoning prospect of a chaplains’ organization, 
such as his comment that “while the varieties of religious faith are great[,] the…purpose is one,” 
indicated the YMCA’s influence as an incubator of religious unity.67 
Brent saluted the religious collaboration he witnessed in France. In a letter to his sons he 
wrote, “There is a considerable amount of impatience with the rivalry and competition in the 
churches. I myself am of the conviction that if we succeed in reaching a unified world through 
Internationalism and fail to realize a unified church, the future will be pretty hopeless.” Religious 
antagonism had no place in Brent’s worldview; if civil cooperation devoid of its religious counterpart 
rendered the future “hopeless,” Brent toiled to create a hopeful future by crafting an environment in 
which religious cooperation could and would flourish. From his experiences in the YMCA, then, 
Bishop Brent approached the project of chaplain organization from a perspective of ecumenism 
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rather than parochialism, cooperation rather than competition.68 
As eager as Brent was to mold a collaborative religious experience, he also recognized the 
challenges ahead. In mid-December 1917, as he surveyed the conditions in France, he underscored 
the obstacle wartime conditions presented: “When one gets close to the situation it is much more 
difficult…the great thing is to keep one’s idealism alive. This is easier to do at home than 
here….The prospect of a Glorious death pro patria at a distance is far more glorious than when it is 
near at hand.”69 The proximity of death magnified the gravity of crafting a new religious program for 
the military.  
But Brent was undeterred. Though he originally resisted a military commission, he soon 
realized that acquiring military status would ease his work. Never classified as a chaplain, he officially 
served as a major working under the Adjutant General whose sole task was to “put the Chaplain’s 
office and function, as an important military asset, in its right relation to the Army.”70 By early 
January 1918, he began sketching a plan for AEF chaplains by listing the clergy for whom he needed 
to account—old army chaplains, recently appointed army chaplains, Red Cross chaplains, YMCA 
secretaries, Knights of Columbus (KC) chaplains. In sum, he wrote in his diary, “At present [there 
is] no co-ordination between all these moral and spiritual agencies….The Y.M.C.A. cannot + must 
not function as a church – contrary to character + explicit promise. At present no clearinghouse for 
co-ordinating chaplains + Y.M.C.A. activities.”71 Determining a method by which the military and 
civilian agencies such as the YMCA could streamline their services to best fit each organization’s 
mission certainly animated the project for Brent. But he moved quickly to develop a plan that 
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incorporated the services of each of the participating welfare groups and mimicked military 
efficiency and order. Namely, by drawing on the model of British and Canadian chaplains with 
which he was familiar through his YMCA and Canadian consulting work, Brent promoted a 
hierarchy of chaplains within the service. A General Headquarters (GHQ) Staff Chaplains’ Office, 
comprised of three chaplains, would administratively oversee division chaplains who would, in turn, 
manage unit chaplains. The first trio of GHQ chaplains consisted of Brent, representing liturgical 
(high church) Protestants; Paul Moody, a Congregationalist National Guard chaplain and son of 
famed evangelist Dwight Moody representing congregational (low church) Protestants; and Francis 
Doherty, a Catholic regular army chaplain. This configuration ensured that multiple streams of 
Christianity would be present at the highest levels of authority and decisions would have the 
imprimatur, if not the full agreement, of a confederation of clergy.72 
Approved by General Pershing on April 30, 1918 and established through General Order 
No. 66 on May 1, the GHQ Chaplains’ Office managed AEF chaplains and synchronized the work 
of external religious welfare organizations for the duration of the war—in France. Even with this 
somewhat limited scope, the task was formidable. Among the first tasks the GHQ Chaplains 
addressed was simply determining the number of chaplains present in France. As one report stated, 
“No steps had been taken to tabulate the Chaplains already in the American Expeditionary Forces. 
No list existed, and owing to the fact that Chaplains were frequently carried on rosters by their rank 
(First Lieutenant), it was not always immediately possible to find them on the records.”73 Finding out 
first, how many chaplains were present, where they were located, and what denominations they 
represented, and second, the religious composition of units, would allow the GHQ Chaplains to 
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allocate better their most prized resource: chaplains. 
For even as the war progressed and Congress passed legislation to increase the number of 
chaplains, the GHQ suffered from an insufficient number of military clergy. In October 1918, 866 
chaplains were available to serve 2 million American men in France. Instead of one chaplain for 
every 1200 men, as legislation called for, or even the higher ratio of one chaplain for 1800 men, one 
chaplain served about 2300 men. The GHQ Chaplains groused that 255 Catholic, 7 Jewish, and 604 
Protestant chaplains had to suffice when there should have been 566, 30, and 1080 respectively. 
While the GHQ report allowed “it is not felt that more Christian Science or Mormon Chaplains are 
needed,” that sentiment may have reflected exasperation with the perceived narrowness of Christian 
Science and Mormon leaders (who counted as Protestants) than adequate coverage of soldiers’ 
needs.74 
Mormonism and Christian Science represented American-made faiths, traditions born of 
nineteenth-century religious revivals and charismatic leaders that derived from but nonetheless stood 
apart from Protestantism. In 1830, Joseph Smith, Jr. published the Book of Mormon, an epic saga 
translated by Smith into English after he received instructions revealing the location of buried 
golden tablets in Palmyra, NY by the angel Moroni. Whether viewed as fantastic or fraudulent, 
Smith heralded a religion with America as its historic and contemporary epicenter. The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints promised a restoration of the true Church, understood its members 
as God’s Chosen People, and pledged to create the Kingdom of God on earth, in an American 
territory designated by God and told to their current-day prophets as Zion. In text, church structure, 
worship, ritual, and—most famously—the (brief) embrace of plural marriage, the Saints made 
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themselves distinctive, all the while asserting that they embodied true Americanness.75 
Christian Science emerged about a half-century after Mormonism, from the experiences and 
teachings of Mary Baker Eddy in the urbane environs of Boston. Like Joseph Smith, Eddy created 
an updated canon by offering her followers a new scripture—Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures 
(1875)—to read aside the Bible and crafted new, often secret, rituals for her followers to practice. 
While Eddy, unlike Smith, claimed authorship of Science and Health, she also presided over an 
unorthodox blend of belief and ritual, with her emphasis on faith healing and spiritual practice.76 
Christian Science generally appealed to a small subset of white, middle-class Americans in the 
Northeast and neither attracted the level of wrath Mormonism faced nor claimed to be 
archetypically American. But it too incurred suspicion and lingered at the periphery of acceptable 
American religions.77 Thus Mormonism and Christian Science both presented a dilemma to the U.S. 
military: where did they fit in the Protestant-Catholic-Jewish schema used to organize and deploy 
chaplains? Classifying the two religions as Protestant elevated administrative ease over religious 
complexity. But the bureaucratic solution bred discontent, for few Americans viewed—with good 
reason—either Mormon or Christian Science chaplains as merely another shade of Protestant and 
thus accepted them as capable of leading general Protestant worship. It was one thing to allow 
Catholics to help Jews, Jews to help Protestants, and Protestants to help Catholics during war—such 
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overtures acknowledged religious difference while enabling religious service. It was quite another to 
insist that any non-Catholic or non-Jewish religion could be collapsed into Protestantism, for that 
assumed doctrinal, ritual, and theological differences mattered not at all. 
Despite their problematic characterization of Mormonism and Christian Science as 
Protestant, the GHQ Chaplains Office had more immediate supervisory and regulatory concerns to 
handle. The trio of Army chaplains managing the AEF chaplaincy also developed administrative 
procedures through which chaplains would write weekly reports and headquarters could process 
newly arriving chaplains as well as assign and deploy chaplains to the most needed areas.78 As men 
prepared for battle, chaplains preached and led prayer services, moralized and counseled the soldiers 
in their units. As they followed their men into battle, however, their duties changed to providing 
first-aid, comforting the dying, and registering battlefield graves.79 No matter the specific duty, all of 
this work needed to be documented and reviewed, accounted for and appraised.  
Bureaucratic procedures became important not only to improve the management of the 
chaplaincy, but also to improve its stature. As Brent relayed to Father John J. Burke, the head of the 
National Catholic War Council, in September 1918, the Army chaplaincy was a work-in-progress, 
with only 700 chaplains performing the work of 1200. “Owing to the low rank of Chaplains they 
have not that official recognition which is given to other officers with analogous responsibilities,” 
Brent wrote. “I am very far from stressing rank for a Chaplain, except so far as it enables him to fit 
into the Army system and get the proper facilities to perform his duties.”80 Pershing expected his 
officers to accord chaplains respect. To ensure his position was clear, he stated as much in an order 
distributed to all officers: “‘A sympathetic recognition of the chaplain’s duties and responsibilities is 
expected of every officer. It is only through their ready cooperation that he can reach the entire 
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army.’”81  
One way to earn the respect of other officers was to show the demands placed on military 
clergy. And the demands faced by Army chaplains exceeded those of regular clergy. As G. W. 
Weldon reported,  
This life was entirely different. We used tallow candles when we could get them, carried our 
own water, waded through mud, held services in a leaky tent, taught Bible classes in their 
company streets with the sky for shelter, played volley ball with both officers and enlisted 
men, boxed with them, rode horse back with and without a saddle with them, sang with 
them around the piano in the evenings when the days work was done and a lot of other 
things that might seem too trivial to mention. At night I slept in an open tent where I could 
look out at the stars. I hope many prayers slipped out that open tent for I longed to see the 
work of the Lord prosper in my regiment.82  
 
Likewise, when Lewis L. Harney (Christian Scientist) reported on the work of Christian Science 
chaplains, he included excerpts of their letters home. One chaplain disclosed, “We have been 
bombed nearly every night and on Sunday last while reading the service out in the open field to five 
boys, an air fight took place directly over our heads.”83 Chaplain Patrick J. Lydon (Catholic) 
explained to his Catholic superiors that a rolling chapel was unnecessary because celebrating Mass 
became impractical at the front. An attack would preclude holding any service, an open field would 
make them easy targets for an enemy, and the very trees that provided cover in the forest would 
make a mobile chapel unsteady. But these challenges did not impede prayer or group worship: 
“‘When time will permit one can always find some place that will suffice. It may be that one may 
have to use, as I have used, a wrecked chapel, or an old barn or a shed, or maybe an old box in the 
woods, but it reminds one of Bethlehem and it lends an impressiveness to the Holy Sacrifice….what 
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chaplains need more than a chapel is a small Ford truck.’”84 
Rustic conditions and the prospect of trench warfare certainly created a distinct atmosphere 
for religious work, but the environment in which chaplains served differed significantly from their 
home churches in another important way: unlike civilian clergy, military chaplains were responsible 
for men beyond their own denominations. In the words of Chaplain C.C. Bateman (Northern 
Baptist), this meant that “the chaplain [was] a spiritual sportsman [who] could use fishing tackle or 
exercise his use of the Gospel gun as a wing shot.”85 While chaplains did not carry weapons, 
Bateman’s martial metaphor bespoke dexterity, an ability to adapt to new circumstances quickly. 
When Bishop Brent reflected on the developing chaplaincy to Father Burke a couple months before 
the Armistice, he noted, “One of the most gratifying things that we have seen is the spirit of 
fellowship and mutual respect that there is among all the Chaplains. There is no loss of conviction. 
Men are working along their own principles, but the element of controversy is hushed and the one 
thought is, how best to serve the officers and men of the A.E.F. in their supreme trial.”86 
Even as the needs of officers and men varied over the course of the war and in different 
locales, a consistent refrain of fulfilling obligations to all men in novel ways threaded through 
chaplains’ reports. In France, Chaplain S. Arthur Devan (Northern Baptist) helped arrange Saturday 
services for the Jewish soldiers in his regiment. At the end of services, “I always (at their request) 
preached a sermon to them from the [O]ld Testament. It was probably an unusual combination for a 
Protestant clergyman to administer communion from a Catholic Altar after preaching at a Jewish 
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synagogue service – which I often did however, at St. Leonard.”87 In his civilian life as a Protestant 
minister, Devan would rarely have had a reason to address Jews, but as a military chaplain, he 
regularly wrote sermons for them because Jewish soldiers comprised an equal part of his 
multireligious flock. And Protestant rituals, so integral to his life as a clergyman, were just as likely to 
occur in Catholic space as in a tent, a field, or a more customary chapel. Similarly, Chaplain James 
Howard reported that Catholics not only attended his Protestant services but, in contrast to dicta 
from the Church to avoid interfaith activities, he found that Catholic soldiers would “take 
communion at my hands [and] in a Bible class, which we kept going for several months, first in 
training camp and later at the front, there were both Catholics and Jews – studying the New 
Testament!”88 For chaplains and soldiers alike, war produced more than encounters between men of 
different faiths; it also acquainted men with unfamiliar religions and created opportunities to craft 
and experience new rituals. 
But ecumenical religious service to American soldiers had its limits. Chaplain Arthur C. 
Whitney (Christian Scientist), who earned a Croix de Guerre and Bronze Star from the French 
government for his service marching with and ministering to men at the front lines, received “a 
request or warning from one of the Chaplains at General Headquarters Chaplains’ Office not to set 
my religious views before others than Christian Scientists.” Appointed in one of the chaplains-at-
large spots, Whitney was classified by the military as a Protestant. Yet he remained constrained by 
his minority religious background, unable—by dint of implied threat—to engage religiously with all 
the soldiers of his division. In place of spiritual ministration, Whitney turned to sports and 
recreation, setting up a canteen, running a barber shop, organizing a library, equipping a tailor shop, 
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and operating a post office.89 These tasks, so often handed to the YMCA and Red Cross during the 
war, became the chaplains’ province when restricted from mass bible studies and general worship. 
As much as Brent and his fellow GHQ chaplains sought to professionalize the chaplaincy, concerns 
about perceived parochial or provincial religious groups nevertheless limited at least some of the 
newly appointed chaplains-at-large. 
To oversee and frame the work of chaplains in France, the GHQ Chaplains’ Office 
established a Chaplains School. Over eight days, they trained newly arrived clergy in more than 
military maneuvers and battlefield protocol. In stating they wanted to “give men who come fresh 
from America the advantage of the experience of those who have already had work in the Line and 
are conversant with the conditions of the Army and of life in France,” they recognized that military 
conditions bred distinct forms of religious work.90 In November 1918, 192 Protestants, 135 
Catholics, and 6 Jews had trained at the Army’s school in Chateau d’Aux.91 Just as the Army 
developed a feasible training regimen through which to instill the spirit of cooperation, Charles 
Brent lamented, it ceased with war’s end. He nevertheless offered a positive spin on the outcomes of 
the school and the maturation of cooperative procedures. As soldiers returned to the United States, 
he reported, “a chaplain either Protestant or Catholic is to be assigned to every transport. If the 
naval chaplain already assigned to a ship is a Catholic – the Army chaplain will be a Protestant and 
vice versa. This gives us a Protestant and a Catholic chaplain on every transport.”92 Lessons gleaned 
“over there” could, quite literally, travel home. 
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Advocacy from the Margins: Minority Religious Groups Become American 
The summer of 1917 was an uncertain one for the Jewish Welfare Board (JWB). It was new, 
formed only a few months earlier to partner with the Commission on Training Camp Activities to 
aid Jewish soldiers. It was unofficial, not yet sanctioned by the United States government as the 
authorized agency for Jewish welfare work. It was unstable, challenged on the one hand by existing 
communal institutions such as the Young Men’s Hebrew Association and B’nai Brith and opposed 
on the other hand by immigrant leaders chafing at the authority of New York Jewish elites.93 While it 
had but a tenuous hold on American Jewry, the JWB nevertheless possessed clear ideas about what 
it could accomplish for and on behalf of American Jewish soldiers. As the civilian interface between 
the military and a panoply of religious and communal Jewish organizations, the JWB would promote 
religion and citizenship, morals and morale. It would secure the rights of Jewish servicemen and 
shield impressionable men from the influence of Christian organizations. It would shepherd 
American Jews through war as patriotic Americans and committed Jews, thus demonstrating the 
consonance between Judaism and Americanism.94 
These often incompatible goals clashed, advocating for particularity and championing 
universality simultaneously. The mismatch was neither new nor atypical, a contest between values 
that stretched back to the early republic and applied to most intersections of religion and politics. 
But it acquired a new resonance as the Armed Forces became a site through which millions of young 
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men, almost of fifth of whom were not born in the United States, marched under the flag and bore 
arms for the nation. The War Department’s push for non-sectarianism and its need to accommodate 
religious Americans was similarly contradictory. All religions—or at least those recognized by the 
military as part and parcel of American life—stood equal and yet each required different 
compromises. Among the items on the JWB’s agenda on the summer of 1917 were two requests the 
War Department was reluctant to settle: the push for Jewish chaplains and the appeal for kosher 
food for Jewish soldiers. 
Two days after draft day and several months after the War Department began advocating for 
additional chaplains, Newton Baker informed the Committee on Military Affairs that he supported 
“the principle” of Senate bill 2527. The bill proposed to provide for the appointment of chaplains 
“representing religious sects not recognized in the apportionment of chaplains now provided by 
law.”95 This was a bit of a misnomer, the law did not enumerate a list of acceptable religion groups 
for the chaplaincy. In practice, however, chaplains represented a limited number of mainline 
Protestant groups as well as Catholics. The proposed statute, which would not be signed into law 
until October 6, 1917, rectified this problem by creating a new type of chaplain, one tied not to 
regiments but instead derived from a religious group, even if ultimately assigned to a particular unit. 
In its final form, the law stated “Division commanders may apply to the Adjutant General of 
the Army for the services of chaplains-at-large of the Jewish, Christian Science, Eastern Catholic, 
Mormon, and Salvation Army denominations if they deem that there are sufficient numbers of the 
adherents of such faiths in their divisions to render chaplains-at-large necessary.”96 The emphasis on 
“sufficient numbers” reflected the World War-I era distribution of manpower, as drafted soldiers 
and sailors usually received assignments to domestic bases and ports close to their hometown 
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region. For example, majority-LDS units existed at Camp Kearney (California) and Fort Lewis 
(Washington) while significant numbers of Jews lived together at Camp Upton (New York) and the 
Philadelphia Navy Yard.97 This legislation formally opened the American military chaplaincy to 
members of particular minority religious groups, most of which fell under the vast category of 
“Protestant.”98  
Both Christian Scientists and Mormons, eager to embrace the chaplaincy, accepted the 
opportunity to appoint chaplains without questioning exactly how they would be labeled or fit in.99 
Their most immediate need was to determine how their men could meet the established standards 
for chaplains, or absent that, how flexible the military would be. In particular, both groups needed to 
work around the requirement for ordination as neither faith ordains its leaders. The exigencies of 
war overtook precision, as the army commissioned the men appointed by the Christian Science 
Board of Directors and the LDS Church’s leadership without recorded comment. Christian 
Scientists felt that their chaplains’ “willingness to conduct undenominational services in addition to 
their own created a very favorable impression,” which may have aided their effort.100 At least some 
Christian Science chaplains earned the aplomb of higher-ranking officers for their prodigious efforts. 
Martin Jackson’s senior chaplain, for example, wrote, “Your task is peculiarly difficult because of the 
fact that your men are scattered and you cannot throw yourself into the little group in which you 
live, and feel justified in forgetting the rest of the division. In a way the ordinary battalion chaplain 
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has an easier task. His men are always right at hand and he can get to them at a moment’s notice.”101 
Civilians took note of the integration of chaplains from new religious groups as well. When 
the Navy appointed a Christian Science chaplain four months later, in February 1918, the New York 
World editorialized that this event “denotes a significant change in the public attitude toward the 
faith founded by Mrs. Eddy.…Christian Science then and long after was an anathema to the regular 
religious denominations of this country.…Now the Government gives it full recognition and 
accords its readers an equal status with the ministers of other creeds.”102 
Despite the New York World’s public proclamation, the military—not to mention the 
nation—did not easily accept these new chaplains. Of the three religious groups explicitly 
incorporated into the chaplaincy in World War I, Mormons faced the most resistance. LDS Church 
leaders were dismayed to find that the army allotted them only three chaplains, believing that the 
government had provided for “‘not less than twenty chaplains.’”103 Whether the Church 
misunderstood the legislation as allowing for 20 LDS chaplains or misconstrued the rejection of 
candidates as educationally unqualified as unfair or mistook YMCA allegations of the Church as 
“unChristian” and thus unfit for the chaplaincy as the critique of the state is unclear.104 But 
Mormons undoubtedly faced significantly more scrutiny than others, in part because allegations of 
polygamy lingered after the 1890 revelation repudiating it and in part because the Mormon emphasis 
on proselytization worried other Christians.105 No matter the cause, anxiety about some new 
religious groups filtered into the military as well. 
When Newton Baker first reviewed the proposed law, he asserted that appointing additional 
                                                
101 Quoted in Christian Science War Time Activities, 303-4. 
102 Editorial, The New York World, February 5, 1918. 
103 Quoted in Boone, “The Roles of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,” 546. 
104 Boone, “The Roles of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,” 547. 
105 “New Attack on Polygamy” Missionary Review of the World 31 (July 1918): 545; “Is Mormonism Still A 
Menace?” Ibid., 806. 
 
 
 58 
“chaplains-at-large” would be acceptable but cautioned that the War Department felt that “a 
maximum of 10 rather than 20 is a fair proportion of chaplains who should be appointed under this 
authority, which number will fully meet all the requirements of military service.”106 Baker never 
explained his reasoning but his restraint may have reflected the uncertainty with which most 
Americans greeted Christian Scientists and Mormons, the two Christian groups that would benefit 
most from this change. Fifteen years earlier, the nation erupted over the election of Senator Reed 
Smoot, a Utahan who also served as an apostle of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. If 
Americans resisted seating elected Mormon members of Congress—successfully, in the 1898 case of 
B.H. Roberts and unsuccessfully, in the 1902 case of Smoot—how would they respond to the 
appointment of Mormons in a state-sanctioned religious role?  
However, American Jews, not Mormons or Christian Scientists, led the push for this bill. In 
particular, Representative Isaac Siegel (R-NY) lobbied both the Army and the Navy to support 
legislative provisioning of Jewish chaplains. A brisk correspondence between Siegel and Cyrus Adler, 
the head of the JWB, during July 1917 highlights the effort made by the Jewish lawmaker on behalf 
of American Jewish soldiers. He met with Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, who agreed that 
one Jewish chaplain could serve. He found Secretary of War Newton Baker amenable to more than 
one Jewish chaplain. He reported that Baker and the Adjutant General disagreed over whether 
special legislation was even necessary, as the latter thought “legal authority exists for the 
appointments” of Jewish chaplains, and suggested that Siegel forward two to three applications 
“forthwith in order that the matter might be determined.”107  
No Jewish chaplains were appointed before the Chaplains-at-Large bill passed in early 
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October 1917, but by then other chaplains recognized the need for Jewish chaplains in the service.108 
Chaplain Ernest Paugh wrote to Adler “to ask if the Jewish Church could send us an assistant to 
work on my staff.” He recognized that “there are quite a few of the men of your faith” among the 
3500 men in his care, though he reminded Adler that “this work would not be exclusively among the 
Jewish boys.”109 While Paugh sought help directly albeit informally from the JWB, his effort 
underscored the desire among chaplains to aid the men in their midst, even as the state tarried. 
Siegel’s summer efforts to cultivate a pool of possible applicants were therefore useful, as they 
readied the JWB to supply rabbis to the armed forces as soon as legislation made it acceptable. Ten 
months later, General Pershing himself requested 25 additional Jewish chaplains so long, of course, 
as they were naturalized citizens.110 
Indeed, the Chaplains-at-Large bill accomplished more than providing for chaplains from 
theretofore unaccounted for religious groups. It also pushed the named religious faiths to develop 
civilian ecclesiastical authorities that could endorse chaplains to the U.S. military. This process took a 
variety of different forms. The First Church of Christ, Scientist, did not need to create a new 
apparatus, as the Christian Science Board of Directors affirmed the acceptability of the men it 
recruited.111  
The LDS Church took the prerogative to hand-select the men forwarded to the Army for 
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service. Herbert Brown Maw, one of three Mormon chaplains to serve in World War I, had enlisted 
in the Air Corps when he received a message to call Charles W. Penrose, the Counselor in the First 
Presidency.  Penrose informed Maw that the church just learned it could appoint three chaplains, 
and “‘we have chosen President B.H. Roberts and we have selected Calvin Smith,’ who was the son 
of President Joseph F. Smith at that time, ‘and we would like you to be the other chaplain.’”112 The 
Mormon Church took full responsibility for selecting men it deemed best fits for the chaplaincy.  
The Jewish Welfare Board faced a different set of challenges than the hierarchical LDS 
Church or the centrally organized Christian Scientists as it had to represent multiple streams of 
American Jewish religious life. Representative Siegel worried that an “attempt to create a board of 
Rabbis or Jewish ministers in this country to finally determine upon the qualifications of Jewish 
chaplains would, I fear, bring about a lot of unnecessary controversy.” As a result, he preferred 
certifying candidates through a combination of the JWB and his personal word. Once he received 
assurances that both the War Department and the Navy would “take my word in that the man 
presented by us is qualified both by learning, education, and character to be a chaplain,” he claimed 
doing so would be best because “we could save time and get the men appointed in view of the 
urgent necessity of having them enter upon their duties.113 Siegel’s emphasis on haste 
notwithstanding, the JWB created a Chaplains’ Committee, which consisted of representatives from 
the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jewish movements, to review and endorse applicants to 
the military.114  
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The committee received 149 applications for Jewish chaplains and endorsed 34, of which the 
military commissioned 25. The composition of the Chaplains’ Committee notwithstanding, rabbis 
who served as chaplains in World War I only represented the Reform and Conservative movements. 
Despite allegations of discrimination against Orthodox Jews by the elite and more assimilated 
leaders of the JWB, deference to Reform and Conservative rabbis stemmed not from bias but 
adherence to military regulations as only the Reform and Conservative seminaries required college 
degrees. Orthodox rabbis, many of whom were not U.S. citizens and received ordination in non-US-
government-accredited European yeshivot or seminaries, could not meet basic military 
requirements.115 
Demarcating space for “Chaplains-at-Large” instigated what would become a decades-long 
project to redefine American religion, to establish American religion as a phenomenon no longer 
tethered to Christianity, to recognizably mainstream groups, or to large percentages of the American 
population. As the service of 25 Jewish chaplains during the war highlights, the quota of 20 
chaplains from “religious sects not recognized” set by the Chaplains-At-Large bill did not hold. 
Over the course of the war, 1 Salvation Army, 3 Mormon, 11 Christian Science, and 25 Jewish 
Chaplains served in the U.S. military.116 The bill, somewhat unremarkable on its face, accomplished 
more than opening the chaplaincy to additional religious groups. Immediate induction of Mormon, 
Christian Science, and Jewish chaplains did not mean that the process was easy or smooth, or that 
the nation automatically accepted or fulfilled the needs of less conventional religions. But on an 
instrumental level, the Chaplains-At-Large bill created opportunities for less common American 
religious groups to present themselves as American as well as to lobby for their needs and request 
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accommodations from the state.  
Advocacy from the margins illuminated blind spots embedded in the military’s desire for 
nonsectarian religion and accentuated tensions between universality and particularity. As the largest 
new group to enter the chaplaincy during the war, American Jews occupied an odd position. On the 
whole, the military not only accepted but actively welcomed rabbis into the ranks of the chaplaincy 
and Jewish chaplains often exalted their inclusion. Even in their eagerness to serve their country, 
however, rabbis could not help but notice and literally mark their difference as they rejected the 
cross as the chaplains’ insignia. Likewise, the JWB’s fight for kosher food in the military accentuated 
Jewish distinction even as Jews sought to emphasize patriotic similarity and Wilsonian “100-percent 
Americanism.”  
As Isaac Siegel championed legislation supporting Jewish chaplains in the summer of 1917, 
he also helped the JWB press its case for kosher food for Jewish soldiers. Jewish law demanded 
separating milk and meat and forbade eating pork or shellfish. The regular presence of pork 
presented the biggest issue for Jewish soldiers in a military that understood meat as a dietary 
mainstay. Individual officers were not entirely insensitive to this problem, as Chaplain Louis Egelson 
reported: “The officer of my mess, a Captain and a staff-officer informed me that he would order 
the substitution of other food for me on the occasions when pork or ham was served. This he did 
voluntarily without the slightest intimation of my part.”117 Improvising on a case-by-case basis did 
not, however, help Jews writ large. Religious leaders within the community acknowledged that 
combat conditions represented sufficiently abnormal circumstances. Rabbi Bernard Levinthal, a one-
time president of the Orthodox Agudat HaRabanim, the Union of Orthodox Rabbis, and a well-
respected leader of the Philadelphia Jewish community, wrote “Jewish law is lenient with the soldier 
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who goes to war. He may eat the food that is given to him, he may even desecrate the Sabbath if 
ordered by his superiors to do so.”118 Not all Jews were as sanguine. Albert Lucas, of the Union of 
Orthodox Jewish Congregations, wanted the JWB to “secure that which we feel the Orthodox Jews 
of this country are entitled to and it is an absolute requisite to the peace of mind and spiritual 
content of a not inconsiderable portion of the soldiers and sailors of our faith.” For the duration of 
war, Lucas was willing to accept the JWB as the religious representative of American Jewry, but he 
expected a more “vigorous” effort to acquire that which observant Jews required: kosher food.119 
Despite Levinthal’s dispensation, then, many Jews found food inseparable from identity; permission 
to consume treif (non-kosher) food left many servicemen uncomfortable and, Lucas asserted, denied 
them an entitlement their military service granted them.  
When presenting the case for kosher food to the Navy, the JWB acknowledged that not all 
Jews observed laws of kashrut, that feasibility, especially “in the actual line of battle” presented a 
challenge, and that “all of the great Jewish legal authorities have declared for many hundreds of years 
that religious laws may be set aside in defense of one’s country.” But, they argued, the military’s 
interest in strengthening morale dictated that “it is not advisable that men should be furnished with 
food which is abhorrent on conscientious or religious grounds.” Even if kosher rations were not 
absolutely necessary, from a religious point of view, the Navy had a vested interest—or so the JWB 
maintained—in supporting religious practice for the sake of the service itself. Lest the appeal to 
national interest be insufficient, the JWB justified their stance with a nod to military practices 
worldwide. “We have evidence that in the British Army, Mohammedans and Hindoos have their 
special dietaries arranged for them according to their religious practices, and we have been informed 
that throughout the present war, this has been done in the French Army for the Mohammedans and 
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in the German and Austrian Armies for the Jewish soldiers.”120 If American allies in the British and 
French militaries could endeavor to meet the needs of its imperial volunteers and conscripts, the 
“Mohammedans and Hindoos,” surely the United States could match the standard set by its 
enemies—Germany and Austria—in furnishing Jewish soldiers with cans of kosher meat.  
Colonel Harry Cutler, the chairman of the JWB, offered the military an array of options for 
developing a standardized kosher option for Jewish servicemen. Theodore Krainin offered the aid of 
the Hebrew National Sausage Factory, agreeing to sell kosher items to the U.S. government at a loss 
by matching the prices of equivalent non-kosher meat.121 Domestically, local Jewish women could 
operate kosher kitchens on bases or perhaps the military itself could augment its kitchen services.122 
The military, however, deemed none of these options practical or achievable. Even at Camp Upton, 
which hosted the largest number of American Jewish soldiers, the JWB made few inroads. There, 
the General worried about “the dangers of such a step and the undesirability of permitting here by 
way of precedent for further demand elsewhere and abroad. He also was certain that the Secretary of 
War had somewhere issued an order officially disapproving any plans for providing kosher food.”123 
The precedent sought by the JWB was exactly the sort of precedent the military resisted: special 
services for religious groups that required alterations in military protocol. The military would not 
prevent JWB war workers or Jewish chaplains from distributing kosher items, but the military would 
not alter its procedures to enable Jewish servicemen to eat according to religious law. Compromise 
was necessary, but not on the part of the military. 
 In contrast, the military did make concessions about chaplains’ insignia. The first Jewish 
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chaplains to enter the service wore the uniform given to them, a uniform that included the insignia 
of the Latin cross. Not surprisingly, this upset most Jews. Cyrus Adler reported being “startled” to 
see the cross on Navy chaplain David Goldberg’s collar and expressed concerned that “Jewish men 
will also be a little surprised.”124 Chaplain Harry Davidowitz concurred, divulging to Adler that 
“whenever I approach any soldier who corroborates my estimate of him as Jewish, I have to begin 
by explaining away my insignia. His furtive and distrustful glances at my shoulder make an 
immediate explanation embarrassingly imperative. And to hold services for them in my present guise 
may prove disconcerting to some, but I doubt whether inspirational to any.”125 The War Department 
looked upon the situation rather differently. According to Adler, it feared “that various minor sects 
will each ask for some special form of recognition. I have replied with the argument that no 
Christian sect could set up a valid objection to the Cross whereas Jews or Mohammedans could. I 
daresay the matter will ultimately be adjusted.”126  
Adler’s prognostication proved accurate, but the process was somewhat unwieldy. The War 
Department wavered as it grappled with difference in its ranks. It acquiesced and allowed Jewish 
chaplains to remove the cross from their uniforms but dallied over a replacement. The War 
Department rejected the options proffered by the JWB—a six-pointed Jewish star was deemed too 
similar to a five-pointed General’s star, for example—and by late spring General Henry Jerver, 
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, proposed a new plan altogether. Rather than visually separate 
chaplains by insignia for different faiths, he suggested that all chaplains wear the shepherd’s crook, 
insignia of the nineteenth-century army chaplaincy. While more Christological than Jerver perhaps 
realized, the shepherd’s crook offended American Christians, rather than Jews, who found it 
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insufficiently Christian.127 Here, finally, religious Americans could unite.  
The Committee of Six, an ecumenical advisory group composed of Protestant, Catholic, and 
Jewish representatives, appealed to the War Department to revoke this insignia change. The 
Committee of Six spoke as one, affirming the statement of Harry Cutler on behalf of the JWB: “We 
are decidedly in favor of the Christian chaplains wearing the cross as the insignia of their office. We 
would consider it a national calamity particularly in these critical days to eliminate a symbol which to 
millions of men is the greatest inspiration and sign of salvation.” At the same time, they asserted, 
“We are equally concerned in the welfare of non-Jews as well as the Jews in a broadminded 
way…[these] chaplains may not in conscience wear the cross, nor should they be asked to do so.128 
The Committee of Six prevailed, and Jewish chaplains began wearing a double tablet (a 
representation of the Ten Commandments) with a Star of David affixed to the top.129 Where the 
War Department sought sameness, the Committee of Six recognized difference. It insisted that 
collaboration rested on validating literal marks of distinction. A tolerant, “broad-minded” nation 
could encompass variety without losing unity. 
 
Stand and Be Counted: The Protestant-Catholic Census Problem 
Father John Burke understood Minnie Brown’s concern. Religious life was difficult for the 
Catholic men serving in the 7th Regiment. They only had access to a Protestant chaplain; the minister 
could do fine moral work, but could not lead Mass or administer sacraments. He suggested to her 
that remedies might be available if Catholics in such Protestant-led regiments “would represent this 
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fact to their commanding officers with all respect and courtesy….The representation should make it 
clear that their protest is not directed against the person or character of their officer (the Chaplain) 
but solely against his inability, as a Protestant, to give them what they want.”130 Burke harbored no ill 
will toward Protestant chaplains, but he wanted Catholic souls saved, and Protestant chaplains could 
not, by definition, serve as intercessors between Catholic soldiers and their God. While he offered 
Minnie Brown counsel to pass on to the Catholics of the 7th Regiment, in his capacity as the head of 
the National Catholic War Council (NCWC), Burke knew that the likelihood of rectifying this 
situation was low. 
Two related problems stymied Burke and other religious leaders trying to assuage concerns 
about the religious background of chaplains assigned to particular units. First, while a particular 
religion could predominate in geographically-determined regiments, the Selective Service did not 
collect information about religious affiliation. As a result, a Catholic chaplain could be assigned to a 
unit stationed at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana in which only one percent of the men were Catholic. 
As the local bishop reminded Father Burke, “this is of course discouraging and altogether 
wrong.…If no attention is paid to the religious make-up of the Regiments, our chaplains will in 
many cases not be assigned where they can do the most good, and many regiments that are largely 
Catholic may be left without a priest.”131 The bishop’s observation was correct: many regiments 
consisting of largely Catholic soldiers lacked priests. But his assessment of this condition as 
“altogether wrong” mistook the military’s openness to clergy from multiple faith traditions for an 
investment in parceling out chaplains in accordance with the religious composition of units. In fact, 
the military wanted to encourage religious and moral behavior without tying it to specific religious 
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beliefs or practices.  
Second, the military never acquired the necessary number of chaplains to fulfill the 1:1200 
ratio it sought. But for those striving to place Christian chaplains in the service, there was another 
problematic ratio, that of Catholics to Protestants. If Mormons, Christian Scientists, and Jews fought 
to be represented in the chaplaincy during World War I, Protestants and Catholics fought over the 
number of chaplains allocated to them. The military used data from the 1916 World Almanac in an 
attempt to distribute fairly Protestant and Catholic chaplains according to their respective 
percentages of the population of the United States. However, mere counting and dividing, 
Protestants alleged, miscalculated the religious breakdown of the United States. The census revealed 
that Catholics comprised 32.3 percent of the American population, but Protestant leaders disputed 
this number because, they claimed, any religious census based on church membership unjustly 
elevated the Catholic population because Catholics baptized infants while most Protestant 
denominations did not.132 As a result, they argued, the military needed to adjust Catholic numbers 
downward. The American Catholic leadership, in contrast, fretted that they were not receiving 
enough chaplain spots. They knew their numbers had been decreased by 15 percent, which seemed 
much lower than its military-age population.  
Despite the hierarchical organization of the Catholic Church and massive increase in the 
Catholic population in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American Catholics lacked a 
united voice as religious Americans in national discourse. Regional, ethnic, and linguistic divisions 
separated the Catholic faithful and divided their political capital. War brought forth more cohesion, 
however, as fragmented and dispersed Catholic leadership coalesced to speak on behalf of Catholic 
Americans, to respond to the needs of Catholic soldiers, and to counter the suspicion directed at 
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Catholic immigrants through Americanization. Like its Jewish counterpart, the JWB, and its 
Protestant antagonist, the FCC, the National Catholic War Council (NCWC)—the predecessor to 
the National Catholic Welfare Council and ultimately the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops—
operated as the institutional foundation for Catholic unity. Founded by Father Burke, its first 
meeting in August 1917 brought together 115 bishops representing 42 dioceses, 27 Catholic 
associations, and 18 Catholic publications to discuss the Catholic war effort. Designated by the U.S. 
government as the official agency representing Catholic interests in 1918, NCWC subgroups 
oversaw welfare work through the CTCA, the fraternal Knights of Columbus war efforts, and 
chaplain appointments and aid. 
Father Lewis O’Hern, who supervised the appointment of Catholic chaplains to the military, 
carped that the FCC had “convinced the War Department that since we count children in our 
Church membership, we cannot be given Chaplains based on our numerical strength at all.” 
Cognizant of the politics of perception, he asked Father Burke to intervene with Secretary of War 
Newton Baker, noting that instead of requesting 40 percent of the chaplaincy quota, “it does not 
sound quite so big to say Thirty-Nine percent.”133 A month later Baker pleased O’Hern by adjusting 
the Catholic chaplain quota to 38 percent, “practically what we felt we were entitled to, in strict 
justice.”134  
Baker’s move tempered the heated exchanges between Catholic and Protestant civilian 
leadership during the war. But the truce was temporary. Early postwar efforts to stabilize the 
peacetime chaplaincy inflamed passions yet again. A memo to the Chief of Staff laid out the 
denominational apportionment of the 240 chaplain spots. Catholics received a mere 44 positions, or 
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18.3 percent—a far cry from their wartime allocation of 38 percent. With 15 openings (or 6.25 
percent of the total) allotted to the miscellaneous category, the military split the remaining 76 
percent among 21 Protestant groups, which included 4 reserved places (1.7 percent) for African-
American chaplains. The clear tabulation of numbers and percentages, notwithstanding, the 
distribution was not necessarily fixed as “the Secretary of War reserved the right, however, to 
modify these figures whenever the manifest good of the service shall make such modification 
necessary. The services of candidates of exceptional ability should not be lost to the Army through a 
too rigid adherence to the denominational basis.”135 But slight modifications to account for 
exemplary candidates would not significantly alter this intended composition of the chaplaincy 
which, not surprisingly, pleased most Protestants. 
The Methodist Christian Advocate, for example, contended that the wartime chaplaincy split of 
38 percent Catholic and 62 percent Protestant was unwarranted but “no special effort was made to 
change it during the period of the war, lest our enemies draw wrong conclusions.” The NCWC 
could not help but wonder whether “our enemies” referred to Germans or Catholics, especially 
when the paper editorialized that “it is a matter of great gratification” that the War Department fixed 
the peacetime quota at 25 percent Catholic and 70 percent Protestant (with 5 percent open for other 
groups or to correct particular imbalances).136 The reduction in quota from 38 to 25 percent of the 
chaplaincy did not sit well with the NCWC. Father Burke protested this change to Newton Baker, 
underscoring that John Axton, the newly appointed (and Protestant) Chief of Chaplains had 
calculated Catholics as 31.375 percent of the population. Though he considered the number “a bit 
low,” Burke was willing to accept it.137 When his plea yielded no change, Burke’s calm reasoning 
turned into angry argument. “Why there should be a sudden decrease from thirty-seven to twenty-
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five in inexplicable,” he proclaimed. The repercussion of this modification would be clear: given this 
“unwarranted discrimination,” Catholic parents would discourage their sons from entering the 
military and the Church would dissuade its priests from entering the chaplaincy. The chaplaincy 
quota, he concluded, “is a very serious, national question,” but “it has been made a football for 
denominational advantage.”138 
 
Armistice and Its Aftermath: Postwar Religious Politics 
Chaplain Charles Bruton kept busy in the fall of 1918. Every Sunday the priest led two 
masses, each week he conducted non-sectarian services, and during Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New 
Year, he arranged for Jews to attend synagogue in another city on military orders. As he remarked 
The Rochester Post, “I am resolved to be as good a rabbi to them as I possibly can be.”139 Chaplain 
Frank Wilson would not have been surprised by Bruton’s work or commentary. He too flourished in 
the multi-religious milieu of war. Reminiscing about his work in Europe, he wrote about his 
interfaith endeavors, concluding, “So there you have it—the Jewish Feast of Purim, celebrated by 
American soldiers in Italy, in a Young Men’s Christian Association hut, addressed by an 
Episcopalian chaplain, refreshments being furnished by the Red Cross society, and cigarettes 
donated by the Roman Catholic Knights of Columbus.”140 Over and over again, the chaplains who 
served among the American Expeditionary Forces repeated tales of ecumenical accomplishment in 
the wilderness of war: of constructing new means of worship in novel venues, of finding ways to 
fulfill their duty to all the men of their units, of embracing the customs and rituals of faiths other 
than their own. 
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Their stories were real, but they belied both tensions undergirding the U.S. military’s 
experiment in religious inclusion and, moreover, the role of the state in cultivating their unorthodox 
circumstances. Interfaith engagement occurred over eighteen months of war, but the perception of 
the value of cooperative endeavors would not linger for long. The American public would soon 
forget this lesson of war.  It did not disappear, however, because the National Defense Act of 1920 
made permanent structural and organizational changes informally accomplished during the war. For 
chaplains, it instantiated the one chaplain per 1200 soldiers ratio, provided for the permanent 
provision of chaplains with rank, and established the role of chief of chaplains to serve in four-year 
terms. In this leadership role, the chief of chaplains became responsible for “the investigation into 
the qualifications of candidates for appointment as chaplains, and general coordination and 
supervision of the work of chaplains.”141 Having spent eighteen months of war puzzling its way 
toward moral monotheism, the chaplaincy acquired the power to implement this religious ideal in 
1920.142 How the chaplaincy ought to and could govern American religion became the organization’s 
peacetime task. 
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CHAPTER  2 
“Christ is the Melting Pot For All Our Differences”: 
Interwar Visions, Alliances, and Experiments 
 
The Great War was over, the Versailles Treaty signed, the National Defense Act of 1920 
passed, the troops demobilized. While much of the military rushed to decommission its resources 
and disperse its personnel, the nation’s newly appointed and first Army Chief of Chaplains began to 
design, to mobilize, to create. Even as chaplains relinquished their regular army appointments and 
returned to their home congregations, John T. Axton set his sights on larger questions and bigger 
goals: what should and what would the now-official Army chaplain corps look like? What would it 
do? How could, should, and would military clergy serve soldiers?  
About six months after becoming Chief of Chaplains, Axton received a letter from Samuel 
Cavert. As the secretary of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, the group that endorsed 
Protestant chaplains to the U.S. military, Cavert requested that the army appoint a Protestant 
chaplain to complement the existing Catholic chaplain at Fort Slocum, New York. Axton responded 
immediately: No. “Chaplain Campbell,” Axton replied, “is one of our finest and constantly on the 
alert to see that the religious needs of all of the men are cared for.” The Catholic chaplain could 
handle the duties of his post, and could adequately serve the Protestant men stationed there.1 Axton 
consistently reiterated that any chaplain could serve all men. To Cyrus Adler, the head of the Jewish 
Welfare Board, he affirmed that the War Department had already requested materials on the 
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upcoming Jewish holidays and expected that the chaplains would “correctly interpret to their 
commands the wishes of the War Department concerning religious observances for men of all 
shades of religious belief.”2 After Christian Scientist representative Judge Clifford Smith endorsed 
two candidates as potential chaplains, Axton reminded Smith that Christian Science chaplains who 
served in the war were, like all others, eligible for reserve appointments. But too few Christian 
Scientists remained in the army to warrant regular appointments—a situation akin to that of the 
Jews. Nevertheless, he directed chaplains to “call in upon occasion representatives of sects not 
represented in their post” and he concluded, “The experiment is working very well.”3 
The same could not be said for religion in civilian American life. Had William Joseph 
Simmons been privy to Axton’s correspondence, he surely would have used it to recruit new 
members to his burgeoning reincarnation of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). The Southern Methodist 
Episcopalian preacher and self-appointed first Imperial Wizard of the second KKK did not hesitate 
to leverage any racial or religious mixing as fodder for his white supremacist and conservative 
Protestant fraternal organization. The KKK recruited as many as five million white men in 4000 
chapters across all 48 states into its “‘army of Protestant Americans.’”4 Whether burning towering 
crosses, firebombing homes, or lynching perceived violators of unwritten codes of conduct, the 
KKK terrorized Catholics, Jews, and African Americans across the United States. About 700 miles 
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north of the second KKK’s Atlanta origins, Simmons had an ally in Detroit industrialist and auto-
making titan, Henry Ford. The press, rather than vigilante violence, proved to be Ford’s weapon of 
choice. After buying the Dearborn Independent in 1918, he used the paper to print the inflammatory 
forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, in 1921 and, in the 8 years under Ford’s helm, propagated 
his antisemitic views to its national readership. Although its blatant antisemitism ultimately led to its 
downfall in 1927, the Dearborn Independent fomented and nourished anti-labor, anti-immigrant, and 
antisemitic sentiments of the 1920s.5   
While groups like Cavert’s Federal Council of Churches protested the KKK and the Dearborn 
Independent, nativism—directed especially toward Catholic and Jewish immigrants—and racism 
persisted and percolated in more genteel realms of American life. In the early 1920s, elite universities 
such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton identified the rising number of Jewish students entering their 
classrooms and living in their dorms as a problem. Quotas—both stated and secret—became their 
preferred tools for maintaining Protestant hegemony in higher education (Catholics, who had an 
array of Catholic universities from which to choose, did not elicit the same concern or scorn in 
higher education though they faced similar discrimination in housing and employment.)6 The first 
Red Scare’s anxiety about Bolshevist infiltration of American life intensified the enmity toward 
Eastern European Jewish immigrants, some of whom identified as radicals, socialists, communists, 
and anarchists, but all of whom became potential agents of social and political upheaval in the eyes 
of nativists and scientific racists.7  
Successive restrictive immigration acts culminated in the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, which 
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limited new arrivals to a yearly cap of two percent of the national-origin group’s population in 1890. 
This quota severely curtailed immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, the origin point of 
most Catholic and Jewish migrants.8 Anti-Catholicism, which had occasionally quieted but never 
abated since the arrival of Irish immigrants in the nineteenth century, erupted with the nomination 
of three-time New York Governor, anti-Prohibition, and Catholic Al Smith as the Democratic 
candidate for President of the United States in 1928. Theological and social furor convulsed 
Protestants; the stewing modernist-fundamentalist divide erupted in the Scopes trial and ripped apart 
Protestant denominations whose liberal and conservative wings had previously united over 
Prohibition. As religion scholar Martin Marty has remarked, interwar American society “fairly reeked 
of religion,” with conflict the dominant stench.9 
Indeed, the presence of Catholic chaplains in the military prompted more than polite 
inquiries from the Federal Council of Churches. John Axton’s counterpart in the Navy, John B. 
Frazier, encountered similar requests as well as protests, often from mothers frustrated with the 
religious arrangements on their sons’ ships. When Mrs. Gable complained about the presence of a 
Catholic chaplain on her son’s ship and petitioned Frazier to place a Protestant chaplain there 
instead, the first Director of the new Navy Chaplains’ Division responded, “Your son, being 
Protestant, is unfortunate in that he has not been able to attend Protestant services, but I feel sure 
that had he gone to the Catholic Chaplain and requested that a Protestant Church Party be 
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organized on Sunday to visit a ship that carries a Protestant Chaplain arrangements would have been 
made by which he could have attended such services.”10 Religious affiliation did not determine 
whether a chaplain could help sailors. A chaplain did not need to lead services to aid the men in 
their charge; rather, chaplains would provide spiritual ministry or direct men to others who could. 
Frazier’s insistence that any navy chaplain could care for a mother’s son was typical. 
Appointed by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels in 1917, Frazier—a Southern Methodist like 
Daniels—dedicated his time during and after the war to improving the quality and reputation of the 
chaplaincy. Just as he insisted on high educational standards for chaplains, so too did he consistently 
assert, to military and civilian audiences alike, that Protestant and Catholic chaplains were equal to 
one another. Likewise, Axton—a Congregationalist—surveyed World War I chaplains and addressed 
concerns of civilian religious leaders as he established the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. He 
advocated rank for chaplains, encouraged veteran chaplains to retain Reserve commissions, and, 
over the eight years of his two terms as Chief of Chaplains, he regularly toured domestic and foreign 
installations to visit chaplains in the field and make recommendations to the military chain-of-
command and to Congress based on the information gleaned from his travels. 
For both men, then, the early 1920s proved to be a revival. Internal army and navy histories 
of the respective chaplaincies consider the interwar years a low period tied to the weak fortune of a 
peace-time military.11 Yet this quiet period offered a chance to script anew the goals and outlook of 
the chaplaincy. By appraising, articulating, and implementing new ideals and practices during the 
interwar period, the military’s religious branch initiated a state-sanctioned campaign to alter the 
contours of religious belonging in the United States. Simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, these 
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efforts assiduously diminished religious enmity but glossed over racial discrimination. The military 
chaplaincies generated a vision of American religion predicated on ecumenical theology, catalyzed 
and participated in civilian interfaith alliances, and experimented with policies and procedures in 
Civilian Conservation Corps camps designed to unify American soldiers and sailors around moral 
monotheism. In so doing, the military heralded the reconstitution of pluralism, from a melting pot 
to a tri-faith nation.  
 
Visions: Constructing the Chaplaincy’s Religious Worldview 
Three weeks before Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1920, on May 12-14, 
Navy chaplains from across the eastern United States assembled in Washington, DC for a three-day 
conference. Frazier had organized small conferences before, but this was the first time that the 
military ordered such a gathering and the first time that more than fifty active chaplains mustered for 
multi-day professional development that included meetings with other chaplains and ranking Navy 
officials. As Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral Thomas Washington, told the 
assembled group, “I am very much delighted to see this gathering. This is the first one we have ever 
held, and I know that great results are going to come of it.”12 The conference mixed lectures and 
discussions with socializing, sight-seeing, and worship opportunities. The conference opened with 
the mass recitation of the hymn, “All Hail the Power of Jesus’ Name” at the Mt. Vernon Place 
Methodist Church South. After several welcome addresses, hymns, and benedictions, the Protestant 
chaplains stayed for a Sermon and Holy Communion while the Catholics walked 4 blocks northeast 
to St. Patrick’s Church for a Solemn High Mass. After a brief lunch break, the group reconvened for 
the remainder of the daytime sessions at the Navy Building on the edge of the National Mall, where 
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participants could watch the final stages of the building of the Lincoln Memorial. The mixture of 
sacred and secular space established the tone for the conference, in which chaplains offered lectures 
and participated in discussions of religious, pastoral, and administrative topics ranging from “The 
Place of Preaching in a Chaplain’s Work” and “The Personal Religious Work of the Chaplain” to 
“How We May Enlist the Sympathies and Cooperation of Our Superior Officers in Our Work” and 
“The Chaplain as a Shipmate.”13  
Chaplain C. Q. Wright led off the instructional portion of the conference with an afternoon 
talk on the “The Place of Preaching in a Chaplain’s Work.” His lecture focused on the importance 
of bringing the Gospel to the men in a chaplain’s care, but also acknowledged the challenge of 
preaching, especially for new chaplains isolated on ships. A strong sense of Christian mission 
infused his speech. Yet even amidst a clarion call to bring sailors to Jesus, Wright admonished the 
chaplain who “sometimes allows his themes or his schemes to lead him into a sort of propaganda, 
which impresses the people as being of a sectarian spirit, and which cuts him off from a large 
number of people.”14 By 1920, military clergy deemed the denominationalism that still permeated 
civilian church life an unacceptable obstacle, a division that could not sustain an audience. Even as 
Protestant and Catholic chaplains prayed separately, they needed to preach holistically. According to 
Wright, moreover, “Christ is the melting pot for all our differences: He is the only hope of 
unification, of harmony and success, and just now is a great opportunity to emphasize Him as the 
one means of bringing men together and holding them together in every creed, in every line of 
thought and of endeavor and being in the world.”15 Wright’s message emphasized Christianity as the 
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religion of the United States military—which matched his audience of Protestant and Catholic 
chaplains as well as the composition of a primarily Christian Navy—and hailed Christ as the great 
harmonizer of Americans from different backgrounds and cultures. But his language, particularly the 
use of “the melting pot,” reflected the larger task the American military faced—bringing together 
diverse Americans. Most importantly, it evinced the discourse of (white) cultural and religious 
pluralism articulated and promoted in the 1910s by the British Jewish playwright Israel Zangwill and 
contested in 1915 by the American Jewish philosopher Horace Kallen.16 Even as Wright focused on 
American Christians, he borrowed a language and theory popularized by Jewish intellectuals, 
drawing on both Zangwill’s assimilatory melting pot and Kallen’s non-assimilatory harmonizing 
orchestra. Whether or not he was consciously adapting this language, Wright hinted at one goal of 
the military chaplaincy project: fusing native-born and immigrant Americans into larger, manageable 
religious groups. 
As Chaplain C.M. Charlton explained the following afternoon, chaplains did not need to 
erase denominational ties, but rather understand and manage them. To that end, he described 
surveying the religious needs of all sailors he encountered, subscribing to and reading forty-eight 
periodicals that covered at least seven faith traditions, including Catholicism and Judaism, belonging 
to a local ministers’ association, and maintaining a library of “doctrinal or ritualistic or manual 
books” that covered denominations beyond his own Methodist-Episcopal affiliation. When 
stationed at Newport, Rhode Island, he brought in a different local cleric, or “denominational 
shepherd,” every day to meet with sailors. These practices, he argued, allowed him, “an evangelical 
                                                
16 Israel Zangwill’s 1908 play The Melting Pot and Horace Kallen’s three-part series in The Nation, “Democracy 
Versus the Melting Pot: A Study in American Nationality,” popularized the term and theory of a melting-pot nation. 
Nineteenth-century thinkers such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry James, and Frederick Jackson Turner used variations 
of the term, including “smelting pot,” “hot pot,” and “crucible,” but their usage did not penetrate American thought and 
culture in the same way Zangwill and Kallen’s did. Kallen used Zangwill’s term in order to critique it; he rejected the 
assimilatory project of the melting pot and advocated a harmonized orchestra as the metaphor and model of cultural 
pluralism. See Greene, The Jewish Origins of Cultural Pluralism, 76-86.   
  81 
Christian minister,” to aid “soul-hungry Hebrews” who “in less than an hour…[were] on their way 
to a synagogue.” Charlton’s practices were not uncommon; Congressional legislation mandated one 
chaplain per 1200 soldiers, but that ratio was rarely achieved during peacetime. The smaller standing 
army maintained fewer camps, forts, and outposts with dense concentrations of soldiers. As a result, 
chaplains—and, more frequently, local uncommissioned clergy—had to become circuit-riders in 
order to provide religious counsel to smaller groups of men spread across the country. Logistically, 
this could pose problems, as Lieutenant Colonel Robert Pierson relayed to Congress. Because Camp 
Custer lacked a Jewish chaplain, the military sent a rabbi to “have a meeting of the Hebrews. The 
automobile which was sent for him was wrecked. We found it out and rushed down and got him, 
and while he was about three-quarters of an hour or an hour late for the service, I think there were 
probably 50 or 75 Jews that had all waited there to see their rabbi when he came in.”17 Too few Jews 
remained in the smaller peacetime army to warrant dedicated Jewish chaplains, and local—or semi-
local—rabbis often supplemented the work of Christian chaplains. As the testimony of Pierson and 
Charlton indicate, the military invited civilian clergy to augment the religious services the state could 
reasonably provide.  
Indeed, of the 5000 men Charlton canvassed, less than one percent claimed “no religion at 
all.” While most the remainder affiliated with a specific denomination, they responded well to his 
efforts on their behalf. Interdenominational cooperation “for the common good” maximized the 
“power of united impact” and, when “consistently lived up to[,] has made it easy for me to be ‘all 
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things to all men.’”18 Derived from Paul’s message in I Corinthians, the phrase to be “all things to all 
men” emerged in World War I as a common refrain of the task of chaplains.19 Like Paul, chaplains 
could evangelize; but unlike Paul, they could evangelize religion as only a general practice, offering 
spiritual succor in a nondenominational manner that transcended sectarian differences.  
The emphasis on non-confrontational and generically spiritual religion embodied the 
military’s view of religion as a stabilizing social force. Chaplains enabled unit solidarity and cohesion 
by promoting religion—in various forms—as a common good shared by all. Acknowledging 
different religions and denominations but downplaying distinctions between them allowed the 
military to advance personal piety over public assertions of creedal superiority. Even as he relied on 
distinctly Christian language to make his point, Charlton’s experiences with and inclusion of Jews, 
Christian Scientists, and Mormons in his lecture alluded to a vision of American religion that moved 
beyond the Protestant-Catholic categories that, in the early 1920s, were not always—and often 
not—commonly accepted.  
The effort to bridge denominational differences took a more concrete form in the 
development of the Army and Navy Hymnal in 1920-1. While the army and navy chaplaincies 
frequently operated on parallel planes, they worked together to devise a hymnal that would suit the 
military’s need for “diversity and brevity” as none of the available hymn books on the market 
achieved these twin goals. Moreover, a common hymnal would ease transitions and create a familiar 
service for soldiers and sailors moving from one locale (or chaplain) to another.20 Thus Chaplain 
Julian Yates, who would become Army Chief of Chaplains in 1929, worked with Frazier to sketch a 
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draft table of contents for a two-part, Protestant and Catholic hymnal. Within the Protestant section, 
the choices needed to cover hymns popular in multiple denominations, and the two chaplains 
designed both parts to provide sufficient range so as to give chaplains autonomy over their services 
but be reasonably brief to contain the length of worship as well. Once they had composed a draft, 
they distributed it to all chaplains in the service for feedback. 
The responses of chaplains—which included prayers to cut as well as to add—guided the 
manuscript revisions, and with a full, vetted draft in hand, Frazier and Yates looked for a publisher. 
Their efforts attracted the attention of Caroline Parker, music editor of the Century Publishing 
Company, and she agreed to take on their project without a guaranteed minimum order. The 
publishing company assumed some risk, for while Frazier and Yates decided that they would not 
profit from their compilation, neither branch of the military required their chaplains to buy the 
hymnal. Instead they would promote and suggest it, but leave the purchasing decision up to each 
individual chaplain. Parker, who maintained a robust correspondence with all involved parties, 
heavily marketed the hymnal and developed band and orchestral versions to further enhance its use. 
After Century acquired the rights to publish the hymnal, the Jewish Welfare Board (JWB) 
learned of the endeavor and sought to add a Jewish section as well. The JWB offered to arrange and 
pay for the additional pages, and the military agreed that this would be acceptable.21 Parker, who was 
in New York where the JWB was headquartered, worked to accommodate all parties, and became a 
voluble advocate for the hymnal’s chief innovation: its interfaith character. When Louis Marshall, in 
his capacity as president of the American Jewish Committee, wrote to her objecting to a claim made 
in a training manual that “the ideal officer is a Christian gentleman,” Parker advocated on his behalf. 
Within the publishing industry, she not only represented the vanguard of an educated and ambitious 
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post-World War I generation of women who acquired responsibility within the profession but also 
displayed the skills that led women into other human services roles such as personnel management 
and counseling.22 
She wrote to Frazier and asked him to omit “Christian” from the last line of his forward in 
order to ensure that the hymnal would be acceptable to all. Whether Parker’s motivation stemmed 
from her marketing needs or sympathy for Marshall’s claim that “‘there are many men in the Army 
who are officers and many who aspire to become officers who are gentlemen and who possess all 
the qualifications mentioned by the authors except that they are [not] Christians’” or both, she 
convinced Frazier to promote a non-sectarian hymnal.23  
Although the JWB and Parker were both instrumental in fashioning a hymnal that could be 
used in Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish services, within two years this feature became part of the 
military’s branding. As Yates wrote in his brief history of the hymnal in 1923, it “is unique in one 
particular [way] if in no others. It is believed to be the only publication extant containing Protestant, 
Catholic and Jewish hymnology under one cover, and as such it is the confident hope of the 
compilers that it may be a factor in drawing more closely together the three grand divisions of the 
fraternity of God[-]serving Americans.”24 Yates was correct. A tri-faith hymnal was new and, though 
he did not state it explicitly, the state’s coordination of such a prayerbook was unprecedented. That 
the compilers initially intended to include “the three grand divisions” of American religion elided the 
active efforts made on behalf of American Jewish chaplains and soldiers. Yet this erasure signifies 
acceptance as well. For in ignoring the efforts made by the JWB, Louis Marshall, and Caroline 
Parker and in taking credit for including Catholics and Jews alongside Protestants, Yates normalized 
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all three religious groups as standard-bearers of American religion.  
Yates’ 1923 proclamation reflected his own recollection and, perhaps, redrafting of the past. 
But it did not stand alone. Rather, it bespoke the military’s concurrent effort to define its view of 
religion and religious liberty. In 1923, the War Department convened a Conference on Moral and 
Religious Work in the Army. Unlike the Navy’s 1920 Chaplains’ Conference, the Army did not limit 
its conference to chaplains. It intentionally brought chaplains and military officials together with 
“certain prominent citizens of the country”—civilian clergy and lay leaders of religious groups—to 
discuss and recommend programs to improve the provision of religious and moral training to 
soldiers. When this group of 93 white and one black men, all “distinguished clergymen, educators, 
laymen, line officers, and chaplains of the Army of the United States,” escaped the muggy summer 
thunderstorm and gathered inside the New National Museum (what would become known as the 
Natural History Museum) on Wednesday, June 6, 1923, they brought with them the prestige of rank 
and position. Famous World War I chaplains, including Paul Moody (son of evangelist Dwight 
Moody, and by 1923, President of Middlebury College), Charles MacFarland (who in 1923 served as 
the General Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches), and Father Francis Duffy (the most 
highly decorated clergyman in the U.S. Army) sat with the Chairmen and General Secretaries of the 
Federal Council of Churches, the YMCA, the Knights of Columbus, the Jewish Welfare Board, the 
American Red Cross, the American Bible Society, the National Catholic Welfare Council, the 
National Baptist Church, and the Salvation Army as well as presidents of local universities and 
ministers of local churches. But this was no mere gathering of elite religious leaders; aside from the 
respective Army and Navy Chiefs of Chaplains, the Honorable John Weeks, Secretary of War, and 
General John Pershing, headed the list of military officials in attendance.25 
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After an invocation by Axton, Secretary Weeks opened the conference, thanking all the 
attendees for joining him in Washington. He articulated the connection between military training 
and citizenship, asserting that the War Department prioritized making the “finest type of young 
men” recruits into excellent citizen-soldiers who could return home and serve their communities as 
respected leaders. To make this important transformation possible, he would rely on the wisdom, 
counsel, and judgment of the group gathered before him as “nothing will hold mankind better 
together or be of as much benefit to men of all nations as religion.”26 Why was religion so valuable? 
Why would it unite, rather than divide, the “men of all nations”? General Pershing, whose speech 
immediately followed Weeks’, further explained why the military conceived of religion as so 
important: it propelled men toward “clean living.”  
But Pershing’s “clean living” encompassed far more than the moral control pushed by 
Progressive, often Protestant, advocates of abstinence from drink, sex, and gambling. As he 
observed, “Soldiers readily see the difference between that effort which is religious, pure and 
undefiled, and that which merely seeks sectarian advantage. They are quick to recognize a positive 
and practical appeal to those in need of spiritual guidance and have little time or sympathy for those 
who indulge in unbrotherly denunciation of others who seek the same God through different forms 
of faith, expression, and relationship.” The impetus toward “clean living,” the emphasis on “pure 
and undefiled” religion clothed an important message about the definition of religion itself. Belief in 
one God, the same God, the only God, regardless of specific rituals, traditions, or prayers, mattered 
most to General Pershing, who had instigated the first recorded army chaplains’ conference among 
the Eighth Brigade in Texas in 1915. Successful chaplains would set aside sectarian difference and, 
by virtue of holding the position of a commissioned officer without command, would, through his 
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own knowledge and cooperation with other clergy, minister to all men, officers and enlistees alike. 
Adopting the language of the clergy he so respected, Pershing concluded with a blessing of his own: 
“May you be divinely guided,” he said to the military and civilian, religious and lay, leaders assembled 
before him, “as you counsel together and formulate plans for this the most important phase of the 
life and training of soldiers.”27  
Before the planning sessions began in earnest, Morris Lazaron gave the conference’s plenary 
address, “Religion for American Manhood.”28 That the military would ask a speaker to dwell on 
manhood was neither surprising nor new.29 But Lazaron did more than suggest ways that the state, 
through its chaplains, could inculcate manhood, manliness, and masculinity. He also helped the 
conference organizers demonstrate their commitment to non-sectarian religion. In this sense, 
Lazaron was perhaps a pragmatic choice. Ordained as a rabbi in 1915, he served as chaplain in the 
Officers’ Reserve Corps (ORC) in World War I, earned the rank of Major, and remained in the ORC 
until 1953. Moreover, he lived nearby and grew somewhat accustomed to making the 40-mile trip 
between his pulpit at Baltimore Hebrew Congregation and ceremonies in Washington, DC. Two 
years earlier, in 1921, he joined Bishop Charles Brent (Senior American Expeditionary Force 
Chaplain), Axton, and Frazier as the ORC Chaplain representative at the November 11 ceremony 
dedicating the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery.30 But Lazaron was 
also an inspired choice, for he firmly believed that Judaism was only a religion, and Jews were not a 
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nation. He would dedicate much of his career as a rabbi, author, and citizen to Jewish-Christian 
dialogue and interfaith efforts, formal and informal.  
 
Charged with articulating the relationship between “manhood” and “religion,” Lazaron started by 
describing his position: “I speak for no denomination or group[.] While I recognize the natural 
necessity for credal [sic] distinctions and have the most earnest respect for them, I take it that the 
object of this conference is to consider the manhood of America, and particularly the soldiers of 
America, not so much as Protestant or Catholic or Jew, but rather as related to those moral and 
religious truths which we all of us hold in common.” Like Weeks and Pershing before him, Lazaron 
emphasized that the military rendered denominational or sectarian differences irrelevant; common 
“moral and religious truths”—even if only the belief in God—would be sufficient to bridge religious 
differences.31  
Men, Lazaron argued, share three traits: a sense of mysticism or awe (whether or not they 
label it religion), loyalty to larger causes, and recognition of the importance of brotherhood. By 
recognizing and targeting these attributes, chaplains could help develop both religious sensibilities 
and masculine tendencies. Framing religion as adventurous and majestic, rather than dry and boring, 
and hailing God as the powerful and exciting remaker of souls would help make religion accessible 
to young soldiers who are likely enthralled by thrill and exhilaration. Similarly, comradeship and 
duty—two elements of the soldier’s life—deserved emphasis whereas fighting “over differences in 
ceremon[y] and liturgy and doctrine [have] let the hearts of our youth go hungry.”32 Lazaron’s 
emphasis on moral spirituality rather than doctrinal and ritual particularity meshed well with the 
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military’s larger goal of influencing a broad range of young men. But his message also stemmed from 
genuine conviction. As a Reform rabbi, he accepted the position of the Reform Movement’s 1885 
Pittsburgh Platform which stressed the sanctity of God as the central tenet of all religion while 
repudiating law and ritual that neither sanctified nor elevated the spirit.33  In his address, then, he 
spoke as a military chaplain and a Reform rabbi, roles that both he and the military saw as 
complementary. 
The conditions of the Army, Lazaron argued, presented an optimal situation for feeding the 
souls of soldiers. “There is no intimacy like the intimacy of the barracks—it breeds brotherhood,” 
he proclaimed, and as brothers, American men “come instinctively to feel that the big human 
aspirations are the same in all races, nations and creeds. Out there the crown of heroism rested alike 
on brow of Catholic Protestant and Jew…[they] are impatient of prejudice and pettiness and that 
deep down in their hearts our manhood has learned the lesson of human sympathy!”34 Living 
together made American soldiers irritated with and resistant to denominationalism; difference was 
no longer relevant as the soldier “feels that fundamentally all religions are based upon a belief in 
God and a feeling of being responsible to Him,” Lazaron asserted. The American soldier “believes 
that our varying denominations are but the way different groups attempt to describe and interpret 
the God-idea. He believes that our different religious formalities and rituals and ceremonies are but 
the way different groups symbolize and make concrete the religious idea.”35 Lazaron claimed to 
know the mind of the American soldier. Yet rising nativism, anti-Catholicism, and antisemitism of 
the 1920s suggest that his depiction may have reflected an ideal, rather than real, depiction of 
American men, soldiers or civilians. But here too, his rendering of the faith of American men 
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stemmed as much from his own education and commitment to Reform Judaism as it did to his 
experience as a military chaplain and his life as an American male. The language of the “God-idea,” 
the conceptualization of religious formality as symbol, and the insistence on responsibility to God as 
the highest calling of man all reflected key platforms of Reform Judaism.  
Lazaron’s most controversial claim, hidden deeply in the profile of the beliefs of the 
American soldier, not only spurned divine craftsmanship of religious difference but also rebuffed 
any particular religion as correct. The soldier “believes that neither Synagogue nor Church can 
declare itself to be the sole and final representative of God on earth, the recipient of God’s complete 
revelation, vested with the privilege of dispensing salvation. He believes that all men of all creeds 
shall have a portion in the world to come, if they have led lives of goodness and service.”36 Not only 
did Lazaron appeal to religious unity, but he also disclaimed Christ’s power of salvation, perhaps the 
most critical point of contention between Christians and Jews. He resisted Christian language of 
heaven and used Jewish language of “a world to come.” Whether or not his audience noticed, much 
less reacted to, these claims is unclear; that Lazaron felt comfortable making them nevertheless 
indicates that he felt comfortable addressing a mostly Protestant and Catholic audience on behalf of 
the Army chaplaincy as a Jew. At the same time, by softening his declarations with an emphasis on 
morals and ethics—“goodness and service”—as the foundations of religion and post-earthly futures, 
he demonstrated his keen awareness of the military’s developing definition of religion.  
When Lazaron thus concluded his address with an appeal to the Fatherhood of God and 
hence the brotherhood of men already experienced by all soldiers, he recast the military leadership’s 
                                                
36 Morris Lazaron, “Religion for American Manhood.” Catholics of the era would surely have disagreed with 
this statement, for Pope Pius XI dismissed all invitation to participate in pan-Christian movements, much less Christian-
Jewish ones. His 1928 encyclical Mortalium Animos specifically forbade participation in ecumenical groups as “false 
Christianity.” Conservative Protestants and Orthodox Jews would have been similarly skeptical though perhaps less 
resistant than Catholics. On the challenges of interfaith cooperation, see Benny Kraut, “A Wary Collaboration: Jews, 
Catholics, and the Protestant Goodwill Movement,” in Between the Times: The Travail of the Protestant Establishment in 
America, 1900-1960, ed. William R. Hutchison (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 193-228. 
  91 
rejection of sectarian difference in positive, ecclesiastical terms: “Any religious message which would 
claim the minds and hearts of our manhood and soldiery must not only preach God’s Fatherhood 
and man’s brotherhood as a pious phrase but as a consistent theology; must not only proclaim it, but 
live it!”37 With a triumphant call to religious arms, to shame those who “sow seeds of strife among 
us,” and to “declare the truth that we are all of us alike sons of the living God, the loving Father…to 
live that America our blessed land shall be a dwelling place of justice and brotherhood,” Lazaron 
turned the podium over to Brigadier General Charles Martin, the Assistant Chief of Staff, who asked 
the assembled audience to determine methods through which the Army could enhance military-
civilian communities, strengthen American manhood, and make cooperation among religious groups 
as beneficial to the military as possible. 
Over the next day and a half, the group discussed proffered suggestions, appointed 
committees to pursue these new ideas, and agreed upon a set of formal recommendations to 
enhance the chaplaincy. In the summary of pronouncements and findings, the conference made 
clear that the chaplain, unlike the stream of civilian religious workers sent to Europe in World War I, 
supported all soldiers, not just those of his denomination. Appointed and endorsed by religious 
groups, chaplains dedicated their service to more than morale building. While morale contributes 
only to military efficiency, morals and religion support men, citizens, and the nation. The chaplain, 
the conference declared, “is a man true to his own faith; conscientiously respectful of the faith of 
others. He is a living example of both religious faith and religious liberty.” To best embody and live 
this role, the chaplain needed the benefits of regular visits from the Chief of Chaplains, consistent 
contact with his particular denomination, and periodic conferences with other chaplains. The 
military would aid the chaplains and improve their capacity to work with officers and soldiers by 
developing a Chaplains’ Manual, creating a Chaplains’ School, codifying Army Regulations, building 
                                                
37 Morris Lazaron, “Religion for American Manhood.” 
  92 
post chapels, and providing ample equipment. Finally, the group supported petitioning Congress to 
organize the Chaplains’ Corp at full strength to guarantee all men access to a chaplain.38  
A month after the conference ended, when Acting Secretary of War Dwight Davis 
submitted a report to the President, he informed Warren G. Harding that there was “absolute 
unanimity in all pronouncements and findings.” Moreover this unanimity emerged in a “unique” 
context, for the 1923 Conference on Moral and Religious Work in the Army was notable “in that it 
was pansectarian.”39 Although the speeches and discussions did not employ the description 
“pansectarian,” it aptly described Major General John Hines’ view that “Military training develops 
men who have reverence for God and loyalty to the government which they serve.…In the religious 
work of the Army we are gaining a better appreciation of all religions. We know that each expresses 
the common impulses of reverence for and belief in God.”40 As the Army increased its awareness of 
a multitude of religious traditions, it experimented with different expressions of its embrace of 
difference. The summary of conference proceedings most clearly articulated the Army’s 
understanding of the chaplain’s role as the exemplar of both religious faith and religious liberty. 
“Chaplains are commissioned to work for all men without distinction of creed.” Furthermore, “to 
interpret this as meaning that all creeds are alike, or that creed is of no value, is to impose one’s own 
religious beliefs upon others. This is to offend religious liberty, because religious liberty postulates 
religious differences. To wipe out all religious differences, and then claim to be tolerant, has no 
meaning.”41 The conference, in the name of prominent military and civilian leaders, asserted that 
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serving all faiths did not imply collapsing religious differences. It averred that religious diversity 
enhanced, rather obstructed, religious liberty. It adduced the modernist view that individuals could 
retain religious allegiances without impinging on the beliefs of others. As a whole then, the 
conference assumed that the military chaplaincy could overcome the religious factionalization 
occurring in American society and presumed that the chaplaincy possessed the dexterity to move 
between specific religious traditions to promote an ecumenical American religious tradition.  
The Office of the Chief of Chaplains mobilized to follow through on the recommendations 
advanced by the conference. Some were easy to implement. Prior to 1923, Axton had already started 
visiting army posts and he made his tours more regular as well as requested more descriptive reports 
from chaplains and their commanding officers. Some projects required outside resources: in 1924, 
the Congressional Subcommittee on Military Affairs met to hear testimony about increasing the 
number of chaplains. Military and civilian religious leaders faced a much tougher audience when they 
asked Congress to fund additional chaplains.  
Congressman John McKenzie (R-IL), for example, questioned the character and efficacy of 
chaplains. He wondered whether military men of cloth could reach the young men he knew back 
home in Illinois who regularly abandoned church for a lazy Sunday at the fishing hole or to cruise 
around in an automobile. Reverend S.Z. Batten, a spokesperson for the Northern Baptist 
Convention, attempted to allay McKenzie’s fears, emphasizing that he and his fellow clergy wanted 
only the best men to serve as chaplains. He testified that a military chaplain ought to be “a man of 
ability…a man of initiative.” But McKenzie interrupted him to ask “Do you draw the line between 
ministers who belong to the new school of evolution, as against those who do not believe in it?” 
Batten deflected this query, asserting that evolution lay beyond the scope or provenance of 
chaplains: “[M]y feeling is that a man who would go in as a chaplain and would harp on that 
question in one way or another is just the type of man we do not want as a chaplain. We want men 
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there who represent the larger religious life and who will avoid all purely trifling questions.” 
Apparently satisfied, McKenzie agreed with Batten that evolution represented a “trifling” issue, 
allowed him to step down, and listened to testimony by other denominational representatives who 
supported the legislation to increase the number of chaplains in the army.42 Construing evolution, 
which would become a national controversy in the Scopes Trial a year later, as a mere “trifling” 
matter illustrates the degree to which military and civilian supporters of the chaplaincy committed 
themselves to avoiding religious quarrels. If they could sidestep the most pressing religious, 
educational, and social issue of the day, then chaplains could certainly dodge deep but less publicly 
fraught theological debates. 
For instructions on how to behave, chaplains could finally turn to a manual. On the first 
official day of work in 1926, Major General John Hines formally ordered the printing of the Army’s 
first official training manual for chaplains, The Chaplain: His Place and Duties. The 73-page document 
offered contextual, philosophical, and practical advice. After a short history of the chaplaincy from 
ancient to modern times, the manual defined the role of the chaplain, outlined qualifications, and 
delineated duties. The four main tasks of the chaplain consisted of (1) providing military personnel 
with opportunities for public worship; (2) offering “spiritual ministration, moral counsel, and 
religious guidance” to soldiers, officers, and their families; (3) championing religious rationales for 
moral thought and ethical behavior; and (4) promoting character building.43 
To accomplish these goals, the manual identified important characteristics of chaplains, 
listing the “personal qualifications” chaplains needed in addition to the physical stamina and abilities 
required by all military personnel: attention to duty, tact, initiative, intelligence and judgment, force, 
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and leadership. Chaplains must possess “the ability to put oneself into another man’s place” and be 
“judiciously minded—to play the game according to the rules.” In other words, empathy exists only 
within the contours of “that much-to-be-coveted reputation for square dealing.” The most extensive 
category, leadership, attempted to describe the personality of an excellent chaplain candidate. 
Struggling to find appropriate language, the section suggested the presence of an “indefinable quality 
which makes people follow him.” Dismissing “magnetism” as a “misnomer,” the Army guide insists 
that the chaplain must “be able to attract and hold and permanently influence for good the 
personnel within his pastoral charge.” In other words, the ideal chaplain would persuade soldiers to 
commit to religion and conform to military procedures; flamboyant preachers, whether emulating 
the dazzlingly real Aimee Semple McPherson or the fictional notoriety of Elmer Gantry, would not 
suffice.44 Settling for a parade of attributes that coalesce into the ideal military chaplain, the 
handbook grasped for an appropriate designation, one that effectively echoes Max Weber’s 
understanding of charismatic authority.45 According to Weber, “the charismatically qualified 
leader…is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary 
qualities.” For the military’s purposes, the chaplain must, above all, bring a forceful personality 
capable of mobilizing the spirit of the divine for all members of the unit. 
As befit a manual that emerged from the discussions of the 1923 Conference on Morals and 
Religion in the Army, it promoted a capacious understanding of the divine and associated religious 
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traditions. Section five, “Religious Observances,” bluntly stated, “officers and soldiers in the Army 
represent all forms of faith and hold every known religious view.”46 While this certainly exaggerated 
the range of spiritual practices and doctrinal beliefs found among servicemen, it also bespoke a 
dedication to religion writ large. Even without representatives from the entire spectrum of world 
religions, the military positioned itself as a supporter of religious diversity beyond the religions 
known and accepted by the American public. Indeed, for weekly services, funerals, weddings, and 
other ritual occasions, “the United States Government clearly expects each chaplain to be 
conscientious in the performance of his sacred duties and to maintain a high ideal of his obligations 
to all religious needs of his military family.” There were, however, limits to this ideal. For example, 
the mandate to hold two services on a base every Sunday applied regardless of whether the 
chaplain’s denomination would regularly schedule two services during that period. The guide 
cautioned chaplains that the religious backgrounds of soldiers may vary not only according to 
denominations but also by degree of devotion. Accordingly, chaplains should prepare themselves to 
address an audience ready to receive his words and to appeal to an audience composed of those less 
interested in the word of God.47 The manual’s behavioral directives made clear that particular beliefs, 
provided they fell within a theological orbit recognized by the military—primarily but not exclusively 
the Protestant, Catholic, Christian Science, and Jewish traditions—mattered little; an ability to 
inculcate accepted standards of morality, a capacity to imbue spirituality, and a facility to work with 
the many, not the few, mattered most. 
The generous religious outlook advanced by the Army did, however, have limits. When the 
War Department convened another military-civilian conference on religion and morals in the Army, 
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it labeled it the 1926 Pan-Denominational Conference. Secretary of War Dwight Davis announced, 
“we have invited representatives from every religious body in the country. You have assembled here 
without distinction of creed, dogma, race, or color….Minor differences of thought are thrust aside 
and here we have a united Church – united in the love of God and the love of country. Truly, this 
gathering is of great significance.”48 As in 1923, the list of over 140 attendees included clergy and lay 
leaders from an array of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish denominational bodies, endorsing agencies, 
and welfare organizations such as the YMCA, the Knights of Columbus, and the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union. Unlike in 1923, more African-American church leaders, women, and 
Congressional chaplains attended as well.  
But atheists were not invited. When asked, Davis informed the American Association for the 
Advancement of Atheism (AAAA) that he had summoned only “a selected list of men and women 
who had already shown their deep interest in [moral and religious training] activities.” Dr. Charles 
Smith, the president of the AAAA, insisted that the atheist group was committed to the goals of the 
conference and pleaded with Davis to allow a representative of his organization to attend. Axton in 
turn recommended that Davis reinforce the religious nature of the meeting, noting, “it is not a 
gathering for the discussion of questions which are in controversy.” Given that the atheists’ 
association had been agitating for the military to cease paying chaplains’ salaries, Axton’s emphasis 
on avoiding controversy was not unwarranted. Nevertheless, the exchange among Davis, Smith, and 
Axton underscores that a belief in God circumscribed the chaplaincy’s openness to religious 
diversity.49 
Though larger than the 1923 conference, many of the individuals who assembled in the 
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auditorium of the Interior Department on May 4, 1926 would have recognized one another. The 
majority of 1923 conference-goers returned, and many of the newcomers participated in gatherings 
sponsored by the Federal Council of Churches. When they sat down to listen to the opening session, 
familiar faces beckoned from the podium. The Honorable Dwight Davis, Secretary of War, Major 
General John Hines, Chief of Staff, and Rabbi Morris Lazaron again greeted the assembly. Davis 
dramatically framed the military’s commitment to religion and thus the importance of the Pan-
Denominational Conference: “The Army’s entire system of training is based upon the principle that 
the future prosperity of the nation demands an educated citizenry in which love of country, 
veneration of its institutions, and love of God, predominate….Without a virile, honest and 
Godfearing youth, as strong in moral courage as in physical makeup, a nation is doomed to early 
oblivion.”50 With the name of the conference announcing its premise—the vital commitment to a 
broad religious foundation—the speakers dwelled less on comprehensive contours of American 
religion and more on the creeping threat that certain strains of religion posed to the military.  
By the mid-1920s, pacifist thought had entered the terrain of almost all major American 
religious groups.51 The military perceived this mode of thought as perilous, threatening to citizen and 
soldier alike. As religious organizations debated whether their clergy ought to serve in the military as 
chaplains, the military and its representatives attacked what they saw as narrow-minded, pacifist 
religion. Lazaron argued that opposition to national defense was short-sighted and, more 
importantly, he spoke for the chaplains in the room when he maintained that “we come here too, as 
ministers of God who devoutly believe that because a man wears the uniform is no reason to deny 
him the ministry and inspiration of religion.” Clergy must agree that all men, soldiers or not, 
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deserved access to religion. Lay supporters of military ministry understood this well, he claimed. 
They “recognize[d] the true nature and value of the exalted office of Chaplain. You have summoned 
us here not as a pious gesture to appease the tongues of criticism, but because you honestly believe 
in the things for which we stand; because you deeply feel that you have a tremendous obligation to 
the parents of the land as well as to the boys and men in the service themselves.”52 A mere three 
years after his address on “Religion for American Manhood,” Lazaron could assume that disparate 
faith traditions could and would work together. He could no longer assume, however, that they 
would support military religion. As a result, he celebrated those who understood that citizenship 
incorporated responsibilities as well as rights. From the military’s perspective, then, religious 
organizations may have had the right to speak in support of pacifism, but they also had the 
responsibility to serve the souls of soldiers, to continue to endorse clergy as chaplains, to provide 
fighting men with pathways to God.   
Following Lazaron’s short speech, Hines reiterated the military’s commitment to cooperating 
with and learning from civilian life. Just as the military adopted the best business practices, he 
remarked, so too should it borrow the best religious practices. He implored the audience to “show 
us how we may spread throughout the Army a clearer idea of religion, a spirit of moderation and 
tolerance, a keener desire to understand and do the will of God.”53 Moderation and tolerance no 
longer referred only to the flattening of sectarian difference; three years later, moderation and 
tolerance applied to the lenses through which religious groups viewed the military. Because of the 
challenges religion posed to the military enterprise, Army leaders stood ready to listen to civilian 
advice. The next morning, Brigadier General Campbell King, the head of Army personnel, reminded 
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the conference that the military had listened and enacted many of the recommendations from 1923.  
In response, the conference pledged its commitment to the chaplaincy and offered the 
military a list of suggestions, some new and some recognizable from the past. In addition to 
affirming the importance of chaplains retaining contact with their denominations, civilian leaders 
suggested that the military ought to present and promote the chaplaincy to religious groups. In this 
way, the military could assertively frame its religious work rather than defensively respond to attacks 
by pacifists. Nicer chapels, postgraduate training, and a professional chaplain journal would augment 
the work of chaplains, while standardizing use of the Army and Navy Hymnal and improving the 
quality of services would enrich religious experiences for soldiers.54 The chaplains endorsed 
“chaplain” as the primary form of address, rejecting both appellations of rank and sectarian forms of 
address as unnecessary and counterproductive for their work.55 In designating “chaplain” as the 
correct title, the group expressed their autonomy from both typical religious formulas and ordinary 
military procedures. They implicitly declared that their unique military-religious designation trumped 
both religious categories and military hierarchy, simultaneously distancing themselves from standard 
forms of religious and military authority and immersing themselves in their own particular 
ecclesiastical and martial role. 
In addition, the mixed military and civilian group confirmed their dual commitment to peace 
and to the U.S. Army. First, they identified themselves as “ministers of religion in conference 
assembled and representative of the Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish faiths.” Second, they 
pledged “whole-hearted devotion to the cause of peace and the further promotion of the principles 
of justice, both at home and among all the nations of the world.” Finally, they characterized the 
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chaplaincy as an “essentially…peaceful” vocation for which they “repudiate[d] as wholly untrue, 
even the inference that the United States Army uniform is a vestment only of war and not of peace. 
We believe that war is caused by the failure of men to obey the laws of God. It is our function and 
high calling to lead them to observe these laws more fully.”56 Religion, the 1926 Pan-
Denominational Conference insisted, hungered for peace, yearned for justice, and buttressed war 
only when necessary. 
If chaplains dedicated themselves to the causes of peace and justice, the former was easier to 
accomplish in the relatively halcyon days of the mid-1920s. In contrast, justice, especially when 
understood as racial equality in the United States, presented an impossibility in a military far more 
comfortable with religious heterogeneity than racial diversity. Inasmuch as Axton repeatedly 
reminded his chaplains and other correspondents that a chaplain of one religious background could 
serve soldiers of different religious beliefs, the same commitment did not cross racial lines. The army 
remained segregated. During the interwar years, one African-American chaplain, Alexander Thomas, 
served as the post chaplain at Fort Benning, Georgia where he coordinated the religious life of 850 
black soldiers. When queried by the YMCA about services for African Americans, Axton 
characterized Thomas as “an exceptionally capable colored man [who] yields tremendous influence 
with his regiment.”57 Thomas served in the same capacity as other chaplains of his time—and, by 
Axton’s word, met the standards set by military—but his authority and impact extended only to men 
who shared his skin color. Leaders of the National Baptist, African Methodist Episcopal (AME), 
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and African Methodist Episcopal (AMEZ) churches were invited to and attended the major 
conferences in the 1920s. Yet while the War Department deliberately encouraged a podium of 
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish speakers, it did not ask African-American clergy to move beyond 
the audience.  
The Navy cultivated and prided itself on an even more elite officer corps than the Army; this 
conceit mixed with racism to deride the possibility of non-white chaplains. While Catholics could 
present the credentials that appealed to the Navy, the Navy did not find all Catholics acceptable. In 
1930, George Waring, a chaplain who went on to work for the Military Ordinariate, wrote to Navy 
Chief of Chaplains Sydney Evans, to inquire about how to handle a Filipino priest’s chaplain 
application. He enclosed a photograph of the priest and said, “As it is the first application of a 
Philippine to become a Navy Chaplain, I thought I would write to you to find out what is the 
attitude of the Department regarding such an appointment, before replying to Father Rodriquez’s 
letter.” Evans replied the next day, advising Waring of the priest’s incompatibility with Navy needs. 
“I regret to inform you that the Navy Department does not deem it advisable to consider the 
question of Father Rodriquez’s appointment at this time. All Navy Chaplains must be able to 
officiate anywhere, and as ministers must be acceptable, in theory at any rate, to all officers and men 
in the Navy. This would not be true in the case of a Chaplain who was a Filipino,” he wrote. “If the 
Corps were much larger such an appointment might be considered, but at present it is out of the 
question.”58 While the Navy endorsed a more minimal pluralism than the Army, it nonetheless 
promoted an ecumenical religious environment in which Protestant and Catholic chaplains could 
care for one another’s flocks. But a Filipino Catholic, like an African-American Protestant, could not 
cross these boundaries. More importantly, the Navy would not impose even its limited notions of 
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toleration on race, it would not insist that a Filipino Catholic priest could be acceptable to all even 
“in theory” or as ordered by the Naval command. Interfaith cooperation thus ceased at the 
intractable color line. 
 
Alliances: The Military Chaplaincy and Civilian Interfaith Organizations 
Under the vaulted ceilings of Washington’s National Cathedral, during the depths of the 
Depression, a handful of leading DC clergy decided to invite every local religious leader to join them 
in strengthening religious life in the city. They possessed an expansive view of religion and included 
such faith traditions beyond the common trilogy of Protestant Catholic and Jew, as Christian 
Scientists, Latter Day Saints, Quakers, Russian Orthodox, and Seventh-Day Adventists. The 
participation of two of Washington’s leading rabbis, Solomon Metz of the then-Orthodox Adas 
Israel Congregation and Abram Simon of the Reform Washington Hebrew Congregation, 
demonstrated an awareness of Jewish religious diversity. And perhaps most surprisingly for the 
segregated nation’s capital, the committee also sought out and invited African-American clergy from 
different churches. Despite prevailing racial and religious intolerance of the 1930s, Washington DC’s 
clergy championed a citywide program of cooperative religious outreach and uplift through a newly-
formed Committee on Religious Life in the Nation’s Capital (CRLNC). As the efforts of CRLNC 
demonstrate, by the mid-1930s, voluntary religious associations began to map military ideas onto 
civilian life. 
At an organizational meeting eight months later, in January 1935, a larger group resolved to 
hold “a meeting for Ministers of all communions to be held in some neutral place that is appropriate 
and central, with four speakers representing the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths and a high 
officer of the government.” The latter addition was no accident, for the Committee had also 
determined that “the movement will include in its scope all races, creeds, parties, and groups, but as 
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over half of the people in the District are mainly dependent upon government employment…it will 
naturally give special attention to the needs of government employees.”59 In its effort to lead the 
District’s citizenry to embrace the doctrines and practices of religious traditions and to sanctify 
religion as a pillar of American democracy, this nascent interfaith and interracial group recognized 
Washington as a unique city, one built upon and fortified by the business of government. 
Four of the nation’s state-supported clergy—the Army and Navy Chiefs of Chaplain as well 
as the Senate and House Chaplains—served on the CRLNC. They helped the fledgling organization 
gain access to the otherwise closed civil service and military address lists. By the mid-1930s, military 
and civilian branches of government began opening high-level positions to religious minorities while 
remaining racially segregated. However, the military—and the Army in particular—had been 
explicitly grappling with the management of religious diversity for almost two decades. Indeed, the 
Committee’s emphasis on the shared goal of a robust religious life strengthened rather than 
weakened by religious diversity echoed the War Department’s perspective on the military chaplaincy 
articulated a dozen years earlier. The military was of course not the only organization anticipating 
interfaith cooperation; in the 1920s, the National Council (later, Conference) of Christians and Jews 
(NCCJ) also began to chart out terrain in which religion united rather than divided American society. 
Yet the NCCJ also benefited from military contacts: not only was one of its founders Secretary of 
War during World War I, but many former military chaplains contributed their experiences and 
multifaith clerical networks. 
The nativism, antisemitism, and anti-Catholicism of the 1920s generated a counter-
movement, a cascade of “goodwill” efforts that attempted to build coalitions across religions and 
collaborate to improve social welfare and stem discrimination. In 1928, the most enduring 
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organization, NCCJ, began promoting tolerance in a bid to transform American society. As historian 
Kevin Schultz has documented, the NCCJ was more than a “wary collaboration” among Protestants, 
Catholics, and Jews. Rather, under the leadership of Presbyterian minister Everett Clinchy, the group 
strove to “make Protestants better Protestants, Catholics better Catholics, and Jews better Jews” 
while explaining differences and highlighting similarities in order to diminish sources of conflict, 
animosity, and prejudice.60 Most importantly—and quite differently than earlier iterations of 
goodwill organizations—the NCCJ started as a tri-faith union, embedding the idea into its 
administrative structure by insisting on Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish co-chairs. When Clinchy 
needed a Protestant co-chairman, he immediately thought of Newton Baker. In trying to appeal to 
the former Secretary of War, Clinchy opted for flattery, remarking, “we need you because of what 
your name stands for in American life.” But he also pointed out what made Baker stand out from 
other prominent Protestants. “I happen to know,” Clinchy divulged, “that the Jews of America trust 
you and respect you as only a few of our nation’s leaders have gained their confidence. Will you 
permit me to propose your name?”61 Baker’s war work, and effort at religious inclusion as politician 
and leader in Cleveland, made him far more amenable to a minority religious group than many other 
leading Protestants. 
Baker agreed to lend his name and mind to the project. He pressed the group to maintain a 
multi-denominational, rather than nonsectarian, outlook. On a draft manuscript of Sunday School 
material, he rejected hedging as feeble and ineffectual. “A Christian ought to believe in Christianity, 
just as a Mohammedan should believe in Mohammedanism and a Jew in Judaism,” he wrote. “To 
introduce a lot of whereases and perhaps into the expression in the finality of one’s religious faith 
may be a polite concession, but it seems to me to be a disloyalty.” Instead, he expected all 
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believers—be they Catholics, Jews, Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, or any other 
distinct entity—to believe their religion to be whole and true. “And if they do believe that,” he 
asked, “how can they possibly be asked to adopt a detached, speculative and deferential attitude on 
the subject.”62 Much like Secretary of War Dwight Davis asserted to chaplains in the 1920s that 
religious liberty depended on religious difference, so too did Newton Baker articulate a view of 
religious toleration that rested on religious distinction. The War Department proved a viable training 
ground for the interfaith work of the NCCJ, tacitly teaching its leadership the value of recognizing 
rather than excising religious diversity as well as bracing them for a barrage of criticism. When 
personally attacked by anti-Catholics and antisemites who disdained his cooperation with other 
faiths, Baker mischievously replied, “I propose that you pray for me and I will pray for you and the 
God in whom we both believe will probably then give the greater influence to that one of us whose 
spirit is most in accord with His divine will.”63 
In an effort to bring Baker’s calm resilience to the nation, the NCCJ initiated its first 
signature action: the tolerance trio. As Clinchy described it, “we are giving a practical demonstration 
that a Roman Catholic priest, a rabbi of a synagogue, and [a] Protestant cleric can live together 
harmoniously in a suitcase for seven weeks.”64 The rabbi was Morris Lazaron who, from his World 
War I chaplain days onward, dedicated himself to interfaith collaboration while the priest, Father 
John Elliott Ross, joined the group from the University of Iowa. Together, they modeled civil 
discussion of religious tropes, stereotypes, and fears while promoting the common ground shared by 
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. In this way, the NCCJ built on the work of the chaplaincy, carrying 
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the views and messages discussed at conferences in the 1920s to a larger national audience in the 
1930s. Over time, the NCCJ broadened its reach through seminars, pamphlets, films, and 
Brotherhood Weeks, all of which eventually made their way into military environs over the next 
decade.65 The military thus served as both instigator and recipient of the tri-faith message broadcast 
by the NCCJ.  
As an early adopter and a receptive host of interfaith ventures, the chaplaincy linked 
grassroots organizing to the state apparatus. The Committee on Religious Life in the Nation’s 
Capital underscored the importance of the military’s religious program in creating access to avenues 
of power. The CRLNC directed its efforts toward government employees, but needed names and 
addresses of its target population. The presence of military and Congressional chaplains lent 
credence to their effort and material support to their plans. The Navy, for example, merrily provided 
the group with a list of DC newcomers.66 In contrast, Leonard White, the Commissioner of the U.S. 
Civil Service, notified the group that officially policy instructed the office “not to furnish lists of 
federal employees to outside organizations or agencies.” But he would make an exception “in view 
of the purpose sought by the Committee on Religious Life in the Nation’s Capital.”67 More 
importantly, the CRLNC hosted annual mass meetings in Constitution Hall, for which it asked the 
Army and Navy Chiefs of Chaplains to participate. It also used notable politicians to spread its 
message of religious cooperation. In 1935, for example, Secretary of State Cordell Hull addressed the 
gathering. When securing coverage from NBC, the CRLNC assured the media outlet that “at this 
particular time when there are such extremes of intolerance, as far as the churches are concerned, 
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both in Germany and in Russia, the message of the Secretary of State before a gathering at the 
national Capital, of Jews, Protestants and Catholics will be a matter of national and perhaps 
international significance.”68  
Collaborative efforts like the CRLNC arose in tandem with the NCCJ and exemplified the 
importance of Washington connections in promoting religious tolerance and toleration. Military 
chaplains often participated in more symbolic than substantive roles, yet even minor contributions 
helped cement military-civilian alliances. Cultivating these partnerships enabled the chaplaincy to test 
its religious message and expand its reach beyond military personnel to the broader American public. 
During the 1930s, then, an array of organizations and institutions began to prime Americans to 
accept the ecumenical worldview and moral monotheism embraced by the state through the military 
chaplaincy.  
 
Ministering to Roosevelt’s Tree Army: The Military Chaplaincy and the CCC 
Saving the banks was a priority for the President-elect as he journeyed to Washington, DC 
days before his inauguration in March 1933. America had experienced depressions before, of course, 
but none had so thoroughly shaken the economic and social foundations of the United States. 
Rampant speculation decimated corporations; farmers wrung their hands as prices plummeted and 
credit froze; workers found themselves unemployed, on the brink of losing their homes and 
scavenging for food. Calamity supplanted panic as swelling poverty overwhelmed local benevolent 
institutions, no longer able to assist adequately millions facing desperate conditions without 
resources. The day Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office marked more than an inauguration of a 
president. It harkened the inauguration of a national rescue effort, one ultimately defined as much by 
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intransigence and failure as by compromise and success.69 But before Roosevelt uttered the oath of 
office with his hand resting on a 1686 Dutch Bible, on the train ride to his new home, the patrician 
Episcopalian told his Catholic campaign advisor that religious faith would buoy the American 
people. That sentiment sustained him as he rallied Congress to open the banks, secure farms, create 
jobs, build infrastructure, and resuscitate the country.70 
For Roosevelt in 1933, faith was private, religion a personal matter best left to man and his 
maker. But when he ad-libbed the language of his inaugural address on the dais, changing “this is a 
day of consecration” to “this is a day of national consecration,” he shifted from a personal sense of 
the sacred to the sanctification of secular politics. Roosevelt was not the first president to invite 
religion into the civic space. Thanking the divine and asking for providential blessings was part and 
parcel of the presidential repertoire. Lincoln, the only formally unchurched leader, had used the 
same rhetoric of consecration at Gettysburg, recognizing the role of dead Civil War soldiers in 
ushering in new freedoms. Roosevelt also needed faith to forestall fear long enough to bring about a 
national economic recovery. Little did the chaplaincy know on that cold and gray inauguration day 
that it would become a significant engine of spiritual solace and moral suasion. 
The chaplaincy, constrained like the rest of the military by the moribund economy and 
isolationist politics, was about to embark on a grand experiment. Six months earlier, chaplains 
staffing Civilian Military Training Camps (CMTC) in dual roles as religious leaders and post bankers, 
observed a ninety-percent decline in the amount of money deposited with them as well as a sharp 
decrease in valuables men brought to camp. Nevertheless, they claimed, “the scarcity of funds did 
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not have a depressing effect on the students. They seemed to accept the condition as a matter of 
course, due to general economic depression.”71 The Depression altered the chaplains’ behavior as 
well, for fewer chaplains than ever attended the annual meeting in Baltimore amidst a deluge of 
spring rain in 1933.72 In a matter of months, however, New Deal legislation would rescue the 
chaplaincy. By mid-spring 1933, a flurry of correspondence began as military and civilian religious 
leaders began to implement the much-discussed ecumenical vision of the 1920s. Less than a month 
after he took office, Roosevelt signed legislation creating the Civilian Conservation Corps. Officially 
intended to protect forests, counter soil erosion, control flooding, and create access to nature, the 
public works program hired and housed young men. As Roosevelt predicted in his proposal to 
Congress, by July, over 250,000 men were employed and deployed to over 1300 camps around the 
country. Over its decade-long existence, 2.5 million American men would participate in the CCC. 
Managing this effort required the cooperation of multiple federal agencies, including the 
departments of labor, agriculture, the interior, and war. Only the Army had the capacity to handle 
the manpower and personnel needs—screening, selecting, transporting, housing, feeding, and 
clothing—required by the camps. Sixteen years after the United States mobilized its army for World 
War I, the War Department mobilized FDR’s Tree Army.73 
The CCC camps attempted to solve two problems simultaneously: creating employment 
opportunities for a desperately out-of-work population and developing sustainable strategies to 
preserve the nation’s natural resources. But the program, focused as it was on unmarried men 
between the ages of 18 and 25, also presented itself as an effort in character-building and 
citizenship-training. As historian Margot Canaday has demonstrated, CCC camps were “state-created 
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enclaves of male intimacy” that framed its population as family men by requiring them to give most 
of their earnings to “dependents”—most frequently their parents or siblings.74 As such, they were 
places to impress particular state-sanctioned values upon men, not the least of which was religion. 
Roosevelt promised Congress and the nation that the benefits of the CCC included “moral and 
spiritual value” as creating work for the unemployed masses would “eliminate to some extent at least 
the threat that enforced idleness brings to spiritual and moral stability.”75 Chaplains thus acquired a 
new role: stewarding the religious life of the CCC camps, which in turn conserved and preserved the 
military chaplaincy. 
As the Army took on the CCC camp administration, the chaplaincy assumed responsibility 
for religion and welfare. A Federal Council of Churches recruiting brochure made this goal plain. It 
challenged “Christian Citizens” to help not only the 220,000 men in the Army and Navy but the 
“310,000 recently added reasons: the youth in the conservation camps.” The chaplain’s primary 
purpose, the funding appeal stated, was “to instill true religion into the hearts of the men he serves. 
This will be evidenced in strengthened character, right relation with God, and fitness for individual 
and social obligations.”76 Like the soldiers who served in World War I, the millions of Americans 
who fulfilled stints in the CCC camps came from a range of backgrounds. James McEntee, first an 
executive assistant and then the CCC’s second director, described the camp population in terms that 
would become familiar during World War II. “They are from farms and cities, from Catholic, 
Protestant, and Jewish homes, from English, German, Irish, Italian, Polish, Swedish, French, and 
Indian ancestries. Some are illiterates, some college students.” No matter their backgrounds, 
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however, “they have a new experience when they are all thrown together in the CCC. They must 
learn to live with other men of all faiths and backgrounds. They must learn to be tolerant of the 
opinions and respectful of the rights of others.”77 To accomplish these goals, the nation needed 
more chaplains and more money to bolster their work. 
Chaplains modeled this goal through their own behavior, though occasionally some needed 
reminders about how to proceed or at least how to ensure young men read their actions correctly. 
Early in the CCC camp experiment, Army Chief of Chaplains Julian Yates received a message from 
the director of the National Lutheran Council informing him that a Lutheran lad had alleged “‘the 
services of a Protestant Chaplain or minister in that camp are not to be had. He furthermore states 
that the only spiritual ministration is given by a Catholic Priest who in his zeal, it is claimed, 
endeavors to have some of the boys turn Catholic.’” Proselytization was unacceptable, and Yates 
forwarded the letter to the local chaplain so that he would conduct himself with proper neutrality. 
“Possibly the accusation of proselytizing efforts are wholly imaginary,” Yates acknowledged, “but 
the Chaplaincy of the U.S. Army has always steered a safe distance from even the appearance of 
such a practice and I am sure you will not be the exception.”78 Four years later, then-Army Chief of 
Chaplains Alva Brasted explained, the chaplain’s “work is not denominational. This is not saying 
that a chaplain cannot hold a meeting especially for one group, but he must not fail to minister 
spiritually to all groups he serves.”79 On occasion, Brasted also had to remind some chaplains about 
the reach of their service. In one case, he recognized as exemplary that one Chaplain Jenkins had 
arranged for all the Protestant services in each of his camps, but nevertheless remarked, “it is also 
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his responsibility to see that Catholic services are held.”80 
For the three Chiefs of Chaplains who served during the duration of the CCC—Julian Yates 
(Baptist), Alva Brasted (Baptist), and William Arnold (Catholic)—encouraging interfaith work was 
easy and obvious while harnessing the chaplain supply effectively proved to be the most difficult and 
constant challenge. In 1933, the Army Chief of Chaplains had 125 Regular Army chaplains at his 
disposal, hardly sufficient for the expanding CCC camp system. Chaplains in the Reserve Corps 
numbered 1200, and they provided one solution to the ever-present provisioning issue. But their 
availability varied, because they usually held ministerial positions in congregations that expected their 
presence. A September 1933 report from the Federal Council’s General Committee on Army and 
Navy Chaplains announced, for example, “the continuation of the Conservation Camps through the 
winter makes it important that the places of Reserve Chaplains who have been carrying on the work 
during the summer months, but who will need to return to their pastorates in the fall, shall be filled 
by other Chaplains not otherwise employed.”81  
As the primary source of Protestant chaplains, the General Committee consistently proposed 
using civilian clergymen to augment the work of military chaplains. In fact, Roy B. Guild, the 
organization’s executive secretary, thought the CCC camps could provide relief for unemployed 
clergy as well as unemployed young men. He wrote to Chief of Chaplains Yates to encourage him to 
pay 75 to 100 “very capable” jobless ministers as “temporary chaplains” in order to aid the War 
Department in fulfilling its goals to fortify religion in the CCC.82 To Guild’s presumed dismay, Yates 
replied, “I am sorry to say there is no authority for the employment of civilians for welfare work 
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(including religious activities) in the Conservation Camps.”83 Although some civilian pastors were 
ably assisting chaplains as volunteers, paid work was restricted to authorized chaplains. Notably, the 
General Committee saw a “decided increase” in applicants to the Army reserve chaplaincy after the 
CCC camps opened. Over the first seven months of 1933, 122 prospective military ministers 
contacted them, and 66 percent did so after the opening of Camp Roosevelt in Virginia’s George 
Washington National Forest in mid-April 1933.84 Five years later, by April 1938, Reserve Chaplains 
presided over five times the number of worship services than Regular Chaplains.85 
Outfitting the Army with additional reserve chaplains did not resolve all the logistical 
problems associated with the CCC camps, however. The biggest obstacle was distance. The CCC 
divided the country into nine Corps Areas, and many chaplains received assignments to serve up to 
20 camps within broad geographic territories. E. Story Hildreth, a civilian Congregationalist minister 
in Connecticut, complained about the volume of work chaplains faced. He was trying to assist by 
volunteering his time and services in local camps, but observed the pitfalls of this work. “I don’t 
envy the Chaplains in charge of the work in Vermont. I am told that he has over a dozen camps 
already, and more to follow – and no appropriation,” Hildreth complained. “He is probably rather 
busy. I was rather busy, too, before this extra duty was thrust upon me, but I’ll help.”86 Somewhat 
resigned to the state of affairs, Hildreth observed and expressed a microscopic version of what 
chaplains in the American West faced. In California, Rabbi David Greenberg—a rabbi turned part-
time chaplain—described the conditions he confronted in the Fresno, California area: “The roads, 
for the most part, were one lane, unpaved, generally gravel and, in some places, just hard-packed 
                                                
83 Julian E. Yates to Roy Guild, June 19, 1933, RG 247 (1920-1945), Box 69, Folder 080 (General Committee, 
Volume 1), NARA II. 
84 Report of the General Committee on Army and Navy Chaplains, September 21, 1933, RG 247 (1920-1945), 
Box 69, Folder 080 (General Committee, Volume 1), NARA II. 
85 Gushwa, The Best and Worst of Times, 66. 
86 E. Story Hildreth to Federal Council (written on back of financial appeal), 1933, RG 247 (1920-1945), Box 
69, Folder 080 (General Committee, Volume 1), NARA II. 
  115 
dirt.” In April 1935, he found the mountain roads impassable “due to flood and road conditions…I 
would be traveling on a one lane mountain road with a drop of several hundred feet at the edge into 
a valley. The column of flash flood waters would start racing down the road ahead of me and I 
would have to back up the road for a quarter of a mile to a place where I could turn around and 
head for home.”87 Weather could be “a great handicap” and transportation “very vexing,” which in 
turn upheld the importance of paid chaplains rather than volunteer clergy because civilian “pastors 
should not be expected to travel the hazardous trails in such a winter as this.”88 
Geography and weather played significant roles in CCC work because the government 
tasked the chaplains with so many camps. As the District Chaplain in Minnesota, Alva Brasted 
oversaw the work of chaplains in 62 camps while William Arnold presided over chaplains in Texas, 
Arizona, and New Mexico while personally attending to 20 camps.89 Chaplain Richard Braunstien 
(Methodist) aptly characterized this work within the history of his own denominational tradition. In 
“The Circuit Rider Returns,” he wrote, “the soul of Francis Asbury marches on” in the form of the 
CCC chaplain.90 In automobiles rather than astride horses, CCC chaplains traversed the country, 
demonstrating the state’s faith in faith.  
The limited number of clergy available to tend to the men flung across the country created 
opportunities for creative chaplains to use newer technologies to reach more men. David 
Greenberg, the Fresno rabbi, teamed up with a Catholic priest and Episcopalian minister to develop 
a weekly radio program: the Radio Forum of Better Understanding. Despite the clunky name, the 
show lasted seventeen years. The religious triad—much like the NCCJ’s traveling trios—offered 
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commentary on the “religious understanding of the three faiths” and encouraged men of faith to talk 
to one another and share their religious experiences. Whether CCC listeners found the show 
stimulating for its content or simply because “men stationed in lonely outposts” appreciated 
company in the wilderness, the CCC demonstrated that interfaith cooperation on a larger military 
scale was possible.91 The Chaplains’ Association encouraged its members to lead “non-sectarian” 
services: “Catholics, Protestants, and Jews should be made welcome, and the service should be 
sufficiently broad in its scope as to allow all to attend without embarrassment.” What exactly that 
service entailed remained shrouded in mystery, but circulars, bulletins, and articles consistently 
encouraged inclusive pastoral care.92 
The prominence of character-building among the CCC’s goals made ecumenical activities 
more attainable, since religious worship constituted only one dimension of the chaplain’s work. 
Chief of Chaplains Brasted emphasized this role when he reconfigured the fours Cs of the Civilian 
Conservation Corps Camps to refer to “counsel, consecration, cooperation, [and] character,” the 
tasks to which he held the chaplains under his command. More specifically, he enumerated the 
values he expected chaplains to inculcate. “Our task is to help men build into their personalities 
faith, courage, honesty, reliability, self-control, unselfishness, love, and all the essential parts of our 
highest character,” he wrote in a column for The Army Chaplain. “We are workers together with the 
Divine Architect in perfecting this spiritual building.” The attributes he prized, much like Benjamin 
Franklin’s list of personal virtues, reflected the ecumenical orientation of moral monotheism. 
Trained at the University of Chicago’s Divinity School, Brasted disavowed denominationalism and 
bigotry to focus on a collaborative effort “with all my comrades of all Churches in the work of the 
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Kingdom.”93 Tinged with Christianity’s worldview of building a Kingdom of God, Brasted could not 
escape his own Protestant mores.  
At times Brasted issued orders that seemed to contradict his own assertions of 
broadmindedness. He allowed that “not all Army officers are professing Christians” but, he 
continued, “I have never found a commanding officer who did not profess to be a believer in God.” 
That such believers may observe rituals differently or perform different rituals escaped his 
consideration. On the matter of worship services, for example, he proffered strict instructions. “The 
proper time for the formal service of worship is on Sunday morning. There can be no good 
substitute for this. Not even the popular Sunday evening service.”94 Without offering either a 
theological or practical justification for this position, he ignored the fact that not all religions or 
denominations hold Sunday morning sacred.  
The rhetoric of non-denominationalism masked Protestant assumptions. Take, for example, 
the “unique club” started by Chaplain Louis C. LaMotte (Presbyterian USA). He printed 
membership cards for the “Civilian Conservation Corps Christian Code Comrades.” The group 
asked men to pledge, “As a Christian man, enrolled in the CCC, I promise, trusting in God for help, 
to endeavor to live an upright life.” Men needed to “strive to be true to my religious convictions,” 
but the language understood that faith in Protestant terms, as personal and unmarked, consisting of 
only “private devotions and public worship.” Except for the promise to be a “Christian man,” the 
standards for entry were rather broad and benign. Members would avoid “carelessness and evil,” 
uphold and preserve morale in the camps, play fair and encourage others, and act as “a good 
comrade with my fellows.” Citizenship, the card reminded the club’s affiliates, was predicated on 
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honor and respect for authority figures and the pursuit of “orderliness, justice, and brotherhood.”95 
Citizens, in other words, were moral men. Orienting religious leadership around citizenship deterred 
sectarianism while testing the promise of universalism. 
As such, the work of the chaplain was taxing and exhilarating. After a year and a half of 
engagement, the Federal Council’s General Committee surveyed their men in the field. The results 
were both promising and foreboding. On the one hand, the ministers described the enrollees as 
“seeking a better way of life.” They dwelled “in most unusual and unnatural circumstances, living 
together for the first time in new social units” away from the influence of home and family. This, the 
clergy decided, was helpful because most of the young men arrived from “houses that have both a 
social and economic maladjustment.” Paternalism notwithstanding, the chaplains viewed the men as 
excellent candidates for civic training because “their minds are plastic and approachable. They are 
willing to learn and to understand the responsibilities of citizenship.” As a result, they saw an 
“unparalleled need in these unusual circumstances of both a preaching and a pastoral ministry.” On 
the other hand, the stated ratio of one chaplain to eight camps was overconfident, with most 
chaplains traveling upwards of “607 miles over roads that often are not roads” to tend to men 
scattered among ten or more camps. Given that the leadership of each camp included a medical 
officer and an educational advisor, the General Committee implored the military to reduce the ratio 
to five camps per chaplain and assign a dedicated chaplain to camps located in remote wilderness 
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areas, far from towns whose civilian clergy could pitch in.96 Two years later, little had changed when 
Roy B. Guild lamented to Chief of Chaplains Alva Brasted, “I only wish we could prevail on the 
government to limit the number of camps [per chaplain] to six.”97 
The requests for more chaplains and lower ratios continued to pour in, leading the 
government to consider paying civilian clergy instead of relying on the spirit of cooperation for aid. 
At a conference attended by representatives from the General Committee, Catholic Church, and 
Jewish Welfare Board, Catholics and Jews seemed open to the possibility of contract clergymen, paid 
on a limited basis for their work in the CCC just as select doctors and educators were. Protestants, 
however, expressed strong reservations. “So far as the use of money was concerned…it should be 
used by the government itself,” Roy B. Guild reported. The Federal Council thought it prudent “that 
there should be no subsidizing of the work of any religious organization.” In other words, they had 
no interest in serving as government religious contractors rather than chaplains. Far from a viable 
solution, Guild argued, contracting civilians presaged “an executive problem, impossible of 
solution.”98  
The bluster about administrative headaches disguised a much bigger and more intractable 
problem than how to satisfy the personnel needs of the CCC: a turn to anti-militarism and pacifism 
among many Protestant churches and with it, a critique of the chaplaincy itself. The outcry began 
three years before the CCC legislation arrived on FDR’s desk. During a Lenten sermon at 
Washington’s First Congregational Church, Reverend Peter Ainslie of Baltimore spoke bitingly 
against war. His were fighting words to an audience that included Chief of Chaplains Julian Yates in 
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the pews. “There is no more justification for being a chaplain in the army or navy,” the minister 
thundered, “than there is for being a chaplain in a speakeasy.” His host, Jason Noble Pierce—a 
World War I chaplain and pastor to Calvin Coolidge—glowered, publicly disavowing Ainslie’s 
claims as insulting and inaccurate.99 But what the Atlanta Constitution deemed “the venom of his 
pseudo-pacifist passion” was merely an opening shot.100 As the CCC camps magnified the role of 
military chaplains, charges of immoral militarism followed. 
Like those dedicated to the military chaplaincy, pacifists spent the 1920s reshaping their 
vision for the nation and the world. The War Resisters League (WRL), the secular proponent of 
absolute pacifism, consolidated its organization, retaining its single-issue focus on peace. Through 
parades, walks, strikes, radio shows, and leaflets, the WRL advocated nonviolent resistance to all 
forms of war.101 The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, a secular female 
advocacy group, succeeded the Women’s Peace Party. In melding feminism and progressivism, it 
mustered women as peace activists based on presumptions about female moral concerns and 
visions.102 Dorothy Day’s Catholic Worker movement animated priests, nuns, and lay Catholics who 
sought to divest themselves from the machinery of war and oppression.103 The Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, the left-wing interfaith organization dedicated to advocating Christian nonviolence, 
tripled its membership from 2000 to 6000 between 1920 and 1928. What it lacked in mass appeal, it 
made up for in organizational fury. It not only helped bring together multiple denomination peace 
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fellowships but also used the “theology of the cross” to push for religious dissent against war and 
liberal democracy itself.104 
Much as military leaders sought to sideline secular and religious peace activists alike as 
radicals unmoored from mainstream American priorities and politics, the reach of pacifists tread 
dangerously close to military operations. Peter Ainslie pursued his campaign to dissolve the 
relationship between the chaplaincy and the churches. At the 1933 meeting of the Church Peace 
Union, he proposed that denominations forbid their ministers from serving in the chaplaincy in war 
or in peace. The CCC, in other words, was as much a target as the chaplaincy during active conflict. 
Of all the civilian endorsing agencies, the Federal Council’s General Committee felt the influence of 
Christian pacifism most keenly. In the mid-1930s, the Newark Conference of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church, the Disciples of Christ, and the Evangelical and Reformed Churches of Christ all 
voted to withdraw their clergy from the chaplaincy or voted to disband the Federal Council’s 
General Committee.105 In 1934, the Federal Council itself wondered how to address “a situation in 
which large numbers of men are separated from the usual civilian forms of religious ministration. 
We have de facto a military parish.” Although the group concluded “this situation defines a 
responsibility which must be met, if humanly possible, consistently with the Church’s teaching about 
war and peace,” it left unstated how this would work in practice.106  
Within months of the CCC’s formation, antiwar religious leaders began broadcasting their 
skepticism toward the enterprise, on the grounds that the Army was effectively gearing up for war. 
Appointed by the Federal Council to oversee religious work in the mid-Atlantic’s Third Corps Area, 
Thomas G. Speers worried Chief of Chaplains Julian Yates. The former Army chaplain, who had 
earned a Distinguished Service Cross during World War I, criticized the Reserve Officer Training 
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Corps from the pulpit and caused Yates to wonder whether he “may see the error of his way” and 
serve the CCC enthusiastically. “Candidly,” he wrote to the Federal Council, “I…believe his 
usefulness will be considerably diluted and our cause handicapped.”107 The chaplaincy, even when 
assigned principally to CCC camps, became a site of religious study and conflict. Who, exactly, did 
chaplains serve? Could churches hold anti-war positions and endorse chaplains? 
The Federal Council’s internal debates often spilled from private correspondence into the 
public sphere, leading Chief of Chaplains Brasted to warn the General Committee’s leadership about 
the deleterious effects of this debate. “As a result of sensational publicity,” he wrote in 1936, “many 
good Christian people in the military service…have come to feel that the hand of the church is 
against them because they are in the military service, and against the country.” Although Brasted 
recognized that the rabble-rousers did not necessarily represent the majority of church-goers, “the 
radical in the churches does our cause more harm than many realize,” and the Federal Council 
needed to contain them. He had little patience for these radicals and worried that “the ultra-pacifists’ 
non-resistance unpreparedness point of view” would come to dominate the Federal Council’s 
otherwise good work.108 By the late-1930s, almost every issue of the quarterly Army Chaplain 
discussed pacifism in some form, frequently in direct opposition to voices emanating from the pages 
of The Christian Century, the major mainline Protestant periodical. To emphasize their service to the 
nation, the chaplains’ journal changed its standard cover image, swapping out the image of the 
chaplains’ insignia (a cross or a ten-commandments tablet) to an American flag, thus visually 
reinforcing its commitment to patriotism and the nation’s defense. Commissioned in non-combatant 
roles, chaplains attempted to navigate the dichotomous pulls of church and state through words, 
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trying to steer a middle course between pacifism and militarism, arguing that neither inaction nor 
aggression would benefit America. Nevertheless, growing tremors of war signaled changes ahead for 
the pulpits of civilian clergy and military chaplains alike.109 
Brasted embarked on his own publicity campaign as well, publishing opinion pieces in 
denominational periodicals in order to make his case for the chaplaincy. In the Lutheran Herald, for 
example, he offered a “Defense of Chaplains: Plain Philosophy of a Practical Pacifist.” Drawing on 
Biblical and contemporary examples, he elaborated how the chaplaincy followed the model of Paul 
and how the military differed little from local police forces. To those who opposed war on the 
grounds it constituted a sin, he offered a litany of precedents usually framed as acceptable uses of 
force, from Joshua commanding an army of Israelites to Patrick Henry leading an American 
revolution. Since “no sane person wants war more than he wants disease or flood,” Brasted viewed 
the American military as a tool only of national defense. World peace, he concluded, rested on the 
ability to wage war for “better a righteous war than an unrighteous peace.”110 
Little had changed a year later when the General Committee’s Chairman Joseph Sizoo 
attempted to allay the “great anxiety that oftentimes…is intimated that the Protestant Church has no 
longer loyal love and regard for those who are ministers of our faith in the Services.”111 But Brasted 
was no longer content with platitudes. The “sensational anti-chaplaincy statements made by certain 
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religious leaders” was “unfortunate,” and so long as the “hostile barrage against the chaplaincy” 
continued, he could see little productive or helpful coming from it. In a world on the brink of war, 
with fighting in Spain and Manchuria in the daily news, the rancor toward both the chaplaincy 
specifically and “national preparedness as provided in the Constitution” generally would harm 
church and country. The Chief of Chaplains dedicated ten pages to defending the chaplaincy, 
outlining his understanding of chaplains’ roles, and asserting the importance of maintaining good 
relationships between the military and the churches. Although they perform non-denominational 
work, the denominational endorsement meant “they cannot be true representatives if they withdraw 
fellowship from their church or if the church withdraws fellowship from them.”112 
While looming pacifism threatened to disrupt or shatter the mutually reinforcing alliance 
between the Federal Council and the military, civilian organizations used the CCC camps to try to 
shape the state’s work to their own objectives. Religious teetotalers concerned with the likely repeal 
of the eighteenth amendment used the CCC camps to champion alcohol restrictions. A Methodist 
pastor, for example, reported that “sad conditions” prevailed in Pennsylvania where there was “an 
established canteen selling liquor.” The drunks milling about town irritated locals who had “voted to 
remove all drink from our territory in this recent election. Our citizens are of a high type and want 
no drunken camps in our midst.” Local ministers had stopped and would continue to refuse to go to 
the CCC camps if the government did not contain the alcohol problem.113  
Support for limiting alcohol consumption was relatively easy to procure compared to 
promotion of racial equality and justice. CCC policy deliberately sent men away from their home 
communities, thus engendering contact between unemployed Americans from different 
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backgrounds. Despite the geographic, ethnic, and religious mixing of men, however, the CCC was 
racially segregated with opportunities for African-American men scarce and underdeveloped.114 In 
line with standard Army policy, black chaplains could only minister to black men, and chaplains, 
along with educational advisors and medical officers, represented the few leadership positions 
granted to African Americans in the CCC camps. In 1933, the Regular Army included three black 
chaplains (out of five total black officers), and by 1935, eight African-American chaplains had been 
appointed to CCC camps. When the number dwindled to four in 1938, Edgar Brown, a CCC 
administrator and founder of the National Negro Council, complained to the War Department.115 A 
ratio of one chaplain to 25 African-American CCC camps was hardly satisfactory much less equal or 
even workable. 
As an ecumenical body that included African-American churches and organized a committee 
on race relations, the Federal Council became a clearinghouse for race-related criticism of the CCC 
and tried to leverage its standing to alter racist assumptions embedded in CCC policies. After 
conducting an interview with Loyd Hickman, a black minister who had served as an educational 
advisor in a CCC camp, the General Committee alerted Chief of Chaplains Alva Brasted to 
problems Hickman had identified. First, as in most camps, white officers commanded black men. 
When Hickman arrived and replaced a white educational advisor, he was not quartered with the 
other officers but sent to the infirmary to sleep and to the enrollee’s bathroom to shower. The 
prevailing racial and racist logic meant that his race denied him the rights his status conveyed. 
Second, he quickly learned that white officers “had too many assumptions relative to the 
                                                
114 Patrick Clancey, “Conserving the Youth: The Civilian Conservation Corps Experience in the Shenandoah 
National Park,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 105, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 460. 
115 Calvin W. Gower, “The Struggle of Blacks for Leadership Positions in the Civilian Conservation Corps: 
1933-1942,” Journal of Negro History 61, no. 2 (April 1976): 130-1, 132-3. Brown’s lobbying efforts helped improve the 
leadership options for African Americans but earned him the ire of CCC Director Robert Fechner, who deemed him a 
pest. Only a couple camps acquired a full slate of African-American officers, including commanders. The restriction on 
black commanders stemmed from the government’s interest in sating, rather than baiting, local communities who feared 
and resisted African-American CCC camps. 
  126 
dispositions, temperament, and desires of Negroes.” One report claimed they “were lazy and would 
not read” and the officers therefore blocked access to the temporary traveling library. “The 
expressed fear was that the young men would take the books and never return them and not read 
them, of course.” But Hickman opened the library and “the books were always returned promptly. 
He found, therefore, that the boys would read.”116  
Access to the Chief of Chaplains enabled the Federal Council to lobby additional authority 
figures. Brasted’s response, more platitude than substance, highlighted the difficulty African 
Americans faced in extracting concrete concessions to change the separate and unequal CCC 
facilities. The Chief of Chaplains responded to the complaint by allowing that “the race question is a 
delicate one” and “we don’t need anything to happen in the CCC which will make for ill feeling 
between the races.” He advised pursuing the issue with Second Corps Area chaplain who could help 
resolve the matter. There was very little “delicate” about the hurdles revealed to the Federal Council 
aside from the government’s desire to mute and ignore racial discrimination. Brasted acknowledged 
as much when he stated, “there is dynamite in reports of this kind. All that is needed to set it off is 
certain publicity.” Seeking to avoid an uncontainable explosion but “at a loss to know what to 
suggest regarding the solution of this old and vexing problem,” all he could offer was “the key to the 
solution of all social problems…Christ.” Eager to dispatch the problem of discrimination without 
needlessly entangling himself in it, the Chief of Chaplains assured the Federal Council that “all our 
Corps Area Commanders desire that both the white and colored enrollees shall receive all the 
benefits to which they are entitled.”117 Such assurances meant little to the men who lacked fair and 
just access to the material advantages the CCC gave white men. But the General Committee’s 
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attempt to work through the chaplaincy signaled the opportunity the chaplaincy provided beyond 
religion: even when unsuccessful, civilian religious organizations could poke and prod the state 
through its spiritual and moral endeavors, hoping that with enough advocacy, results might 
eventually follow. 
 
Conclusion 
In 1938, Reserve Chaplain William Hughes (Catholic) submitted a thesis in support of his 
application for promotion in rank. The study’s premise assumed a “major emergency” in which a 
Reserve chaplain was ordered to active duty and sent to a training camp as a division chaplain 
responsible for overseeing other chaplains. There, they would serve recruits “from a nearby city in 
which pacifism is rampant due to the activities of clerical and lay propagandists.” After surveying the 
young men, the chaplain learns that 60 percent are religiously affiliated, 25 percent are “indifferent 
to all religion” and 15 percent are “avowed atheists or have such tendencies.” How the chaplain 
ought to handle this hypothetical situation required addressing three inter-related questions. What 
should the chaplain do to “make suitable religious provision and moral guidance”; to engender 
enthusiasm and high morale; and to “prevent possible harmful influence which might be occasioned 
by the proximity of the camp to the nearby pacifist community?”118  
Hughes was confident that chaplains could tackle this situation and mold the men into 
faithful, loyal citizens. After consulting with the local command staff, he recommended the 
chaplains work out regular worship times, with services expected for Protestants and Catholics on 
Sundays and services for Jews on Saturdays. To address the men who appeared agnostic toward 
religion, he suggested making sermons attractive and energetic, tapping the mind as well as stirring 
the heart. Certain that “peacetime lethargy…gives way in war time in many cases to serious 
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thoughts” on God, religion, and death, he deemed music desirable and philosophical discussions 
essential to reaching the atheistically inclined. Services that could be conducted by ministers, priests, 
and rabbis interchangeably offered an ideal opportunity to bring together the community. As for the 
threat of pacifism, the chaplain would have to decimate its influence, in part by bringing in outside 
speakers whose personal conversion experiences led them to forsake their pacifist and possibly 
disloyal pasts. Aiming for the “fraternal correction of [the] recalcitrant” required vigilance as well as 
an eagerness to “find the cure and the tonic in love of God and country and fellowman.”119 
Hughes’ concern about the atheist-pacifist threat to spiritual and physical preparedness was 
exaggerated. But it was also fitting, for it illuminated the state of the chaplaincy in a world on the 
brink of war. While many Americans sought to distance themselves from the rapidly approaching 
European conflagration, the likelihood of a “major emergency” nevertheless increased. As chaplains 
read Hughes’ plans in fall 1938, newspapers carried word of a night of broken glass in Germany, 
where synagogues went up in flames in coordinated attacks on Jews. A year earlier, Japan had 
invaded China and less than a year later, Germany would occupy Poland. This much was clear: after 
almost two decades of crafting an ecumenical vision for the American military chaplaincy, chaplains 
understood that their responsibilities included ministering to Protestants, Catholics, and Jews alike. 
They recognized that the religion and patriotism could be linked, with God, country, and 
brotherhood coalescing into a state-supported religious adhesive critical to national defense. And so 
it was in April 1941, with the world at war and the United States at peace and with four years 
experience as Army Chief of Chaplains, that the Catholic priest reflected on his time in the military. 
“When I came into the Army, the Chaplains’ organization was a scooter outfit; and now it is more 
like a streamlined high-powered vehicle,” William R. Arnold remarked.120 Eight months later, his 
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revved-up religious machine would be tested on an uncharted and unprecedented track. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Gospel of Chaplain J im :  
Boundaries of Religious Citizenship in the Warfare State 
 
When Amiela Haznar tuned her radio dial to WBZ on weekday mornings in the summer of 
1942, she found an on-air friend, a confidante, a potential savior.1 Haznar, the mother of a deployed 
soldier, regularly listened to Chaplain Jim, a radio drama that the Blue Network—the more 
prestigious of NBC’s two radio networks—began broadcasting four months after the United States 
entered World War II.2 Like the heroes of interwar, golden-age detective fiction,3 the eponymous 
Chaplain Jim could solve any problem. From week to week, the kind and clever Chaplain Jim solved 
pragmatic, metaphysical, psychological, spiritual, military, financial, and emotional challenges faced 
by enlisted soldiers in shows ranging from the “Case of the Soldier Who Never Received Mail” and 
the “Case of the Soldier Who Didn’t Believe in Miracles” to the “Case of the Soldier Who (Thought 
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He) Didn’t Fit In” and the “Case of the Soldier Who Found God.”4 
When Chaplain Jim debuted on the week of April 6, 1942, it projected the image of the 
military chaplaincy that the state had envisioned, the realization of the tri-faith religious project 
initiated in World War I and experimented with during the interwar years. Chaplain Jim had to reach 
soldiers of every religious background as well as an audience comprised of a range of faiths. To 
millions of American listeners on the homefront, the Gospel of Chaplain Jim quietly insisted on 
religion’s centrality to the state. The radio show storylines helped embed the military’s religious 
gospel—an ideological commitment to moral monotheism, ecumenism and religious cooperation—
into civilian culture. The state’s religious project, carefully crafted and tested in the two decades 
between the wars, went public in World War II, reaching a mass audience of soldiers and Americans 
writ large through both the large-scale implementation of the chaplaincy and through public-private 
enterprises like radio shows and other publicity campaigns. 
Because the military chaplaincy connected religion to national identity and citizenship, it 
beckoned members of minority religious and racial groups to use religion to advocate for themselves 
as equally American and deserving of recognition as full citizens. The very act of categorizing—or 
making legible—Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism as American necessarily placed other faiths 
outside its bounds.5 African-American believers stood inside and outside these categories, 
unequivocally part of these faiths (most notably, Protestantism) and irrefutably different by virtue of 
historical and state-sanctioned segregation.6 Excluded groups such as the Eastern Orthodox and 
Buddhists pushed for access to the military chaplaincy precisely because it represented a powerful 
channel of acceptance and admission to American religion and politics. Yet the instantiation of 
                                                
4 For a complete list of titles, see scripts located in RG 247 (1920-45), Boxes 23-28, NARA II. 
5 On legibility, see James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 2-3 and passim. 
6 On the complexities and ambiguities of black religion as a category, see Barbara Savage, Your Spirits Walk 
Beside Us: The Politics of Black Religion (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism not as state churches but as paragons of state-sanctioned 
religion also generated a religious reckoning from within. While American Catholics and Jews 
celebrated their entrance into the American mainstream, wartime conditions forced certain 
adaptations and concessions. Most importantly, however, underneath the veneer of placid 
Protestantism, this vast category was breaking apart as it stretched to encompass Mormons, 
Christian Scientists, and Seventh-Day Adventists and strained to incorporate evangelicals and 
fundamentalists alongside the quintessential liturgical and modernist Protestant chaplains. 
The Navy, unlike the Army, actively resisted these burgeoning controversies by isolating 
itself from the efforts of minorities—religious and racial—to access to the chaplaincy. As an 
institution, the Navy was smaller (some 2000 chaplains served fleets and ports over the course of the 
war, in contrast to over 9000 who donned the Army’s camouflage), more tied to class-based elitism 
(and thus generally unwilling to interpret requirements flexibly), and more racially segregated. It 
hewed to a Protestant-Catholic-Jewish vision that, like the Army, eased Catholics and Jews into a 
sanctioned and well-known entity, but nevertheless continued to make occasional policy decisions 
that undercut their majoritarian place. 
World War II marked the culmination, not the beginning, of tri-faith America. Four intense 
and uncertain years of war helped naturalize religious unity against enemies abroad. A quarter-
century earlier, the categories of Protestant, Catholic, and Jew helped fuse a multitude of white 
ethnic immigrants into manageable administrative groupings during the United States’ brief foray 
into war. By the 1940s, a commitment to moral monotheism, spread domestically by and through 
the armed forces, fortified the American war effort on multiple fronts across the globe. However, 
marking boundaries of religious citizenship prompted those designated as racial and religious others 
to fight for inclusion on religious grounds. Publicizing the chaplaincy’s work enabled marginalized 
Americans to recognize that a restrictive reality belied the rhetoric of ecumenism. As they lobbied 
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for recognition, racial and religious minorities forced the state to tinker with ostensibly innate and 
fixed religious classifications.  
 
Radio and Religious Belonging: The Case of Chaplain J im  
Chaplain Jim counseled all, illuminating the toll of war, and showed men and women alike 
how “The Lord Changes Things.” In the original episode draft, however, Chaplain Jim 
demonstrated how “Christ Changes Things.” It was William Arnold, the Army Chief of Chaplains 
during World War II, whose red pencil crossed out “Christ” and substituted “The Lord.” For 
Arnold believed that “the fact that CHAPLAIN JIM has not been specifically described as a 
Protestant, Jewish, or Catholic chaplain has proven to be most helpful to the broadcast….the 
comments coming from the various religious groups indicat[e] that he is acceptable to all. In view of 
this I know that you will continue your policy of keeping him anonymous.”7  
For the nation’s first Catholic Chief of Chaplains, an anonymous—which was to say, 
ecumenical—chaplain was critical to serving the nation and winning the war. Over the run of the 
show, Arnold deployed his critical eye and red pencil to ensure that Chaplain Jim was unmarried 
(and therefore could be a priest) and never prayed to or mentioned “Christ” (so he could be a rabbi). 
Spread by a civilian-generated and military-sanctioned radio show, the Gospel of Chaplain Jim 
acclaimed more than the “Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man.”8 While the composite 
character was fictional and his globe-trotting adventures invented, Chaplain Jim played a real role in 
                                                
7 Chaplain Jim Radio Transcript, Episode 53, May 11, 1942, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 23, Folder: 000.77 
(“Chaplain Jim” Radio Scripts, Vol. II), NARA II; William Arnold to Frank and Anne Hummert, March 1, 1944, Box 23, 
Folder (000.77 “Chaplain Jim” Administrative Correspondence), NARA II. 
8 Roger Straus, the Jewish chairman of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, pioneered the phrase, 
“Fatherhood of God and Brotherhood of Man,” when defining religion as the bedrock of democracy in the mid-1930s; 
it became a part of the currency of tri-faith rhetoric fairly quickly. See Wendy Wall, Inventing the “American Way”: The 
Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 8, 78, 179, 
and Kevin Schultz, Tri-Faith America: How Catholics and Jews Held Postwar America to Its Protestant Promise (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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breaching the gap between the Office of the Chief of Chaplains and the homefront. He embodied 
the paragon of the World War II chaplaincy, the exemplar of a clergyman who could sublimate 
sectarian religious interests for the good of the nation, and he clothed the military’s religious 
ideology in civilian culture.9 Crafted to advance the military’s particularly pragmatic religious ideals 
and practices—the generic multifaith moral monotheism, in which shared religious convictions 
centered on a belief in God and doing right by man—he also dexterously avoided the friction 
inherent in the tri-faith creed. Beneath the public culmination of cooperative ecumenism, tension 
roiled. After all, the state managed religion by policing its borders. The establishment of American 
religion as the shared space of three faiths necessarily sidelined and excluded religious and racial 
groups that possessed equal claims to and pushed for recognition of their assertions and 
acclamations of Americanness.  
Chaplain Jim launched with “The Case of the Soldier Who Never Received Any Mail,” which 
revolved around one Paul Hendricks. When the story began, an otherwise healthy Hendricks had 
attempted to get himself a bed in the infirmary. With the doctor’s permission, Chaplain Jim took on 
the task of finding out why. He went to the barracks, found Private Hendricks, and eventually 
uncovered that in the absence of mail from his estranged mother, Hendricks told the other men in 
his unit that a famous singer was “his girl.” But the Army was bringing her to base as musical 
entertainment, and he knew his friends would discover his lie; as a result, he attempted to hide in the 
infirmary. Over the next couple of episodes, the show let the radio audience hear Chaplain Jim plot 
with the famous singer, catch the soldiers ribbing Paul over his girl, and listen to Chaplain Jim as he 
                                                
9 The Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains was well aware of its need to cultivate and protect a particular 
image. One of the staff chaplains working for Arnold, John Allan, reminded one of the office’s sources in the field to 
behave in a manner commensurate with the chaplaincy and to hold reports in strict confidence as the office would 
“delete or clarify or fit into the military picture such sections of his report as we feel need deleting or doctoring.” John 
Allan to Paul Moody, May 9, 1941, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 70, Folder 080 (Guardians of America), NARA II.  
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convinced Paul’s mother to come from afar to visit him.10  
As in many later episodes, the set-up combined a mildly realistic premise with a few 
completely unrealistic plot turns. On the one hand, some men undoubtedly failed to get mail and 
made up extravagant stories to explain why. Soldiers caught one another in fabrications about their 
lives and families expressed remorse for their limited contact. Chaplains intervened as men faced 
ridicule and spoke directly to their families. Famous musicians and entertainers visited army posts 
and men competed to get their attention and autographs. On the other hand, chaplains did not 
travel to visit families or negotiate ruses with popular singers. But moderate realism sufficed, for the 
explicit purpose of Chaplain Jim was to cultivate sympathy for soldiers, demonstrate men overcoming 
their foibles, and elevate the chaplain as a multi-purpose guidance counselor, moral touchstone, and 
spiritual advisor. A few embellishments did not hurt this cause. 
As part of the scene setting for Paul’s army woes, the first episode also portrayed a diverse 
army unit. During a roll-call for mail, a sergeant yelled “McHenry… Donetti… Jamcoe… Kelly… 
Goldberg…Riordan… Gibbs… Hendricks” and then continues, “Maxwell… O’Flaherty… 
Adropoupolous… Svenson… Jackson… McDermott… Cain.”11 By using the Irish McHenry, the 
Italian Donetti, the Jewish Goldberg, the Greek Adropoupolous, and the Swedish Svenson 
alongside less identifiably ethnic names such as Gibbs, Hendricks, Jackson, and Cain, the 
scriptwriters produced an ethnically and religiously diverse unit.12 While the show skirted ethnic, 
religious, and racial tension, it nevertheless lauded an American army comprised of men from a 
                                                
10 Chaplain Jim, Episode 1, Number 1, “The Case of the Soldier Who Never Received Mail,” RG 247 (1920-
45), Box 23, Folder 000.77 (Chaplain Jim Scripts, Vol. I), NARA II. 
11 Chaplain Jim, Episode 1, Number 1, “The Case of the Soldier Who Never Received Mail,” RG 247 (1920-
45), Box 23, Folder 000.77 (Chaplain Jim Scripts, Vol. I), NARA II. 
12 As the military remained racially segregated until 1948 and the Hummerts prided themselves on “realism,” a 
racially integrated unit would be have been anomalous. However, African-American chaplains served in World War II 
and a black Chaplain Jim would not have been implausible, except in the imagination of the scriptwriters who assumed 
that African-Americans existed only at the periphery of the military.  
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multitude of backgrounds. The soldiers in Chaplain Jim’s unit embodied the list of races, ethnicities, 
and religions invoked in the WPA’s “Ballad for Americans” and made famous by CBS’ 1939 radio 
broadcast of Paul Robeson’s performance. In this way, Chaplain Jim adopted a common trope of the 
era’s radio and film productions, the contrived “roster of exotic ethnic surnames” to advance what 
Michael Denning has called “pan-ethnic Americanism.”13 
The U.S. entry into World War II in 1941 coincided with the height of radio’s mass media 
influence. Yet while Chaplain Jim served both political and religious purposes, it differed significantly 
from prototypical forms of political radio—such as FDR’s “fireside chats”—and paradigmatic 
brands of religious radio—such as the sermons and services produced by dramatic revivalist and 
evangelist Aimee Semple McPherson.14 In contrast to the overtly political or religious broadcasts of 
presidents and preachers, Chaplain Jim embedded a politically useful and morale-boosting form of 
religion into the narrative conventions of a soap opera. For three-and-a-half years, in 15-minute 
increments and later in hour-long segments, the radio show used religion to unite soldiers and 
citizens around both a military enterprise and a common belief system. In Chaplain Jim, the military 
hailed a very particular form of generic monotheism. However, by embedding its views of religion 
into a collaborative military-civilian radio drama, the state underplayed its own role in inculcating 
religion as central to the American wartime project. This was intentional. As historian James 
Sparrow points out, “The essential task [of morale management]…was to obscure the statist 
foundations of public power while insinuating them into the thoughts and lives of the citizenry.”15  
                                                
13 David Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The United in Depression and War, 1929-45 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 761; Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Verso, 1997), 130. For a discussion of the limits of this trope and the latent suspicion toward foreigners it attempted to 
mask, see Wall, Inventing the “American Way,” 138-143.  
14 For more on the flourishing genre of religious radio, see Tona J. Hangen, Redeeming the Dial: Radio, Religion, 
and Popular Culture in America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
15 James Sparrow, The Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 49. On wartime public-private morale initiatives more generally, see Sparrow, The Warfare State, 
48-77.  
  137 
 
Although Chaplain Jim became part of the Office of War Information’s prodigious efforts to 
promote patriotism during World War II, it not only predated the agency’s existence but also 
originated with a civilian. Louis Cowan, perhaps best known as the creator of The $64,000 Question 
and president of CBS radio in the 1950s, initiated Chaplain Jim by proposing a religion-oriented 
wartime show. As a civilian consultant to the War Department’s radio branch, he argued that an 
entertaining drama would effectively assuage parental fears about their sons at war and supersede 
musical or prayer-focused programs in popularity.16 With the support of Edward Kirby, another 
civilian working in the War Department as the Chief of the Bureau of Public Relations’ Radio 
Branch, Cowan approached Ed Kovak, the vice president of NBC’s Blue Network. Kovak liked 
Cowan’s idea and offered him a short weekday slot. Rather than take on the writing and production 
himself, Cowan turned to well-known radio serial producers Frank and Anne Hummert. From the 
New York offices of the Blackett, Sample, and Hummert advertising agency, the husband-and-wife 
team added another soap opera to their plentiful docket.17 
In some ways, Chaplain Jim resembled the other serials the Hummerts developed. Like other 
formulaic week-long dramas, the plot built until it reached a suspenseful climax resolved by the end 
of the week. Similarly, it was a national, weekday, daytime show directed at women.18 Before every 
episode, radio announcer George Ansbro introduced the show by “inform[ing] the radio listeners 
that the program was ‘dedicated to the mothers, wives, sweethearts, and families of the men who 
                                                
16 Louis Cowan, interview by Eric Barnouw, March 1, 1967-May 1, 1967, Oral History Transcript, Columbia 
University Oral History Research Office, New York, NY. 
17 Howard Blue, Words at War: World War II Era Radio Drama and the Postwar Broadcasting Industry Blacklist 
(Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2002), 185-88. Before the war, Kirby had served as the Director of Public 
Relations of the National Association of Broadcasters and was initially brought into the War Department as the Civilian 
Advisor for Radio. As a result of mail indicating listener support for religious programming, NBC separated its religious 
radio from its education section. See, “Religion: A Job for Jordan,” TIME Magazine, February 15, 1943. 
18 The show was publicized nationally in white and black newspapers alike. See, for example, “Radio Today,” 
The New York Times, May 19, 1942 and “Radio Programs,” Atlanta Daily World, Dec 23, 1945. 
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wear the khaki of the United States Army.” 19 Each episode also ended with Chaplain Jim addressing 
his target female audience in the same way. Just as he asks every soldier whether he has written to 
his mother, so too does he conclude: “mothers, wives, and sweethearts are asked this question. 
‘Have you written to your boys in the Army this week? They want mail. They want to hear from you. 
So write…write to them cheerfully and regularly. Keep their spirits up. Don’t let them worry about 
you. Sit down and write today!”20 The explicit injunction to write to their soldiers highlighted that 
although Chaplain Jim followed certain narrative conventions of daily soap operas, it owed its 
existence to a different and perhaps higher purpose: it represented one of many War Department 
efforts to improve American morale and demonstrate that the Armed Forces cared for men under 
its control. Chaplain Jim targeted the “average American” and attempted to garner the sympathies of 
homefront listeners who could listen to the War Department-sanctioned show without commercial 
interruption.21 The state, through the War Department, recognized that soap operas served as 
effective carriers of government messages because, as Frank Hummert relayed to the New York 
Times, audiences would “‘follow an example, but won’t listen to a precept.’”22  
Through its association with the War Department, Chaplain Jim diverged from the rest of the 
Hummert serials in two important ways. First, the Hummerts sent every script for editorial review 
and approval to two military departments: the Bureau of Public Relations’ Radio Branch, which 
oversaw civilian morale, and the Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains, which among other tasks, 
                                                
19 George Ansbro, I Have a Lady in the Balcony: Memoirs of a Broadcaster in Radio and Television (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Company, 2000), 127. Ansbro, who introduced the show on air, claims that Chaplain Jim was not a soap 
opera, possibly because it was based on (some) actual experiences. Ansbro notwithstanding, the narrative structure and 
content reflected those of radio soap operas.  
20 Chaplain Jim, Episode 1, Number 1, “The Case of the Soldier Who Never Received Mail,” RG 247 (1920-
45), Box 23, Folder 000.77 (Chaplain Jim Scripts, Vol. I), NARA II. 
21 On the evolving representation American norms in this period, see Sarah Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, 
Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
22 Jack Gould, “Soap Factory: Something About the Hummerts, Frank and Anne, and 6,000,000 Words a 
Year,” New York Times, February 14, 1943. 
  139 
 
presided over soldiers’ morale. Second, it incorporated the experience of actual chaplains as well as 
the worldview of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains into its storylines. Thus the narratives often 
melded fact and fiction, education and entertainment.  
To develop a more accurate portrayal of a chaplain, Arnold wanted the Hummerts meet with 
actual chaplains. He first sent them to Jacob Rothschild, a rabbi who had spent 16 months in the 
Southwest Pacific, and was briefly based at the New York Port of Embarkation—easily accessible to 
the New York-based Hummerts.23 Upon giving Rothschild’s contact information to the writers, 
Arnold clarified, “it is not my intention that a denominational slant should be given to any 
broadcast. For this reason…I should like to recommend other chaplains from time to time so that 
you might have occasion to meet with chaplains of the Protestant and the Catholic groups.”24 The 
Chief of Chaplains’ office maintained a steady emphasis on nonsectarian ecumenism. When a Mrs. 
E. Williams requested that Chaplain Jim “pay tribute to the Salvation Army,” Arnold’s office 
acknowledged the suggestion, but delicately ducked the plea by asserting, “it would be impossible to 
do justice to all these organizations” that serve soldiers. Buried in cagey language about the 
inadvisability of singling out particular groups lest others be left out lay the real reason the Salvation 
Army would not be mentioned on-air: “it would establish an undesired precedent.”25  
Mrs. Williams’ sectarian request notwithstanding, specificity and realities of war still had their 
place in script development. To build a storyline about a chaplain in battle who aided his men while 
sick and injured, for example, the Hummerts used Chaplain Terence P. Finnegan’s experiences in 
                                                
23 After the war, Rothschild accepted a synagogue pulpit in Atlanta, where he denounced segregation and 
became an outspoken advocate of civil rights. In 1958, the Temple was bombed, presumably in response to his social 
justice work. See Melissa Fay Greene, The Temple Bombing (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996). 
24 William Arnold to Frank and Anne Hummert, February 14, 1944, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 23, Folder 000.77 
(“Chaplain Jim” Administrative Correspondence), NARA II. 
25 Herman H. Heuer to Mrs. E. Williams, March 25, 1944, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 85, Folder 080 (Salvation 
Army), NARA II. 
  140 
 
the Pacific.26 In order to encourage improved race relations and to reach out to African-American 
families, Louis Cowan also persuaded the Hummers to meet with Truman Gibson, a lawyer who 
advocated for black soldiers as a civilian aide to Secretary of War Henry Stimson.27 Cowan’s effort 
signaled how civilians could shape the public’s encounter with the military. Occasionally, then, the 
radio show hinted at the “Protestant-Catholic-Jewish-Negro” ideology developed by the Office of 
the Army Chief of the Chaplains during the interwar years which became public in World War II. 
Chaplain Jim helped convey this multi-faith—albeit racially segregated—vision to civilians. 
About thirteen months after the show began, for example, the Hummerts proposed that 
Chaplain Jim become a transport chaplain. They sought to make him a mobile chaplain, who could 
“go to practically all battle fronts and to have virtually all the experiences of an Army Chaplain.” 
They suggested several ship-based storylines, including an episode in which “memorial services for 
all will be conducted – Catholic, Protestant, Jewish services,” in order to comfort families at home. 
While Arnold was willing to accept to the implausibly portable chaplain, he insisted that the 
memorial services be changed to “three separate services” rather than an inaccurate co-mingled 
ritual mélange.28 For while joint religious services occasionally occurred, War Department policy 
provided for separate services, even if overseen and at times even conducted by a chaplain of a 
different faith. At Camp Rucker, Alabama, for example, the posted Sunday schedule allotted each 
group an hour for services, starting with Catholic Mass, moving to Jewish services, followed by Holy 
                                                
26 Board Meeting Minutes, November 12, 1943, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 259, Folder 337 (Board Meetings, 
1943-44), NARA II. Finnegan (Catholic) entered the chaplaincy in 1937, where his first assignment was a Civilian 
Conservation Corps post. He was in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and earned a Bronze Star for his work with 
infantry troops at Guadalcanal in 1942-3—the basis of the Chaplain Jim episode (though the radio show placed him in 
Europe). He became the second Air Force Chief of Chaplains in 1958. 
27 Louis Cowan Oral History; Chaplain Pinn, an African American chaplain in WWII, appeared on the show as 
Chaplain Jim’s colleague on April 2, 1943.  
28 Arnold’s annotation of Frank and Anne Hummert to E. M. Kirby, May 3 1943, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 23, 
000.77 (“Chaplain Jim” Administrative Correspondence), NARA II. 
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Communion/General Protestant Services, and an evening Christian Science service.29 Therefore, to 
ensure that Chaplain Jim was not himself associated with a particular service, editorial marks axed 
lines that enumerated a Chaplain Steiner conducting a Jewish service or a Chaplain Reilly celebrating 
Mass in favor of banal comments about posting the schedule of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish 
services onboard ships.30  
Likewise, when Chaplain Jim dispensed a Bible to Paul Hendricks in the second episode of 
the show, it was merely a Bible—not a King James, a Catholic, or a Hebrew Bible. When soldiers 
worshipped on the show, they simply talked about attending services weekly—exactly what the War 
Department wanted its soldiers to do—but avoided any reference to what kind of service. What 
prayers they said were irrelevant; what mattered was that they went to services and prayed. When 
Private Mark Sheldon’s girlfriend died in “The Soldier Who Found God,” Chaplain Jim told him, 
“At a time like this, we can always find one consolation...if we remember that God is with us.”31 The 
discussion between the two men centered on a comforting God, a spiritual bulwark in hard times.  
As Chaplain Jim moved overseas to combat zones in Europe, devastating and deadly war 
wounds became more prominent. While recovering from his own minor wounds suffered while 
traveling to Sicily, the chaplain spent time with other patients at a base hospital in North Africa. 
There, listeners heard him cheer and console injured men; when a patient died, he murmured, “May 
the sins of this man have been forgiven”—a less denominationally-specific form of the original 
sentence, “Heavenly Father, forgive this man his sins.”32 The show assumed that sins committed 
                                                
29 “Schedule of Services for Post Chapel, Camp Rucker, Alabama,” March 2, 1943, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 62, 
Folder 080 (Christian Science, Vol. I), NARA II. 
30 E.g. Chaplain Jim Radio Transcript, Episode 259, June 19, 1945, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 28, Folder 000.77 
(“Chaplain Jim” Radio Scripts, 1945), NARA II. 
31 Chaplain Jim Radio Transcript, Episode 36, May 26, 1942, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 23, Folder 000.77 
(“Chaplain Jim” Radio Scripts, Vol. II), NARA II. 
32 Chaplain Jim Radio Transcript, Episode 153, August 8, 1943, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 25, Folder 000.77 
(“Chaplain Jim” Radio Scripts, No. 138-160), NARA II. 
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during life matter at the moment of death, but also presumed a generous, forgiving God. But in the 
face of ruthless battles and unmistakable suffering, Chaplain Jim’s stance remained the same. To a 
private distressed by his brother’s death at Anzio, Chaplain Jim relayed his own grieving over his 
brother’s death during World War I. “I still found comfort in exactly the way I’m asking you to find 
it,” he stated, “in prayer and in God.” 33 The message served a dual purpose: for the radio show, it 
displayed Chaplain’s Jim ongoing and ever-present ability to aid any soldier, and for the audience at 
home, it supplied an antidote to the potential torment of daily casualty reports. 
Although Chaplain Jim generally articulated his messages about religion to the listeners 
through the show’s plotlines, occasionally the character used the show as a platform through which 
to address his audience directly. In January 1943, a week after President Roosevelt declared his 
support for the Federal Council of Churches’ “Universal Week of Prayer,” Chaplain Jim chimed in 
with encouragement after the episode finished. Assuming common and full agreement with the 
president’s declaration that “‘without spiritual armor we cannot win the war, be worthy of winning 
it, or be fit to make the peace,’” the character united his audience around the common cause. Lest 
they be uncertain about how to proceed, however, he drew on the nurturing voice of his character 
to motivate Americans to participate in religious life: “My hope is that many who may have 
forgotten how to pray were started on this wonderful and consoling path again last week—and that 
such of you as were, will continue with those of us who feel life would neither be possible nor worth 
living without faith in God and prayer.”34 Tinged with a Protestant emphasis on prayer, belief, and 
faith, Chaplain Jim urged his followers to act. Join up, he called out, enlist in a community of 
worshippers and believers—if not also into the military itself. 
                                                
33 Chaplain Jim Radio Transcript, Episode 192, May 4, 1944, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 26, Folder 000.77 
(“Chaplain Jim” Radio Scripts, No. 161-173), NARA II. 
34 “President Backs A Week of Prayer,” The New York Times, January 3, 1943; Chaplain Jim Radio Transcript, 
Episode 123, January 10, 1943, emphasis original, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 25, Folder 000.77 (“Chaplain Jim” Radio 
Scripts, No. 118-137), NARA II. 
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In matters of race, too, Chaplain Jim occasionally provided a lesson alongside a recruiting 
tool. If Chaplain Jim could mask his religious affiliation, he could not conceal his race. The range of 
men he served, as denoted by the array of neutral and ethnic surnames, meant that he was white 
because, in a Jim Crow military, black chaplains could serve only black men. Louis Cowan recalled 
meeting Judge William Hastie, an African-American civilian aide to the Secretary of War, who 
informed him that “one of the great problems…was that the benighted, bigoted middle class—not 
middle class, but lower middle class…were full of hatred for Negroes in the Army and said they 
were cowards and ran away every time there was a battle, and all the rest. Well, it wasn’t true as he 
told us, and as facts proved, and it was an unfair story.” After this conversation Cowan called the 
Hummerts and told them since their serials reached millions a day, and because those listeners 
included “the heart and the backbone of those that have the great prejudices about the Negroes,” 
they had a chance to sway these Americans away from prejudicial thinking.35  
Indeed the Army desperately needed African American chaplains and, in March 1943, 
Chaplain Jim aired an episode-cum-commercial in an explicit effort to garner more applicants. The 
episode revolved around a conversation between two Chaplain Jims, the lead character and the real-
life Chaplain James R. C. Pinn, who had recently returned to the United States after serving with the 
41st Engineers in Liberia.36 During the show, the two clergymen discussed Pinn’s work on a 
transport ship—where the character and the real chaplain shared a 100 percent attendance rate at 
their weekly worship services for the regiment known as the “Singing Engineers”—as well as in 
West Africa—where the rainy season stymied the construction unit’s work, but not their spirits. 
Prompted by Chaplain Jim to reflect on his duties, Chaplain Pinn stated, “I kept telling myself how, 
                                                
35 Louis Cowan, interview by Erik Barnouw, March 1, 1967-May 1, 1967, PRCQ #917, transcript, 62-66, 
Columbia University Oral History Research Office.  
36 “Chaplain Pinn, Back in States Tells of First U.S. Negro Troops in Africa,” The Chicago Defender, April 10, 
1943. Pinn was making the radio rounds upon his return; the article notes readers could listen to him on the Wings Over 
Jordan program on the Columbia Network on April 25, 1943. 
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I, as a chaplain, must be prepared to take full advantage of every opportunity…to inspire 
constantly…men to undaunted faith in God, in their country, in their offices and comrades…and in 
themselves.” The emphasis was unswervingly positive, highlighting all the ways black ministers, like 
their white counterparts, could serve American men. There was no mention, of course, of 
segregation, harassment, limitations, or inequitable military justice. Those were not matters for 
public consumption. Thus the mainstream radio campaign for black chaplains ignored the ongoing 
and prominent Double V campaign in the black press—the argument that victory for democracy 
abroad required victory for full citizenship rights for African Americans at home. Chaplain Jim 
(Foster) and Chaplain Jim (Pinn) made a “shoulder-to-shoulder appeal” for 4000 more chaplains, a 
mere 235 of which were reserved for black clergy. The discrimination inherent in opening a mere 
five percent of the chaplain corps to blacks remained invisible and inaudible.37 
In one of the few cracks in the “anonymous” nature of Chaplain Jim, the four parts of “The 
Soldier Who Found God” also revealed how the chaplain entered seminary and became a member 
of clergy. Although no particular denominational information came across, the chaplain and his 
friends used the word “church” and referred to Sunday services.38 On the one hand, this made 
Chaplain Jim decidedly Christian. On the other hand, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains employed 
“church” as a stand-in for any place of religious worship and the War Department encouraged—at 
times even insisted on—Sunday services for all religious groups unless the exigencies of battle 
prohibited large gatherings or formal prayer. Editorial marks on the manuscripts stressed the military 
chaplaincy’s capacious use of “church.” When Chaplain Jim accompanied soldiers at Normandy, he 
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reflected on the fierce battle he witnessed: “two hours ago this field was an inferno. Now, it’s quiet 
again and those who have fallen will be buried with all the rites of their church and the sacrament of 
God.”39 Crossing out the reference to “sacrament”—a religious term most frequently used and 
associated with Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy—helped reduce the particularity of death rites, 
while maintaining “church” in the same sentence indicates that it was understood as a broad-minded 
term. If war killed indiscriminately, U.S. military funeral practices still followed and honored the 
religious affiliation of the serviceman. Indeed, when Chaplain Jim met Davy Silverberg’s mother, he 
assured her that her son was buried “according to Jewish rites” and “Chaplain Wise, my colleague, 
conducted the service.”40  
Overall, the language, actions, and persona of Chaplain Jim closely mirrored the religious 
worldview that the War Department and the Office of the Chief of Chaplains attempted to cultivate 
within the armed forces. Chaplain Alvie McKnight found that the show resonated with his 
experiences. When he sent the Chief of Chaplains a script he wrote based on his experiences in the 
Solomon Islands, he wrote, “We have been fortunate enough to hear most of the Chaplain Jim 
Programs since my return to the United States, and I want to tell you now that they are much worth 
while. I also know from experience that they are quite typical of the Chaplains[’] every day 
experiences out there.”41 Indeed, the bulk of Chaplain Jim’s work centered on counseling soldiers, 
often in matters of morality, complications of love and challenges of death. These topics allowed 
                                                
39 Chaplain Jim Radio Transcript, Episode 198, June 18, 1944, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 27, Folder 000.77 
(“Chaplain Jim” Radio Scripts, 1944), NARA II. 
40 Chaplain Jim Radio Transcript, Episode 237, March 18, 1945, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 27, Folder 000.77 
(“Chaplain Jim” Radio Scripts, 226-250), NARA II. Although Wise potentially represented a fairly generic name, it 
would have resonated with American Jewish listeners as echoing the name of Rabbi Stephen Wise, one of the most 
prominent rabbis of the era—a scion of Reform Judaism and a friend of FDR. On Wise, see Melvin I. Urofsky, A Voice 
That Spoke for Justice: The Life and Times of Stephen S. Wise (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1982). On 
FDR’s complicated relationship with American Jewry, see Richard Breitman and Allan J. Lichtman, FDR and the Jews 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013). 
41 Alvie McKnight to Joseph Ensrud, August 22, 1943, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 23, Folder 000.77 (“Chaplain 
Jim” Administrative Correspondence), NARA II. 
  146 
 
Chaplain Jim to offer advice and comfort without delving too deeply into the specifics of any 
particular faith tradition. 
For listeners like Amiela Haznar, however, William Arnold and his careful red pencil 
remained invisible and silent: his office, his work, and his agenda unseen, unheard of, and 
untraceable. From its inception, the show represented a civilian-military, commercial-public, 
Protestant-Catholic-Jewish collaboration. It became more than a morale-booster for families on the 
homefront; through the editorial work of Chief of Chaplains William Arnold, Chaplain Jim promoted 
a particular religious worldview central to the state’s wartime mission. It also cultivated a laudable 
character that Arnold felt best represented his corps. Early on, he quickly eliminated the “folksy” 
drawl that the Hummerts had given Chaplain Jim. In the first episode, the show’s audience heard 
Chaplain Jim say, in reference to the embarrassed soldier Paul Hendricks, “‘You mean he was tryin’ 
to escape maneuvers by pretendin’?”42 Thereafter, Arnold rejected any incomplete vocabulary or 
incorrect syntax. After all, the requirements for chaplains included a bachelor’s degree and 
postgraduate training and ordination. Arnold wanted the listening public to hear a smart, well-
spoken chaplain, not a caricature of informally trained roving preachers. The show was a recruiting 
tool as well as an advertising campaign. It explicitly encouraged clergy to serve as military chaplains 
and modeled what the military thought chaplains should be and do.  
 
Constructing a Tri-Faith Chaplaincy 
“War is a dastardly business,” remarked Rabbi Moritz Gottlieb in a report from the 
Southwest Pacific in 1943. But even amidst the most hellish conditions, signs of sacred forbearance 
materialized. While traveling with Colonel Ivan Bennett (Baptist), the highest-ranking chaplain in 
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General MacArthur’s Pacific Command, Gottlieb observed “millions of men [who] have learned not 
to judge each other as Catholic, Protestant, or Jew.” Chaplains set the standard, including a Catholic 
chaplain who arranged services for his Jewish men in a local Methodist Church and an Episcopalian 
chaplain who took on the responsibility of searching for lost Passover matzot by going “from island 
base to island base on small boats” pausing only to conduct funeral services for men who died when 
the Japanese sunk one of the boats.43 Archbishop Francis Spellman noticed this cooperation as well. 
After visiting multiple domestic military installations, he assessed “the relations with non-Catholic 
chaplains” as “excellent.”44 Edward Larsen, a Lutheran Navy chaplain deployed to the Pacific, found 
himself drawn to the Catholic chaplain’s midnight mass on Christmas Eve 1944 and celebrated the 
combined Protestant-Catholic choir’s successful service the next day. A half-year later, as the U.S. 
dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki, he reflected on the impact of war on his religious thinking in 
a letter to his wife: “I am afraid that the constricted thinking of our synod is a little too 
stifling….There are so many congregations where it would be hard to fall in line especially after 
serving men of all faiths and trying to meet their needs.”45 Larsen typified the chaplains Gottlieb and 
Spellman observed in his openness to thinking outside the strictures of his own faith to reach the 
range of men served. 
The work of the chaplaincy was most often studied and reported through the lenses of 
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism. A mid-war press release, for example, noted that 180 
chaplains had recently completed Navy Chaplain School at the College of William & Mary—“139 
were Protestant, representing 18 denominations, 34 were Roman Catholic, and 7 were Jewish.”46 
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Similarly, a few weeks before the Japanese surrendered, the Navy confirmed to news outlets that 
2,790 chaplains were on active duty: 1,968 Protestants, 780 Catholics, and 42 Jews.47 In reports to 
the Chief of Chaplains, navy chaplains generally broke down their data into these three categories as 
well. Thus Robert Sassaman, a Lutheran chaplain, recorded the composition of the 91st Battalion as 
“658 Protestants, 318 Roman Catholics, and 31 Hebrews among the enlisted men. There were 73 
others who were classified among other sects or whose medical records did not list any religious 
affiliation. Of the 29 officers, 18 are Protestant, 7 are Roman Catholic, and 3 are Hebrew, and 1 is an 
atheist.”48 
Indeed the leaders of the military chaplaincies during World War II—Army Chief of 
Chaplains William Arnold (Catholic) and Navy Chief of Chaplains Robert Workman 
(Presbyterian)—developed systems and structures that imprinted an interfaith worldview upon the 
chaplaincy as it grew tremendously during the war years. Regulations demanded that, “so far as 
practicable,” chaplains should “serve the moral and religious needs of the entire personnel of the 
command to which he is assigned, either through his own personal services or through the 
cooperative efforts of others.”49 
Belief in and fidelity to a Protestant-Catholic-Jewish tri-faith ideal began in the recruitment 
of chaplains. While each denomination mustered its own men for the military, the application 
process sought to ferret out the “fair-minded” from the narrowly sectarian. When Roosevelt 
reinstated the draft in 1940, the armed forces began to swell, and the need for more chaplains grew. 
Official entrance into war significantly amplified the need for chaplains, but the processes for 
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acquiring them needed tweaking rather than formation. As in World War I, the military 
commissioned chaplains who met their age, physical, educational, and experiential standards and 
received the endorsement of a sanctioned civilian religious organization. And as before, the General 
Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains (Protestant), the Military Ordinariate (Catholic), and the 
Jewish Welfare Board, represented the largest number of religious groups. While the exact process 
varied slightly from group to group, all applicants had to complete forms, write personal essays, and 
supply reference letters in order to be considered for the chaplaincy. Despite the Military 
Ordinariate’s efforts to empower bishops to select priests for service—and its pleas for them to 
supply more—the Catholic quota remained unfilled.50 The Jewish Welfare Board’s Committee on 
Army and Navy Religious Affairs (CANRA) insisted on interviewing prospective chaplains, in part 
to assess appearance and speech and in part to determine “the religious integrity of the candidate 
and the flexibility of his views in terms of the needs of the service.”51 
The General Commission—whose application was used by the majority of Protestant 
denominations sending men to the chaplaincy—used a reference form that required rating 
applicants to ensure “only the right men” would be chosen. To glean a better sense of who the men 
were and how they might interact with military parishioners, the two-page form included a chart 
rating personal qualities such as energy, judgment, humor, “mental acumen,” tact, “personal 
magnetism,” and appearance. It solicited feedback about whether the candidate demonstrated a 
“genuine liking for people” and if he possessed a “constructive religious message for youth.” It 
queried whether the minister was debt-free and lived a “congenial” domestic life. It asked about 
preaching abilities and the emphasis of sermons. And it pressed for information about his attitudes 
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on “a) democracy, b) interdenominational cooperation, c) social problems, d) economic order, e) 
people of different racial or religious background, f) pacifism and militarism.”52 The ideal chaplain 
could wrestle angels like the biblical Jacob and make decisions like Solomon. To be “fit for service” 
meant living a morally upright (and debt-free) life while showing brains and brawn, sensitivity and 
charisma, wisdom and wit—preferably with a good voice to boot. It also meant holding “correct” 
opinions: acclaiming democracy, applauding ecumenism, praising capitalism, tolerating difference, 
and accepting military force as necessary.  
Once selected for the chaplaincy, Chaplain School reinforced the reality of a multi-faith 
military. Initially located at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, the Chaplain School moved to the 
grounds of Harvard University in August 1942 to accommodate the ever-increasing cohorts, which 
grew from 75 to 450 men. The stated purpose of the five- and six-week sessions was, in military 
parlance, indoctrination. Not of religion, which the state presumed chaplains already had via 
seminary training, but in the ways and words of military life.53 Dorm-rooms provided indoctrination 
of another sort: the school intentionally assigned men to rooms with clergy of different 
denominations in order to cultivate an ethos of religious cooperation.54 The point was not to 
disregard denominational difference but respect it so that chaplains would be able to conduct 
denominational services as well as “do what in conscience he can do for men of other faiths in 
pastoral, educational, and cultural work.”55 Harold Saperstein, a Jewish chaplain from New York, 
bunked with 2 Catholic priests and one Protestant minister. “They are all very fine fellows,” he 
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recorded, “and we get along splendidly.” Saperstein learned the lesson the Army hoped he would, 
finding that uniform-clad clergy made it “difficult to tell the difference between the faiths.”56  
Not all incoming chaplains interpreted the interfaith lodging experiment in the same terms. 
Lyman Berrett traveled from Salt Lake City to Boston to attend Chaplain School, and he also 
noticed that “the six in the room were all six different religious denominations.” The Mormon 
chaplain was surprised by their habits—they drank coffee, tea, and liquor, they smoked, they 
caroused in the evenings, and they seemed sexually libertine. But most strangely to him, “I was the 
only one of six of us who actually believed that Jesus Christ was the Son of God and divine way and 
in any shape or form…ministers in other religions didn’t have that kind of testimony.” When he 
spurned the behavior of and was disappointed in the “philosophies” espoused by his fellow 
chaplains, Berrett actually showed that he graduated from Chaplain School having accomplished one 
of its aims. Despite his disdain for the ideas and conduct of the ordained clergy in his room, he still 
talked to them and learned about them. He was ready to ship out and serve as a Graves Registration 
Chaplain in Okinawa where, he later reminisced, “I enjoyed my association with Latter-day Saint 
men and Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish men.”57 He absorbed the message of Chaplain School even 
as he resisted some of its carriers.  
The military enacted its commitment to a tri-faith ideal in numerous ways. It not only 
allowed but encouraged the National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ) to present 
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“Trialogues on National Unity” on military bases across the country.58 Likewise, during the NCCJ’s 
Brotherhood Weeks—weeklong celebrations of unity and consensus—Protestant, Catholic, and 
Jewish chaplains hosted joint “Brotherhood Services” and participated in “Brotherhood Programs” 
on local radio stations.59 More tangibly, recruits selected one of three options for their dog tags: P 
(Protestant), C (Catholic), or H (Hebrew). As in World War I, the military distributed pocket-sized 
Armed Forces Hymnals and, after Evelyn Kohlstedt, an Iowa civilian, asked President Roosevelt to 
follow King George’s example and hand out Bibles, the military began to give out Protestant (King 
James), Catholic (Douay), or Jewish (Jewish Publication Society) scriptures. The Bibles all contained 
a greeting from Commander-in-Chief Roosevelt at the beginning and a postscript from Chief of 
Chaplains Arnold advocating contact with chaplains.60  
Chapel construction soared in the early 1940s, and provided a concrete means through 
which to highlight religious toleration. Congress allocated almost 13 million dollars for chapels in 
March 1941, and over the course of the war, the Army spent almost 32 million dollars on 
approximately 1,300 chapels in the United States and abroad.61 Designed, according to William 
Arnold, “by a government which declares that man shall be free to worship God as seems best to 
himself,” the extensive construction campaign assumed Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish worship 
would occur in the same building. While the standardized blueprint for clapboard-framed building 
with a high steeple that could seat 350 may have resembled a New England meetinghouse, the non-
denominational interior offered a variety of setups for different forms of worship. Wooden pews 
included folding kneeling benches, the balcony could seat a choir, and an electric organ could 
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provide musical accompaniment. The cloth draped across the altar declared “Holy, Holy, Holy,” one 
of few phrases accepted (though interpreted differently) by Christians and Jews.62 No art, crosses, or 
figures permanently adorned the exterior or interior walls because, Arnold wrote, “If the display of 
religious appointments in the chapel is such that men do not feel free to come into the chapel to 
meditate or worship when no specific service is being held by a Chaplain then we are breaking faith 
with the government that made these chapels possible.”63 Likewise, when asked about the display of 
overtly sectarian Protestant or Catholic literature on book displays in chapels, Arnold offered a 
general principle to the inquiring chaplain: “Controversial writings may have their value, but an 
Army chapel is a poor place to distribute them.”64 Religious debates had their place, but not in Army 
space.  
From the top down, the Army chaplaincy tried to acknowledge distinctions while abating 
tension. Outside the chaplaincy, the ecumenical effort came to define a nondescript chapel building 
as quintessentially American. At the dedication ceremony for the first cantonment chapel built as 
part of the 1941 chapel expansion project, the Quartermaster General lauded the structure as 
“distinctively American…because only in a free country could you find a church built to be used for 
worship by Catholic, Protestant, and Jew alike.”65  
On a local level, however, respecting difference and tempering friction depended on builders 
and chaplains hewing to the policies promulgated by Arnold—which would, in time, be codified in 
Army Regulations but had not yet been statutorily defined. In some places, the religious 
opportunities were vast and space easily shared. The Church Services Bulletin at Fort McClellan 
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listed 106 activities across 12 regimental chapels, ranging from worship services, bible studies, and 
devotionals to Confession, Vespers, and choir practices. On Sundays, the Second Regiment Chapel 
started with Mass at 9 am, and proceeded with Protestant and Jewish services in the morning and 
additional Christian Science and Protestant services in the evening.66 Smaller venues followed the 
same model. At Camp Rucker, Alabama, the posted Sunday schedule allotted each group an hour 
for services, starting with Catholic Mass, moving to Jewish services, followed by Holy 
Communion/General Protestant Services, and an evening Christian Science service.67 Chaplains 
carried the plan of sequentially using chapels with them abroad. Samuel Faircloth (American Baptist) 
recalled sharing a chapel north of Florence with a Catholic chaplain: “We wouldn’t clash with each 
other, we wouldn’t work together…The Catholic would have his service ahead of me, because they 
would have mass earlier. We had no problems.”68 
In contrast, difficulties arose at Fort Meade, a mere 30 miles from Arnold’s DC 
headquarters, where a built-in Catholic-style altar and image of the crucifixion bothered the new 
Jewish chaplain. Chaplain Harry Southard confirmed that the Inspector General hewed to Arnold’s 
provisions for alternating use of the space and not affixing permanent symbols in the chapels but 
found uneven implementation as he toured camps and installations. The Jewish chaplain, he noted, 
refused to conduct services until the Army installed a curtain to cover the picture and the altar.69 The 
problematic display of crucifixes extended beyond Fort Meade, but as Aryeh Lev told CANRA, 
“where gifts of a Christological nature are made, little can be done to deter the authorities from 
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accepting these gifts, unless they are influenced by tactful explanations.”70 Personal relationships, 
rather than policy directives, often determined the degree to which chapels remained neutral 
religious spaces. 
The presence of multiple chapels could foment rather than alleviate tension. Reverend 
Bratcher, a member of the American Baptist Home Mission Society, found the presence of a 
Catholic chapel at Camp Grant troublesome. Arnold pointed out that Protestants and Catholics 
were free to “make separate use of two chapels” as long as everyone agreed and it caused no 
“inconvenience.”71 In reality, Camp Grant had four chapels, and Baptist representatives who visited 
four months later did not find the allocation any more satisfactory. According to their observations, 
only one was truly neutral and thus available to all. Earl Frederick Adams deflected attention away 
from potentially parochial Protestant-Catholic clashes when he commented “Obviously, the Jewish 
group would feel quite embarrassed to use that chapel.”72 The rhetoric of tolerance allowed civilian 
visitors to appeal for changes without relying on their own preferences; ecumenism, not Protestant 
sectarianism, demanded a shift in chapel allocation. 
Other civilian religious leaders struggled just to gain access. Hempstead Lyons, a Christian 
Science practitioner, sought to hold services for Christian Scientists at Chanute Field, Illinois. But, 
conforming to the military definition of Christian Science as Protestant, local authorities excluded 
Lyons as unnecessary. “They have classed me along with the Methodist and Baptist ministers,” he 
complained to the head of Christian Science Camp Welfare Activities. “They evidently feel that the 
                                                
70 CANRA Meeting Minutes, October 21, 1941, I-249, Box 1, Folder: CANRA Meeting Minutes, 1940-45, 
AJHS.  
71 M.E. Bratcher to William Arnold, April 21, 1943 and William Arnold to M.E. Bratcher, April 28, 1943, RG 
247 (1920-45), Box 58, Folder 080 (Baptist-North, Vol. I), NARA II. 
72 E.F. Adams to William Arnold, July 15, 1943, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 58, Folder 080 (Baptist-North, Vol. I), 
NARA II. 
  156 
 
Army Protestant Services suffice in a general way for men interested in Christian Science.”73 Lyons 
wisely asked his superiors to pursue this matter with their contacts in the military. Christian Science 
leaders recognized that decision-making authority rested with local commanding officers, but 
nevertheless appealed to the Chief of Chaplains to intervene.  
The Christian Scientists were right: permission to use space was at the discretion of local 
authorities. The chaplaincy was responsible for “assur[ing] the right of worship of groups of all 
denominations,” as William Arnold told Walter Krueger, the Commanding General of the Third 
Army. But that did not mean the military was obligated to grant unlimited access to its bases and 
personnel. “Where and when, and by whom those services are to be conducted,” Arnold continued, 
“must be decided locally, with local conditions on mind.”74 In the case of the Christian Scientists at 
Chanute Field, chaplaincy officials also affirmed that as long as members of the denomination 
requested such a service that “in general, it would seem proper for Army chapels to be made 
available” so long as they did not interfere with ongoing activities.75 When Lyons felt frustrated by 
the military’s failure to distinguish Christian Science from other groups and assumed that blurring 
denominational lines prevented him from ministering to Christian Science soldiers, he may have 
been correct. But granting local commanders authority and requiring soldiers to request services also 
kept meddling outsiders at bay, allowing the military to assert its vision of religious fellowship in its 
space. 
That vision adhered to unwritten standards of respectability. Joseph Gredler, a Catholic 
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priest, was the only chaplain stationed on his post, and he was therefore responsible for finding local 
Protestant clergy to offer services. He found several willing to oblige but, he wrote to the Chief of 
Chaplains, “one of them put on a rather sensational service, with a woman preacher. It lacked 
dignity.” He wondered whether there were guidelines he could use to bar that type of service and 
asked whether he could differentiate between ministers from denominations that “rate Chaplains” 
and “free lancers.”76 The answer he received was perhaps less precise than he expected, but 
nevertheless granted him significant discretion. He ought to ensure that “in religious matters all 
things should be done decently and in order” and should invite only those “clergymen who belong 
to recognized religious bodies.”77 The emphasis on men was not accidental.  
When Mary Elizabeth Dibble enlisted in the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC) to 
serve her country, she was stationed at Fort Des Moines. In the fall of 1942, she wrote to the 
Christian Science Board of Directors and noted the “need of spiritual aid” and “divine guidance” 
among her fellow servicewomen. Wanting to be “of the greatest service possible” and having heard 
that the Army was accepting women as chaplains, she wondered, “if I might not be of greater use to 
the Christian Science movement as a chaplain.” Dibble was probably disappointed by the response 
she received from Arthur Eckman, the Manager of the Christian Science Committee on Publication. 
He suspected she had been misinformed about the possibility of female chaplains, but had 
nonetheless gone through official channels to investigate the possibility. After all, as a committed 
Christian Scientist, he was well-acquainted with female religious leaders and had received letters 
from other Christian Science women practitioners who thought they would make capable 
chaplains—at least for WACS and WAVES. But Chaplain Rixey confirmed Eckman’s suspicions; no 
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women were allowed to serve as chaplains and no change in regulations was afoot. Military chaplains 
had to be male. The women Dibble had heard about were most likely selected to serve as chaplains’ 
assistants “who are appointed not to do religious work but to take dictation, type letters, and do 
whatever else of a clerical nature that office assistants are expected to do.”78 To Rixey and the other 
men in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Dibble’s query was preposterous. There were no 
women chaplains and the men running the military chaplaincy could scarcely imagine why or how 
women could serve in such a leadership role.  
Thus even though no policy explicitly banned civilian women clergy from visiting their 
adherents on military bases, they were not necessarily welcomed either. Without receiving a list of 
“recognized religious bodies,” Chaplain Gredler could have reasonably excluded a female Christian 
Science practitioner or Aimee Semple McPherson—the leader of the Four-Square Gospel who was 
also well-known for “sensational” worship—even though both religious groups were eligible to send 
male representatives to the chaplaincy. By delegating power to local chaplains and commanding 
officers, the military permitted personal standards of decorum and propriety—often informed by an 
individual’s religious background—to regulate access to religious worship, often eclipsing the 
technocratic language of regularity and legibility. 
At the same time, however, the state wanted tri-faith rhetoric to reach beyond military gates. 
Letters, circulars, and bulletins often referenced the work of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish 
chaplains—not as an unusual or unexpected event but as part of normal, everyday life in the Army. 
John G. Lambrides, a regimental chaplain, briefed families and friends of soldiers about the schedule 
of events at Camp Maxey, TX provided by Chaplain Robert J. Baldauf (Evangelical & Reformed), 
Chaplain Edward C. Henry (Catholic), Chaplain Abraham Klausner (Jewish), and himself (Baptist). 
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Together they tendered “spiritual support to all men, irrespective of religious affiliation” and 
“covet[ed] your fullest cooperation and your intercession to God on behalf of our Nation in this 
hour of need.”79 As in World War I, the Navy Chief of Chaplains resisted petitions from mothers 
seeking to place chaplains of their faith on their sons’ ships. A joint letter from Workman and 
Admiral Chester Nimitz advised Mrs. J.F. Kelley that a Catholic chaplain would not replace the 
Protestant one aboard her son’s ship because “it is impracticable to assign two chaplains of different 
faiths in ships of the naval forces.” Moreover, they pointed out, because “an exchange of church 
parties takes place and confessions heard and Mass said in the various ships of the Fleet by chaplains 
attached to other commands, this arrangement is far-reaching.” 80 In other words, they saw no need 
to swap chaplain assignments because chaplains were themselves mobile and attended to general and 
specific needs within the fleet. 
When Chaplain Oakley Lee submitted articles to The Christian Advocate, a weekly Methodist 
paper, he often lauded the ecumenism he found in the Army. One week, for example, Jewish 
violinist Yehudi Menuhin played for his troops. “The Stradivarius was playing a tune of tolerance, of 
freedom from want of religious liberty and all the thousand and one things that go to make 
democracy….it mattered not that the ‘Ave Maria’ is usually associated with Catholic literature, it 
mattered not that we were in the Methodist Church, or that we were Protestants, Catholics, and 
Jews, allied forces from all the Nations, somehow it symbolized the whole thing we were fighting 
for.”81 
If freedom of religion encompassed a variety of faith traditions, it also meant freedom not to 
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worship and not to be compelled to attend services. William Arnold sometimes had to remind 
chaplains that they could not, in fact, require attendance at worship hour. To Alvin Myries, he 
stated, “The fact remains that the service is there; and if any man fails to attend the burden of 
responsibility rests upon the man and not the chaplain.”82 Arnold undoubtedly wanted soldiers to 
pray, but understood coercion was improper. Sometimes, however, religious pressure came from 
sources other than the chaplain. Colonel L.G. Fritz, the Commanding Officer of the North Atlantic 
Wing Air Transport Command, issued a memo to all station commanders and personnel serving 
under him. After emphasizing the importance of religious freedom as an American value, he 
invoked his authority as their Commanding Officer “to bring to your attention the importance of 
divine worship. Plan to attend the service of your choice, whenever your duties permit, from which 
you will derive spiritual strength and insight, and at the same time you will give support to a very 
important phase of the North American Wing program.”83 Fritz’s logic presumed that the availability 
of “the service of your choice” mitigated his injunction to show up at such services. If cajoling was 
not exactly the same as compelling, it came perilously close when slated into the imperative of a 
military superior. Religious effort and military success, according to some leaders, went hand in 
hand. 
Objections to required participation in religious services arose from religious quarters, 
however. At the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, the Commanding Officer did his best to 
encourage tri-faith understanding among officers and trainees. He invited Protestant, Catholic, and 
Jewish chaplains to lead the general Sunday service together and designated a different 
commissioned officer to formally greet worshipers each week. His ecumenical program backfired for 
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Catholic chaplains and officers who, according to canon law and Papal directive, were restricted to 
Catholic services. They attended and spoke as necessary but felt profoundly uncomfortable yet 
unclear about whether they could disobey the military chain of command.84 When presented with 
the situation, Frederick Hagan—writing on behalf of the Catholic Chief of Chaplains—reiterated 
that attendance at religious services, even in the military, was always an individual choice. “The 
advice of this office,” Hagan counseled, “is to let each individual worship God in his own way in 
accordance with his training and conscience. Commanding officers and chaplains should so plan the 
religious activities to give each soldier that privilege.”85 Prescribing tri-faith experiences exceeded the 
bounds of military authority, but not everyone recognized the moral, creedal, or human limits of 
forced ecumenism.        
Identifying the edges of religious toleration was challenging in part because when someone 
like Colonel Fritz referenced “Freedom of Worship” in his missive, he explicitly drew on President 
Roosevelt’s classification of “Freedom of Worship” as one of the “Four Freedoms” for which the 
United States was fighting. Eleven months before the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt devoted 
his State of the Union address to a rationale for war, or at the very least, readiness for war. Along 
with ramping up war manufacturing, increasing munitions production, supporting the Lend-Lease 
program, and stimulating patriotism, Americans needed to position themselves as guardians of “four 
essential human freedoms”—freedom of speech and worship, freedom from want and fear.86  
  The response to conscientious objection to the “good war” reveals the extent to which state 
religious ideology exerted a powerful force within American society. In contrast to World War I, in 
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which religious objectors to war faced scorn, mob violence, and imprisonment, World War II 
Americans greeted conscientious objectors (COs) with a mixture of disapproval and tolerance.87 This 
reaction stemmed in part from the agreement reached between Selective Service Director Lewis 
Hershey and the historic peace churches—the Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren—to create 
alternatives for COs. Registered COs could choose between noncombatant service, such as the 
medical corps (a popular option for Seventh-Day Adventists who followed the precept of 
“conscientious cooperation”), or alternative service either in mental institutions or Civilian Public 
Service (CPS) camps.88 The response of World War I chaplain O.D. Foster to World War II COs is 
instructive. When he first visited an East Coast Quaker-run CO camp, he viewed it as “a lark for a 
type of mind that thinks less socially than individualistically.” By the time he made it to San Dimas, 
California where he found a Quaker-run CO camp consisting of men from 26 different 
denominations as well as 8 men lacking a religious preference, he changed his mind about the value 
of CPS camps. Along with several copies of the camp newspaper, The San Dimas Rattler, he reported 
to the Chief of Chaplains that “this experiment of a medley of religious males trying to live together 
religiously, with but the negative common interest – of objecting to war – bringing, if not holding 
them, together, may, if wisely directed, contribute quite as much as a sociological laboratory as their 
type could have contributed in a military way.”89 
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The military prescription of tri-faith religion moved Catholics and Jews from the margins to 
the mainstream, but this did not occur without certain concessions to military order. When Otho 
Sullivan, a chaplain stationed at the Columbia Army Air Base, addressed his inquiry to Monsignor 
Arnold, he probably expected a sympathetic response. After all, he was a Catholic priest asking his 
superior cleric and officer for a meatless menu on Good Friday. He noted that not only would it 
ease the Catholic observance of Holy Week, but “fish are kosher, and usually acceptable to 
Protestants too.” Chief of Chaplains Arnold, however, saw the situation rather differently. “The law 
of abstinence,” he replied, “is a disciplinary regulation binding only on those who voluntarily profess 
belief in Catholic doctrines.” In his experiences, moreover, not all Catholics followed the regulation, 
especially those in the Southwest United States where parishes “had turkey suppers on Fridays, 
though I limited myself to the oyster stuffing.”90 In Europe, non-Catholic chaplains sometimes 
found local, non-English speaking priests to conduct Mass and hear confession for their Catholic 
soldiers. While the language barrier did not present a problem for Mass, which was then always said 
in Latin, it created a problem for confession. To address this issue, some chaplains printed the Ten 
Commandments in two languages so soldiers could point to their infractions; it was neither 
complete nor anonymous, but it allowed soldiers to fulfill their obligation to perform the sacrament 
of penance.91 Indeed, Archbishop Spellman, in his role as Military Vicar, sent a circular letter to all 
Catholic chaplains in 1942 informing them of the relaxation of certain sacramental rules and 
obligations during the war. Mass, for example, could be said in the evening if morning services were 
impossible.92  
For American Jews, too, inclusion required ritual accommodations. If a meatless Good 
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Friday menu was impossible, so too was mess-hall kosher food.93 Saturday morning Torah-reading 
most often occurred on Friday nights, and one Passover Seder generally sufficed instead of the usual 
two.94 In civilian life, rabbis and cantors generally led congregations in prayer; but Jewish rituals, 
unlike Protestant and Catholic services, do not require rabbinic supervision. As a result, on training 
bases and in combat areas without Jewish chaplains, lay leaders frequently stepped in to conduct 
prayers. Because the military wanted a single interface with American Jewry, the Jewish Welfare 
Board, and its subsidiary CANRA, had to present a united front even though American Judaism 
consisted of multiple movements with differing perspectives on theology, law, and ritual. In 
particular, the state’s need for one American Jewish voice combined with extended wartime exigency 
to produce an unusual institution: the Responsa Committee, a group comprised of rabbinical 
representatives from the Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox Jewish movements that rendered 
halachic, or legal, decisions together. While its published volume Responsa in Wartime cautioned that its 
answers to Jewish legal questions—which were notable for flexibility and leniency—applied only to 
American Jewry serving the nation,95 it nevertheless revealed how engagement with the state 
propelled shifts within religious groups and changes in religious doctrine. 
 
Protestant-Catholic-Jew-Negro 
Yet as much as the Protestant-Catholic-Jew triptych permeated military decision-making and 
civilian rhetoric, the Army chaplaincy actually operated through a significantly different lens, that of 
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Protestant-Catholic-Jew-Negro. The religious apparatus of the armed forces functioned within a 
segregated military, and the Army—unlike the Navy—actively recruited and promoted black 
chaplains. Adherence to the color line, in which black chaplains could never serve white units, meant 
that race limited the assignments and opportunities available to African-American (as well as 
Chinese-American, Japanese-American, Filipino-American, and any other non-white) clergy. And 
while race also unsettled the promulgated religious order by adding another variable into categorical 
religious thinking, religion similarly disturbed the racial order imprinted on the World War II-era 
military by making African Americans equal to (white) Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.  
When the military compiled internal statistics of worship attendance and chaplain strength of 
service, it categorized data rows marked as Protestant, Catholic, Jewish and African American. When 
the military dispatched civilian religious leaders overseas to boost morale, it sent Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, and African-American delegations. And when the military designated chapel space 
for different services, it set aside time for Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and African-American 
worship.96  
While some integrated worship services occurred, they almost always adhered to policies of 
strictly separate seating.97 Nevertheless, the presence of black chaplains meant that black units had at 
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least one black officer, a not insignificant accomplishment in a military that frequently assigned 
white officers to black units. And the inclusion of black ministers as officers provided a platform 
from which to decry segregation. When a black chaplain ordered to Omaha’s Paxton Hotel for a 
Chaplains’ Conference was refused a room, the Seventh Service Command decided it would no 
longer hold conferences in private spaces in which it could not compel integration.98 
However, as a matter of policy—and despite the provisos that religion eclipsed race in 
tending to the military flock—white chaplains (of any faith) could serve any unit, but non-white 
chaplains were restricted to same-race units. This approach to chaplains extended far beyond 
African Americans in the U.S. military. When the Congregational and Christian Churches disclosed, 
for example, that a Chinese American pastor wanted to become a chaplain, the Office of the Chief 
of Chaplains advised the group, “the only place we could use a Chinese pastor would be with a 
Chinese unit. To the best of our knowledge and belief, the organization of Chinese units in our 
Army is not contemplated. Chinese in the service are in regular units of other Americans. Therefore, 
we have no requisitions for Chinese chaplains.”99 The math was simple: without a wholly Chinese-
American unit, there was no place for a Chinese-American chaplain, no matter his religion. The 
chaplaincy could include clergy from a range of religious and racial backgrounds, but only if they 
mapped onto the racial architecture of the military. 
The Jim Crow military left many Americans without a representative of their race in the 
chaplaincy corps, which raised the question of how predominantly white ministers would and could 
serve non-white troops. By 1944, a pamphlet, “The Chaplain and the Negro in the Armed Services,” 
provided some answers. It cautioned chaplains that lack of experience or contact with African 
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Americans would not preclude assignments to black units and further, all chaplains bore 
responsibility for improving race relations. “There is no reason in religion,” the 30-page booklet 
intoned, “why any chaplain should not minister to men of any race. Thus the chaplain who at the 
moment is at a distance from Negroes in the service should bear in mind that tomorrow he may be 
assigned to a Negro unit.”100 Yet while spirituality itself might have transcended the color line, 
chaplain assignments certainly did not.  
Quite notably, white chaplains had to gird themselves to handle religious duties with black—
or other non-white—units. As the pamphlet expounded, “there [wa]s more at stake here than the 
well-being of the Negro or the spiritual life of the chaplain. The good of our Nation is involved.”101 
For the good of the country, in the spirit of wartime patriotism, then, white clergy needed to 
understand who African-American soldiers were: that, like white personnel, African Americans 
remained individuals with particular concerns and perspectives; that as a group, African Americans 
had overcome deep and wounding challenges since emancipation; that units consisted of men from 
a variety of faith traditions, albeit most commonly Baptists and Methodists; that the segregated 
military “irritat[ed]” them and that African Americans posted to the South faced discrimination 
“ranging from simple inhospitality to brutal abuse.”102 In general, the instructional briefing 
acknowledged but downplayed segregation and structural discrimination while offering simplistic 
advice—approach men as individuals, avoid assumptions about faith, refrain from stereotypes and 
distasteful jokes, eschew minstrelsy as a form of entertainment, and empathize with off-base 
difficulties in procuring transportation or finding recreation. Admonishing white chaplains to spurn 
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racist language like “‘nigger,’ ‘darkey,’ [and] ‘coon,’” represented the most direct and clear 
instructions offered, even as the Double V campaign pushed African Americans to reconsider their 
roles in service to the nation, to ask whether their military service was meaningful and whether it 
could be used to change their status in the United States. Ever conscious of the fragility of 
perceptions abroad, “The Chaplain and the Negro” pressed chaplains to sway the opinions of all 
their men and encourage their acceptance of African-American soldiers: “the American uniform, no 
matter by whom it is worn, must be respected by all other Americans if our armed forces are not to 
suffer a dangerous loss of prestige in the eyes of foreign peoples. Similar emphasis must be placed 
upon respect for our allies, many of whom have colored troops in their armies and navies.”103 
Nevertheless, the biggest problem, from the perspective of the Army Chief of Chaplains, 
was how to fill the African-American chaplain quota. In early 1943, the Army Chief of Chaplains 
reached out to the five principal African-American churches—National Baptists, Methodists, AME, 
CME, and AMEZ—and requested their assistance in filling 445 slots available for black chaplains as 
set by the Army’s Tables of Organization. He fretted that only 116—a quarter of the quota—were 
currently on duty, and should the churches not be able to fill the remainder, the chaplaincy would 
turn to other denominations for help. Working under the assumption that “the religious leaders of 
Negro churches consider it advisable to have Negro Chaplains for Negro troops,” Arnold wanted to 
“cooperate fully” to meet the “chaplain procurement objective.”104 Within 6 months, the Army had 
doubled the number of black chaplains to 247, but they were racing against a quota that was 
increasing by 10 chaplains a month.105 
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By the middle of 1943, the Army desperately needed African-American chaplains and was 
willing to relinquish strict educational standards to commission them. In a letter sent to every 
denomination that had endorsed African Americans—from black denominations such as the AME 
and National Baptist Churches to more typically white groups such as the Disciples of Christ and 
Congregationalist Churches—the Office of the Chief of Chaplains stated, “We have an urgent need 
for Negro chaplains….The Chief of Service is prepared to consider men with two or more years of 
college or seminary training and three years of successful pastoral experience.” Despite consenting 
to adjusted guidelines, the military still equivocated, noting that, “Of course, the full educational and 
professional training is most desirable but hand-picked men with the qualifications indicated will be 
given consideration as the need of the service requires.” Moreover, the letter concluded, “we are not 
announcing any lowering of standards for Negroes and each applicant will be considered on his 
merits.”106 When the supply of a particular group of chaplains dwindled and pragmatism demanded 
change, the Army chaplaincy hesitantly acceded to reduced educational credentials.  
But easing the path for black ministers to become chaplains did not mean churches could 
necessarily or easily provide more men to the Army. Willard Wickizer, the Executive Secretary of the 
Disciples of Christ Committee on War Service, pointed out that the paucity of African-American 
ministers afflicted their churches as well and it was a “problem we have been working on.” Tellingly, 
he was also uncertain about the capacity of black ministers and feared losing “the few able men we 
do have” as they held “such key positions in the Negro brotherhood that if they were to give up 
their present work things would almost collapse.”107 Wickizer’s unveiled racism prevented him from 
encouraging more men from his church to apply to the Army. 
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Some African-American chaplains in the service felt their own denominations were not 
doing enough to recruit and endorse clergy. Chaplain S.A. Owen informed the Chief of Chaplains 
that the National Baptist Convention, USA, “has not been the most diligent” in sending ministers to 
the chaplaincy. He admitted that the scarcity of “well trained men” was a “handicap” to this 
endeavor. Much as he wanted to dedicate his post-war life to helping develop better educational 
pathways to allow more “Negro ministers…the advantage of liberal training” and advancing men 
into the chaplaincy, there was little he could do to alter the current situation.108 Of the typically white 
denominations, the Congregational Church took on the responsibility of funneling as many African-
American clergy to the military as it could, all the while advocating on behalf of racial equality in and 
outside the armed forces. Every time a hotel forced a black chaplain to use a service elevator at a 
meeting or denied food service at a group meal, the Congregationalists protested. Thus even as the 
Army vacillated between seeking out more African-American chaplains and ignoring the racism they 
experienced, religious groups seized opportunities to challenge unequal treatment. 
Once in the service, black chaplains’ experiences varied considerably. The Office of the 
Army Chief of Chaplains strenuously claimed that “race discrimination is not practiced by our 
present colored chaplains in religious work” and “chaplains use their influence as far as possible to 
prevent racial disturbances.” At the same time, however, the administration also worried that this 
work of pacifying black troops was insecure, constantly influenced by external “agitators of the race 
question” and diminished by “prejudiced white men bungling their jobs by improper speech and 
action.” This dangerous combination of outside pressure and internal discrimination sometimes “got 
hold of some chaplains and stir[red] them up…sometimes they lose their sense of loyalty to the large 
                                                
108 S.A. Owen to William Arnold, February 7, 1944, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 79, Folder 080 (National Baptist, 
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interests of their country and people.”109  
Racial inequality, in other words, could run afoul of patriotic commitments, but the solution, 
as Chaplain Benny Jones found out rarely rested on dismantling discrimination. It was a little hotter 
and a little more humid than usual on the Louisiana night that led authorities to question Chaplain 
Jones’s commitments. What exactly he said that muggy September night over the chapel’s public 
address system remained in dispute. A white officer, Second Lieutenant Francis K. Morgan, claimed 
he heard one thing, and the chaplain asserted he said something a bit different. Both agreed that the 
minister commended Camp Claiborne’s African-American soldiers for their patriotic service, 
framing their work in construction and service units as essential to the war effort. Did Chaplain 
Jones encourage the men to stand up for their rights as American citizens, suggesting they stop 
sitting in the back of buses or cease entering local restaurants anywhere except the front door? Did 
he tell them war at home loomed, a battle for the rights and dignity of black men, a fight that could 
involve dangers as life-threatening as combat overseas? Did he, in other words, goad a revolt, 
fomenting the racial unrest that plagued southern military bases during World War II? Or did he 
simply affirm his unit’s prowess as fighters and their rights as Americans, in order to boost their 
morale?110 
The military intelligence officer who filed the report never interviewed Chaplain Jones. But 
sent through proper channels, the memo eventually landed on the desk of the Army Chief of 
Chaplains, who in turn dispatched one of his staff chaplains to respond. In a confidential reply, 
Chaplain John Monahan instructed Chaplain Edgar Siegfriedt to reign in the black chaplains serving 
under him and remind the clergymen of their proper role in the army. What had been an individual 
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Correspondence, 1941-48), Box 3, Folder 291.2 (Race), NARA II. 
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concern became a group matter. From Washington, DC, Chaplain Monahan suggested that the 
command chaplain advise his “colored chaplains that they are definitely not to promulgate racial 
hatred. Chaplains are appointed in the Army of the United States to furnish religious ministration, 
preach the word of God, and to counsel men in the right direction…[not] to incite hatred for their 
fellow brethren, either white or colored.”111 Under Monahan’s injunction, African Americans, 
already restricted to the margins of the Jim Crow army, had become responsible for staving off racial 
unrest, and black chaplains, already hindered by segregation, liable for provoking discord among 
soldiers. From this perspective, race relations ought to stand separate from the military’s project of 
promoting religious toleration. But Chaplain Monahan’s admonition to focus on religious work and 
sideline racial matters was actually impossible. In his office, in the administrative headquarters of the 
army chaplaincy, race and religion regularly co-mingled, often bedeviling bureaucrats but never 
wholly separating from one another.  
 
Between Race and Religion: Japanese-American Chaplains   
Two-and-a-half months after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, on February 19, 1942, FDR 
issued Executive Order 9066, which allowed for and led to the incarceration of about 120,000 
Japanese Americans. With the notable exceptions of left-leaning public intellectuals such as 
journalist Carey McWilliams, photographer Dorothea Lange, Socialist party leader Norman Thomas, 
and African-American civil rights activist Bayard Rustin, and groups such as the pacifist Fellowship 
of Reconciliation, the Quaker American Friends Service Committee, and the American Civil 
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Liberties Union (ACLU), most Americans accepted the internment of Japanese Americans as an 
acceptable cost of war. Most Americans, of course, were not directed to pack up their possessions, 
forced to leave their homes, and required to begin new, uncertain lives in barracks, upon the order 
of the benign-sounding but hostile War Relocation Authority.112  
The War Department took a different tack. Although the Selective Service classified all 
Japanese Americans as Class 4-C (enemy aliens) after Pearl Harbor, the Army sought Japanese-
American loyalty and harbored skepticism about the negative propaganda surrounding internment. 
Both the Army and Navy provided citizens and non-citizens—often offered the prospect of 
naturalized citizenship113—opportunities to serve as translators, journalists, writers, cartographers, 
interrogators, and spies.114 Moreover, when members of the Hawaiian Territorial Guard petitioned 
to serve, the Army transformed it into the 100th Infantry Battalion in spring 1942. After the 100th 
Battalion, which included future U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye, proved its mettle in Europe, in winter 
1943 the Army created the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, which primarily consisted of mainland 
men whose families were interned. The patriotic bait did not entice all Japanese Americans, but 
some Nisei—especially those from the territory of Hawaii—wanted to enlist. While over 10,000 men 
from Hawaii were willing to sign up and complete loyalty questionnaires, mainland Nisei hesitated, 
and the 442nd could not subsist on volunteers alone. To fill its ranks, in November 1943, the 
Selective Service reclassified Japanese-Americans as eligible for service and drafted about 14,000 
Japanese Americans.115 
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For the Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains, the inclusion of Japanese Americans in the 
Army posed three related questions: first, what chaplains would serve the 100th and the 442nd; 
second, could Japanese-Americans serve as chaplains and if so, whom would they serve; and third, 
how would the military handle Buddhism, the faith of many Nisei as well as the enemy Japanese.  
Technically, the racial and religious composition of units was irrelevant; military policy 
dictated that any chaplain could serve any unit for all chaplains were commissioned to serve all men. 
And when the 100th Battalion came under Army command, first stateside at Camp McCoy, 
Wisconsin, and then abroad, in North Africa and Europe, it acquired a succession of white, 
Christian chaplains. When Israel Yost presented himself to Lieutenant Colonel Farrant L. Turner in 
October 1943, the Hawaii-born commanding officer of the 100th wondered whether the military had 
sent a rabbi to minister to Buddhists and Christians. Yost, a pastor from Pennsylvania, quickly 
realized that he would find few fellow Lutherans in the seats of his chapel. Instead, for the next two 
years he learned how to counsel, tend to, address, and lead or arrange services for an array of 
Protestants, some Catholics, a core group of Mormons, and many Buddhists.116 Although Yost 
lacked any experience with Japanese Americans and felt most comfortable with the doctrine and 
rituals of the Lutheran Church in America,117 he earnestly committed himself to the men in his care. 
As he later recalled, he held adherents to Lutheran standards for Communion and “never attempted 
to conduct a Roman Catholic or a Mormon or a Buddhist religious rite,” but also “prayed with 
soldier who wanted a prayer…witnessing to my own faith but also explaining how others taught 
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differently.”118 He relished baptizing those who chose to become Christians while also advocating on 
behalf of a soldier’s stepfather, an imprisoned Shinto priest.119  
Yost crafted an imperfect but viable path through a religious canvas stretched to encompass 
faiths, traditions, and rituals beyond his previously known and preferred religious worldview. By the 
time the War Department approved the creation of the 442nd Battalion, however, Yost no longer 
represented the ideal chaplain for a Japanese-American unit. By then, the Army had commissioned 
several Japanese-American Christian chaplains and began discussing the possibility of a Buddhist 
chaplain. The request for a Buddhist chaplain came not from Buddhist soldiers, but—at least as 
requested through official channels—from Colonel C.W. Pierce, the Commanding Officer of the 
newly formed regiment. The Commanding General of the Third Army, which oversaw the 442nd’s 
training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, approved the request, and in turn, solicited a Buddhist chaplain 
from the Chief of Chaplains.120 This was not the first time the Army handled an inquiry about 
serving Buddhists. In December 1942, Chaplain Wilfred Munday received a response to his query 
for help finding someone to serve Buddhists at Camp Grant: “Our impression would be that 
probably the nearest Buddhist priests to Camp Grant would be found in Chicago, Illinois….If our 
impression is correct, that should be close enough to secure the occasional services of one of them 
in ministering to those of his faith. You should, of course, take this up with your Commanding 
Officer.”121 At the time, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains could merely hazard a guess as to 
where a chaplain dedicated to serving Buddhist soldiers might find a Buddhist priest. A few months 
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later, relying on an “impression” about Buddhists no longer sufficed. A large number of Japanese 
Americans had arrived at Camp Shelby; the Chief of Chaplains needed to find a Buddhist chaplain. 
And William Arnold tried. With the Adjutant General peering over his shoulder, wanting 
updates on the search, Arnold looked for a Buddhist priest who could meet the Army chaplaincy 
requirements.122 He informed Bishop Matsukahe, the leader of the Buddhist Mission of North 
America, that the Army would “be pleased to consider a clergyman of your faith who meets the 
eligibility standards” and noted that “a clergyman appointed from your faith will be assigned to a 
unit the majority of whose members are Buddhists.”123 This was unusual. Most clergy seeking 
appointments contended with the unknown and some, like Israel Yost, found themselves with 
unexpected assignments. But a Buddhist priest was different. He could approach the chaplaincy 
knowing his placement, in demographic if not geographic terms, because the chaplaincy was both 
flexible and rigid: elastic enough to include a Buddhist but stiff enough to assume only one 
appropriate posting for a Buddhist priest. 
Matsukahe furnished Arnold with one name, Reverend Masara Kumata, who had been 
relocated to Topaz, Utah, and who had already written to the Secretary of War based on advice from 
the Japanese American Citizens League.124 At the same time, Reverend Newton Ishuira, then 
residing at the Gila River Relocation Center in Arizona, offered his services to the Secretary of War 
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in a letter, which was passed along to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. To Kumata, Arnold sent 
an application form and requested he apply, pointedly observing, “if you are appointed, you will be 
the first Buddhist chaplain in the army of the United States.”125 In response to Ishuira, Arnold 
equivocated. He thanked him for his interest, wondered whether Bishop Matsukahe would endorse 
him, and allowed him to apply while cautioning that the response was not “an offer or a guarantee 
of appointment, as appointments from your faith are made as the requirements of the service 
justify.”126 Arnold’s wary tone may have reflected impatience with Ishuira’s Buddhist faith or 
concern about his Japanese-American background. But Arnold was open to a Buddhist chaplain, as 
his letter to Kumata suggested and the Army commissioned several Japanese-American Christian 
chaplains. Although Arnold may have sounded sharp, his phrasing was actually stock. 
“Appointments from your faith” was generic rather than directed, a standard line used in many 
responses to potential chaplains, letters more frequently sent by Arnold’s subordinates than by the 
Chief himself. 
By April 1943, pressure mounted for the Army to commission a Buddhist chaplain, but if 
Arnold was open to Japanese-American Buddhist chaplains, he also knew that the appointment 
process would be more difficult. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department 
recommended two Buddhist ministers who had participated in the ROTC program at the University 
of Hawaii while his wife and another civilian woman furnished names as well.127 At the same time, 
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Colonel William Scobey from the Assistant Secretary of War’s office reminded the Chief of 
Chaplains that “before any action is taken on [Kumata’s] application he must be cleared by the G-2 
Division of the War Department General Staff.”128 In other words, Military Intelligence would have 
to clear Kumata, a standard applied to no other chaplain candidates, including Japanese-American 
Christians. The real impediment to Kumata’s chaplaincy appointment was not loyalty, however. 
Defective vision and an untreated cataract precluded a commission, and when he failed the Army 
physical, Arnold reported asking Bishop Matsukahe for another option. But, Arnold told Scobey, the 
Buddhist Bishop informed him that “it would not be possible to furnish another suitable candidate.” 
This meant that “at the present time, therefore, it does not seem possible that there will be an 
appointment of a Buddhist chaplain.”129 
The present time was June 1943, and by then, another factor mitigated against the 
appointment of a Buddhist chaplain: tension between Christians and Buddhists, inside and outside 
of the Japanese-American community. From Pasadena came a message from relocated Episcopal 
priest, Reverend John M. Yamazaki, who implored his California contact to “make [a] ‘confidential’ 
report to Army not to take Buddhist Priest. They are the chief factor…[in] prevent[ing] Japanese 
[from] be[ing] American-ized.” Based on this information, the correspondent, C.S. Reifanider 
concluded “Personally, I think it is most important if a Japanese Chaplain or Chaplains are to be 
appointed for the Japanese Combat Unit, that they should be Christian ministers, whether the 
majority of the Unit are Buddhist or not.”130  
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Internal opinion from Camp Shelby, MS, where the 442nd Battalion trained, echoed 
Reifanider’s sentiment. Two chaplains, a Baptist and a Methodist, had been assigned to the Japanese-
American combat team and both insisted that worship attendance was good, Bible class turnout 
consistent, and morale fine.131 Moreover, according to the inspection report filed with the War 
Department’s General Staff, “‘both chaplains had heard that a Buddhist priest might be assigned to 
the combat team and recommended against such action. Both stated that the men were coming to 
them for advice.’”132 With the needs of the new trainees apparently met, a Buddhist chaplain was 
unnecessary. As a result, by early July, William Arnold acknowledged that his office had not 
commissioned a Buddhist chaplain, but “because of advice from various sources it seems best that 
none should be.”133  
A month later, when Newton Ishuira alleged religious prejudice against Buddhist priests, 
Arnold’s office rejected the accusation. Tellingly, they argued that the composition of the 442nd was 
insufficiently Buddhist to warrant a Buddhist chaplain. “The preponderance of religious adherents 
are Christians,” the reply to Ishuira stated, although no formal census was taken and no set 
threshold existed. Outside the Japanese-American battalion, the religious composition of units did 
not determine chaplain assignments; instead, theoretically the chaplaincy allocated chaplains to faiths 
at a rate of 1 chaplain per 100,000 adherents. But, the letter continued, “the unit now has its full 
complement of chaplains” thereby negating the need even to consider Ishuira or any Buddhist 
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chaplain candidate.134 
Yet Ishuira was correct. Pernicious religious, rather than racial, logic pervaded the decision 
to exclude Buddhist priests from the chaplaincy. Despite Arnold’s initial willingness to open the 
chaplaincy to Buddhist priests, the inadequate supply of ready-to-endorse Buddhist clergy combined 
with resistance to placing a Buddhist in the chaplaincy articulated by a sector of the Japanese-
American community and army inspectors enabled Arnold to dismiss Buddhism as unnecessary to 
the chaplaincy. This decision did not extend to Japanese Americans writ large, for the blessing and 
sanction of the Congregational Church enabled four Japanese-American Christian ministers to serve 
as chaplains.135 It was a confined and controlled military service, limited to Japanese-American units, 
heavily scrutinized by military intelligence, and bound by tiny numbers. The enemy, though, was 
(Shinto) Buddhism, and excluding Buddhists from accessing chaplains of their faith went 
unquestioned. Nevertheless, for Japanese Americans, Christianity opened the chaplaincy. 
 
Religious Unity and Its Discontents: The Military’s Protestant Problem 
For the military, “Protestant” served as an essential category of religion and a useful marker 
of faith, one that paralleled Catholic and Jewish and supported the tri-faith standard. During World 
War I, Bishop Brent had distinguished between liturgical and non-liturgical Protestants, a distinction 
that faded over the next two decades. Nevertheless, many of the people and denominations 
bracketed under the large heading of Protestant found it endlessly troubling. An Episcopal priest 
pointed out that “the term ‘Protestants’ is so general that it really means nothing at all; for in that 
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category would be included Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Mormons, Christian Scientists, and it really 
tells nothing as the definite spiritual and religious needs of the men.” Without more detailed and 
concrete knowledge, how could the military adequately serve the men in its care? And why, he 
implored, could the military not simply ask draftees about their religious affiliation? After all, Yale 
asked his freshman son for that very information.136 
That the military was not the same as a private university and worked under a radically 
different constitutional order escaped Henry Sherrill. But his complaint about the blanket use of a 
generic label resonated with other “Protestants” as well. The 1936 Census of Religious Bodies—a 
task undertaken by the Commerce Department—provided a snapshot of the tapestry of American 
religious life. According to its survey of churches (a term used to denote any religious institutions, 
regardless of what it called itself), there were 256 different religious bodies counting almost 56 
million members.137 The census noticed the presence of small religious groups like the Bahai and 
Muslims, and offered a thorough and rich portrait of the diversity of American Protestantism. It did 
not, however, differentiate among denominations in Judaism or record ethnic differences in 
Catholicism. On its own, then, the census was descriptive, if imperfectly so. But in the hands of the 
military, it became prescriptive. It legitimated which religious groups deserved chaplains and which 
groups did not. The Army set a loose threshold of 100,000 members as the benchmark for inclusion 
in the chaplaincy.138 When tiny groups such as the Gospel Firebugs—which described themselves as 
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“old-time revivalists”—approached the Office of the Chief of Chaplains to request a slot as 
“evangelistic chaplains,” the answer was easy: no.139 Not only were they tiny (membership: 4),140 but 
they did not exist on the census and thus did not exist for the purposes of the military. 
Tiny churches often bothered the Chief of Chaplains with their cries for recognition, but the 
presence of larger, more difficult to categorize religions proved harder to reconcile. Eastern 
Orthodox churches presented a particularly vexing case. The 1936 Census revealed a “considerable” 
number of Greek Orthodox and Russian Orthodox communicants in the United States, enough to 
merit several chaplains. But neither faith was represented in the chaplaincy, and by 1940, the Army 
Chief of Chaplains anticipated that with a general mobilization a “sufficient…though necessarily 
scattered” group of Orthodox Americans would enter the service. He began making provisions for 
commissioning Orthodox chaplains by inviting the Russian and Greek Orthodox churches to 
nominate a church official to serve as the group’s representative to the military.141 If necessary, then, 
the Army would contact that person to recruit, select, and endorse a chaplain. 
When war came, Orthodox men were drafted and entered the military. But they were hard to 
spot because they had no easy way to identify themselves. When they referred to themselves as 
Orthodox or Eastern Orthodox, officials translated that as Catholic or Protestant as they saw fit. 
There were also those who self-classified as Catholics—which, technically they were, albeit not 
Roman Catholics—while others self-selected as Protestants—which, under the military’s 
classification scheme that designated everyone not Catholic or Jewish as Protestant, they were as 
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well.142 Metropolitan Antony Bashir wrote the President to plead the case of his Greek Orthodox 
followers: “We are not Roman Catholic, nor are we any form of Protestant….Our young Orthodox 
men are therefore either to go without Spiritual guidance and Religious Worship, or else be forced 
by circumstance to accept Roman Catholic or Protestant ministrations.”143 The extant categories 
camouflaged the Eastern Orthodox, rendering them invisible and denying them warranted chaplains. 
The creation of the 122nd Infantry Battalion changed everything. In January 1943, FDR 
issued an executive order forming a Greek Battalion—a unit designated to parachute or boat into 
Greece to liberate it from Nazi control.144 Its Greek-speaking immigrant and native-born 
commandoes were almost all Greek Orthodox, and as William Arnold had told Russian Orthodox 
prelate, Cyril A.W. Johnson, the year before, “If all members of any one denomination were in or 
near a certain place or unit the problem of religious ministration would be easy, simple, and most 
effective.”145 Once informed about the activation of a Greek Battalion, Arnold contacted Greek 
Orthodox Archbishop Athenagoras and asked him to send one of his best priests immediately.146 
The incorporation of a Greek Orthodox chaplain also provided opportunities for more extensive 
conversations with and bred competition within the Orthodox churches. In particular, the Russian 
Orthodox clamored for chaplains of their own, gathering information about the distribution of 
Russian Orthodox soldiers and lobbying the War Department for a chaplain at Fort Jackson, where 
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a 500-man strong Russian Orthodox group clustered.147  
The Chief of Chaplains had unintentionally waded into internal disagreements among the 
various Orthodox Churches in America. When the Greek Orthodox Archbishop Athenagoras met 
with Arnold in Washington, he gave “the impression that he had been empowered to represent the 
Patriarchal Churches of the Orthodox Faith, namely the Greek, Russian, Syrian, Yugo-Slavian, and 
Romanian, united into one Church Federation in America.” That particular federation was fictive, 
but several Orthodox churches did unite as one, and faithfully sent their articles of incorporation to 
Arnold in the hope of attaining more chaplains. From the Chief’s perspective, however, the 
Orthodox Churches were spiraling out of control and asking his office to intervene in inappropriate 
ways. “It is not the function of this office to enter into the denominational differences of individual 
denominations or groups of denominations,” he warned Ralph Montgomery Arkush, the attorney 
representing a faction of the Russian Orthodox Church. “Therefore, the differences among the 
churches of the Orthodox group should be worked out among themselves.”148 In other words, 
William Arnold wanted the Eastern Orthodox Churches to act like the Protestant denominations 
consolidated under the Federal Council of Churches’ General Commission or the multiple 
movements of American Judaism that operated as the Jewish Welfare Board’s Committee for Army 
and Navy Religious Affairs.  
While Arnold wanted the Eastern Orthodox to unite as a single group, whether or not this 
approach mapped on to their civilian religious reality, the Protestant model of interdenominational 
cooperation was fraying. The General Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains was the successor 
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group to the World War I-era General Committee, overseen by the Federal Council of Churches. By 
World War II, the organization was bigger and more autonomous; it formally represented Mormons, 
Christian Scientists, and Seventh-Day Adventists, in addition to all the mainline white and black 
denominations it had served in World War I. But an increasing number of conservative evangelical 
and fundamentalist Christians resisted the General Commission’s influence—not because it did poor 
work, but because however attenuated, it remained an arm of the liberal Federal Council of 
Churches. 
The tension over the role of the General Commission and who spoke for Protestants—be it 
a mainline/evangelical or collaboration/autonomy divide—was merely a symptom of a much larger 
issue of the capacious, and questionably useful, category of Protestant. Amassing support from a 
broad cross-section of Protestant groups was never an easy task, and by 1940, the General 
Commission incorporated the Mormons, Christian Scientists, and Seventh-Day Adventists under its 
auspices. The terms of operation had changed as well. Whereas during World War I, the group as a 
whole endorsed clergy, by World War II, the daunting task of sending thousands of ministers to the 
military called for a new format. Each individual denomination would assess prospective chaplains 
and render decisions based on a somewhat standardized application. As a result, the General 
Commission served more as a paperwork conduit and lobbying agency than anything else.  
Despite the dispersion of endorsing power to each denomination, not all groups relished the 
administrative oversight. In particular, the Southern Baptist Convention—which was decidedly more 
conservative than its Northern counterpart—wanted to separate from the General Commission; its 
leadership asserted that since it was not affiliated with the Federal Council of Churches, it should 
split and run its own program.149 The Army was not impressed. Paul Moody, then the head of the 
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General Commission, assured them that Baptists could “be counted on” and were not “so sectarian 
or narrow-minded” as to follow through on their threat.150 Moody precisely identified the Army’s 
concerns. It favored keeping the General Commission intact so that “it may truly represent a cross-
section of the so-called Protestant element in our national life.”151 The Southern Baptist Convention 
was welcome to mail its chaplains religious literature and demand that its chaplains send reports to 
the Home Mission Board, but the Office of the Chief of Chaplains resisted “any action taken…that 
would decrease the usefulness” of the General Commission.152  
However, Southern Baptist resistance to the General Commission possibly stemmed less 
from the operation and outlook of the endorsing agency and more from its particular frustration 
with the rules of endorsement as established by the military. Southern Baptists, like many of their 
Pentecostal, evangelical, and fundamentalist counterparts, found it difficult to get their ministers 
commissioned as chaplains. Unlike Mormons, who usually had B.A.s but no ordination, these 
Protestants were ordained but frequently lacked college degrees and formal seminary training. Out 
of about 23,300 Southern Baptist ministers, only 13.4 percent (or a little over 3,000) had B.A.s and 
seminary training while 32.2 percent (or about 7,500) had never attended either college or 
seminary.153 While the standards frustrated some Protestants, others viewed the requirements more 
opportunistically. The head of the Northern Baptist Convention’s Board of Education applauded 
strict enforcement of educational credentials. “The action of the Government in requiring thorough 
training for Chaplains has strengthened the position of accredited seminaries and I hope it will result 
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in a greater recognition of these standards by churches in the future.”154 
Among the denominations that could not easily pass educational muster with the military, 
the experience of the Assemblies of God, one of the few Pentecostal denominations deemed 
acceptable by the military during World War II, is instructive.155 A month after the United States 
entered World War II, the Army sent letters to religious groups encouraging them to champion the 
chaplaincy to their clergy.156 J. Roswell Flower, the General Secretary of the Assemblies of God, 
wrote back, conceding that his group “is not so strict in the matter of educational requirements as 
are some other denominational bodies.” As a “spontaneous, aggressively evangelical movement,” 
college graduation was fine but not necessary, and “ordination to the ministry is dependent upon 
ability and success in the ministry rather than the fact of graduation from the training school.”157 
Flower acknowledged that the qualities prized by Pentecostals—a conversion experience, religious 
fervor, and enthusiastic preaching—called for little of the formal education demanded by the 
military. But six months later, Roswell’s position had changed. He forwarded the course catalog of 
the Central Bible Institute to the Chief of Chaplains and argued in favor of accepting its graduates 
as, he asserted, it “compares favorably with the Moody Bible School of Chicago.”158 Eager to send 
Assemblies of God preachers to the military, the denomination legitimated education and hailed its 
seminary training. Unfortunately for the Assemblies of God, the military was unconvinced and 
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continued to stress the need for both college and seminary graduation.159  
Some Protestants confronted a structural, rather than political, barrier to the chaplaincy. 
Upon evaluating chaplain candidates in 1940, Alva Brasted, a Baptist who served as the Chief of 
Chaplains in the mid-1930s, remarked to William Arnold, “I know that so far as the Catholics are 
concerned that there will be no difficulty in filling the quota with high grade candidates. So far as the 
Protestants are concerned, what would we do if 100 more Protestants were needed for the 
Chaplaincy? It’s hard to get a half dozen.”160 Brasted overstated the dearth of qualified Protestants, 
but his comments highlight how educational obstacles to the military chaplaincy were, by and large, 
a Protestant—in the expansive military sense—problem.  
When badgered by U.S. Senator Abe Murdock about the educational standards, which as in 
World War I, included a B.A. from an accredited university and postgraduate seminary training, 
William Arnold remarked: “It should be remembered that the duties of a chaplain extend beyond a 
spiritual ministration exclusively to the members of his own religious faith. He must be a man of 
experience, ability, tolerance and thoroughly capable of being able to provide general spiritual 
instruction and inspiration to the entire command.”161 The Senator from Utah was Mormon, a 
religious group that the military classified as Protestant. But unlike most Protestants, the Church of 
Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints did not ordain its clergy. Since the military viewed ordination as 
an essential quality for prospective chaplains, the LDS Church struggled to supply adequately 
credentialed men to the military. Murdock wanted Arnold to bend the rules. 
Working through Congressional representatives to pressure the military for accommodations 
                                                
159 Walter B. Zimmerman to J. Roswell Flower, May 5, 1943, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 58, Folder 080 
(Assemblies of God, Vol. II), NARA II. 
160 Alva Brasted to William Arnold, February 7, 1940, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 124, Folder 210.1 (Appointment 
of Chaplains 1940), NARA II. 
161 William Arnold to Abe Murdock, June 13, 1941, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 44, Folder 032 (Letters to 
Congress, Vol. I), NARA II. 
  189 
 
was a strategy employed by Mormons, Christian Scientists, and Adventists who also remained in 
constant contact with the Chief of Chaplains. Of these three, the Mormons were most successful. 
During World War II, they reached an agreement by which college graduates who had served 2-year 
missions could become chaplains.162 The LDS Church and most Mormon chaplains argued that this 
was sufficient and equivalent to the backgrounds of other chaplains.163 Not everyone agreed, 
however. Timothy Hoyt Bowers-Iron, an LDS chaplain who served in World War II and again in 
Korea, observed, “This may be heresy, but one of the things I felt about some of our chaplains, 
myself included, was that we weren’t really as well prepared theologically or philosophically.” He 
elaborated, “I think it is one thing to know that you have the true gospel…or [to] explain what you 
believe and why you believe it. It is a little different proposition where you have to produce a 
sermon or two every week, fifty-two weeks a year. That demands a little broader background than 
most of us have.”164 Bowers-Iron recognized his training did not fully prepare him for the rigors of 
the chaplaincy. As he continued, “We went out with a tremendous assurance that we knew it all and 
we really didn’t know much.” His self-awareness emerged not only in comparison to better-educated 
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish chaplains, but also from comparing his experiences with others 
from what he referred to as “small, self-contained church[es].” He saw in a Pentecostal chaplain the 
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same combination of hubris and naivety.165  
As more and more religious groups sought access to the chaplaincy, the military found itself 
twisted in a knot: it needed a neutral criterion from which to select chaplains who would be open to 
working with soldiers and sailors of different faiths but could not interrogate chaplains’ beliefs. 
Education represented an imperfect proxy, one that stratified religious groups by education level—
and bent to the needs of the service, in the case of recruiting black chaplains. In the parlance of late 
twentieth-century law, the mandatory college and seminary training standards demonstrated formal, 
but not substantive neutrality.166 These credentials applied to every prospective chaplain, but the 
particularities of religious training produced disparate outcomes that favored religious groups whose 
ordination or recognition of clergy depended on formal education. The intent, as Chiefs of 
Chaplains and other military leaders reiterated, was to provide chaplains who could minister to a 
broad range of faiths and practices. Because the military wanted to avoid making decisions about 
religion—which would clearly violate the First Amendment—they opted to use education as a proxy 
for toleration, ecumenism, and open-mindedness.  
Education distinctions merely initiated a much more contentious and enduring rift among 
Protestant denominations. Between the wars, the lines between mainline and conservative 
Protestants had hardened. The 1925 Scopes trial publicly played out the division between 
modernists and fundamentalists. In the face of public ridicule, many evangelicals and 
fundamentalists turned inward. Outside the public eye, they began building institutions and 
networks to challenge the mainline modernists.167 Led by fundamentalist Carl McIntire, the 
American Council of Churches of Christ (ACCC) was one such effort directly opposed to the 
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Federal Council. While McIntire was a separatist who resisted cooperation with non-fundamentalists 
and saw little positive value in interfaith efforts, he was also politically aware and engaged, if not 
always savvy and astute.168 In the military chaplaincy, he saw opportunity, though one bedeviled by 
the government’s use of the 1936 Census. He did not mince words when laying out his argument; 
the census, he asserted, operated as “a perfect gerrymander against independent fundamentalists, 
against small denominations not in the Federal Council plan, and against fundamentalists who have 
been contending against modernistic Federal Council tendencies.”169 Staff chaplains reading this 
document found it bewildering, and filled the margins with an assortment of question marks, 
exclamation points, and comments such as “impractical,” “inaccurate,” and “mistaken.” But 
McIntire’s news release did not merely critique; it proposed a “simple action” as remedy to the 
problem it had identified. All the military needed to do was rid itself of its attachment to quotas by 
denomination, thereby ending the discrimination against “Protestant non-ritualistic evangelicals” 
that resulted by the “monopolistic hold of the Federal Council.” In the budding evangelical and 
fundamentalist world, parachurch organizations overtook denominational sectarianism. As the 
Federal Council was, to their mind, “pacifistic, non-evangelical, and un-American,” nothing less than 
the future of the nation was at stake: “In this emergency Bible-believing Christians must exert 
themselves to see to it that a proper percentage of fundamentalist and true American chaplains are 
appointed.”170  
                                                
168 On Carl McIntire’s theology and political activism, see Markku Ruotsila, “Carl McIntire and the 
Fundamentalist Origins of the Christian Right,” Church History 81, vol. 2 (June 2012): 378-407. Ruotsila wisely argues that 
McIntire’s postwar anti-Communist work helped build alliances between fundamentalist Protestants and conservative 
Catholics despite his separatist theology, though Ruotsila also underplays the racism undergirding McIntire’s anti-civil 
rights position. 
169 J. Oliver Buswell, News Release: “How Are Army and Navy Chaplains Appointed?,” October 1942, RG 247 
(1920-45), Box 56, Folder 080 (American Council of Churches of Christ, Vol. I), NARA II. This position piece accepted 
the Census-based quotas insofar as they allocated chaplains to Catholics and Jews, but vociferously protested the 
Protestant distribution. It also demanded that the military cease employing Christian Science chaplains on the grounds 
that the church was inclined toward pacifism, which it was not. 
170 J. Oliver Buswell, News Release: “How Are Army and Navy Chaplains Appointed?,” October 1942 and 
Arthur Williams and J. Oliver Buswell to William Arnold, July 25, 1942, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 56, Folder 080 
  192 
 
The ACCC not only wanted to participate in the chaplaincy, but also advanced its own 
vision to maximize operational efficiency. Arnold’s deputies emphasized that the Federal Council 
neither controlled the General Commission nor selected which chaplains to endorse, but this effort 
mattered little. They also pointed out that McIntire’s own denomination, the Bible Presbyterian 
Church, had supplied five chaplains to the Army—through conventional Presbyterian channels 
under the auspices of the General Commission—but this, too, was deemed inconsequential.171 
Rather, the ACCC’s secretary and president of its Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains, J. 
Oliver Buswell, assured the Chief of Chaplains that he could simplify the process of chaplain 
appointments altogether by reducing the number of categories and thus quotas to five: Catholic, 
Jewish, Ritualistic/Sacramentarian (e.g., Episcopalians and Lutherans), Evangelical Protestant, and 
miscellaneous.172 While his office had remained unfailingly polite and welcomed Buswell to visit, the 
ACCC’s effort to reshape his command exasperated William Arnold. He finally replied to Buswell, 
rebutting his plan point-by-point. On the matter of denominational allotment, the Chief retorted, 
“On the contrary it will complicate matters and increase dissatisfaction and friction.” Arnold would 
not be reformulating procedure to benefit the ACCC, but he reminded Buswell, his office would 
consider ACCC-backed chaplains through their denominations and “where that proves impossible 
we shall try to make a place for them in the miscellaneous group.”173 
This concession did not please Buswell, who continued to badger the Chief of Chaplains for 
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more positions for his men. Since “in the truest historical sense of the word,” independent 
fundamentalists “are a Congregational body,” he announced, they “should be recognized as 
Congregationalists.”174 This logic presupposed the Army could tell the Congregationalists—a well-
established (and quite liberal) church body with its own endorsing procedures—what to do. The 
ACCC wanted the impossible: to order the Army to violate its own protocols that delegated 
endorsing authority to religious groups so that the military, and thus the state, would render no 
decisions on the religious suitability of any given chaplain candidate. The ACCC intuited that these 
procedures were not perfectly neutral, for they substituted the authority of census categories for 
individual professions of faith. But the ACCC was also grasping for more than recognition; as an 
interoffice memo noted, the group wanted “to tell us who cannot be chaplains” which was to say 
“all who are not members of this group.” The organization was insistent and demanding, and, after 
several months of regular correspondence with the ACCC, Harry Lee Virden was fed up. He was 
quite sure of several things. First, the ACCC “would welcome a battle-royal” with the General 
Commission; second, it “has a chip on its shoulder—and makes it sound as though they are against 
all other Christians—and that they are the only believers in the Bible”; third, “they are more 
interested in using the chaplaincy for the spread of their propaganda than in self-sacrificing ministry 
to those in the service.”175 
If Virden was frustrated, Arnold was stuck. Virden’s contentions were apt, and his latter 
concern presented a significant philosophical and administrative hurdle. A willingness to offer non-
sectarian (to the extent possible) worship and counsel represented the finely calibrated balance 
between avoiding the establishment of religion while providing state-sanctioned religious services 
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under military conditions and protecting individual rights to the free exercise of religion (or non-
religion). Were the ACCC to use the chaplaincy as leverage to impose its religious ideals, it would 
almost certainly violate individual freedoms. But preventing the ACCC from nominating chaplains 
would likewise signal a restriction of religion verging on the establishment of an alternative, but 
exclusionary non-ACCC religious worldview. 
Arnold put his faith in the military infrastructure. In the winter of 1943, he asked his staff to 
figure out how to reapportion procurement goals and denominational quotas to offer slots to the 
Independent Fundamentalists. Harry Fraser puzzled over who, exactly, the “Independent 
Fundamentalists” were, while George Rixey guessed at a definition, “They seem to be a group of 
Congregationalists, Methodists, [and] Baptists out of line with their denominations, probably on the 
question of Fundamentalism.” Whatever they were, “the Chief feels that they should be 
represented” and their task was to arrive at a number. After a brief discussion, they placed the 
Independent Fundamentalists in the Miscellaneous group and granted them .003 of the total. Since 
the War Department sought to add 4,300 chaplains in 1943, this allocation turned out to be about 12 
Independent Fundamentalist ministers.176 Neither the American Council of Churches of Christ nor 
the Independent Fundamentalists ever felt satisfied with their quota or treatment within military 
quarters, but Arnold was confident he did the best he could under trying (and annoying) 
circumstances.177 
                                                
176 Board Meeting Minutes, February 5, 1943, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 259, Folder 337 (Board Meetings, 1943-
44), NARA II.  
177 In March, Arnold informed several commanding generals that the Independent Fundamentalists could 
receive 10 spots, but that no other constituent group of the ACCC had even 50,000 members and thus did not warrant 
chaplains. Whether this slight revision downward reflected aggravation with the group or a shift in the number of 
chaplains being commissioned is unclear; the ACCC felt it deserved at least double that number. After exhausting 
Congressional representatives to no avail, Carl McIntire wrote to the President, stating that “another one of our 
problems has been the chaplaincy” and neither letters nor meetings with the military had resolved the matter. William 
Arnold to Commanding General, First Service Command, March 9, 1943; J. Oliver Buswell to William Arnold, April 17, 
1943; Carl McIntire to the President, April 1, 1943, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 56, Folder 080 (American Council of 
Churches of Christ, Vol. I), NARA II. 
  195 
 
For the Chief of Chaplains, relief came in the form of another upstart organization, the 
conservative but more conciliatory, National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). Founded in 1942, 
the organization sought to collaborate and promote a positive, rather than hostile, evangelical 
alternative to the FCC. While Carl McIntire complained about being characterized as one of the 
“‘extreme’ evangelicals” when he attended an NAE study group on the chaplaincy,178 the NAE 
approached the military with more deference and less bluster.179 One of its first subcommittees was 
its Chaplains Commission, and by 1944, it was ready to endorse chaplains. Before it could take on 
that role, however, the military needed to recognize it as a civilian agency suitable for the task. 
Constituent members of the NAE wrote to the Chief of Chaplains asking to be represented by the 
organization, and prominent evangelicals like Bob Jones certified that the NAE was “not the radical 
crowd.”180 Less than two weeks later, Arnold informed the NAE that it could serve as an endorsing 
agency, provided it conformed to basic rules such as representing only denominations (not 
individual churches) and only those not covered by other groups.181 
While the NAE was generally more cordial than its rival, the ACCC, it presented some of the 
same administrative complications. It also received 10-12 chaplain appointments for its scattered 
membership, and the Army chaplain staff debated whether they should “throw the entire block at 
them and let them fight it out among themselves” or whether they should try to carefully subdivide 
the allocation—as it did for the Protestant groups comprising the General Commission. In a 
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Bob Jones to William Arnold, January 27, 1944, RG 247 (1920-45), Folder 080 (National Association of Evangelicals), 
NARA II.  
181 William Arnold to Frank Stollenwerck, February 3, 1944, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 79, Folder 080 (National 
Association of Evangelicals), NARA II.  
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preemptive effort to fend off complaints, Carl Wilberding quipped that allowing the NAE to make 
decisions was better, for “it seems much nicer for the other fellow to have the headache. It doesn’t 
hurt as much.”182 Moreover, competition between the NAE and the ACCC to challenge the Federal 
Council did not escape the attention of the Army chaplaincy. Deputy Chief of Chaplains George 
Rixey attempted to maintain an unofficial truce between the organizations by recommending that 
the War Department’s General Staff refuse to meet with the leadership of either organization.183 V-E 
Day was five weeks away, but Rixey’s diplomacy did little to relax unrelenting internecine Protestant 
conflict; the last weeks of war merely foreshadowed years of church conflict ahead. In this sense, 
war forced a reckoning with, though not a resolution of, the Protestant problem. 
 
Conclusion: “Interfaith in Action”—The Complicated Legacy of the Four Chaplains 
Exactly what happened as the ship listed and finally slunk beneath the frigid North Atlantic 
waters on that cold winter night will never be certain. This much is clear: less than an hour after 
midnight on February 3, 1943, a German U-boat torpedoed the U.S.A.T. Dorchester, one of six ships 
in a convoy headed from Newfoundland to the U.S. Army Command Base in Narsarsuak, 
Greenland. By dinner, the day’s gale-force winds had calmed and most men could again stomach 
food. But the sea still churned with danger as the Dorchester entered Torpedo Junction. Less than 100 
miles away from safe harbor, the ship’s captain received word that submarines had been detected 
and ordered all 900 men aboard—soldiers, merchant marines, and civilians—to sleep clothed and 
wrapped in life jackets. Less than 30 minutes elapsed between the torpedo blast and the 
disappearance of the luxury-liner-turned-military-transport ship into the iceberg-laden ocean. Two of 
                                                
182 Carl Wilberding, Memo to George Rixey, undated, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 79, Folder 080 (National 
Association of Evangelicals), NARA II.  
183 George Rixey to Colonel Pasco, April 2, 1945, RG 247: General Correspondence 1920-75, Box 79, Folder 
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the convoy’s escort ships, the Escanaba and the Comanche, rescued survivors frozen on rafts and 
floating in lifeboats—226 in all. While the Dorchester was equipped with enough life-jackets and life-
boats for all aboard, panic combined with hypothermia to kill most of the men. Among the 674 men 
who died that night were four chaplains: George L. Fox (Methodist), Clark V. Poling (Dutch 
Reformed), John P. Washington (Catholic), Alexander B. Goode (Jewish). 
The chaplains, unlike some of their charges, understood the chaos around them. They knew 
most men were scared, cold, and ill-prepared as they clambered into boats and rafts or jumped into 
the water. They distributed life-jackets and encouraged terrified soldiers to act like sailors and get 
into the boats—by climbing over railings, sliding down ropes, or hoisting themselves overboard into 
the water and swimming. Chaplain Washington fastened a life preserver onto an unprotected young 
man. Chaplain Goode gave away his gloves and then his boots. Chaplain Poling pushed men into 
the sea. Chaplain Fox waved and wished men luck. All four sacrificed their life jackets to others 
before linking arms, praying in English, Latin, and Hebrew, and going down together, having 
abandoned neither ship nor sailor nor spirit.184   
News of the deaths filtered out somewhat slowly. The chaplains’ families received 
notification that their sons, brothers, husbands, and fathers were missing in action about ten days 
after the Dorchester went down. Almost two months later, the press began publishing articles about 
the calamitous night. Despite the time lag, the American reaction was swift and unambiguous. 
Newspaper coverage dubbed the four chaplains heroes, and the men were quickly, albeit 
                                                
184 “The Saga of the Four Chaplains,” The Four Chaplain Memorial Foundation (fourchaplains.org/story); Dan 
Kurzman, No Greater Glory: The Four Immortal Chaplains and the Sinking of the Dorchester in World War II (New York: 
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posthumously, honored for their heroic stand.185 For those who survived a bitter night tossing in the 
hypothermic sea, the chaplains’ unselfish and cooperative last stand was courageous and uplifting.186 
Memories and first-person accounts of the chaplains’ dedication resonated and quickly spurred 
commemoration of the “immortal chaplains.” Within five years, a three-cent postage stamp brought 
the image of the four chaplains who exemplified “interfaith in action” to American doorsteps.187 
Stained-glass windows, chapels, awards, and foundations quickly followed. The symbolic power of 
the chaplains aboard the Dorchester was unmistakable. It highlighted ecumenical generosity in its 
highest form and the promise of American faith in its darkest hour.188 
But the oft-used and much-lauded emblem of American religious unity was far more 
complicated than four men of different faiths praying together in the face of imminent death. The 
state played roles both obvious and invisible. It was, for example, both accidental and probable that 
the chaplains aboard the Dorchester represented multiple faiths. Two other chaplains were removed 
from the duty roster, and a colonel overseeing personnel selected two more names to join them.189 
The military committed to staffing transport ships with Protestant and Catholic chaplains; it 
happened that a Jewish chaplain was already assigned to this voyage. Deliberate policy-making also 
ensured that the chaplains would be white, well-educated, and ecumenically-inclined. The application 
process and chaplain school prepared these clergymen to make a choice to stand linked together as 
                                                
185 E.g., “Four More Chaplains Listed as Casualties,” Los Angeles Times, March 27, 1943; “Former Rabbi Listed 
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186 Dozens submitted affidavits to the military testifying to the chaplains’ actions. See Appendix 1 in Kurzman, 
No Greater Glory, 221-23. 
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one. Twenty-five years of military vision and indoctrination coalesced in the image of four wise men, 
praying aloud, each to his own maker, each in his own way, each to his own end.  
The Office of War Information, in collaboration with private ventures, also crafted a 
political culture that trained Americans to understand the Dorchester in richly figurative and vividly 
momentous terms. Chaplain Jim coached listeners to see religion as vital to sustaining soldiers and the 
homefront alike. Faith served as a critical adhesive rather than an engine of strife in war. Between 
the night that the Dorchester was attacked and the time Americans read about it, they saw Norman 
Rockwell’s “Freedom to Worship” painting in the Saturday Evening Post. Months later, the U.S. 
Treasury adopted Rockwell’s Four Freedom series as the image selling its 1943 war bond 
campaign.190  
The sacrifice of the four chaplains and the ability of Americans to apprehend it as heroic 
depended on individual decisions and state action. Through the World War II chaplaincy, the 
military harnessed distinct religious commitments and faith in ecumenical conviction, enlisting clergy 
to circulate the moral monotheism in rhetoric and deed. It was not an unbounded religious 
worldview; rather the military could consolidate and promote American religion precisely because it 
circumscribed participation in the chaplaincy to a large but limited population. As the United States 
turned to the task of rebuilding a world fractured and broken by war, the chaplaincy offered a state-
developed and tested tool for moral and spiritual reconstruction.  
                                                
190 “Freedom to Worship,” The Saturday Evening Post, February 27, 1943. Rockwell’s initial plan for painting was 
four men in a barbershop—a Protestant barber, a Catholic priest customer, a Jewish customer, an African-American 
customer, and a white Anglo customer—but early critics deemed it too stereotypical. The final image includes seven 
people, three men and four women, all of whom were praying “according to the dictates of his own conscience” 
(indicated through rosary beads, prayer books, fez, etc). See Colleen McDannell, Picturing Faith: Photography and the Great 
Depression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 145. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A Global God:  
The Military-Spiritual Complex in a Covenant Nation 
 
Their mission was a secret. The men knew, on some level, that it was important, possibly 
even significant. They knew they had made it through a rigorous selection process. They knew they 
had prepared for eight months. They knew their work was dangerous and that it could fail. But they 
also heard the laughter of their fellow servicemen, felt the ridicule heaped on their silent effort, and 
wondered about the murky effects of their constant, if seemingly ineffective and measly, practice 
runs. When the selected men assembled at ten o’clock that night, they recognized that the briefing 
was different. At long last, they knew their charge. When their clocks hit midnight, when Sunday 
turned to Monday, they met again—to finalize the plan, gather equipment, and receive final 
instructions. And then, before they departed, they prayed. Chaplain William B. Downey (Lutheran) 
led the group, voicing their wishes in the heat of the dark, humid Pacific night: “Almighty 
Father…guard and protect them….May they, as well as we, know Thy strength and power, and 
armed with Thy might may they bring this war to a rapid end…and once more may we know peace 
on earth.”1 
Nine hours later, the American crew of the Enola Gay dropped the atomic bomb on 
                                                
1 Quoted in William Laurence, Dawn Over Zero: The Story of the Atomic Bomb, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1972), 209. The recounting of the atomic bombings Hiroshima and Nagasaki are based on Laurence’s Dawn Over 
Zero, 196-252. Laurence was a journalist whom the military officially invited to observe and report on the preparation for 
and bombing of Japan. The first edition of his extended narrative was published by Knopf in 1946. In his text, Downey 
prays to the Almighty Father. Another version, published in Liam Nolan’s history of Japanese Lutheran Kiyoshi 
Watanabe efforts to help Americans during World War II quotes Downey concluding his prayer in the name of Jesus 
Christ, but cites no source for the prayer. It is not clear which version is correct. Liam Nolan, Small Man of Nanataki 
(London: Peter Davies, 1966), 143. 
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Hiroshima.  
As the bomb eviscerated the Japanese supply and shipping depot, the radio relay called back 
to base: “Mission successful.” Blinded by the light of the blast, the men could not see the 
destruction they had wrought. Nevertheless, Captain Robert Lewis, who maintained a log of the 
flight at the behest of journalist William Laurence, recorded a different reaction: “My God!”2 
Colonel Paul W. Tibbets, Jr., the pilot of the Enola Gay and the leader of the 509th Composite 
Group, saw only “a black, boiling nest” below. The bomb’s mushroom clouds obscured the 
obliterated city and the immediate decimation of one-third of Hiroshima’s population, but the men 
still understood the gravity of their action. It was a “sobering” moment, Tibbets said, when they 
experienced the shock waves of devastation before flying back to Tinian Island.3 Upon their arrival, 
Downey found his prayers partially answered: all of the men flying B-29s on August 6, 1945 
returned. His supplication for a rapid end of war—a reflection of the U.S. military’s calculated 
attempt to induce unconditional surrender from the Japanese by unleashing nuclear fission—went 
unheeded.  
Three days later, Chaplain Downey prayed again: “Almighty God, Father of all mercies, we 
pray Thee to be gracious with those who fly this night. Guard and protect those of us who venture 
out into the darkness of Thy heaven. Uphold them on Thy wings. Keep them safe both in body and 
soul and bring them back to us….Above all else, our Father, bring peace to Thy world.”4 This time, 
all the men, including the chaplain, knew what they were doing. This time, the prayer was more 
                                                
2 Laurence, Dawn Over Zero, 212-22. On the fiftieth anniversary of the bombings, the Smithsonian Museum 
planned an exhibit of the Enola Gay, and a controversy erupted over the portrayal of the decision to use the bomb. See 
Edward Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, eds., History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1996). On the cultural and intellectual legacies of the atomic bomb in American life, see Paul 
Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Random House, 
1985). 
3 “The Operational History of the 509th Bombardment,” in The Manhattan Project: The Birth of the Atomic Bomb in 
the Words of Its Creators, Eyewitnesses, and Historians, ed., Cynthia C. Kelly (New York: Atomic Heritage Foundation, 2007), 
330. 
4 Laurence, Dawn Over Zero, 229.  
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ambivalent, more cautious, and more concerned, seeking God’s grace for men who would 
undoubtedly and distressingly kill. This time, the bomb’s early light meant a reckoning with the dark 
and barbarous underbelly of God’s kingdom. Within twelve hours, another crew of American pilots, 
bombardiers, and navigators found a hole in the day’s cloud cover and detonated a second atomic 
bomb on Nagasaki. Less than a week later, Japan surrendered, bringing an end to World War II and 
bringing forth a chance for the peace for which Downey—and others—prayed and so ardently 
sought. 
Achieving peace would prove more difficult and complicated than ending war—if war had, 
indeed, stopped. “War time,” legal historian Mary Dudziak has argued, is more fluid than the 
discrete and temporal markers of its outbreak and ending allow. If the American entrance into 
World War II was clear, its exit was not. Japan’s surrender in 1945, President Truman’s official 
pronouncement of the cessation of hostilities in 1946, the formal termination of war against 
Germany in 1951, or the signing of a peace treaty with Japan in 1952 all serve as possible endpoints.5 
Meanwhile, in the seven years between dropping the atomic bombs and ratifying a peace treaty with 
Japan, the United States found itself at war again, albeit with new and different enemies. War time 
and peace time blurred as the United States entered the ambiguously defined Cold War and then 
fought and concluded the Korean War. After demobilizing over 10.5 million soldiers between June 
1945 and June 1947, the armed forces stood at about 1.5 million personnel. During the same two-
year period, military spending shrunk from about 91 billion dollars to 10 billion dollars. Even in this 
leaner peacetime state, however, the dismantled war machine remained the largest military in the 
world.6 For nine years, from the capture of Rome in June 1944 to the signing of the Korean 
                                                
5 Mary Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3-9, 
33-40. 
6 Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1985), 20-23. 
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Armistice Agreement in July 1953, the United States actively battled or occupied multiple regions of 
the world.  
During this period, the American military underwent significant administrative 
reorganization. The National Security Act of 1947 separated the Air Force from the Army and 
unified the three branches of the armed forces—the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force—under the 
newly created Department of Defense. Initially the Army chaplaincy expected to continue to oversee 
and supply Air Force chaplains, as it had done for the Army Air Corps during World War II. 
However, the Air Force Chief of Staff decided to separate the units, and the Air Force acquired its 
own chaplaincy—including designated chaplains, a command structure led by Chief of Chaplains 
Charles I. Carpenter (Methodist), and a chaplain school.7 In 1945, William R. Arnold completed two 
terms as the Army Chief of Chaplains, after which three men served in the post in quick succession: 
Luther D. Miller (Episcopalian), Roy H. Parker (Baptist), and Ivan Bennett (Southern Baptist). In 
the Navy, which continued to oversee ministry to the personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps, 
William N. Thomas (Methodist), Stanton W. Salisbury (Presbyterian, USA), and Edward B. Harp 
(Reformed) led the chaplain corps from the final days of World War II through the end of the 
Korean War. With the creation of the Department of Defense came the formation of the Armed 
Forces Chaplains Board (AFCB), an Army-Navy-Air Force entity responsible for collaborating on 
religious policy within the military. The consolidation of the three services under a single Secretary 
of Defense belied the military’s increasingly global reach and newly-acquired global power. In the 
early postwar years, the chiefs of chaplains began to manage religious programs designed to address 
the needs of personnel stationed across the world and religious policies expected to support military 
                                                
7 Initially, the plan was for the Army to continue to supervise the Air Force chaplaincy, with Carpenter 
designated as the Air Force Chief of Chaplains operating under the Army Chief of Chaplains. Why exactly the 
chaplaincies split remains unclear, though a number of apocryphal stories suggest that Army Chief of Chaplains Luther 
Miller overreached, and Air Force Chief of Staff, Major General Carl Spaatz, reacted accordingly. See: Charles I. 
Carpenter, Transcript of Interview by Captain Tocado, July 31, 1971, p. 45-8, Columbia University Oral History 
Collection 
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goals at home and abroad. 
 The advent of the Cold War brought with it new conditions, expectations, and concerns 
stateside and overseas, and the military chaplaincy was part and parcel of these shifts. President 
Truman and Army Chief of Staff George Marshall pressed for Universal Military Training as an 
alternative to the draft, and they instituted the “Fort Knox Experiment” to test the possibility of 
their vision among 18-year-old American men. In 1948, Truman issued Executive Order 9981, 
which formally desegregated the United States military. The implementation of an integrated military 
took years, but the process began with a number of presidential commissions and military 
committees in the 1940s. Supported by a trifaith trifecta of local clergy and chaplains, the Fort Knox 
Experiment became a symbol of the importance and success of moral training alongside military 
readiness. Truman’s array of presidential commissions included the President’s Committee on 
Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces, which studied and applauded the chaplaincy for its 
commitment to defending the nation against spiritually devoid and presumed-Godless Communists.  
Indeed, as the military scrambled to redefine itself and adjust to its new roles in the 
aftermath of World War II, the place and use of religion within the state’s martial enterprise changed 
as well. Although Truman and Eisenhower did not always agree—on military decisions or political 
strategy—the two men operated in tandem8 to build a military-spiritual complex, a religious armory 
that ideologically and socially structured and crusaded on behalf of the American state. Chaplains 
instituted and instigated religion in domestic areas and foreign lands. When the military released 
soldiers in the aftermath of war, chaplains too sought to return to civilian pulpits. But as Army Chief 
of Staff, Dwight D. Eisenhower was reluctant to let go of military clergy; in April 1946, he wrote 
that while he was demobilizing unnecessary personnel, “the opportunity for service by the Army 
                                                
8 For two different appraisals of the relationship between Truman and Eisenhower, see Steve Neal, Harry and 
Ike: The Partnership That Remade the Postwar World (New York: Scribner, 2001) and William Lee Miller, Two Americans: 
Truman, Eisenhower, and a Dangerous World (New York: Vintage, 2012). 
  205 
chaplain is as great, or greater, than it has ever been.”9 A mere seven years later, at the end of the 
Korean War, President Dwight D. Eisenhower saluted the work of “militant preachers and 
chaplains” who helped ground the free world in religious faith. “It seems to me,” he posited, “no 
one who is teaching moral standards or spiritual values has any right to do it apologetically. If I have 
ever had to quarrel with chaplains, it has been because they have been a little bit too diffident where 
I thought they should have been a little more belligerent in what they had to say.”10 Whether 
discussing morality or spirituality, Eisenhower’s chaplains served the United States, a country the 
military explicitly framed as a covenant nation. In the wake of Communist threats, maintaining 
national Providence demanded bellicose, not bashful, clergy. 
Yet little hesitancy or reluctance existed in the chaplaincy during this period. In its most 
expansive and restrictive ways, religion—as well as its oscillating counterpart, morality—suffused 
and interrupted the work of the military. In Europe, as military chaplains encountered death camps 
and worked with refugees and displaced persons, they harnessed the influence of spirit and state to 
help restart and rebuild the lives of those decimated by Hitler’s wrath. In occupied Europe and 
Japan, chaplains stood at the center of the military’s efforts to control and discipline bodies; 
chaplains lectured about sex, tried to prevent rape and limit prostitution, and sanctioned or hindered 
marriage. The chaplaincy fortified morality in the military, taking on a new ideological fervor in the 
spiritual defense of the nation during the early Cold War. In Korea, chaplains not only counseled, 
aided, and prayed with and for American forces, but also infused the Korean military with religious 
fervor through the transmission of ideas, structure, and supplies. In all of these arenas and in all of 
these ways, the chaplaincy embarked on a global moralizing campaign, shifting its role from religious 
provisioning to moral-standards bearing. In the aftermath of World War II, the American state 
                                                
9 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Dr. Hazen, The Chaplain vol 3, no. 4 (April 1946): front cover. 
10 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Speech to the Washington Ministerial Union, May 25, 1953, Papers as President of 
the U.S., 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Speech Series, Box 4, DDE. 
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engaged in spiritual and moral reconstruction at home and abroad. From the military’s perspective, 
where religion signaled potentially distinct, asynchronous, and contested beliefs, morality heralded 
unified, harmonious, and homogenized benchmarks of behavior. As a result, elevating morality as a 
fusion of differing belief systems allowed the military to use the chaplaincy to generate and promote 
a military-spiritual complex, a defense of American democracy ultimately rooted in Protestantism 
but presumed to encompass diverse American faiths. 
 
Living the Legacy of War: Religious Responsibilities in the Wake of Nazi Atrocities 
Emperor Hirohito’s surrender was a relief: the war was finally over. Yet for many chaplains, 
the meaning of war, the significance of death, and the implications of American intervention abroad 
were just becoming apparent. Navy Chaplain Samuel Sandmel (Jewish), who was stationed in the 
Pacific, confessed that he felt “strangely inarticulate” upon receiving the news of Japanese 
capitulation.11 Army chaplain Morris Frank, the first Jewish chaplain to enter Germany in 1944, 
expressed a similar reaction to V-E day: “My feelings are mixed – and I find it difficult to write or 
think. I’m happy that there is an end to the useless killing, but I can’t help but think of the some 20 
million who have died in this horrible war.”12 Over eleven months, from the liberation of France 
and invasion of Germany to the defeat of Hitler and the fall of the Rising Sun, American chaplains 
encountered the moral violence undergirding World War II: bombed-out cities, fractured families, 
uncertain futures, war crimes, and most vividly perhaps, the atrocities revealed in Nazi concentration 
and death camps.  
The new world, the postwar world, proffered opportunities for peace and peddled fear of 
future war. Allies quickly become enemies, as fragile links between the Soviet Union and the United 
                                                
11 Samuel Sandmel to Frances Fox Sandmel, August 13, 1945, MSS 101, Box 23, Folder 8, AJA. As a regular 
writer of lengthy letters and the future author of over twenty books, Sandmel’s loss of words was unusual. 
12 Morris Frank to Florence Frank, May 7, 1945, SC 15430, AJA. 
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States broke apart, and vanquished enemies became allies, as newly democratized Japan provided a 
Pacific barrier separating the U.S. from the USSR and China. Amidst swiftly shifting geopolitics, 
however, the American Occupation Armies, in Germany and Japan alike, faced tasks both prosaic 
and extraordinary: how to re-establish everyday life, how to regenerate society, and how to rebuild 
conquered nations. Through this work, chaplains confronted not the Arendtian banality of evil, but 
the repercussions of an appallingly bald immorality that provoked, sustained, and concluded global 
warfare. 
Encounters with refugees, victims, and survivors—the people who would become known as 
Displaced Persons (DPs) in the immediate aftermath of World War II—began in the middle of the 
war. From Tehran, in 1943, Chaplain David Rubin (Jewish) reported a swell of Russian and Polish 
Jews seeking safety, ideally in Palestine.13 In Rome, in June 1944, Chaplain Morris Kertzer (Jewish) 
greeted 4,000 Jews gathered at the city’s main synagogue, Tempio Israelitico, knowing that the story 
of liberation was “even more personal” for the congregation, the soldiers and survivors who 
“crowded…to raise their voices in prayer and thanksgiving.”14 In Paris, in September 1944, Theater 
Chaplain Judah Nadich (Jewish) reconnected families, spoke to the press, and became a liaison 
between military authorities and French Jewry, while in Rheims, Chaplain Isaac Klein (Jewish) 
organized a religious school and led services for the town as well as the Jewish soldiers of the Ninth 
Bomber Command to which he was assigned.15 In Belgium, in November 1944, Chaplain Morris 
Sandhaus (Jewish) helped coordinate care for 56 Jewish orphans in Brussels.16 In Germany, in 1945, 
Chaplain David Max Eichhorn (Jewish) led services for several thousand Jews remaining in Dachau 
                                                
13 Louis Barish, Rabbis in Uniform: The Story of the American Jewish Military Chaplain (New York: Jonathan David, 
1962), 21-22. 
14 Morris Kertzer, Reflections, and Kertzer, Address at Tempio Israelitico, June 9, 1944, MS 709, Box 12, 
Folder 7, AJA.  
15 Alex Grobman, Rekindling the Flame: American Jewish Chaplains and the Survivors of European Jewry, 1944-48 
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and tried to balance the needs and reactions of tortured survivors with the directives and orders of 
the American military.17  
Little, however, prepared chaplains—or anyone else—for the scenes they would find at 
concentration camps. Reading or hearing about the unfathomable and encountering the 
inconceivable were not the same thing. Hitler’s plans to decimate European and world Jewry 
exceeded the imaginative capacity of most Americans; even those who theoretically knew what they 
would find at death camps could not easily process what they encountered. American soldiers 
discovered the first camp—Ohrdruf, a labor sub-camp of the death camp Buchenwald, by accident 
on April 4-5, 1945. A week later, Chaplain Edward P. Doyle (Catholic) accompanied the medics of 
the 104th Infantry Division to Nordhausen, another sub-camp of Buchenwald. There, he found “a 
world difficult to describe.” His experience with the medical brigade did little to ready him for the 
warped and catastrophic conditions that awaited, the 700 scarcely-alive bodies packed into barracks 
among 3000 corpses. “I have seen as many as 125 wounded a night in our combat area of Belgium 
and Holland and assisted in preparing the wounded for surgery and the like, but never have I seen 
such suffering and anguish,” he recalled.18 A day later, U.S. Army Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
George Patton, and Omar Bradley toured Ohrdruf, coming face-to-face with Nazi atrocities in the 
forms of pyres of corpses, lice-ridden bodies, and stashes of torture devices, as well as underground 
bunkers filled with looted art, gold, and jewelry. Eisenhower made publicizing the brutal conditions 
a priority: he entreated diplomats and the press to visit, to witness, and to broadcast the 
indescribable scene. He also ordered all units in the vicinity to tour the nightmarish camp. “We are 
told that the American soldier does not know what he is fighting for,” Eisenhower explained. “Now, 
                                                
17 David Max Eichhorn, May 6, 1945 in Greg Palmer and Mark S. Zaid, eds., The GI’s Rabbi: World War II 
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at least, he will know what he is fighting against.”19  
Chaplain Herschel Schacter needed no such reminder. The same day Eisenhower inspected 
Ohrdruf, the rabbi entered Buchenwald with Patton’s Third Army. There, he searched for Jews, 
going in and out of the barracks, shouting, in Yiddish, “ihr zint frei” (“You are free”).20 He not only 
possessed the language skills necessary to reach many of the Jewish prisoners, but used his position 
as a chaplain to offer religious services to the newly-freed, starting with Sabbath services the next 
evening and perhaps most famously—as captured in a Signal Corps photograph—leading 
overflowing Shavuot services in a cavernous hall filled with both striped-clad survivors and 
uniformed American soldiers a month later. He also formed a chevra kadisha, (burial society) so as to 
properly bury the Jewish dead, drafted lists of survivors to help reunite families, and adapted the 
army postal system to the needs of survivors by mailing letters on their behalf under his name.21  
While few Jewish men required the motivation of Ohrdruf, Nordhausen, Buchenwald, or 
any other concentration camp, they found themselves similarly challenged to comprehend and 
convey the extent of the devastation. When Morris Frank wrote to his wife, all he could offer were 
elliptical phrases: “The stories they tell – the horrors they relate – the brutalities they have 
undergone – unbelievable – beyond description…premeditated torture – starvation – slow death – 
burning hell.”22 Chaplain Harold Saperstein (Jewish) found that entering Germany represented an 
emotional turning point, an experience like no other in the war. In contrast to fighting in Italy and 
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France, where he had observed his surroundings with curiosity and even delight, Germany inspired 
only hatred and vengeance. It was, from his perspective, “a cursed land” where “the indescribable 
odor of death still pervades the air. They are still digging corpses out of the ruins.”23 After finding 39 
boxcars stuffed with “shriveled mummies” and crematoria laden with bones and ash, Chaplain 
Eichhorn reported to the JWB that “we cried tears of hate. Combat hardened soldiers, Gentile and 
Jew, black and white, cried tears of hate.” And when Jewish survivors attacked Nazi guards, he and 
his soldiers stood aside, watching, for “deep anger and hate had temporarily numbed our emotions” 
and intervention seemed unwarranted, if not pointless.24 
The Jewish ritual calendar often provided Jewish chaplains with poignant means to explain 
their work and emotions. Assigned to Southern France with his American troops, Chaplain Kertzer 
witnessed the return of the community’s rabbi to his congregation. The rabbi, whom the community 
presumed dead, had been serving with the Free French Interior (the French Resistance) and 
unexpectedly walked into Friday night services in uniform and cavalry boots. As he relayed the scene 
in a letter, Kertzer remarked that it “was a real Shabbat Shuvah.” In fact, September 22-23, 1944 was 
Shabbat Shuvah, the Sabbath of Return that falls between the Jewish Holy Days of Rosh Hashanah 
and Yom Kippur and marks the pleas by the prophet Hosea for Israel to return to God. As two 
rabbis, one French and one American, one liberated and one liberator, led services together, they 
sanctified the return of French Jewry to their homes and the presence of American Jewry to fill 
vacant seats. When the French rabbi wished everyone a “bon Shabbat,” a good Sabbath, the 
American chaplain commented, 
Battle-toughened men, men who had lived through Salerno and Anzio, who had driven from 
Rome to Florence and Pisa, who had come ashore upon the Riviera and helped in the push 
that drove the Nazis reeling across their own borders—seemed repaid at this moment for all 
their travail and sacrifice: there was a genuine look of spiritual serenity on their bright faces, 
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as this rabbi of the underground, brought back from the dead, repeated the priestly blessing 
over their young heads.25 
 
Similarly, holidays such as Passover, which celebrated the biblical exodus from Pharoah’s Egypt, and 
Tisha B’Av, which commemorated the destruction of the Temple in ancient Jerusalem, served as 
vehicles through which to make sense of the senseless worlds the Allies encountered in Europe.  
Even those serving across the globe, in the Pacific Theater, interpreted Jewish holidays 
through the lens of the destruction of European Jewry. In the Philippines, in 1945, Chaplain Samuel 
Silver offered a sardonic take on the upcoming Passover holiday: “What a happy Passover it’ll be, if 
by that time the Berlynchers have bit the dust and the Germaniacs will have been drowned in the 
onrushing Red Sea of tanks.”26 At the heart of Silver’s wit lay midrash, a classical Jewish form of 
exegesis that uses comparisons and allegories from Biblical texts to explain the world; comparing 
Hitler’s Germany to Pharoah’s Egypt let Silver see and offer a vision of Jewish triumph, of enemy 
extinguished through the hand of God—or at least Allied military force. From Okinawa, Chaplain 
Moshe Sachs provided a more direct explication of the meaning of Tisha B’Av in his newsletter, The 
Jewish Oiy Kinawan. In August 1946, he wrote, “the holiday must teach us to respond constructively, 
even militantly to Jewish tragedy…not only to mourn but to determine to build a secure homeland 
for the ‘remnant.’”27 
For Jewish chaplains stationed in Europe, attachment to the Occupation Army enabled them 
to serve their country and their people. Duty to God and country took on new import—and novel 
complications—as American rabbis helped shepherd the shearith hapletah, the “surviving remnant” of 
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European Jewry, from Holocaust to new lives while reporting to military command. By virtue of 
their military standing and religious roles, chaplains became conduits between army protocol and 
civilian needs. When Chaplain Eichhorn—who officiated at the first Shabbat service at Dachau after 
liberation—addressed the survivors in a sermon, he made his position clear: “Today I come to you 
in a dual capacity—as a soldier in the American Army and as a representative of the Jewish 
community of America.”28 As much as it was an honor to represent the military and the Jewish 
people, however, these “dual capacities” or twin modes of being—as American chaplain and Jewish 
rabbi—could also be unnerving. Ten days after the liberation of Paris, Morris Frank tried to make 
sense of his experience. He understood the moment as “history making” but struggled to express 
how it felt to meet “the remnants of our decimated people...[they] greeted me as a liberator…the 
first Rabbi–Chaplain–American to hold services with them….One would think I was important – or 
that I had single-handedly liberated the population.”29 Where Frank focused on his role as a small 
piece of a much larger military operation, rescued Jews saw the chaplain as emblematic, if not 
constitutive of, salvation.  
As American forces penetrated the continent and captured territory previously overridden by 
Nazis, the administrative work of liberation became clear. The initial experiences with survivors—
announcing the arrival of American forces, rescuing men and women from starvation, sickness, and 
despair, holding religious services, and assailing Nazi atrocities—gave way to the more precarious 
challenge of figuring out how to sustain and guide DPs. The task was enormous, and chaplains were 
often bombarded with competing interests. While the needs of Jewish DPs, the intent of the U.S. 
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military, the goals of aid organizations ostensibly aligned, reality was more complicated and less 
perfectly synchronized. The Jewish Welfare Board, for example, explicitly instructed Jewish 
chaplains to refrain from mentioning their relief work in reports—lest it be misconstrued or 
misunderstood—and enjoined chaplains to restrict such work to their personal time and initiative.30 
The vast majority of Jewish DPs would, within a year after the war’s formal end, find 
themselves in western Germany, within the American sector and under American authority—
military and civilian. Organizations such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 
(JDC), the Red Cross, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 
coordinated and oversaw much of the work to aid the victims of Hitler’s regime. But where they 
would (or more importantly, could) go and resettle, how they would get there, and what resources 
they needed to rebuild their lives remained uncertain. As DPs attempted to start life anew, American 
chaplains often conveyed information and assisted refugees looking for family members and family 
members seeking out survivors. Fred Oppenheimer was living in Chattanooga, TN when he 
received word that his mother, who had been sent to Theresienstadt, survived and had returned to 
Munich. Through a trio of Jewish chaplains, he reached out to her. First, Chaplain Morris Frank, 
who had recently returned to Chattanooga, suggested he write to Chaplain Herman Dicker, a rabbi 
attached to a medical battalion in Germany who had regular contact with survivors, Second, he then 
sent his mother a package through Chaplain Earl Stone, who was stationed less than 10 miles away 
at Ft. Oglethorpe.31 Networks of chaplains enabled civilians to access and use military connections 
to aid family reunification.  
When possible, Jewish chaplains also helped move supplies and materials from civilian 
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Jewish relief organizations through military channels to reach their European brethren. But 
chaplains worked under the supervision of local commanding officers, which meant that the rabbis 
could try to influence and direct policy but ultimately maneuvered within constraints set by army 
regulations and the commanders enforcing them. The military, moreover, trained men to fight, not 
to govern, and managing scores of refugees in chaotic environments beset with food scarcity, 
inadequate shelter, rampant disease, and ethnic tension challenged even the most sympathetic 
officers. Despite these problems, entrepreneurial Jewish chaplains like Abraham Haselkorn, Herbert 
Eskin, Robert Marcus, and Eugene Lipman requisitioned food, homes, and transportation—
sometimes through legal purchases and sometimes through illegal borrowing.32 For other Jewish 
chaplains, the havoc of postwar occupation provided cover for their illicit activities. Abraham 
Klausner, for example, transferred himself back to Dachau where he compiled lists of survivors, 
distributed religious goods, mailed letters on behalf of DPs (the military postal service made no 
accommodation for civilian correspondence), informed DPs of their rights, established schools, and 
created separate camps and hospitals for Jewish DPs.33 Chaplain Herbert Friedman similarly 
engineered commotion to his advantage, albeit to liberate rare Jewish books and manuscripts, rather 
than people. At the urging of Gershom Scholem, a German-born scholar of Jewish mysticism at 
Hebrew University, Friedman forged a receipt, commandeered an ambulance, and shipped crates of 
documents to Palestine.34 
Chaplains thus volunteered their time, knowledge, and language skills to aid DPs. But their 
effort—as important as it felt to them and as encouraging their advocacy may have been to DPs—
was still constrained by both the overwhelming needs of DPs and the limited supplies and energy 
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accessible to chaplains. Thus when Chaplain Aryeh Lev arrived in Europe as part of the Chief of 
Chaplains’ post V-E day delegation, he met with chaplains working with DPs and concluded, 
“Money doesn’t help—not when 4000 Jews come out of Buchenwald. A chaplain can do very little. 
What is needed is a number of trained workers and boat loads of supplies and food.”35  
Despite Lev’s concerns, most Jewish chaplains generally understood their work with Jewish 
DPs not as an assigned task but as an ethical imperative derived, at least in part, from the utterances 
of daily prayer. Chaplain Morton Fierman traveled from London to Paris in the winter of 1945, 
where he first observed the impact of the Nazi regime on European Jewry: “What I saw of the 
Jewish civilian population made my heart turn over…[their] stories of torture, despair, difficulties 
threw me off balance….the world must be set right.”36 Aiding European Jewry, or using the 
chaplaincy to reset the world, transformed morning prayers from metaphor to reality, from rituals of 
worship to rituals of service. Praising God for clothing the naked, freeing the imprisoned, and 
raising the downtrodden pushed rabbis to act in God’s image,37 so much so that several Jewish 
chaplains extended their commitment to the American military. In the summer of 1946, Chaplain 
Herbert Friedman informed his synagogue president that “legally and theoretically” he could apply 
for a discharge and return to his civilian congregation. But, he insisted, “morally and according to 
the dictates of my conscience, I cannot.” Given the ratio of 14 Jewish chaplains (several of whom 
were detailed and devoted to the air corps) to a quarter-million Jewish DPs, Friedman asserted that 
“it is simply not right” to leave.38 Even as American congregations wished that their rabbis would 
return to their regular pulpits, some rabbis often prioritized the work afforded to them through their 
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roles as military chaplains. They saw relief work as a moral calling, and the military accepted, at least 
temporarily, their drive to devote particular resources (Jewish chaplains) to a particular community 
(Jewish DPs). 
Yet while Friedman and others insisted that their presence in Europe remained essential and 
necessary, not everyone—military or civilian—concurred. Rabbi Joseph Lookstein traveled to 
Europe in the winter of 1946 and reported to Chief of Chaplains Luther Miller (Episcopalian) that 
there were too many chaplains, Jewish and Christian, lingering on the Continent. The number of 
troops warranted fewer military ministers, although the paucity of military need allowed chaplains to 
aid DPs—activity once opposed, but now supported, by most commanding generals in the region. 
Lookstein recommended rotating chaplains back to the United States, declaring surplus those no 
longer needed, and separating those who had fulfilled their terms of service.39 Nevertheless, the 
Office of the Advisor on Jewish Affairs to the Commander in Chief of the European Command 
requested at least five and up to ten Jewish chaplains dedicated to work with DPs. As the 
Occupation Army transitioned to more active oversight of civilian daily life and refugee relief, it 
created a specialized position because “the Army believes only experienced rabbis in military 
uniform [could] properly perform” the task.40 The Army wanted clergy familiar with military 
hierarchy, command, and infrastructure to serve the DPs in its orbit. Integrating work with Jewish 
DPs into the operational responsibilities of Jewish chaplains provided an orderly means through 
which to nurture the religious and communal needs of survivors. 
American officials’ investment in religious life and standards of interfaith cooperation 
impressed European Jews more accustomed to hiding their religious practices from, rather than 
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inviting in, state officials. Chaplain Friedman reported that Aubrey J. O’Reilly, the Catholic senior 
chaplain of the Berlin District, attended the 1946 Passover Seder. “By virtue of the interest displayed 
by these highly-placed military leaders in Berlin,” Friedman wrote in his monthly report, “this 
Passover had especial significance, since the remnant of the Jewish people, seeking an escape from 
this land, naturally lean upon the American Army, and appreciate the consideration shown by its 
leaders.”41  
Inasmuch as the value the American military placed on religious equality and collaboration—
indeed, American religious mores as conceived by the military—undergirded the work of and 
bolstered the chaplaincy, it also blinded military leaders to the pernicious, if unintended, 
consequences of uncritically applying it to postwar Europe. As the army mobilized to organize DPs, 
it assumed the logic of military religious praxis could easily transfer to DP camps. Of the six million 
DPs initially recognized on V-E day, 2.5 million were repatriated by early July 1945 and a half 
million fell under British, French, or Russian authority. The three million DPs remaining under 
American authority originally comprised an undifferentiated lot, in which Jews and non-Jews, 
victims and collaborators were statistically listed and defined only by nationality. Tension between 
Jews and non-Jews festered. Reports and warnings from chaplains, soldiers, journalists, and civilian 
leaders culminated in President Truman dispatching Anna M. Rosenberg, an expert in manpower 
and personnel, to examine the circumstances facing French Jewry and Earl G. Harrison to study the 
conditions of German Jews (or Jewish DPs then residing in Germany). The creation of separate 
camps for Jewish DPs constituted one outcome of the Harrison Report, which detailed—through 
the influence of chaplains like Klausner—the problems and injustices faced by Jewish DPs living 
alongside former assailants. Herman Dicker, an army chaplain who served in France and then 
Germany, later concluded that assigning Jewish chaplains to temporary special duty “eliminate[ed] 
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many of the obstacles caused by lack of mutual understanding” between DPs and American military 
authorities.42  
 
Foreign Affairs: Fraternization, Sex, and Marriage 
For chaplains of all religions working in Occupied Germany, the military’s non-fraternization 
policy provoked some of their most significant problems. Eisenhower, as the Supreme Commander 
of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, issued a directive on September 12, 1944—the day U.S. forces 
first entered Germany—that forbade congenial contact with German nationals, making no 
distinction between victims, resisters, collaborators, and Nazis. Defined as “the avoidance of 
mingling with Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity, or intimacy, whether individually or 
in groups, in official or unofficial dealings,” the non-fraternization policy proscribed activities 
ranging from billeting with, attending church services with, and marrying Germans to drinking, 
discussing politics, or socializing with Germans. While violations incurred fines ranging from $10 for 
talking to Germans to $65 for sleeping with Germans, enforcement was lax, infringement was 
constant, and resistance was strong.43  
Regular offenders of the fraternization policy included chaplains, not only the rabbis for 
whom adherence would have meant not serving Jewish survivors but also chaplains from other 
faiths who sought out co-religionists and felt it wrong to act standoffish. Chaplain W. Marlborough 
Addison (Christian Science) requested a discharge from the Army specifically so that he could serve 
his fellow German Christian Scientists who “need the guidance of The Mother Church.” His 
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familiarity with church leadership and with the regulations of the Occupation Army seemed to make 
him an ideal candidate for this position. However, he lacked the requisite points to leave the Army 
(which demobilized men based on a protocol tied to length and quality of service as well as 
dependents on the homefront) and, moreover, as the Christian Science Board of Directors learned, 
“the whole policy of the Chaplains’ Office is against freelancing chaplains.” Thus Addison remained 
in Germany but continued to report on and attempted to aid Christian Scientists living under the 
military government.44 Chaplain Timothy Hoyt Bowers-Iron (LDS) found that he vacillated between 
anger and obligation, uncertain of how to check the “tremendous emotional impact” of witnessing 
the remnants of atrocities at Nordhausen and Buchenwald against a desire to facilitate services for 
German Mormons. Indeed, despite the fraternization ban’s explicit prohibition of joint church 
services, he felt it “would be good for international relations if we could be meeting together.” With 
permission from his Division Chaplain, Bowers-Iron conducted a combined service, first with 
Germans on one side of the church aisle and American servicemen on the other and ultimately with 
mixed seating and regular interaction between German and American Mormons.45 Like Chaplain 
Addison, Chaplain Bowers-Iron helped bridge German and American religious communities by 
sending information, visiting co-religionists—trading his cigarette allotment for gas to travel—and 
encouraging his church to send a leader to help the Germans reorganize their religious community. 
Far more contentious than religious services, sexual contact—consensual and forced, 
temporary and long-term—proved particularly vexing for the military writ large and chaplains in 
particular. As the Allied forces marched through Germany, they encountered the German 
homefront, filled as it was with the elderly, women, and children. And keeping (straight) servicemen, 
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who had been ensconced in a generally all-male environment, from expressing their interest in local 
women often proved futile. Within months after German surrender, American newspapers and 
magazines reported sexual liaisons between former enemies. By October 1, 1945, the fraternization 
ban was lifted—except for living with and marrying Germans.46 Still, as Chaplain Bowers-Iron later 
commented, “the problem of keeping [men and women] apart was pretty drastic.”47 This challenge 
extended to all fronts of the war and all areas in which American forces entered, stayed, and lived, 
whether as part of Occupation Armies or aiding in postwar reconstruction.  
As Americans remained in foreign countries, chaplains became keenly aware of another risk 
of sex between American men and foreign women: rape. In both Germany and Japan, wartime 
propaganda and brutality raised expectations that enemies would act as barbarians and rape and 
sexual assault would be common.48 The exact number of rapes that occurred during and after the 
war is unclear, in part because rape was used as a weapon of war. Between 1942 and 1945, JAG 
handled 904 rape cases in Britain, France, and Germany and convicted 458 men, but rape is 
chronically underreported and underprosecuted.49 Rape charges against American soldiers peaked in 
Germany in April 1945, when 501 soldiers were accused of rape; accusations declined to 241 in May, 
when Germany surrendered, and decreased to about 45 allegations per month thereafter.50 
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Rape accusations, moreover, were not color-blind. Over four-and-a-half months, from D-
Day to mid-October 1944, 179 French women lodged rape complaints against American soldiers; 90 
percent asserted that their rapist was black. The troubling racial demographics of the American men 
accused of rape by French women led an unnamed African-American Army chaplain to prepare a 
pamphlet, “Let’s Look at Rape!” in the fall of 1944. Despite the jocular exclamation point, the six-
page document was deadly serious. It cautioned that “All of these [rape] complaints did not stand up 
under investigation,” but by October 15, a mere seven weeks after the Allies liberated Paris, 64 
African-American men awaited trial for rape, while only 11 white soldiers faced comparable charges. 
Although the military determined that only one-third of the complaints against black soldiers 
merited courts-martial—compared to two-thirds of the complaints against white soldiers—the 
numbers nevertheless portended a “disaster.”51 Indeed, of the 100 American soldiers executed for 
committing rape in France, 86 were black.52 Striking enough on their own, the statistics were 
especially distressing given that African-American troops comprised less than ten percent of the 
American Armed Forces in France at the time. That African-American soldiers faced significantly 
higher rates of alleged rape was not unusual. In the United States, accusations by white women 
toward black men were neither rare nor unexpected in this period.53 Jim Crow America made the 
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black man’s gaze, speech, and gestures suspect, no matter the reality or intention.  
Yet at the very moment when racism likely inflated statistics of black men accused of rape,54 
a military officer and member of clergy insisted that men take responsibility for both their actions 
and the perception of their actions. Marked “secret,” the pamphlet reached the desk of Lieutenant 
Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, the highest-ranking black officer in the European Theater of 
Operations. “Let’s Look at Rape!” combined declarative sentences, clear infographics, and pert 
illustrations to make one overarching point: each soldier was responsible for his own behavior. Even 
when the chaplain warned men to “beware these women of easy virtue,” the Nazi and Fascists 
trickster collaborationists who might “accuse you of rape for the purpose of creating racial trouble in 
the Army and back home,” he insisted that men needed to “cover [their] movements” and watch 
their liquor because “drunkenness is never an excuse for YOUR crime.” The pamphlet concluded 
with a 4-step battle plan for every unit: 1) discuss rape and “determine that it shall not happen”; 2) 
teach every man the importance of not raping women and not being perceived as rapists; 3) take 
communal responsibility and “don’t let any man go wrong”; and 4) unite and work together to 
eliminate the problem. After reviewing the document, on January 23, 1945, Davis issued a memo to 
the Theater Chaplain advising him that “Let’s Look at Rape!” was “most timely and should be 
presented to all members of our service.” Three days later, the Theater Chaplain, L. Curtis Tiernan 
(Catholic), attached the pamphlet to a bulletin distributed to all chaplains—black and white—in 
Europe, noting that the pamphlet was “worthy of the serious consideration of all” and encouraged 
chaplains to share it with their troops.55  
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Sex exasperated the military and often placed the chaplaincy in an awkward spot. As an 
institution that understood itself as the moral vanguard and moral protector of the Americans in its 
orbit, the military preferred to promote chastity and abstinence as virtuous standards even as it knew 
that its members were sexually active. As a result, the Army approached and engaged sexual activity 
with a classic bait-and-switch maneuver: publicly protest and privately pardon, or vociferously 
rebuke while distributing condoms and treating disease.56 With young, unmarried men making up the 
bulk of U.S. Armed Forces, chaplains were responsible for regular lectures on what the military 
dubbed “sex-morality.” Regardless of any given religion’s view on sex, the military assigned 
chaplains with the task of emphasizing self-restraint as a moral virtue. At the same time, sex 
happened and venereal disease was real, and the military instructed its medical staff to operate 
prophylaxis stations, give “personal hygiene” lectures, and dispense condoms. While some chaplains 
accepted this set-up as sensible and reasonable, others found themselves operating at cross-
purposes. Chaplain Bowers-Iron (LDS), for example, noted that while lecturing men about sexual 
immorality “gave me personal satisfaction,” it had little practical effect.57 A confidential overseas 
inspection report from Chaplain Charles I. Carpenter (Methodist)—then an Air Corps chaplain and 
future Air Force Chief of Chaplains—critiqued the military’s approach to sex and venereal disease as 
too lax and in need of reformulation. “We appear to have completely given up the fight to maintain 
ideals and morals, and are simply trying to salvage as much human life as possible from the possible 
wreckage that can result from lust run wild,” he stated. Using drugs to treat the consequences was 
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“deadly” because it enabled GIs to stray with few consequences. Masses of men away from the 
influences of home combined with “a strange emphasis on the ‘pin-up girl’ by which the eye of the 
soldier is often focused (and through the eye, the mind) on the feminine form from the purely 
physical and lust arousing standpoint” stymied even the most prudent men.58 
As a Catholic priest, World War II Chief of Chaplains William Arnold had to tread carefully 
between the teachings of the Church (which required premarital abstinence and forbade 
contraception) and the goals of the military (which conceded premarital sex occurred and equipped 
its men with condoms). Internally, Arnold focused his concern on the “indiscriminate distribution” 
of prophylaxis that, in his opinion, “expose[d] the Army to the very serious charge of actively and 
directly contributing to the delinquency of youth.” He found it troubling that the military would 
puzzle and confuse men by instructing them to obey moral law while granting them the tools to 
flout it.59 Publically, however, Arnold advised his chaplains to hold tightly to morality and decency 
and lauded most of the medical corps for offering dignified and professional presentations. He 
acknowledged that occasionally a doctor could act like a “gross-minded smarty” but instructed 
Chaplain Edward J. Waters (Catholic), him to “do what you can to strengthen the character of your 
boys against the crude methods of men who think that vice is merely a physical danger.”60  
Despite Arnold’s efforts to placate concerned Catholic priests, they still lamented their 
inability to curb or restrain virile young men and Catholic leaders were comparably chagrined. When 
Chaplain John Curran informed Bishop John O’Hara, the Military Vicar that he stopped medical 
officers—including a Catholic doctor—from officially supplying condoms but felt flummoxed by 
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“the secret undercurrent [of distribution] that always works,” O’Hara was nonplussed. He in turn 
wrote to Army Chief of Staff George Marshall to request a general order prohibiting the distribution 
of contraception. Though signed “faithfully yours,” Marshall’s reply likely disappointed the Catholic 
superior. The War Department held firm to its position that “our efforts to combat venereal disease 
must be intensely practical” and therefore, while chaplains stressed education and moral virtue, “we 
cannot disregard any effective means of prophylaxis recommended by the medical profession.”61  
In general, the military chaplaincy perceived and acted on behalf of what historian Margot 
Canaday has called “the straight state.”62 Although World War II marked the start of American men 
and women “coming out under fire” and despite many gay men serving as chaplain’s assistants,63 the 
chaplaincy as a whole generally understood sexuality as heterosexuality. However Chaplain Charles 
C. Dutton became quite cognizant of homosexuality at Fort Bliss, at least after two men individually 
approached him, each “claiming that he is homosexual.” At a loss for how to respond, he requested 
assistance from the Chief of Chaplains. Frederick Hagan responded, cavalierly announcing, “‘there is 
one in every hundred.’” He added, “this may not be an accurate statement but sooner or later every 
chaplain contacts such men and there is a need for a sympathetic and understanding approach.”64 If 
Hagan’s response lacked much in the way of concrete guidance, it was relatively compassionate, if 
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somewhat dismissive. Two years later, a few months before the war ended, Chief of Chaplains 
Arnold responded to a similar query with a far more vituperative stance: the gay soldier should 
receive an immediate dishonorable discharge because he represented “a virulent danger to the Army. 
His immorality exerts a vicious influence.”65 Whether the severity of Arnold’s opprobrium reflected 
his personal views or a more lenient outcome than presuming sodomy and sending the soldier 
through a court-martial is not clear.66 There were at least two chaplains who came under scrutiny for 
homosexuality: Chaplain Roderick H. Fitch and Chaplain Clyde H. Roddy (Congregational-
Christian). The former was dishonorably discharged and received three years prison-time for 
sodomy—a charge to which he admitted guilt—while the latter faced allegations of homosexuality. 
Accusations were enough to dislodge a career, as Chief of Chaplains Arnold pointed out: “Entirely 
aside from one’s opinion as to the truth and untruth of the charges of homosexuality, it is definitely 
believed that the return of Chaplain Roddy to active service as a chaplain would not be to the best 
interest of the Service. Where there is so much rumor a chaplain would be under constant suspicion 
and his usefulness would be marred at every turn.”67 On rare occasions when homosexuality clearly 
entered the chaplaincy’s gaze, consequences fluctuated according to the role as well as the whims 
and interpretations of the chaplains involved.  
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Chaplains understood military sexuality as narrowly heterosexual, but from an administrative 
perspective, sex still comprised more than the act itself. Hence, after receiving numerous complaints, 
the Army Chief of Chaplains lobbied to restrict the sale of pornographic magazines—or any 
“unmailable” periodicals—from post exchanges.68 Adopting the post office’s classification enabled 
the military to bar material deemed lewd, obscene, or lascivious without allocating resources to 
grading publications. Yet even where successful, limiting access to pin-ups, porn, and racy magazines 
did not eliminate immoral temptations and examples. As more young men became officers over the 
course of the war, however, some chaplains found their maturity lacking. Chaplain Hugh G. Carroll 
(Catholic) asserted that he and other chaplains had observed “a marked degree of vulgarity and 
smut” as younger men attempted to impress older and higher-ranking officers attached to the 140th 
Infantry. Quite problematically, he continued, the enlisted men hear these exchanges which, in turn, 
“nullified” the chaplains’ efforts to enforce “clean speech.”69  
While some chaplains vigorously policed (or tried to) a broad range of tantalizing activity, 
others resisted the military’s efforts to regulate their behavior. At its most extreme, Chaplain Dudley 
C. Lackey (Methodist) admitted “moral derelictions” after receiving venereal disease treatment at the 
51st Station Hospital. After an interview with two ranking chaplains in which he confessed to 
committing adultery, Lackey tendered his resignation “for the good of the service” and Theater 
Chaplain Milton O. Beebe (Methodist) reported the infraction to the Methodist Commission on 
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Chaplains so that they could determine his fate as a civilian Methodist minister.70 Other chaplains 
avoided detection by the military, although they did not necessarily hide their sexual activity. Navy 
Chaplain Bertram Korn (Jewish)—who eventually became a Rear Admiral in the Naval Reserves—
confided to a fellow chaplain that he—a young, unmarried rabbi—was lonely at Camp Elliott, in San 
Diego. His “love life, much of an escape as it is, and a rugged one too – has little or no chance of 
permanency….But the fact that I have someone to make love to, physically and actually, does help.” 
Moral and religious teachings about premarital sex notwithstanding, Korn was comfortable having 
sex and telling another rabbi about it. His experiences, he argued, helped him understand why men 
he counseled accepted “any kind of marriage that presents itself.” Most importantly, he framed the 
challenges of Navy life as a route to “personal growth which may make us better and harder men, 
more likely to be better servants of God, more devoted to the things we prize and which the Army 
and Navy spurn every minute, more understanding of the impulses of human beings, more faithful 
to what is right and true and just.”71 Although Korn was atypical in acknowledging his sexual forays, 
other chaplains also recognized sex as a human and therefore understandable desire. From the 
Pacific, Chaplain Samuel Silver (Jewish) wryly observed, “Most of the GIs here are fugitives from 
barren New Guinea GIsles, and the sight of Filipino girls dazzles them. And even more dazzling are 
the WACs & nurses, here in numbers….I’ve dug up a few k’subos [marriage contracts], just in 
case.”72 
But those seeking sex did not necessarily desire relationships and marriage, and brothels 
provided another option—much to the dismay of chaplains. In Japan, where “it was taken for 
granted that the foreigners would demand sexual gratification[,] the question was simply: who would 
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provide it?”73 The answer, at least from the perspective of the Japanese government, was discrete 
“comfort facilities” built by local entrepreneurs and overseen by local police. Financed by 
government loans, euphemistically-titled Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA) buildings 
housed women who serviced the erotic fantasies and sexual desires of American soldiers while 
providing a buffer between soldiers and “good girls.” The inexpensive RAA facilities accomplished 
the goals of the Japanese government: it stemmed rape. They did not, however, achieve the interests 
of the Occupation Army, which, upon discovering high rates of syphilis and gonorrhea among its 
troops, disavowed prostitution as a violation of human rights and democracy and dismantled the 
RAA centers in 1946. The Japanese Home Ministry responded by asserting that women had the 
right to work as prostitutes, and thus legalized the profession in “red-line” districts. Panpan 
women—or women of the night—became a ubiquitous presence in the streetscapes of postwar 
Japan.74  
Navy Chaplain Lawrence L. Lacour (Methodist) found this situation repugnant and, when 
the Navy did little to address his concerns, opted for a more public airing of complaints. From his 
perch in Tokyo Bay, the chaplain mailed a letter to The Des Moines Register in which he assailed 
commanding officers who “refused to do anything to discourage promiscuity.” The Navy, he 
argued, needed to “consider the moral aspects of policies governing personnel” and could not rely 
on all naval officers, as some “by example and advice have encouraged immorality among our men.” 
Against the fleet chaplains’ protest, he wrote, the Navy allowed men to frequent houses of 
prostitution—except for a brief mandated hiatus when Archbishop Spellman toured the area. 
Reprinted in local and national publications, the letter was inserted into the Congressional Record and 
led Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to reaffirm the Navy’s public policy to suppress 
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prostitution by limiting access to brothels in order to “protect the American ideals of home and 
family life.” Thus the Navy Department Bulletin reminded officers that “no action shall be taken that 
might be construed as encouraging, tacitly approving, or condoning prostitution.” But, the memo 
continued, “commanding officers will not neglect…other means of reducing venereal disease in 
their respective commands but will continue to exert every effort towards this objective.”75 To the 
likely dismay of Chaplain Lacour, the knots of sexual morality remained twisted as pragmatism 
countered purity in policy-making.  
While the Supreme Command for Allied Powers (SCAP) and the American government writ 
large publicly disclaimed its troops consorting with women on the fringe of respectability, it 
generally ignored commercial sex and obstructed marriage through immigration regulation. For 
chaplains stationed in the United States and across the world, officiating—or dissuading—marriage 
became one of the most common tasks in the immediate postwar period. Of the 16 million soldiers 
and sailors who served in World War II, upwards of one million (6.25 percent) would meet, marry, 
and bring war brides from 57 countries to the United States between 1942 and 1952. A tiny number 
of war grooms married WACs, WAVEs, military nurses, and other American women posted 
overseas.76 Over 125,000 GI marriages took place during the war—predominantly in Britain and 
other English-speaking Allied nations, between white men and white women—while many more 
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sexual liaisons, some consensual, others not, some of which led to marriage and others of which did 
not, occurred during postwar deployments.77  
The number of women seeking entry to the United States as the result of war-prompted 
relationships led to a flurry of Congressional legislation. First, the War Brides Act in December 1945 
“expedite[d] the admission…of alien spouses and alien minor children of citizen members of the 
United States Armed Forces.” Then, six months later, Congress enacted the Fiancées Act to 
“facilitate…the admission of alien fiancées or fiancés.”78 Necessitated by immigration quotas set by 
the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, this new legislation sanctioned war marriages by enabling spouses and 
children to enter the country without running afoul of either immigration laws or national-origin 
quotas. Yet the legislation was neither total nor neutral: it accounted only for the marriages that 
resulted from the Occupation Army in Japan and thus did not dismantle the Japanese Exclusion Act 
embedded in the Johnson-Reed Act.79 But Japanese war brides existed and their soldier-husbands 
wanted to return to the United States. In 1947, the Alien Wife Bill, which became the Soldier Brides 
Act, provided that the “alien spouse” of a citizen-soldier “shall not be considered as inadmissible 
because of race.” However, the law was limited to marriages cemented within 30 days of the act’s 
passage, thereby restricting its applicability to those who happened to marry within the month—no 
easy feat due to military regulations.80 Only in 1952, when the Immigration and Nationality 
(McCarran-Walter) Act terminated Japanese exclusion by granting nominal immigration quotas to 
Japanese nationals—in an act that otherwise retained quotas—were Japanese war brides able to 
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enter the United States in large numbers.81  
Against this backdrop, military chaplains played critical roles in negotiating marriage. Within 
the military, marriage had long been the province of chaplains. They were, after all, commissioned 
clergy deputized by the state to perform and certify marriages. Although marriage law varied by 
locale, all states authorized clergy to sanctify unions and solemnize relationships between a man and 
a woman by signing marriage licenses.82 Moreover, starting in the Civil War, presiding over and 
recording marriages—most notably between free African Americans—became an integral part of 
chaplains’ duties.83 In the twentieth century, chaplains’ marriage work was manifold. Pre-marital 
counseling, wedding planning, parental reassurance, ceremony conducting, immigration assistance, 
and marriage troubleshooting all fell under the chaplains’ purview. Radio and television 
programming, ranging from the wartime “Chaplain Jim” to the postwar “Chaplains in Action” 
highlighted that chaplains’ work might “begin[] in the chapel, but it doesn’t end there.”84 
Although the military assumed all clergy were ready to marry men and women, this role 
posed difficulties for some chaplains, notably those who were not ordained and unaccustomed to 
effectuating civil marriage. In particular, LDS and Christian Science chaplains acquired the right and 
the duty to oversee marriage rites that they did not possess in their own churches. The LDS Church 
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sanctioned this role, though oddly framing it as a prerogative from the Church’s First Presidency 
rather than a mandate from the state. Either way, it offered “suggestive comments which may be 
made to the groom and bride and the assembled party prior to the performance of the ceremony” as 
well as a template for the order and language of the ceremony.85 One LDS Chaplain, Milt Widdison, 
recalled being asked to officiate at a military wedding—“military formation…and all”—for which he 
“borrowed a few ideas from a Methodist friend’s book and went along with the program.” Despite 
his unfamiliarity with the military ritual, he commented, “it was as valid as a quickie ceremony in a 
Las Vegas marriage chapel.”86 In the military, as in civilian life, legality sometimes mattered more 
than spirituality.  
Christian Scientists, unsure of their legal standing since their practitioners neither received 
ordination nor performed weddings, queried the Chief of Chaplains. They wanted to know whether 
their chaplains could, in fact, oversee military marriages as well as whether this military function 
would spill over into civilian rights and responsibilities. Chaplain George F. Rixey allayed the 
Church’s concerns when he asserted “that because a chaplain holds a commission in the Army, this 
fact should enable him to qualify in many states to perform marriages” but “if such authority was 
granted…it would cease when they received their discharge from the Army.”87 Presiding over 
marriages, then, could be both flexible and temporary. 
Yet even when the authority to officiate marriages was permanent, the military environment 
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presented quandaries unique to the office of the chaplaincy. Indeed, in the arena of marriage, the 
chaplain in uniform occupied the seat of secular county clerks and justices of peace as much as they 
inhabited their pastoral role and ministerial robes. In contrast to civilian life, for example, chaplains 
married men and women who fell outside their faith practices—which could confuse an American 
public accustomed to marriage ceremonies conducted by clergy only for couples of their religion. 
When challenged about a Catholic chaplain marrying two Protestants, the Office of the Chief of 
Chaplains responded simply, “the marriage was valid.”88 In addition, when stationed abroad, 
chaplains occasionally encountered nations with rather different legal approaches to marriage. Much 
to the consternation of chaplains accustomed to formally and legally performing marriages, for 
example, postwar Germany framed marriage as only a civil contract. As a result, when American 
troops married German nationals, chaplains had to stand aside until the civil authorities approved 
the marriage. Chaplain Herman Heuer (Lutheran) learned that “a clergyman whether he be an 
indigenous clergyman or a foreign chaplain, may not perform the marriage ceremony as prescribed 
by civil law. The ecclesiastical solemnization is another matter which may not take place until the 
civil marriage has been accomplished.”89 Chaplains retained the right and ability to preside over 
religious ceremonies following civil ones but military regulations insisted that chaplains follow 
German law for the purpose of creating valid marriages under international law and U.S. 
immigration law. 
While chaplains presided over weddings in the military beyond the scope of their roles in 
civilian religious life, the military did not oblige chaplains to violate their own religious commands. 
The military respected the Jewish interdiction on interfaith marriages, allowing military rabbis to 
                                                
88 John S. Monahan to John S. Hild, December 18, 1939, RG 247 (1920-45), Box 197, Folder 291.1 (Marriages, 
Vol. I), NARA II. 
89 John S. Kelly to Herman Heuer, December 11, 1952, RG 247 (1951-1953), Box 513, Folder 291.1 (Marriage, 
Vol. XVI), NARA II. 
  235 
decline to oversee them, but did not itself forbid such arrangements.90 A television script initially 
written in Chaplain School and revised by Chaplain George H. Birney (Methodist) and Chaplain 
Wayne L. Hunter (Presbyterian U.S.) highlighted this situation. An officer entered the office of one 
Chaplain Shain and requested his services in getting married the following day. Chaplain Shain 
worked through a number of concerns: the apparent swiftness of the wedding (the couple had 
actually been dating for several years), the need for legal sanction (the couple had acquired a 
marriage license and had taken the requisite medical exams), and the religion of the pair (the fiancée 
was Jewish but the soldier was not). When the officer asserted that the faith of the chaplain is 
immaterial to him, Chaplain Shain retorted, “has it occurred to you that it might make a difference 
to me?” When the soldier expressed confusion, the rabbi explained that chaplains “regardless of 
their denominations still abide by the rules and beliefs of their denominations in their service just as 
they do in civilian life.” As he did not perform mixed marriages in civilian life, so too was he unable 
to do so in the military. However, rather than block the wedding, Chaplain Shain procured the 
number for the local justice of the peace and helped the officer make plans to wed the following 
day. The scene ends with the officer commending the chaplain for “standing for what you believe to 
be the right thing to do.”91 Intended to model an appropriate course of action and to provoke 
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discussion among clergy at Chaplain School, the scene exemplified the military’s approach to 
religious dicta: chaplains retained the right to follow their own religion’s marriage law and practice, 
provided their abdication did not deny members of the Armed Forces from marrying.  
Interfaith marriages—legal according to the state, but often problematic if not forbidden by 
religions—often strained chaplains’ dual commitments to the military and to specific religions. The 
Chief of Chaplains regularly reminded chaplains that while they had to abide by local marriage laws, 
civil law did not constrain interfaith marriage. As clergy, chaplains could find interfaith marriage 
troubling and frustrating, but “no government agency is in a position to enforce particular religious 
beliefs and practices.” The chaplain himself could elect not to participate in a marriage he found 
ethically dubious, but, as William Arnold recalled, he “once performed 385 marriages in one day, and 
about half them were between non-Catholics. Some were Protestant, some were Mohammedan, 
most were pagan.”92 Whether or not his data were precise, his point was clear: chaplains followed 
their conscience and the needs of couples sometimes occasioned unusual or unorthodox scenarios. 
So long as the unconventional was legal, however, the War Department accepted it. Nevertheless, 
parents often found mixed marriages as worrisome as chaplains. After her son informed her of his 
impending marriage to an Englishwoman, Mrs. Morris Cohen pleaded with Chaplain Morris 
Fierman (Jewish) to intercede. “Needless to say, I was very shocked as we are of the Jewish faith, 
and she is not,” she wrote. “For this reason, I feel that such a marriage would be unsuitable for the 
problems that will present themselves will be many and great.” Although concerned with the 
presumed danger of interfaith marriage rather than theological prohibition per se, Mrs. Cohen 
nevertheless saw Fierman as her ally—indeed, she was correct. He called her son, and their 
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conversation apparently changed his mind, much to the relief of his mother.93  
In other cases, both civilians and soldiers viewed chaplains as ministerial mediators on their 
behalf. From Sioux City, Iowa, Marilyn Penner wrote to the Chief of Chaplains on behalf of the 
unmarried women on the homefront, pleading with him to “absolutely prohibit marriages between 
American soldiers and foreign women.” She understood her request and reasoning as not 
xenophobic, but demographic: “Already thousands of American girls know they face spinsterhood 
and a life of loneliness and unhappiness” because death and foreign war brides snuffed out too 
many potential mates. The chaplaincy declined to follow her suggestion, asserting that “relatively 
few American men will marry foreign girls” and media reports were exaggerating the problem.94 
There were, however, a number of American men who—despite opposition from the homefront—
wanted to marry foreign women, and sought the counsel and aid of their chaplains. Charlie Lerner 
was stationed in Calcutta, where he met and fell in love with an Indian Jewish woman named 
Seemah. His parents, however, remained skeptical of this match. Over and over again, he reassured 
them that they had nothing to worry about and implored them to accept her and assent to their 
marriage. Their concerns were both religious and racial, and he attempted to convince them that 
Seemah was “white and Jewish.” To make his case, he offered three lines of argument. First, he 
reminded his parents that “there are Jews all over the world, yes even in India[,] and [they] are 
white.” Second, he noted that he had a rival in love—a Polish Jew who “happens to be some sort of 
rabbi himself,” which led Charlie to point out that “if he’s after her for marriage, she must be 
something zayer goot [very good].” Finally, he offered his trump card: he planned to meet with 
Chaplain David Seligson who, he assured his parents, would provide a “certificate proving her a Jew 
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and white.”95 Charlie’s father, in turn, approached the JWB to request confirmation that Seemah was 
Jewish and the JWB, in turn, asked Chaplain Seligson to make a determination.96 For his part, 
Chaplain Seligson affirmed that the couple had talked to him and that Charlie had asked for his 
endorsement. Although Seligson implicitly indicated that Seemah was Jewish, he ducked an overt 
declaration of support by suggesting it would be in everyone’s best interest for Charlie to return to 
the United States, establish himself, and then bring Seemah over as his fiancée.97 Although Seligson 
hardly resolved the argument between Charlie and his family, both sides saw the chaplain as an 
arbiter of Jewishness as well as American racial categories outside the borders of the United States.  
At times, however, chaplains used the military atmosphere as cover for minor violations of 
religious doctrine. Chaplain John S. Monahan (Catholic), for example, petitioned the Archbishop of 
Baltimore to marry an enlisted couple, a Catholic male officer and a non-Catholic female soldier, in a 
hotel rather than in a public religious venue such as a chapel or church, as required by the 
archdiocese. Monahan knew that “the family of the bride, while greatly prejudiced against the 
Catholic Church, does not object to having the ceremony performed by a Catholic Army chaplain” 
but worried that insistence on a chapel wedding “might mean that sufficient pressure would be 
brought upon the Catholic party to make him weaken and allow the ceremony to be held outside the 
Church.” He further maintained that this situation was unique because, among other reasons, it 
came to the attention of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains after the couple had selected a 
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location, and would not, therefore, set any precedent.98 The Archdiocese’s decision remains unclear, 
but Monahan—who served in the Chief of Chaplains Washington, DC office—certainly felt it 
reasonable and proper to push the Church to accommodate a particular military predicament. In 
addition, the Chief of Chaplains found it eminently reasonable for a soldier to select the chaplain of 
his choice to officiate a marriage. When a Catholic chaplain complained that a Protestant chaplain 
had married a Catholic couple, the military replied that unless coercion could be proved, neither the 
chaplain nor the soldier’s actions were problematic.99  
The exigencies of war also promoted creativity and transformed regular weddings into grand 
celebrations. Of one of the first weddings to occur in the free Philippines, Chaplain Samuel Silver 
declared, “Marriages may be made in heaven, but when [the] fiancé drops in from there, a to-do 
naturally results.” After the soldier-groom arrived via air, he met his WAC-bride before “300 people, 
from colonels to privates” and three Jewish chaplains co-officiated the wedding—leading the groom 
to comment, “‘Back home I could have hardly afforded one rabbi; out here in dem visten volt [the 
desolate world], I have three of them.’” The nuptials included a variety of religious customs, ranging 
from a Christian choir singing “O Promise Me,” “rice [being] hurled at the couple,” and a bamboo 
chapel in which  “a white parachute [hung], providing the suitable canopy effect.” After all, Silver 
noted, “when the bride wears khaki & the groom is in the air force, a parachuppah is the proper 
touch.”100  
The joy documented and cheered by Chaplain Silver did not extend, however, to many of 
the interracial and binational couples that met and married—generally overseas—in the postwar 
years. The military’s regulation of marriage represented one prong of the state’s project to moralize 
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about, control, and discipline racial bodies. The prohibition on Japanese citizens immigrating to the 
United States as well as state laws banning interracial marriage hampered relationships that 
developed abroad while simultaneously encouraging casual sexual liaisons rather than serious 
partnerships. Marriage, as a legal matter, rested on state law. “No Federal statute,” the Adjutant 
General reminded a bickering Kentucky court clerk, “empowers an Army chaplain to perform 
marriage ceremonies in places which are subject to the jurisdiction of the respective states without 
complying with the laws of the several jurisdictions where such ceremonies are to be performed.” 
Military bases—forts, camps, ports, and ships—remained an exception, according to the Adjutant 
General, in which marriage was “governed solely by the pertinent provisions of Federal law.”101 The 
Chief of Chaplains deflected this leniency, arguing instead that all chaplains must comply with state 
and local marriage laws even in military space to avoid “many complicated, unpredictable and 
undesirable issues insofar as legal rights involved in divorces, inheritances, and other situations 
arising from marital status are concerned.”102 Hence regardless of the state laws in effect—be it 
residency requirements (for couples or officiants), age of consent, blood tests, waiting periods, or 
miscegenation prohibitions, chaplains were “obliged to conform” to them.103 
There was, of course, no federal law governing marriage per se, though a passel of military 
regulations affected marriage gatekeeping in the military. The most significant policy—which existed 
in some form between 1939 and 1996—restricted Armed Forces personnel serving overseas from 
marrying foreign nationals without the express permission of the country or region’s senior 
commanding officer. Thus while chaplains performed many marriages abroad, the commanding 
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officer’s “subjective assessment of the probable success of marriage” determined whether the 
ceremony could even occur.104 General Douglas MacArthur, the commanding general in Japan, 
refused soldiers permission to marry women who were not allowed to enter the United States 
according to the rationale that doing so “would be to flaunt the sanctity of the marriage 
ceremony.”105 MacArthur, who viewed the occupation of Japan as an opportunity for “spiritual 
recrudescence,”106 infused marriage with religious meaning in order to uphold, rather than criticize, 
the law. Elsewhere, military officials were more flexible but still considered a range of state and local 
laws when rendering decisions on marriage applications, particularly because by the 1950s, approval 
potentially signified additional challenges for administrators assigning couples to military bases 
stateside.107  
Binational, interracial marriages not only tested American views of miscegenation and cross-
cultural exchange, but also, for some chaplains, spurred questions about faith, doctrine, and belief. 
Navy Chaplain George W. Thompson (American Baptist) served as a Staff Chaplain with the 
Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) from 1949 to 1952. His rotations through a variety of ships 
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in the Pacific fleet brought him into close contact with servicemen returning to the United States 
with foreign—most often Japanese and Korean—brides. As a result, he wrote a memo, “If I Marry a 
Foreigner” which was approved for publication by the Navy in April 1952. Along with the caution 
to take marriage decisions seriously, to think hard about the ramifications of interracial or binational 
marriage, and to consider the values each individual brought to marriage, Chaplain Washington 
proposed a series of questions that made the standard by which he judged proposed marriages quite 
clear. “Would this person fit into your family and be accepted as an equal, or would the family feel 
you married beneath your cultural, religious, social, and moral level?” he queried. Then, focusing 
principally on religion, he created an unambiguous hierarchy between the Christianity he assumed 
Americans practiced and the other religions—implicitly Buddhism—practiced in Asia. As he 
articulated it, his concern centered not on the couple but on their anticipated children: “Are you 
certain that you will be willing for your children to be taught a religion which is contrary to and in a 
very definite sense has a moral standard below that of the Christian religion?” According to 
Thompson, it was impossible to reconcile differing belief systems, especially those that encompassed 
animal or ancestor worship, as “people of other countries worship gods that are strange gods, and 
gods that require certain loyalties to which we object. Their conception of their god and his 
demands are certainly foreign to our conception of our God….We cannot believe that sacrifice to 
heathen gods is right, and it would be difficult for us to compromise on the worship of our God.”108 
Chaplain Thompson’s efforts to prevent marriages between American Christians and what 
he deemed foreign heathens—or, at the very least, encourage war brides to convert—did not go 
unnoticed. The Home Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention applauded his work and 
asked the Navy Chief of Chaplains to assist them in furthering it. They hoped to expand 
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Thompson’s work to all war brides through the chaplaincy and therefore requested that all Navy 
chaplains conduct “Christian Friendliness Surveys” to elicit the religious affiliation of new 
immigrants.  This was necessary, they argued, because “if we do not do something about this, they 
will eventually paganize us instead of our bringing them to Christ.” Recognizing that not all 
Americans were Baptist, the Home Mission Board agreeably offered to share this information 
“among the various denominations and religious bodies of America, based on the religion of these 
war brides.”109 The denomination also volunteered to provide instruction classes for Japanese war 
brides who expressed interest in Christianity, but the Navy declined to enact their suggestions.110 
While the military remained non-committal to civilian evangelization overtures, it allowed 
chaplains to hold religious classes for war brides on transport ships—proselytization in form, if not 
name. Baptist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Methodist chaplains worked together to develop a 
curriculum and brochure for the classes, maintaining that “since America is a Christian nation, no 
person is well Americanized until he or she is informed on the teachings of the Christian religion.”111 
That the United States was not—at least constitutionally—a Christian nation and that the chaplaincy 
itself included non-Christians was, to these transport chaplains, irrelevant.112 Chaplain Thompson led 
many of these classes and explained that they were necessary because “these women are coming to 
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America to become homemakers, mothers, associates, and in time, citizens of this 
country….Christianity is the predominant religion in America and few of these immigrants will live 
where Shintoism or Buddhism have temples.” By framing the need to educate Japanese women as a 
type of Americanization and assimilation to middle-class domestic norms and gender roles, the 
chaplain avoided labeling the work evangelical. Lack of access to Buddhist and Shinto temples, not 
Buddhism and Shintoism, produced the religious quandary. Ever the teacher and the minister, 
Thompson claimed that exposure to Christianity “can give them a welcome in spite of customs, 
attitudes, taboos, and racial intolerance.”113 Religion, in its American Christian form, will protect 
Japanese war brides from the prejudice and intolerance purveyed by American Christians. The faulty 
logic bespoke a sincere desire to prepare Japanese women for their roles as American wives and 
mothers along with a willful disregard—or at least disinterest—in American pluralism and religious 
freedom. Though relatively contained within the war bride program, the melding of American 
nationalism with Christianity, rather than a more generic monotheism, heralded a shift in the 
ideological overtures of the postwar chaplaincy. 
 
Sword and Shield: Building the Military-Spiritual Complex 
The desegregation of the armed forces both significantly altered and barely maintained the 
tenor and operations of the military chaplaincy. On July 26, 1948, President Harry Truman issued 
Executive Order 9981, abolishing segregation in the armed forces. It asserted “there shall be equality 
of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, 
religion, or national origin.” Technically, the order instantly overturned more than 150 years of state-
sponsored segregation in the military, but the shift was not sudden nor the implementation 
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especially swift. The order veered between dictating that the end of discrimination occur “as rapidly 
as possible” and allowing that it would take time to do so “without impairing efficiency or 
morale.”114 From a policy perspective, the impetus to desegregate the armed forces began in earnest 
in 1946. In the wake of race riots, violence against black veterans, and lynchings, Truman convened 
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights to investigate problems and recommend solutions relating 
to civil rights in the United States. Among its other findings, the committee’s report, To Secure These 
Rights, insisted that racial equality in the armed forces was essential precisely because military service 
stood at the nexus of obligations and rights. For both ethical and pragmatic reasons, the committee 
argued, discrimination was unjust and diminished the nation’s fighting capacity. Segregation in the 
military developed informally and through administrative law, and the Truman Administration 
recognized an opportunity to make a bold statement about its dedication to the legal equality of all 
Americans in the midst of a heady re-election campaign by using an executive order to bypass 
Congress.115 
The relative acquiescence or resistance to Truman’s initiative varied by branch of service, 
status, and role, and the chaplaincy did not necessarily follow general trends. Although the National 
Security Act of 1947 unified the Army, Navy, and Air Force into a single organization, each unit 
sought and fought to retain its autonomy, leaving James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, 
with little administrative power to desegregate the military unilaterally. Truman created and charged 
another committee—the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the 
Armed Services, better known as the Fahy Committee—with overseeing desegregation. In general, 
the Army and Marines proved most hostile to change, while the Navy accepted it, and the Air Force 
welcomed it. But while the Navy consented to desegregating its enlisted men, its officer corps 
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resisted integration. Meanwhile the Army—which was larger, included more Southern officers, and 
enlisted the most African Americans—claimed separate could be equal and continued to defy the 
President’s command.116 Yet the Army chaplaincy was already integrated—at least administratively. 
The Army commissioned black clergy, trained them alongside white clergy (as it had since World 
War I), and promoted black chaplains. The Navy, which defiantly avoided commissioning black 
chaplains until late in World War II and then promptly dismissed them after the war, remained 
truculent. In contrast, the Air Force chaplaincy, which was led by Charles I. Carpenter (Methodist) 
after he separated from the Army, concentrated more on establishing itself than excluding others. 
Moreover, Carpenter operated under the credo, “don’t hesitate to change if it’s for the better.”117  
The creation of the Department of Defense also produced the Armed Forces Chaplaincy 
Board (AFCB), a council that met regularly and attempted to streamline the work of the chaplaincy 
and, when possible, coordinate chaplaincy efforts across the military. As the Fahy Committee gained 
traction, the respective Chiefs of Chaplains needed to address questions about integration, so the 
AFCB took up the issue. During the AFCB’s second meeting, held at the Pentagon in July 1949, 
“the employment of negro chaplains” constituted the final matter of business to discuss. It was, 
“from the Navy viewpoint, purely academic.”118 Indeed, it would take two-and-a-half more years and 
the advent of the Korean War, for a black chaplain to appear on the Navy’s active duty roster. After 
five years of life as a civilian pastor, Chaplain Thomas D. Parham (Presbyterian)—the second of two 
African-American chaplains commissioned by the Navy during World War II—returned to the 
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Naval chaplaincy, where he spent thirty-one more years in service.119 Although the Korean War 
toppled the Navy’s intransigence on racial discrimination, it also highlighted the slow path to 
integration. Two months after Parham rejoined the Navy, The Christian Century reported, “there are 
still no instances of chaplains being assigned across color lines” and pointed out that, much to their 
dismay, none of “the several chaplain corps have gone on record favoring such exchanges.”120 
Within a few months, the mainline Protestant newspaper happily reported that while the tides of war 
remained uncertain, “chaplain assignments are now being made on a nonsegregated basis in army 
units in the Korean theater.”121 
Although the Fahy Committee and the prolonged effort to integrate the armed forces 
received sustained media coverage and public attention, the chaplaincy garnered more consideration 
and scrutiny from a concurrent advisory group, the President’s Committee on Religion and Welfare 
in the Armed Forces (PCRW). Led by Frank Weil, an attorney who presided over the Jewish Welfare 
Board and helped establish the United Service Organization (USO) during World War II, this 
committee included such religious leaders as Daniel Poling—a World War I chaplain whose son, 
Clark Poling, was one of the four chaplains to die on the Dorchester—and Edmund Walsh—a 
Jesuit who founded Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. Civic leaders such as Truman 
Gibson—a Chicago attorney who had served as an advocate for African Americans in the War 
Department—and Dorothy Enderis—a Milwaukee educator—also joined the committee.122 
Instructed to determine how the military could best enact “the ‘policy of the Government to 
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encourage and promote the religious, moral, and recreational welfare and character guidance of the 
persons in the Armed Forces, this committee accepted its mandate, and thereby to enhance the 
military preparedness and security of the Nation.”123 More specifically, Truman created the 
committee for two related reasons. First, more than half the drafted servicemen in the postwar 
military were under 21, and he believed the military retained responsibility for maintaining the 
morality of impressionable American youth. Second, he understood the late 1940s as a period in 
which the United States “was trying to win the peace…and to win that peace we must have these 
young men as a backlog to secure that peace.”124 Truman’s charge to the committee not only tied 
together religion, morality, and welfare—long the province of American military chaplains—but saw 
them as interrelated concerns driving the suitability of arenas such as military housing, recreation 
opportunities, and entertainment programs as well as guiding educational needs of the service. As a 
result, some of the concerns of the Weil Committee—as the PCRW was colloquially known—such 
as the living conditions of black soldiers fell under the province of both groups. But the Fahy 
Committee ultimately had a narrower, albeit far more daunting, focus on racial equality. In contrast, 
the Weil Committee studied a broader but ultimately more concrete set of issues—the chaplaincy, 
community organizations, housing, and information & education programs—in order to clarify and 
support Truman’s emphasis on the religious underpinnings of national security. 
The chaplaincy proved to be the easiest subject for the Weil Committee to investigate and 
reform. A single entity within each branch of the military, its decisions rested within a clear chain of 
command, and it was, they found, functioning relatively well. No branch met the ideal ratio of 
chaplain to soldiers, presumed to be about 1 chaplain per 800 enlistees, which led to a 
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recommendation to commission a much larger pool of chaplains. But according to data compiled in 
1949, even the newly formed Air Force chaplaincy employed 1 chaplain for 977 soldiers, a rate that 
far exceeded previous peace and wartime standards of 1 chaplain per 1200 men (which was rarely 
achieved). As Weil informed Truman in 1950, “the extent of religious opportunities offered to 
military personnel is reasonably adequate….We found, too, that the chaplains themselves, have 
ample opportunity to function effectively as clergymen within the military service.”125  
Aside from advising the military to commission more chaplains, the committee’s report 
highlighted two main issues: selection and training. The group worried that religious groups might 
reserve their best clergy for civilians and send less desirable men to minister to the military. Once 
chaplains entered the service, how could the branches best train them to accomplish their duties? 
The committee supplied little evidence that weaker candidates entered the service or that chaplains 
needed significantly better training.126 Yet the role of the military minister differed from that of a 
civilian pastor in one significant way: he was responsible for the religious lives of all men, regardless 
of religious affiliation or race. As the report put it, chaplains needed to “demonstrate the essential 
unity of all races, faiths, and groups” and “being the servant of God for all, the chaplain cannot 
cultivate a narrow sectarian spirit.”127 This was not a new vision or novel idea. The Army and Navy 
Chiefs of Chaplains had promoted and, to differing degrees, instilled this idea in their chaplains 
starting in World War I. By the end of World War II, few questioned this mission.  
The postwar years demanded attention anew not because the military had forsaken religious 
diversity in its ranks but because the nation’s new enemy toted more than weapons and defense 
required more than nuclear bombs. By 1950, the PCRW declared that if “we expect our Armed 
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Forces to be physically prepared, we must also expect them to be ideologically prepared.”128 Or, in 
the words of Truman, “we must always make spiritual values our main line of defense.”129 Inimical 
Communism, as embodied by the Soviet Union in the growing Cold War, demanded a fresh, if 
nonetheless conventional, approach. In this new world, chaplains provided more than spiritual 
guidance and moral suasion. They made the United States into and ensured it remained a holy 
nation. As the Weil report remarked, American military chaplains—in contrast to nonexistent Soviet 
ones— “give our democratic faith a very large measure of its strength. The other side of the conflict 
has organized its idea upon a rejection of moral law and individual dignity that is utterly repugnant 
to any of our religions. Indeed, it has been necessary for the totalitarians to attack and stifle religion 
because such faith represents the antithesis of everything they teach.”130 The committee made 
explicit what had been implicit in the push for visibly public interfaith cooperation during World 
War II: American religion encompassed more than faith in God. Even as it eschewed sectarian 
divides, American religion demanded faith in the political ideology of American democracy. 
To that end, the PCRW aligned with and commended the military chaplaincy’s new 
endeavor, Character Guidance. The military had long charged chaplains with inculcating morality in 
its troops, but in the early postwar years, the Armed Forces formalized this role through Character 
Guidance programs. The signature feature of the military chaplaincy in the three postwar 
branches—the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy—Character Guidance tightly and ideologically 
linked religion and morality with democracy and citizenship. Teaching character was not a new idea. 
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Rather, the military’s embrace and design of a formal moral education program represented a federal 
counterpart to state and local character education that became common in schools during the 
Depression and was rejuvenated in the late 1940s.131 Through regular lectures, chaplains instilled—
or attempted to—the virtues and values the state viewed as central to its mission. The impetus for 
this program came from Secretary of War Robert Patterson who sought to use chaplains as a 
weapon against growing rates of venereal disease and disciplinary cases. Army Chief of Chaplains 
Luther Miller (Episcopalian) then shaped the directive into a more expansive series on morality and 
citizenship, which reflected his leadership of the chaplaincy away from diversifying and broadening 
religious access and toward forming model citizens through morality education.132  
Character Guidance emerged alongside and in conjunction with another mid-1940s 
citizenship development plan: Universal Military Training (UMT). The program intended to build a 
standing army ready to turn young American men into citizen-soldiers by mandating one year of 
military training after high school graduation (or upon turning 18), after which they would become 
reservists who, already trained to fight, could readily serve in the event of war. Initially contemplated 
by Roosevelt during World War II, championed by Truman after the war, and supported by about 
80 percent of voters, UMT roused hostility to maintaining a standing army. Advocates trumpeted 
UMT as a cost-efficient means to secure and defend the state while providing men with necessary 
physical and technical skills and imbuing them with morals and values. Critics, however, charged 
that UMT was a wasteful, poorly designed, militaristic, restrictive, and impractical program that 
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contravened individual liberty, stifled freedom, and abrogated rights. Debates over UMT rested on a 
core divide about the nature of the relationship between the obligations and rights of citizenship in a 
democracy. Yet even as proponents of UMT shifted their arguments away from the 1940s espousal 
of moral and citizenship benefits to a 1950s, Korean War-laced focus on military efficacy, critics 
never questioned whether the military should contribute to the creation and shaping of “good 
citizens.”133  
Congress never passed UMT, but in 1946, the War Department designed an experimental 
UMT unit at Ft. Knox in which about 800 men would train for one year under Major General John 
M. Devine. In 1947, 664 young men volunteered for a 6-month training session, and the Army 
dispatched a trio of chaplains to oversee the religious and moral dimensions of the trial UMT. 
Entrusted to build virtuous Cold Warriors, Chaplains Maury Hundley, Jr. (Disciples of Christ), 
Charles J. Murphy (Catholic), and Morris E. Eson (Jewish) led worship, taught ethics, lectured on 
morals, and publicized the value of the program.134 They met individually with every recruit, 
compiling reams of data on the religious backgrounds and views held by their seventeen- and 
eighteen-year old congregants. Citizenship and morality lectures were mandatory, and soon moved 
outside the experimental unit and became standard among all units based at Ft. Knox.135 According 
to the chaplains, the moral and citizenship project succeeded: profanity, alcohol consumption, and 
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venereal infection rates declined and church attendance rose.136 Of course, the unit’s commander 
had removed beer from the post exchange, trainees lacked regular access to women, and made 
worship only technically optional—those who elected not to attend chapel faced an hour meeting 
with a chaplain in its stead. “Father Devine’s Heaven,” as the Ft. Knox regulars referred to the UMT 
unit, steeped its youth in holy fervor.137 As Chaplain Murphy insisted in the post’s newspaper, “you 
are first, last, and always a religious animal, and UMT will not let you forget it.”138  
Nor did the military want any of its personnel to forget religion or its counterpart, morality. 
Navy Chief of Chaplains Stanton W. Salisbury described new recruits as entering a space in which 
they “will be without the normal restraints imposed by the family, the church, the community, and 
the personal approval or disapproval of the neighborhood in which the person has individual status. 
Though he may not have been conscious of it, these factors, these restraints, from which he has 
been torn loose, have on the whole, subconsciously controlled the type of behavior performed by 
youth in his civilian community.”139 Based on the experience at Ft. Knox, in the fall of 1947, Chief 
of Chaplains Miller began promoting The Chaplain’s Hour, a weekly eight-page outline written by 
Chaplain Martin H. Scharlemann (Missouri Synod Lutheran) which evolved into the serialized, six-
volume set of 60 sample talks titled Duty-Honor-Country. At once pithy and uncompromising, the 
original 52 lectures—which ranged from “The Meaning of Citizenship,” “What Makes a Man a 
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Man,” and “Self Control” to a “Authority as a Moral Problem,” “How Free Am I,” and “A Fool and 
His Money”—melded Sunday School lessons, Philosophy 101 classes, and Benjamin Franklin 
aphorisms into a year’s worth of relatively simplistic life lessons undergirded by unadorned anti-
Communism.140  
Writing Character Guidance talks became a staple assignment in Army chaplain school and, 
when collated and distributed, these publications served as the templates for regular moralizing, for 
the effort to convey “a sense of responsibility for the preservation of a free way of life.” The rubric 
envisaged trainees not as masses of undifferentiated uniforms but rather as individuals who would 
learn that “according to our great American traditions, man is a creature of God and that, therefore, 
he is both responsible and accountable to the Creator for what he does with his talents and life.”141 
For example, Chaplain’s Hour 24, “What is Right?” offered a “discussion of right and wrong, together 
with the sources of moral knowledge and the means of growing in the right.” It suggested facilitating 
conversations that expanded from personal considerations such as the role of motives in doing right 
and wrong to political theory debates about whether “our rights [are] based on right” and finally to 
international matters such as whether the United Nations should act as the world’s conscience and 
“how the evil of secret treaties between nations could be corrected by publicity.” Each edition 
included a sample lecture that conveyed a clear message through examples from civilian and military 
life, a list of discussion questions, and sources for additional reading. Chaplains could use the 
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provided material as given or elaborate as they saw fit.142  
The state evinced no concern about the Character Guidance program’s conflation of religion 
and morality or particular religious assumptions within the program. In fact, the manual distributed 
to chaplains about Character Guidance stated that these “lectures are not sermons” and “they are 
not concerned with religion in the technical sense of that word, but only with morality.” Chaplains 
were to teach Character Guidance, not preach. Character Guidance’s provenance, the guide asserted, 
was merely natural theology—defined as matters of “outward decency” that completely avoided “the 
problems of denominational motivation.” The logic made a certain military sense: by focusing 
attention on action, rather than supernatural causes or processes, it steered clear of sectarianism. The 
example proffered bespoke a different story, however. “The statement that men ought to worship 
God is a way of expressing the significance of the Ten Commandments,” the instructions 
announced. “The duty of worship is a requirement made by the Moral Law as such. To explain how 
and why God ought to be worshipped may border on denominational instruction.”143 References to 
the Ten Commandments, however, contained no such specificity and merely fell under a commonly 
claimed Judeo-Christian “American inheritance”—a constructed tradition intentionally unrecognized 
as such.144 
This view of the United States as a religious nation—a generically monotheistic one, at the 
very least—cemented the dichotomy between the United States and the Soviet Union, the free and 
the fettered, the capitalist and the Communist, the God-fearing and the God-free. As the Chaplains’ 
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Character Guidance Manual clarified in its first lesson, the world consisted of three kinds of nations: 
secular, demonic, and covenant. According to this schematic, the secular nation (suggested 
examples: France and Uruguay) eliminates God from public life, making nontheistic patriotic loyalty 
its key feature; the demonic nation (e.g., Hitler’s Germany and the Soviet Union) replaces God with 
country; and the covenant nation (e.g., Britain and the United States) publicly acknowledges and 
celebrates its relationship with and reliance on divine Providence.145  
Membership in this covenant nation obligated military personnel to adhere to certain 
behavioral standards, and while the chaplaincy undoubtedly liked thrifty, industrious servicemen, it 
focused its efforts on producing chaste, self-controlled ones. Thus in addition to the general 
Character Guidance lectures on abstinence, venereal disease, and marriage and family life, the 
Chaplains’ Sex Morality Lecture Manual provided an additional six outlines for conversations on proper 
courtship, clean minds, sexual purity, self-restraint, and appropriate marriages. Not surprisingly, the 
manual pitched conventional gender norms as natural: “man by virtue of being the stronger of the 
two sexes is woman’s protector.…The role of protector covers any and all circumstances, her moral 
as well as her bodily welfare.”146 In the name of mothers, sisters, sweethearts, and daughters, men 
needed to guard women’s honor. While warning against the terrors of venereal disease, the manual 
generally followed the directive of Army Chief of Chaplains Luther Miller who felt it best if the talks 
took “a positive moral and religious approach to the subject based on elements which contribute to 
character development. The positive rather than the negative approach is more sound 
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psychologically and religiously.”147 The manual did not, however, account for the mid-twentieth 
century’s most cutting-edge research, a stance heartily approved by the President’s Commission on 
Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces. After meeting with noted sex researcher Alfred Kinsey, 
PCRW chair Frank Weil cryptically informed the rest of the committee that Kinsey’s “findings are to 
a degree not in accordance with our concept of what the young men in the armed services were.”148 
Their young men were, or ought to have been, chaste, not virile. Military venereal disease statistics 
notwithstanding, the PCRW rejected Kinsey’s findings that Americans engaged in more frequent 
and varied sexual practices than generally assumed and traditionally expected. This underscores the 
degree to which the committee’s perspective on morality—which encompassed other forms of vice 
ranging from prostitution and gambling to the consumption of liquor and comic books—was often 
more aspirational than accurate.  
On the whole, chaplains reported the implementation of Character Guidance as valuable, 
efficient, and successful, although occasionally dissenters voiced their objection to its efficacy. From 
Ft. Jackson, South Carolina, Chaplain Lawrence Nelson (Baptist) detailed his chaplains giving 136 
lectures to 24,377 men and 94 sex morality lectures to 9,227 men over three months,149 while from 
the Philippines Chaplain Loren T. Jenks (Baptist) described his clergy giving 271 lectures to 59,721 
American troops and Philippine Scouts. An “irregular and unscientific” survey of the personnel of 
the Marianas Bonins Base Command suggested that the servicemen preferred these lectures to 
weekly sermons, perhaps, Jenks conjectured, because of a combination of “conscientious 
preparation,” “material furnished,” and the need to “keep the interest of rather large audiences 
sometimes amounting to 700 men.” Jenks cautioned, however, that repetition was becoming a 
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problem, especially for personnel who transferred in and already heard the same material.150 
Chaplain Stephen H. Stolz (Catholic) lodged a more direct complaint with the deputy chief of 
chaplains: “Talking shop, I would pass on to you how many feel about the Citizenship Lectures. 
Chaplains, officers, and men have told me that they are tired of them, there are too many, that once 
a week for each organization is too much.” Moreover, he agreed that this grousing was warranted. 
“There would be no difficulty if I could preach like the military man’s Fulton Sheen…but I find it 
difficult to deliver ‘Honesty is the Best Policy’ on Saturdays with the same zeal as ‘Make Friends of 
the Mammon of Iniquity’ on Sunday. Humbly [I] suggest we declare a moratorium on these weekday 
talks – and have them, say, once a month and be sure that every man attends.”151 Suffusing military 
personnel with heavy-handed morality could numb as well as motivate, but the respective 
chaplaincies—officially, at least—neither ceased nor adjusted the frequency of lectures. 
The urgency with which the chaplaincy, and by extension, the military approached Character 
Guidance reflected less a commitment to religiously determinative foreign policy and more a 
growing unease with the declining influence of religion on domestic lives. The Navy’s program of 
“moral indoctrination” began when recruits arrived at training stations; as part of their orientation, 
they attended six lecture/discussions: Sex Education, Responsibilities, Religion, Moral Principles, 
Marriage and Family Life, and Citizenship. The Navy expected this “systematic approach” to trigger 
“the conservation and the improvement of moral standards among Naval personnel.” The inductees 
needed this guidance because only half of them arrived with “at least [a] nominal church 
relationship” and half started with “no relationship whatever, nominal or otherwise.” And of the 
half with any religious affiliation, less than half maintained a “strong” church relationship, thus 
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leaving three-quarters of the American Navy seemingly bereft of spiritual and moral guidance.152 As 
Navy Chief of Chaplains Salisbury proclaimed in a sermon about “This Present Generation,” 
“religiously we are faced with the fact that about 49% of our youngsters are absolutely illiterate in 
religion and the consequent moral verities.”153 If military leaders and publications equivocated about 
whether moral instruction treaded on religious territory, they nevertheless reckoned that religious 
dedication fortified moral integrity and national security.  
But the overlap between religion and morality remained messy and slippage could pose 
problems even among those supporting the same end goals. Take, for example, the Armed Forces 
Chaplains Board’s response to the Second Army Inspector General in 1949. The inspector 
demanded that each of the chaplaincies designate someone responsible for thwarting Communism 
through religion. The AFCB responded that, on the one hand, Communism stood outside the 
board’s work but, on the other hand, the chaplaincies already took care of this through the Chaplain’s 
Hour and Character Guidance which emphasized the “moral and citizenship responsibilities required 
in a democracy.” The inspector remained unsatisfied, still seeking some sort of “program involving 
books and brochures on the subject.” Unimpressed by this suggestion, the AFCB countered, 
“Communism was just one enemy of religious life. Materialism, secularism, fascism, communism, 
and any other evil philosophy was attacked constantly by chaplains through sermons, Chaplain Hour 
Lectures, group discussions, talks in civilian communities and in personal conferences.” The group 
concluded that since the inspector described himself as a “poor Methodist” who “reluctantly 
admitted he had not attended church or chapel services for years,” he was incapable of appropriately 
assessing their anti-Communist work through either religion or morality and suggested he start 
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attending church “on or off the post.”154 
Yet the very democracy hailed by anti-Communists and fought for by the military could 
constrain the religion the armed forces sought to promote. When Air Force Chaplain Martin Poch 
(Missouri Synod Lutheran) responded to a PCRW query about how the Army handled non-religious 
soldiers, he replied that such cases were rare but “we certainly permit him to do as he pleases, and 
that is his constitutional right.” Committee member Edmund Walsh was not fond of this answer 
and suspected other forces at work. Walsh consulted with Robert Jackson at the Nuremberg Trials 
and likely encouraged Joseph McCarthy to pursue Communists in plain sight. He asked the 
chaplains: Did any “very zealous or ultra-liberal groups” try to prevent the military from eliciting 
religious affiliations? Air Force Chief of Chaplains Charles Carpenter reassured him that there was 
no problem, joking that the military context didn’t hurt.  
Yet Carpenter’s quip was not as humorous as he assumed, for there was a degree of religious 
coercion in the military. First, mandatory Character Guidance—no matter how strenuously the 
chaplaincy avowed it was moral, rather than religious, instruction—required military personnel to 
accede to very specific—if not always denominational—ideas about ethics and institutions, 
relationships and behaviors. To teach men that “marriage is a divinely established institution” meant 
offering a particularly Christian, and primarily Protestant, understanding of matrimony.155 Second, 
while the military touted its multi-faith chaplaincy, not everyone shared in this positive gloss. PCRW 
member Daniel Poling gestured to the fragility of interfaith religious cooperation during committee 
hearings. Churches, according to the conservative editor of the Christian Herald, “said you might have 
fraternal relationships, but…they did not believe it was possible to have a community program on 
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the basis of inter-faith participation and inter-faith responsibility.”156 In contrast to Poling’s doubts, 
the Air Force reported more Protestant-Catholic-Jewish cooperation than in civilian life, noting that 
there were “22 chaplains on duty at Lackland Air Force Base. This is broken down into a Jewish 
chaplain, five Catholic, a Christian Scientist, a Mormon, and the rest the normal Protestant 
denominations.”157 The Air Force proudly touted its acceptance of minority religions—it boasted 
Catholics, Jews, Mormons, and Christian Scientists among their corps. But the problem that Poling 
hinted at and that the Air Force chaplaincy completely missed was not the existence and 
endorsement of pluralism but rather increasing tensions between what the Air Force saw as “the 
normal Protestant denominations” and the growing interest of evangelical and fundamentalist 
Protestants in the military chaplaincy.158 The more conservative wing of evangelicals and 
fundamentalists, whose political prospects rose in the postwar period, rejected the pluralism and 
ecumenism of the military, seeing such religious initiatives as indicators of America’s spiraling 
decline away from its status as a model covenant nation into irresponsible secularity and demonic 
futures. Equivocating on the nature of the relationship between religion and morality meant that, at 
times, the insistence that religio-morality centered the nation yielded religious coercion, rather than 
religious freedom. 
 
“Wearing the Cross in Korea” 
“Tomorrow we are going into combat,” Chaplain Emil Kapaun wrote to his Catholic 
superior, Bishop Mark Carroll on July 17, 1950. “I have everything in order, all Mass stipends, my 
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will, etc.”159 The Kansas-born priest was wise to ready his spiritual and earthly affairs. Two months 
after Kapaun landed on the Korean peninsula with the 8th Cavalry, he entered Pyongyang with his 
unit. As the first snow fell over the hillsides and mountains north of the 38th parallel, the chaplain 
settled into a daily routine, in which he presided over regular worship, met with soldiers, and wrote 
letters to the families of hundreds of American men killed in combat. Two weeks later, after 
celebrating four masses on All Saints Day, he dug a foxhole under the full moon and bivouacked in 
the hills around Unsan with the 3rd Battalion. It was a cold night, with the temperature hovering 
around 20 degrees, and the chaplain and his men shivered in their summer cotton uniforms. Loud 
bursts of rifle fire and grenade blasts awoke those who had drifted to sleep. Chinese infantrymen, 
sent by Beijing to aid their North Korean Communist allies, had surrounded the Americans. The 
surprise barrage of attacks decimated the Americans; only a quarter of the battalion escaped back to 
the protective cover of the UN lines, and Chaplain Kapaun was not among them. Although he 
enabled other men to elude capture, the resourceful chaplain found himself marching northward 
through frozen rivers and over snow-capped mountains. He was a frostbitten POW.160 
For six months, the veteran of World War II postings in Burma and India unofficially 
presided over the imprisoned Americans. While his Chinese captors decided that the chaplain, 
despite his officer’s insignia, scarcely mattered, Kapaun’s fellow prisoners-of-war viewed him as their 
leader, even their savior. On their overland trek, he carried wounded men, encouraged others to stay 
strong, and buried the dead, including Chaplain Kenneth Hyslop (Northern Baptist). When the 
group reached Sambokal, or The Valley—a three square-mile former farm town surrounded by 
mountains turned penal colony—he spent nights secretly prowling for food, relayed messages 
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between the separately-quartered officers and enlisted men, and led illicit worship services in which 
the group prayed for freedom—and the deliverance of their guards from Communism. Forced to 
march again, Kapaun continued to tend to his flock at Camp No. 5 at Pyoktang, a former resort 
town naturally barricaded by rivers and mountains and politically protected by proximity to the 
Chinese border. He flummoxed guards, scrounged up food, and offered impromptu worship to raise 
the flagging spirits of the weary. When “the majority of us had turned into animals, fighting for 
food, irritable, selfish, miserable,” Captain Robert E. Burke recalled, “the good priest conducted 
himself as a human being.”161 And as a human being, Kapaun was fallible, succumbing to a 
combination of starvation, blood clots, dysentery, and pneumonia on May 23, 1951. Buried in an 
unmarked mass grave, his congregation honored him with a three-and-a-half foot handcrafted cross, 
carved by a Jewish captive who, in the spirit of Kapaun, tricked Communist officials into allowing 
the men to keep it. For his efforts, the chaplain received posthumous military decorations—the 
Distinguished Service Cross, the Bronze Star, the Legion of Merit medal, the Prisoner of War Medal, 
and, 62 years later, the Medal of Honor.162  
Yet Chaplain Kapaun’s work encompassed more than the courageous service to soldiers for 
which he has been honored. The fearless POW priest understood the Korean War as a proxy war 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. He was as committed to anti-Communist ideology 
as he was to dignifying all humans—including enemy North Korean soldiers—with proper burials. 
He also viewed his military service as divine service. Months before ministering to men in Korea, he 
led Easter services in Tokyo, where he reported to a friend, “here I am in a Mission land, a pagan 
land, but one which has received exceptional blessings from God and the way it looks (if Russia 
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does not get in here) many of the Japanese are going to receive the true faith.”163 Like many 
chaplains, he brought a missionary’s mentality with him to war, believing conviction and action 
would powerfully transform political regimes and religious systems encountered abroad. And when 
he found fellow Catholics in Korea, Kapaun incorporated them into his flock. In Ansung, he 
offered a Thursday Mass for Koreans, the first service celebrated in the town’s ransacked church 
since the Communists had overrun the area; although conversations between the chaplain and the 
townspeople generally required an interpreter, “at the altar [they] had a common language.”164 The 
following Sunday, Korean civilians and American servicemen worshipped together; for a brief 
moment, before the Christian soldiers marched on, religion bound together Catholics in common 
cause, as neither nationality nor colloquial tongue mattered for the Latin prayers. As with Jewish 
chaplains and soldiers in postwar Europe, war-prompted encounters blurred the lines between 
fellowship and rescue.165 
The Korean War ended in a stalemate, with the 38th parallel and the demilitarized zone 
(DMZ) continuing to divide the Korean peninsula in two, the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (KPA) in the North and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the South. The United States 
entered the civil war in the summer of 1950, after KPA forces steamrolled into Seoul and South 
Korea was on the verge of collapse, and led U.N. forces until the ceasefire three summers later. 
After forestalling the KPA at the Pusan Perimeter in peninsula’s southeastern corner by early fall, 
American, South Korean, and British soldiers pushed northward during fall and winter, recapturing 
Seoul and re-crossing the 38th parallel as the spring sun melted that coldest of winters. For two more 
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years, war slogged on, and casualties on both sides mounted—eventually totaling more than 4 
million, half military and half civilian—as the DMZ remained the staging ground for stalemate. In 
this sense, the Korean War represented one of the first hot episodes in the global Cold War, a 
contest the United States felt compelled to participate in under the banner of maintaining the free 
world against Soviet and Chinese Communism.166  
But U.S. interests were more tangible as well since Japanese surrender in 1945 led the U.S. to 
occupy the island nation as well as its colonial holdings, including Korea. When the U.S. liberated 
Korea from its fiercest East Asian archenemy, it did so imperiously, with no input from either 
Koreans or other allied powers. American occupation lasted three years, during which General John 
Reed Hodge attempted to contain external threats and internal unrest, in part by creating a new 
Korean military. During this period too, future South Korean president Syngman Rhee returned 
from exile abroad, guerilla rebellions challenged the fledgling national police, and a combination of 
political and military forces violently repressed leftist uprisings—whether factory unions or local 
town councils. Thus while American foreign policy experts debated the value of sending ground 
forces into Korea in June 1950, the discussions lasted barely a week before General Douglas 
MacArthur led American combat forces into battle—cavalierly, it turned out—to defend American 
credibility and prestige.167 The final military impasse hardly elevated American stature, but in helping 
to render the conflict an oft-forgotten war, the deadlock at the 38th parallel obfuscated the nature 
and consequences of the Korean War. It was, as its leading historian Bruce Cumings, writes, an 
“appallingly dirty” war with moral atrocities committed by both sides.168 It justified containment as 
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the key priority of American foreign policy and with it, “the enormous foreign military base 
structure and the domestic military-industrial complex to service it…which has come to define the 
sinews of American global power ever since.”169 Religion lubricated these “sinews of American 
global power.” As American combat forces labored to a stalemate in 1953, its chaplains endeavored 
to build more durable links with Korean soldiers and civilians. For Protestant and Catholic 
clergymen, opportunities to rejuvenate Korean Christianity coexisted with the mandate to serve the 
varied religious needs of American servicemen. The military-spiritual complex, initially devised in the 
ruins of postwar Europe and Japan and developed under the looming shadow of Communism at 
home, sanctioned and encouraged proselytizing in Korea. The evangelization prohibited among 
American soldiers and marines acquired a new legitimacy in the ideological and real battlefields of 
the Korean peninsula.  
First, however, the United States had to mobilize its ministers. When the U.S. entered the 
Korean War, it rapidly needed to assemble a much larger military force, including a sufficient 
number of chaplains to meet the needs of armed forces personnel. Army Chief of Chaplains Roy 
Parker (Southern Baptist) had a mere 706 chaplains serving under him in July 1950. With few 
inactive reserve chaplains eager to volunteer for duty in Korea, the Army resorted to involuntary 
recalls, despite protests from clergy comfortable in their civilian pulpits. By October 1951, the Army 
finally met 98.9 percent of its authorization of 1464 chaplains, but accumulating losses in Korea 
hobbled efforts to stay at authorized strength. By 1953, the Army chaplaincy mustered only about 
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1400 chaplains, 87 percent of the expected 1618.170 The Navy faced a comparable shortage, made 
more difficult by the increased allotment of chaplains to Marine Divisions. In World War II, Marine 
divisions received 16 Navy chaplains; in Korea, the two Marine Divisions required 26 chaplains 
each. Yet in midsummer 1950, the Marines counted a mere 18 Naval Reserve chaplains dispersed 
across its units.171 
Military needs also prompted new arrangements from civilian religious groups attempting to 
supply chaplains to the armed forces. With insufficient numbers of priests in the regular Army, 
Navy, or Air Force, the Military Ordinariate scurried to redress gaps in coverage. The military vicar 
commended Catholic chaplains for “multipl[ying] themselves in caring for an armed force that was, 
in the losing days and in the mountainous terrain, just a little above the demoralization point.” But 
stretching the existing Catholic chaplaincy to its limits did not offer a sustainable course of action, 
and Cardinal Spellman, the Military Vicar, worried about ecclesiastical disarray in the event that 
either an inadequate number of Catholic chaplains volunteered or American chaplains intermingled 
with Republic of Korea units received ambiguous or mixed orders. The Vatican took the 
extraordinary step of placing all Catholic chaplains serving under or alongside American troops and 
her allies under the authority of the American Military Ordinariate “in order to effect some unity and 
uniformity of jurisdiction and privileges.”172 The Jewish Welfare Board faced a similar quandary: how 
to ensure that the American rabbinate contributed its share of chaplains to troops in Korea. The 
flagship seminaries of the three main Jewish movements, Yeshiva University (Orthodox), the Jewish 
Theological Seminary (Conservative), and Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion 
(Reform), agreed that each would meet one-third of the Jewish chaplain quota. To accomplish this, 
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the institutions decided to draft rabbis from graduating classes.173 While the state could not conscript 
clergy, per Selective Service Regulations, civilian religious groups could set their own standards. 
Meanwhile, in Korea, bibles and hymnals became a form of religious and imperial currency 
as the war provided new opportunities for Americans to build relationships with Korean chaplains, 
ministers, and civilians. Long a mission field for American Protestants and Catholics, Korea became 
a mission field for the military as well. The Republic of Korea acquired its chaplaincy—comprised of 
volunteer civilians—in 1951, as a result of two American auxiliary chaplains pushing for its creation 
and helping to provide supplies.174 From the headquarters of the Far East Command, Chaplain Ivan 
L. Bennett (Southern Baptist) determined that an English-Korean hymnal would be useful for joint 
American-Korean services during battle. When his office ran into roadblocks acquiring funds for 
printing, Bennett approached General Douglas MacArthur and asked him to sign the foreword to 
the hymnal (as FDR had done for the World War II-era hymnals). MacArthur’s signature helped 
release the necessary funds and hundreds of Koreans joined Americans at Sunday hilltop, 
mountainside, or tent services.175 When Chaplain James Wilson (Methodist) succeeded Bennett as 
Far East Command Chaplain, he maintained this hymnal project. However, he also sought to 
purchase and distribute 50,000 Korean hymnals without English translations and with hard 
covers.176 Bennett, by then the Army Chief of Chaplains, approved printing Bibles without pages of 
English, but wondered if it was a pressing need given that the United States government had already 
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shipped 175,000 Korean hymnals overseas.177 
Outside of formal chaplaincy building, American Christian chaplains often collaborated with 
and aided Korean allies in much the same fashion American Jewish chaplains had worked with DPs 
in postwar Europe. One inspection report found that chaplains served as “bridges of understanding 
between the local citizens” and U.S. soldiers and airmen. This role was particularly important 
because, the report observed, “too frequently the only Koreans our service men see are the camp 
hangers-on who steal anything and everything, or offer their bodies for sale. Through the chaplain, 
the service men came to have contact with cultured, intelligent Koreans of character, ideals and 
achievements equal to or superior to our own, and understanding is born.”178 Laced with 
socioeconomic, racial, and moral opprobrium, the report nonetheless advocated contact between 
Americans and Koreans. Navy Chaplain Ross Trower (Lutheran)—who later served as Chief of 
Chaplains—modeled this lauded behavior. When attached to the First Combat Service Group, 
where he worshipped in the first Quonset hut chapel built by Marines in Korea, he met and prayed 
with a Korean Methodist minister. He also co-sponsored Bible classes with a Korean Catholic priest, 
and taught the Bible to Korean doctors and nurses in a Korean Army hospital.179 
Although worship and Bible study could transcend linguistic and national differences, it 
nevertheless imposed western, and specifically Christian, norms and standards on a country 
immersed in Eastern religions—Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and local animist practices 
predominated. Protestant and Catholic missionaries introduced Koreans to Christianity beginning in 
the eighteenth century and successfully converted large percentages of the population by the 
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twentieth century. Yet Korean Christians did not relinquish all ties to more traditional religious 
practices. For some chaplains, this type of syncretic religion proved challenging to comprehend. 
Marine Chaplain John Muller (Reformed) observed—somewhat contradictorily—that “the average 
Korean has no religion, but he probably conforms to many religious practices.” This mélange of 
religious, often Confucian and Buddhist, rituals bothered Muller, for Confucianism he asserted, “is 
not a religion, but a substitute for religion. Its main belief, ancestor worship, is a real obstacle to the 
progress of Christianity.”180 Although he countenanced “friendships with the men [that] often 
crossed religious lines,” he could not make sense or approve of the Asian religions present in the 
“heathen nation” and hampered by “spiritual poverty.” Indeed, he relished transgressing Buddhist 
space by “preaching Christ in what was once a Buddhist temple” and delighted in reaching out to 
Korean Christian churches, which he found “live, thriving [and] evangelical.”181 The military 
chaplaincy’s emphasis on pluralism reached a sharp limit in Korea, where Christianity vied with 
Buddhism for adherents, and many chaplains struggled to escape an American religious logic that 
equated monotheism with democracy. 
 
Conclusion 
In 1952, President-Elect Dwight D. Eisenhower remarked, “our Government has no sense 
unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith and I don’t care what it is.” He went on to specify 
that “with us of course it is the Judeo-Christian concept, but it must be a religion that all men are 
created equal.”182 He expressed his beliefs about religion in a classic Cold War context, contrasting 
an American worldview in which religion was central to a Soviet perspective in which religion 
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scarcely mattered. Placed in its Cold War context, many have interpreted his comments as a 
reference to a “very vague” and ultimately, empty religion.183 But Eisenhower’s religion was rooted 
and substantive. He was both a product and shaper of the military, and his utterance signaled an 
assimilation and celebration of the military’s emphasis on moral monotheism. As a son of the armed 
forces, Eisenhower was “a living embodiment of the nonsectarian ideal,”184 and transferred that 
ethos into American politics. Yet challenges to the depth and reach of that ideal coincided with his 
years in the Oval Office as soaring rhetoric about a religious nation unleashed heady challenges to 
the shape and viability of the military-spiritual complex. The chaplaincy stood as both goal and 
target, a political battleground for American faiths pursuing and critiquing state recognition and 
power.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 “Maybe God is an American”:  
Governing Religion Through the Cold War Chaplaincy 
 
It was hot and muggy as monsoon season crested in the summer of 1954, and hundreds of 
thousands of Northern Vietnamese refugees descended upon the Red River Delta near Haiphong. 
They had loaded the things they could carry on their shoulders and walked for days, sidestepping 
mines and avoiding snipers to reach the space where spongy earth met saltwater. Most were 
peasants, few spoke French let alone English, and almost all were terrified. Ships, gray vessels larger 
than most had ever seen, loomed on the horizon. Anchored at sea, too big to load from land, the 
hulking ships could carry 6000 refugees and transport them south, first to Saigon and then to 
outlying villages and camps. It took an act of faith to board the watercraft—faith that unfamiliar 
hunks of steel could spirit people to safe haven, faith that the uniform-clad men who uttered strange 
words would help, faith that leaving home was the right decision, faith that the unseen south was 
better than the familiar hills and mountains of the north. Reaching the ship required faith too. Faith 
to step onto the cavernous ramps of the amphibious landing craft that delivered people to the big 
ships, and faith that the vehicles festooned with banners proclaiming, “This is your passage to 
freedom” in English and Vietnamese would fulfill that promise, even for those who could not read.  
Latin, it turned out, could serve American needs effectively, if not always efficiently. Under 
the suffocating late August air, rice farmers became boat people, if only temporarily. And priests, 
like Chaplain Francis J. Fitzpatrick (Catholic) and his Vietnamese counterparts, accomplished what 
signs could not. The American priest, sporting Navy-issue white shorts and short-sleeves, and 
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Vietnamese priests, clad in long black robes, communicated with one another and with the evacuees. 
Through exchanges in Latin, the clergy calmed frightened passengers, convinced them to descend 
ladders into the troop compartments below deck, and explained shipboard procedures. Racing 
against an advancing Red Curtain and a 300-day limit on border crossing, Operation Exodus—
known and promoted in the United States as Operation Passage to Freedom—ferried over 300,000 
people and almost 70,000 tons of cargo from north to south. After a two-month battle in early 
spring, Ho Chi Minh’s forces successfully flushed out the colonial French regime from their garrison 
at Dien Bien Phu in May. The ensuing Geneva Accords divided Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel, 
with the Viet Minh governing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north and Emperor Bao 
Dai leading the State (later Republic) of Vietnam in the south. As the French relinquished their 
holdings in Southeast Asia, Ho Chi Minh established a nationalist-Communist administration in the 
North as anticommunist Ngo Dinh Diem left an abbey in Bruges, Belgium and voyaged to Saigon to 
serve as the new Republic’s prime minister. Meanwhile, over the ten months, from August 1954 to 
May 1955, American and French ships, accompanied by 18 Navy chaplains, made 500 three (or 
more) day trips across the Gulf of Tonkin to the South China Sea as part of the largest civilian 
evacuation in history.1 
Passage to Freedom was a humanitarian operation, but it was also a political and military 
one. Almost a million northern Vietnamese migrated south in 1954-55, and about two-thirds of the 
emigrants were Catholic. More than a statistical anomaly in a predominantly Buddhist country, this 
was a political calculation that “result[ed in] a major reordering of the religious balance of 
                                                
1 Withers M. Moore, Navy Chaplains in Vietnam, 1954-1964 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 
1968), 5-54, 142-152. For an extended and celebratory account of the operation, see Ronald B. Frankum, Operation 
Passage to Freedom: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954-1955 (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2007). For a 
more critical appraisal, see T. Jeremy Gunn, Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging of an American National Religion 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2009), 155-175 and Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, 
Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 127-170.  
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Vietnam.”2 The exodus halved the Catholic population of the north and more than doubled the 
Catholic population of the south, providing important support to the newly appointed Catholic 
Prime Minister, “America’s Miracle Man,” Ngo Dinh Diem. While refugees elected to move en 
masse, their decision was neither automatic nor spontaneous.3 The United States, through the work 
of the CIA, the State Department, and the military, influenced and facilitated the population 
transfer. The CIA’s propaganda campaign included fabricated tales of Communist brutality, false 
rumors of forced labor, and fictitious leaflets about nuclear bombs, while the military provided a 
means of escape.4 Whether Navy leaders knew the extent of CIA deception is unclear, but Rear 
Admiral Lorenzo Sabin, the commanding officer of sea operations for Passage to Freedom, made 
plain the religious networks supporting this endeavor: “The native Catholic priests are a very 
determined lot and so far they’ve been able to get their flocks though the Vietminh lines. And 
they’ve got a way of encouraging other natives to join whether they are Catholics [or] not.”5 Military 
chaplains, as conduits of information and spiritual sustenance, often represented the last link in this 
chain of religious encouragement, even if they “did not think of themselves as instruments of 
American international policy.”6 
When chaplains celebrated Mass, baptized babies, distributed religious pictures (primarily 
Jesus and Mary—always portrayed as white figures), and issued New Testaments to the refugees on 
their ships, they projected an image of the United States as a Christian nation. This sovereign savior 
                                                
2 Frederik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random 
House, 2012), 666.  
3 Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man, 131-2. By May 1955, the Catholic population of Saigon exceeded that of Paris 
or Rome. Gunn, Spiritual Weapons, 168. 
4 Gunn, Spiritual Weapons, 167-175. The US had leafleted Hiroshima and Nagasaki prior to dropping the atomic 
bombs which lent leaflets a degree of credibility less than a decade later. 
5 Rear Admiral Lorenzo Sabin to Admiral F.B. Stump (CINCPAC), Aug 24, 1954, Operational Archives, OO 
Files 1954, Box 8, Naval Historical Center. Accessed online: http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-
bin/starfetch.exe?mEIw3V065nexI8ut1@OktGxHpCCOottmo4s9gtxLiSPE3lC7ezC7UXIFcJA546ZFjWYeRKoP@v2l
m67OyfSVR0uhWnQFk1CoOl2sJbv9LYQ/10390745001.pdf. 
6 Moore, Navy Chaplains in Vietnam, 3. 
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encompassed an unrestricted array of Christians—Catholics and Protestants, to be sure, and other 
groups, such as Mormons, Adventists, and Christian Scientists too. Whether delivering Vietnamese 
families to Saigon, repatriating Muslim French Foreign Legion POWs to Oran (Algeria) or returning 
French Army and Navy personnel to Marseilles, chaplains led and oversaw Christian worship 
services—and interpreted high levels of attendance as support for these religious efforts.7 Of the 16 
American chaplains who served in the Passage to Freedom operation, seven were Catholic and the 
rest represented various Protestant denominations.8 For many of the passengers on U.S. Navy ships, 
LDS Chaplain Spencer J. Palmer’s sense that “somehow God’s flag was the American flag” might 
have rang true.9 Safety from Communism appeared cloaked in U.S. Navy uniforms and arrived in 
the form of U.S. Navy ships. 
As the Cold War surged in the 1950s, the United States sought to play the role of the world’s 
protector, the global shield against the Soviet Union. Religion served this imperial effort by 
spiritually insulating democracy, rhetorically framing foreign policy, and substantively undergirding 
military projects.10 Religious consensus was, however, more imagined than real. When Chaplain 
Palmer mused, based on his experiences in Korea and Japan in the early 1950s, that “maybe God is 
an American,”11 he captured a view that the United States wanted to convey to its allies and enemies 
alike. In a cosmic battle for democracy, religion fortified anti-Communism. But if God was an 
                                                
7 Moore, Navy Chaplains in Vietnam, 27-29. 
8 Moore, Navy Chaplains in Vietnam, Appendix A, 138. 
9 Spencer J. Palmer Oral History, p. 13, MSS 3000, BYU. For Palmer, a Mormon, equalizing God’s flag and the 
American flag likely represented theological and political commitments. 
10 On religion and the Cold War, see: Andrew J. Rotter, “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and US-
South Asian Relations, 1947-1954, Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (2000): 593-613; Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield 
of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New York: Knopf, 2012), 411-496; Jonathan Herzog, The Spiritual-
Industrial Complex: America’s Religious Battle Against Communism in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011); Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man; William Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of 
Containment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); David S. Fogelsong, The American Mission and the ‘Evil’ Empire 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Gunn, Spiritual Weapons. On the global dimensions of religion in the 
Cold War, see Philip E. Muehlenbeck, ed., Religion and the Cold War (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012). 
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American, it was not clear what particular religious American God represented—and many vied to 
be the emblematic faith. The Protestant-Catholic-Jewish moment marked and lauded by Will 
Herberg had, in fact, passed by 1955 when he published his book. In its stead stood a much more 
robust and much more fragmented American religious mosaic. 
The politics of religion erupted in the military chaplaincy. Religious conflict was hardly 
unfamiliar or novel, but containing rampant sectarian squabbling had been a signature feat of the 
chaplaincy. For several decades, the armed forces had organized Americans into three major 
religious groups and effectively created a viable consensus over moral monotheism that, in turn, 
fueled the military-spiritual complex. But in the early Cold War, two distinct entities challenged this 
state-crafted religious regime and threatened to fracture religious accord. First, less familiar 
religions—primarily but not exclusively Buddhism—vied for access to and recognition by the state’s 
religious apparatus. Second, upstart denominations that the state bundled together as Protestant 
resisted this spacious category as specious, and the military proved fertile for territorial marking 
endeavors. As the defense establishment grew and as additional religions and more denominations 
sought access to the chaplaincy, the administrative work of governing religion became more 
challenging. While Catholics and Jews settled into the military infrastructure as insiders, Buddhists, 
the Eastern Orthodox, Seventh-day Adventists, Mormons, and evangelicals jockeyed for 
recognition, accommodation, and, in the latter case, for power and control. No matter the contours 
of particular fights, each faith viewed the military chaplaincy as a means of authentication as 
American. 
The military promised to protect the rights of religious minorities at home and abroad, but 
did not have a predetermined plan for accomplishing this task—especially when America’s much-
vaunted religious freedom taxed the boundaries of the identities, attitudes, and practices deemed 
acceptable within military space. The religious diversity of the armed forces chaplaincies could 
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herald inclusion and brook confusion, sometimes simultaneously. Engendering respect for 
difference and alienating those who sought singularity often pivoted on different readings of the 
same circumstances. Ripe for politicking, the military failed to divine or craft a means of religious 
integration beyond three large and fungible categories. Indeed, the very success of an agreement that 
God was an American fueled tactics by marginalized groups to gain recognition and respect, for they 
too wanted to see their God as the American one. 
Buddhism posed a peculiar problem. Eisenhower and the Supreme Court alike assumed that 
the American system of and support for religion rested on the presence and presumption of a 
“Supreme Being.”12 But Buddhism—like other Eastern religions—did not rely on such a figure. 
Integration of a non-Western religion into the American religious landscape occurred slowly and 
unevenly. Advocacy by American Buddhists, primarily Japanese-Americans, faltered until the United 
States’ concern about religious persecution of Buddhists helped fuel support for intervention in 
Vietnam. When foreign policy and military needs demanded understanding of Vietnamese religion 
and culture, key officials turned to Army and Navy chaplains for assistance. Deployed to Vietnam as 
a blend of ethnographers and cultural ambassadors, Chaplain Meir Engel (Jewish) and Chaplain 
Robert Mole (Seventh-day Adventist) enhanced and broadened American knowledge of Buddhism. 
Rather than turn to American Buddhists—who spent years pressing for demarcation on dog tags 
and recognition as a distinct American religion—the military dispatched a Jew and an Adventist to 
explain Buddhism to American troops deployed to Vietnam. 
During the same period, courts-martial set clear limits on behavioral expectations for 
American believers while festering creedal rivalries manifested in bureaucratic mudslinging. In these 
cases, Protestantism represented the object of concern. While Mormons and evangelicals tussled 
                                                
12 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks to the Daughters of the American Revolution,” April 22, 1954, in Public 
Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, 617; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 346, p. 313.  
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over education standards for chaplains and the Unified Protestant Sunday School curriculum, 
Seventh-day Adventists who hewed to Saturday Sabbath practices endeavored to avoid judicial 
scrutiny and punishment. Statements about religious liberty and freedom saturated all of these 
conflicts, as each denomination felt itself disrespected and trammeled by the state. While Jews and 
Catholics navigated the military’s internal channels to accommodate their needs, minority 
Protestants challenged the very authority of the state to encourage cohesion rather than particularity. 
Yet employing the same rhetoric did not indicate coordinated plans or comparable assumptions 
about political engagement. Seventh-day Adventists and Mormons, like Buddhists, used arguments 
about religious freedom in pursuit of validity and legitimacy; evangelicals, in contrast, enlisted 
religious liberty to dispute jurisdictional boundaries set by military Protestantism.  
If faith supported American anti-Communism, it was far from clear just what that religion 
meant or who it included. The efforts to label, litigate, legitimate, and translate religion in this period 
underscore how the United States claimed God as its own but struggled to transform religious 
particularism into pluralism. Far from avoiding matters of faith, the state played critical roles in 
shaping religious identities (through dog tags), regulating religious practices (such as Sabbath 
observance), and monitoring religious belief (through Sunday School curricula). In the Cold War 
chaplaincy, intra-religious and inter-denominational politics collided with the politics of religion and 
the state, thrusting the military into a position of governing God. 
 
Categorizing Religion: Dog Tag Dilemmas in Mid-Twentieth Century America 
In 1948, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains received a petition asking for a simple change: 
to allow military personnel to designate themselves as Buddhists on their dog tags—the military 
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identification tags that listed name, social security number, blood type, and religion.13 To maximize 
the information contained on small metal discs, mid-twentieth-century American dog tags used 
single letter abbreviations to indicate religion: P for Protestant, C for Catholic, and H for Jewish (or 
Hebrew). For military personnel who affiliated with religions such Buddhism, Eastern Orthodoxy, 
or Islam—all of whom were subsumed under “Protestant”—not to mention actual Protestants who 
viewed denomination as important, these three initials were insufficient.  
Minority religious groups who had—at best—questionable ties to the ecclesiastical definition 
of Protestant discovered through dog tags a clear means to lobby for basic recognition. During 
World War II, Mormons had asked to use “LDS” in place of a “P,” but found little aid or recourse.14 
Several years later, approximately 100,000 petitioners, mostly civilians living in Hawaii or California, 
tried to alter dog tag religion yet again. They asked the military to add another religious designation 
on dog tags. The organizers of the petition drive, the National Young Buddhists, also enlisted the 
aid of local, state, and national political leaders to support their effort. Yet the military proved 
surprisingly intransigent in remedying a situation that required little more than using 23 other letters 
in the alphabet. 
A number of sympathetic local political leaders added epistolary support to the clamor for 
postwar change. From Honolulu, the governor of Hawaii, then a U.S. territory, championed the 
cause, noting that a large percentage of Hawaiian soldiers were Buddhist. From Fresno, John L. E. 
Collier informed the Western Young Buddhist League, “the faith that is so desired by the service 
men should be recognized, whether it be Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Buddhist, Mohammedan or 
any other faith.” From L.A., even Republican Assemblyman Harold Levering, most famous for 
                                                
13 On the Civil War origins of American military dog tags, see David McCormick, “Inventing Military Dog 
Tags,” America’s Civil War 25, no. 2 (May 2012): 56-59. 
14 Harold B. Lee to Gustave A. Iverson, June 8, 1944, quoted in Boone, “The Roles of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints,” 571. 
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instituting a required loyalty oath for all California state employees, endorsed the effort on the 
grounds of equity and fairness. If Protestants, Catholics, and Jews had letters of their own, he 
asserted, so too should Buddhists and members of other religious denominations be able to mark 
their faiths appropriately. “To do otherwise,” he wrote, “is contrary to the American tradition for 
which so many Americans have given their lives.”15 Together, each letter and each signature on the 
petition made two inter-related claims: Buddhism was its own religion and, as such, deserved 
recognition from the military as a valid American religious choice. 
But even with local and state legislative endorsement, the petition proved insufficiently 
persuasive. Resistance came from multiple quarters, some laced with racism, some focused on 
empirical decision-making, but all unswayed by the rhetoric of the American way. Reserve chaplain 
Sydney Croft vehemently opposed all efforts made by Buddhists to participate religiously in the 
armed forces, whether lobbying for chaplains or for a dog tag designation. From his perch as the 
rector of an Episcopalian church in Hawaii, he asserted “Buddhism has degenerated; if it was a 
religion in the past, it is no longer a religion insofar as the draft-age group is concerned.” Claiming 
inside information from conversations with World War II Japanese-American chaplain Hiro Higuchi 
(Congregationalist), Croft made plain his disdain for Buddhism while asserting, all too strenuously, 
that his objections had absolutely no basis in race: “I am willingly serving all races of people in my 
work here, and we live harmoniously together and worship together with sincerity and brotherly 
devotion; there has never been any question of racial discrimination.”16 If, like Shakespeare’s Player 
Queen, he doth protest too much, pushing beyond his carefully placed warrant helps expose his 
motivations, which were as much religious as racial. In the Japanese-American war experience, he 
                                                
15 Ingram Stainbeck to Ralph Honda, Kenji Onodera, Shiro Kashiwa, October 26, 1948; John L. E. Collier to 
Ryu Munekata, November 8, 1948; Harold Levering to National Young Buddhists, December 3, 1948, RG 247, Box 
466, NARA II. 
16 Sydney Croft to Luther D. Miller, November 20, 1948; Sydney Croft to James Forrestal, September 21, 1948, 
RG 247 (1946-48), Box 384, 080 (Buddhist), NARA II. 
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saw Christian religious revival rather than persecution. Buddhism was a threat, but not because its 
primary adherents consisted of racial others. Instead, the postwar return to Buddhism imperiled his 
religion, or at least his church, which had gained adherents during the war as Hawaiian Nisei took 
shelter in the protective embrace of American Christianity. And while Croft stood alone in his 
zealous and overt denunciation of Buddhism as debased and maladapted to the American religious 
context, his letters joined a chorus of naysayers, unrelenting in their hostility to classifying Buddhists 
as Buddhists.  
Unlike Croft, most lodged objections by claiming pragmatic grounds for refusal. The Red 
Cross Home Service Committee, for example, theoretically supported an additional classification—
offering “O” for Other as an option—but claimed that they could not endorse “B” for Buddhist 
because B could also stand for Bahaism.17 The Armed Forces Chaplains’ Board adopted this logic 
and took it to an extreme. The problem, they alleged, with adding a new religious designation to dog 
tags was a practical one—it would result in “endless confusion” as “every minute fraction of a 
percent claiming distinct worship, or even simply belief in God, would request their own religious 
symbol. The letter ‘B’ could be interpreted as Baptist; it could mean ‘Believer’ for anyone who 
believes in God; or, under the duress of battle, it understandably could be misread as blood type.”18 
Outlandish as this reasoning was—certainly J could mean Jehovah’s Witnesses or C could indicate 
the Christian Missionary Alliance or P could refer to Presbyterians—it held sway. Luther Miller, the 
Episcopalian Chief of Chaplains, explained that it was unnecessary to change protocol because 
religious identification on dog tags was optional, not mandatory. As a result, he argued, limiting 
military personnel to three religious classifications did not violate individual rights or religious 
freedom but simply reduced confusion. Allowing additional markers of religious affiliation, he 
                                                
17 Ruth Blakey to Mike Iwatsubo, November 17, 1948, RG 247, Box 466, NARA II. 
18 The Chaplain Board to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, October 22, 1948, RG 247, Box 384, Folder 080 
(Buddhist), NARA II. 
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warned, could lead the approximately two-hundred and fifty denominations present in the United 
States seeking particular notations on identification tags.19 
Miller was not completely wrong; other religious groups squirmed under the ill-fitting dog 
tag P and attempted to acquire distinct statuses for themselves. During World War II, the Eastern 
Orthodox campaigned for a classification distinct from either Protestant or Catholic, the 
uncomfortable boxes into which officials translated “Orthodox” as they saw fit, or into which their 
men self-selected for lack of better options. The extant categories camouflaged the Eastern 
Orthodox, rendering them invisible to American eyes. In the late 1940s, as the Buddhist campaign 
for recognition gained momentum, the Greek Orthodox again pled their case. The “indiscriminate” 
designations as either Protestants or Catholics made no sense, especially because “the Orthodox 
Faith is practically as large as the Jewish Faith which is recognized by the proper agency as a 
principal denomination.”20 If numerical strength served as the determining factor in American 
religious classification, then the Red Cross’ suggested “O” ought to refer to “Orthodox,” not just 
“others.” Yet these efforts to drum up support for new letters seemed to go nowhere, as J. Willard 
Marriott, the head of the LDS Military Relations Committee, forecast in 1947. “Even though we do 
not consider ourselves Protestant, and could convince them of our distinctive position, it would be 
very difficult for the War Department to separate us from the smaller Christian denominations and 
put us in a separate category,” he wrote to Mormon elders. ”If they did this for our Church, it would 
                                                
19 Luther D. Miller to Leonard Bloom, September 28, 1948, RG 247, Box 384, Folder 080 (Buddhist), NARA 
II. Depending on his source of information, Miller’s concern was either accurate or exaggerated. The 1936 Census of 
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20 Peter Chumbris to Luther D. Miller, January 8, 1948, RG 247 (1949-50), Box 471, 080 (Greek Orthodox), 
NARA II. 
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have the same request from Christian Scientists, Southern Baptists, United Brethren and many other 
minority groups.”21 In trying to contain, rather than splinter, American religion, the military 
struggled to account for the actual diversity rather than the fictive unity it so desired. 
The push for an Orthodox O lagged behind the contest over the Buddhist B, but both 
groups succeeded in acquiring a new letter of sorts. In January 1949, Army Chief of Chaplains 
Luther Miller recommended a new option, an X for “those soldiers whose religious affiliations does 
not fit any of the three principal denominations.”22 Soldiers who elected the X could also wear 
another piece of stamped metal indicating their particular faith. Born of obstinacy and frustration, 
the X represented an imperfect compromise at best. It conceded the presence of religious faiths that 
did not conform to the blueprint of tri-faith America while refusing to acknowledge them as 
independently valid and acceptable American religions.  
Indeed, during the 1952 presidential campaign, American Muslims wrote to General Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, asking for his assistance in marking Islam on dog tags. He demurred, insisting he 
could do little to help, though he left open the possibility that as president, he might be able to enact 
change.23 But when the Romanian Orthodox church asked for an Orthodox notation in 1955, 
President Eisenhower followed the lead of the military he then commanded: “the Administration 
feels…that the religious classification letters on identification tags can serve the recognized purpose 
only if restricted to broad designation categories.” That plenty of religious groups were not 
Protestant, or Catholic, or Jewish and sought more than an uninformative X was immaterial. Indeed, 
the president’s staff couched the request as trivial, concluding that no letter “would accord the 
Eastern Orthodox faith any greater recognition than it now enjoys, both in this country and 
                                                
21 J. Willard Marriott to Harold B. Lee and Mark E. Petersen, April 23, 1947, quoted in Boone, “The Roles of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,” 571. 
22 “Chief Chaplain Asks ‘X’ Designation on Army’s ‘Dog Tags,’” January 7, 1949, Chicago Tribune. 
23 Abdallah Ingram to Dwight D. Eisenhower, July 29, 1952, Papers as President of the U.S., 1953-61 (White 
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throughout the world.”24 Yet the endorsement of the American state was not insignificant to either 
the church or the state. Whether or not an Orthodox indication on a dog tag would have increased 
public awareness of the church is impossible to ascertain, but the state’s imprimatur would have 
undoubtedly breached the fiction of tri-faith America and thus potentially have interfered with the 
projection of unity this invention celebrated.25  
Nevertheless, over time, petitions wore down the military. First, in 1954, the military acceded 
to the Jewish request to use J, a religious signifier, rather than H, a racial marker, on their dog tags.26 
Larger and more significant changes soon followed. In 1955, the New York Times reported in a small, 
three-paragraph story, “every soldier may now have his particular religious denomination stamped 
on his identification tag.” In its rendering, the change came about as a result of Greek Orthodox 
protest and Army Chief of Chaplains Patrick H. Ryan (Catholic) recommending “that any and all 
denominations be listed.”27 The Assemblies of God weekly, The Pentecostal Evangel, offered a different 
interpretation when it gleefully announced, “in [the] future, the name of the Protestant 
denomination will be shown.”28 For the Pentecostals, the value of this change had little to do with 
Eastern Orthodox or Buddhist efforts to acquire a dog tag initial of their own; rather, the 
publication celebrated the opportunity for Protestant servicemen to declare their specific 
denomination instead of swimming in a gigantic pool of undifferentiated Protestants. The 
transformation of military identification was, in this rendering, a victory for Protestants rather than 
                                                
24 Assistant to the President to the Bishop of the Romanian Orthodox Episcopate of America, June 2, 1955, 
Papers as President of the U.S., 1953-61 (White House Central Files), General File, Box 691, Folder OF 118G, DDE. 
25 Three decades later, the Orthodox were still petitioning “to be considered and listed as a fourth major 
religious body,” at which point the Armed Forces Chaplain Board “approve[d] the recommendation for the use of the 
word ‘distinctive’ instead of the word ‘major’ when addressing the matter of religious bodies or faith groups. It was 
noted that ‘distinctive’ could be used with all faith groups.” See AFCB Minutes, June 4, 1975 in AFCB Minutes 1974-76, 
FJC. 
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the non-Protestant religions formerly construed as Protestant.  
By the end of the decade, in July 1959, Army Regulations 606-5 authorized spelling out 
religious preferences, thereby alleviating the problems caused by the initials.29 The shift to spelling 
out Buddhist or Presbyterian, Orthodox or Mormon was hardly a drastic move. To be sure, it 
signaled that the military acknowledged religious diversity in its midst and allowed atheists and 
agnostics a chance to self-categorize as such. At the same time however, in shifting the act of 
categorization from the state to the soldier, it removed the validation that accompanied the official 
set of PCJ lettering.  
 
Litigating Religion: Doctrine and Ritual Under the Cold War Court Martial 
It was a little after 6 pm on an April Saturday in 1953, and a commanding officer instructed a 
private to stand guard. The soldier refused, citing his religious beliefs. The Sabbath had not yet 
ended and he could not, therefore, perform such work. Arrested and tried at court-martial under 
Article 90 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Private Gilbert Gonzales argued that his 
refusal to obey a direct order was legitimate and reasonable. He was a Seventh-day Adventist (SDA), 
a member of the millenialist church founded by Ellen White in the mid-nineteenth century, and one 
of their fundamental beliefs was the seventh-day (Saturday) Sabbath. An SDA chaplain testified to 
the authenticity of the soldier’s beliefs and the integrity of his faith, noting that “when committed to 
military duties, we ask for the privilege of performing, on the Sabbath, only those duties essential for 
the preservation of human life or the alleviation of suffering.”30  
Whether the military could make allowances for religious actions that did not conform to 
military procedure was not a new question in the 1950s, yet it acquired fresh urgency and attention 
                                                
29 Chief of Chaplains Frank A. Tobey Circular Letter, August 14, 1959, RG 247 (1954-62), Box 561, Folder: 
312.1 (Monthly Letters, 1959), NARA II. 
30 Verbatim Record of Trial of US 54 074 019 by General Court Martial, May 15, 1953, p. 31, Box 12525, SDA. 
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against the backdrop of the Cold War. First, the rhetorical emphasis on religion as a weapon against 
Communism granted minority faiths a means of framing ritual needs as American practices, or at 
least behaviors worth protecting. At the same time, however, military needs—perceived and real—
and traditions often shielded the armed forces from fully considering issues that pitted individual 
rights against conscripted conformity. Second, the reformation of the military justice system—the 
development of the UCMJ, with its incorporation of procedural norms of civilian law (such as due 
process) alongside the retention of delegating legal disciplinary power to commanding officers—
created a supplementary venue for adjudicating religious conflict. In fact, court-martial records 
suggest that religion arrived in the courtroom when either enlistees or their commanding officers did 
not know how to use the chaplaincy as an administrative solution or sought to avoid more measured 
mediation through the military’s religious apparatus. Nevertheless, chaplains—who could not be 
impaneled on court-martial juries—often served as key witnesses who could influence outcomes or 
mitigate sentencing.31 
In the case of Private Gonzales, for example, the chaplain’s intervention combined with 
testimony from several non-SDA officers about the quality of Gonzales’ character led to a non-
guilty verdict. Indeed, “it [wa]s the unanimous opinion of this court that this case never should have 
been brought to trial.”32 Yet statements about the futility of such cases was not a common 
conclusion to courts-martial; most SDA soldiers brought up on charges of disobeying direct orders 
on the Sabbath in the mid-twentieth century were convicted, though their sentences were frequently 
light.  
By the mid-1960s, courts-martial represented a common problem faced by Adventists, in 
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Cold War Court Martial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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part because Adventist participation in the armed forces accelerated dramatically in the postwar 
years. The SDA Church had long viewed war and the military with greater suspicion because of its 
negative experience with the state after the denomination’s founding. After coalescing in the mid-
nineteenth century under the leadership of prophetess Ellen G. White, the church grew into a 
denomination of American Protestant Christianity and ultimately, in the twentieth century, into a 
global church. But in the nineteenth century, Adventists faced a tremendous amount of persecution 
as a strange sect of Christianity whose adherents believed in the New Testament and in Jesus as their 
savior, but also embraced a set of distinct doctrines that separated them from many other 
Protestants—notably the binding nature of the Ten Commandments, including the injunction 
against murder (which applied to the battlefield); the imperative to maintain the fourth 
commandment to “remember and keep the Sabbath Day holy”; and dietary laws that prohibited 
eating pork and emphasized abstention from meat. Like other 19th-century Sabbatarians, SDA 
observe a Friday-Saturday Sabbath and refrain from any secular work during that period. Concerns 
about the morality of murder, transgression of the Sabbath, and the imperative to serve God rather 
than the state combined to influence the church’s unique stance on war: it was not pacifist, but 
nevertheless wary about military service.33 Adventists had harbored distrust toward the government 
and resisted serving in war from the Civil War onward for fear of violating their Saturday Sabbath. 
But unlike Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists consented to entering the military in World 
War I. The SDA “Resolutions of Loyalty and Service,” adopted in July 1918, articulated a stance of 
“conscientious cooperation” which promoted showing loyalty to the nation through enlistment in 
                                                
33 "Why Seventh-day Adventists Cannot Engage in War,” The Review and Herald, March 7, 1865. On tension 
between SDA and the military, see Ronald Lawson, “Onward Christian Soldiers: Seventh-Day Adventists and the Issue 
of Military Service,” Review of Religious Research 37, no. 3 (March 1966): 193-218. It is important to note that the SDA 
position on war varied by geographic context: German Adventists served as combatants in WWI. On SDA chaplains, 
see Robert Mole, God Also Loves Military People: A Brief Story of the Seventh-day Adventist Church and the American Military 
Chaplaincy, 1860-1976 (Takoma Park, MD: General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 1977).  
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noncombatant roles such as the medical corps.34  
World War II proved to be a “decisive” turning point in the SDA’s approach to the military 
and, with it, the chaplaincy.35 In the 1930s, Virgil Perry Hulse became the first SDA military 
chaplain, albeit one endorsed by the Northern Baptists, and served under the army in Civilian 
Conservation Corps camps. At the same time, the church presciently launched what became known 
as the Medical Cadet Corps, a noncombatant training program for physicians, medical students, and 
others who sought to ease their entrance into the armed forces.36 Although the SDA—like 
Mormons and Christian Scientists—joined the Federal Council’s General Commission in March 
1941, it refused to endorse men as chaplains because the chaplaincy remained, in a word, 
unconstitutional. As Carlyle B. Haynes, the director of the SDA War Service Commission, wrote, 
the military chaplaincies “still involve governmental pay for religious services; still require that this 
pay for religious services be taken out of general tax funds; still create a class of governmental, or 
state clergy; still necessitate, unconstitutionally, a religious test for public office….Government 
chaplaincies, in my opinion, are still vestigial remains of the union of church and state.”37 For 
Haynes, the education and ordination requirements for chaplains represented a de facto 
government-administered religious test. The problem did not lie with education per se—Adventists 
did not object to college degrees or a trained clergy—but rather in the implications of requiring 
graduate work and ordination. From the Adventist perspective, seminary training might have been 
useful and fulfilling; once the government made it mandatory, however, education lost its internal 
religious prerogative and became “nothing less and nothing other than a religious test as a 
qualification for office under the United States….Consequently this requirement does indirectly 
                                                
34 Mole, God Also Loves Military People, 27-29. 
35 Mole, God Also Loves Military People, 43. 
36 Mole, God Also Loves Military People, 38-40. 
37 Carlyle B. Haynes, “Shall We Recommend Our Ministers for Military Chaplaincies?” (1941), p. 2, Box 10519, 
Folder: Material from Carlyle B. Haynes Files on Chaplains, SDA. 
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what it does not do directly, and is just as certainly a violation of the constitution as though it were 
done directly.”38  
Adventists also understood the role of the military chaplain clearly insofar as it reduced the 
Adventist minister’s outlook to a generic Protestantism. Classified as a Protestant, rather than a 
Seventh-day Adventist, he relinquished the opportunity to preach the full range and extent of his 
beliefs. Haynes and other Adventists understood that their convictions were not mainstream and 
were often “controversial.” Understanding the Saturday Sabbath as “the seal of God” and Sunday 
Sabbath worship as “the mark of the beast” would, Haynes knew, “produce religious contention”—
something the military desperately wanted to avoid. Similarly, the chaplain served as a “morale-
builder for our government,” not as an advocate of noncombatancy, a central SDA tenet. Thus 
earning a commission as a military chaplain necessarily meant limits on both conscience and speech 
so as to avoid a reputation as a “‘huckster of ecclesiastical eccentricities.’”39 Haynes understood 
Adventists’ position at the periphery of acceptable American religion; unease at diluting Adventist 
doctrine saturated his critique of the acceptability of the chaplaincy writ large. The education 
requirements for chaplains merely made manifest what was otherwise somewhat latent: the 
chaplaincy let church and state mingle. This perilous if not pernicious mixing, from the SDA 
perspective, existed to the detriment of both the church and the constitution.  
Although the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists strongly objected to the 
military chaplaincy, it was not immune to its reach. Over the course of World War II, the church 
began to modify its position on government chaplaincies as a result of pressure from both the 
military and its own membership. Starting in 1942, the Army Chief of Chaplains began requesting 
applications from SDA ministers; by 1943, the Army increased its request from 3 to 25 men, and 
                                                
38 Haynes, “Shall We Recommend Our Ministers for Military Chaplaincies?,” 4. 
39 Haynes, “Shall We Recommend Our Ministers for Military Chaplaincies?,” 6-7. 
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SDA members began asking their leadership to advise them about whether they could apply. The 
church continued to affirm its opposition to the chaplaincy. In February 1943, it stated, “as a body 
holding noncombatant principles we cannot consistently endorse applying for military commissions, 
there is also involved the principle of separation of church and state.” Three months later, it again 
considered the question of the chaplaincy and elaborated its rationale for resisting state overtures to 
join the chaplaincy: “If it is permissible for the state to employ religion, then it is not difficult to 
conceive of the occasion arising when the employing state shall determine what kind of religion shall 
be taught, and when and where.” This antagonism toward the chaplaincy did not stop two SDA 
ministers from circumventing the church by acquiring endorsements from the General Commission 
to become army chaplains during the first two years of the U.S. involvement in the war.40 In April 
1944, the church began to amend its position in favor of a milder and more ambiguous stance. After 
further requests to reconsider its position—from the military in need of chaplains and from 
Adventist ministers who wanted to serve—the church’s leadership voted to retain their historical 
commitment to strict separationism but to rescind their earlier statement objecting to the chaplaincy 
writ large. As a result, the decision to apply for a commission as a military chaplain became a matter 
of individual conviction rather than institutional policy. The church, in other words, did not sanction 
military service but did not prevent the handful of preachers interested in the chaplaincy from 
participating in it.41 Finally, in the 1950s, the General Conference resolved to “place no barrier in the 
way of Seventh-day Adventist ministers of maturity and high spiritual experience undertaking this 
                                                
40 “General Conference Committee Actions Regarding Chaplaincies,” (n.d.), Box 10519, Folder: Material from 
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line of work should they feel personally called to do so.” But their fears of government intrusion and 
coercion still stymied their ability to advocate on behalf of SDA soldiers.42 
As the church loosened its resistance to the chaplaincy and the military more generally, 
Adventists began entering the armed forces in greater numbers, but challenges—especially related to 
keeping a Saturday Sabbath—remained. During World War II, Carlyle B. Haynes monitored 
complaints and attempted to intercede on behalf of the SDA War Service Commission. However, as 
he informed Private Richard K. Krieger, accommodations were feasible, but not required: “any 
privilege of this kind will have to be worked out with a soldier’s immediate superior officer.”43 In the 
1950s, Project Whitecoat enabled Adventists to serve their country as noncombatant medical test 
subjects. Run out of Fort Detrick, the top-secret program brought together church and national 
needs by offering Adventists the opportunity to voluntarily enlist in biological warfare trials, thus 
fulfilling patriotic duties while avoiding combat.44 Yet not every Adventist who wanted to serve as a 
human guinea pig could, which meant that men who enlisted expecting to join the predominantly 
Adventist unit under Project Whitecoat became subject to the authority of commanding officers less 
aware and often unsympathetic to their concerns. Despite the cooperation between the General 
Conference and the armed forces engendered by the creation of Project Whitecoat, members of the 
SDA National Service Organization recommended Adventist men wait to be drafted rather than 
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43 Carlyle B. Haynes to Richard K. Kreiger, November 27, 1945, Box 10473, Folder 3, SDA. 
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enlist in order to secure noncombatant status and limit Sabbath conflicts.45 
Courts-martial of Adventists accelerated in the postwar years, and these trials often hinged 
on disjunctures between religious dicta and military procedure. Countee Johnson was stationed at 
Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska when he and his wife encountered a member of the Anchorage 
Seventh-day Adventist Church who convinced them to resume attending services. The once-lapsed 
Adventist returned to the church in December 1955, and after two months of “faithful” 
participation when possible, the airman requested Saturday leave to better fulfill his religious 
obligations. After speaking to the base chaplains, Johnson learned that “there was no provision…to 
give him Sabbath off from work” because, as a smoker and drinker, he did not appear to be a 
genuine believer. Moreover, while he had entered the Air Force as an unaffiliated Adventist and thus 
accepted a combatant role, his return to the church led him to refuse bearing arms—a not 
insignificant part of his job as a member of the Air Police.46 His pastor asserted that Johnson had 
conquered cigarettes and renounced liquor, pronouncing him “100% sincere.”47 Despite this 
testimony, when charged with violations of Article 90 and 91 of the UCMJ—for refusing direct, 
lawful orders to serve on Saturday and bear arms—Johnson lacked any recourse. The base 
commander reviewed the file and determined that “extenuating and mitigating circumstances are 
insufficient to warrant dropping” the charges. In particular, the commander elaborated, Johnson had 
received the same accommodation of several hours’ leave granted to any other air policeman, all of 
whom were “encouraged to regularly attend church services.” From the perspective of the Air 
                                                
45 J.R. Nelson, “SDA Military Enlistments Bring Problems,” Columbia Union Visitor 69, no. 29 (July 16, 1964). In 
the early 1960s, only the Army used the draft to fill its ranks. As a result, Air Force and Navy regulations prevented 
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SDA. 
47 Merle Smith to George W. Chambers, March 16, 1956, Box 10473, Folder: Johnson Court Martial, SDA. 
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Force, Johnson’s desire for 24 hours of leave, rather than the few necessary to go to church, created 
the problem; since “personnel of all faiths must perform scheduled duty,” he could not expect to 
receive more leave than others took to fulfill their worship obligations.48 
Indeed, the exacting requirements of the Sabbath-keeping, derived from the SDA church’s 
distinctive doctrine, informed the church’s rigorous approach to observance and, in turn, 
negotiations with the military. In addition to maintaining a sundown Friday-sundown Saturday 
Sabbath, the church defined the day of rest as one in which members “honor God by attending 
divine services, by ministering to those in need, and by refraining from ordinary pursuits.” 
Expressed as practice, this doctrine instructed Adventists to attend church, allowed them to provide 
medical care in emergency situations, and enjoined members from partaking in routine work “such 
as receiving of pay, drills, attendance at inspections, and other services which could be cared for 
beforehand or postponed.”49 Standing guard, a mainstay of military regimens worldwide, constituted 
improper Sabbath work, and refusal to discharge that duty often served as the precipitating event in 
courts-martial. Similarly, indirect aid to medical staff, such as noncombatant roles in transportation 
or vehicle maintenance, was impermissible.50 While the military understood its more limited 
adjustments for SDA personnel, such as permission to attend church services on Saturday mornings, 
as adequate, these bounded accommodations did not fully meet SDA needs. Unlike most other 
Protestant denominations, Seventh-day Adventists defined the Sabbath according to biblical 
precepts more familiar to Jews than Christians, in both temporal and regulatory terms.  
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Despite the overlap between American Jews and American Adventists on Sabbath practices, 
American Jewry had, for the most part, already resolved its Sabbath challenges with the military, and 
its solutions provided little aid to Adventists. Marked by diversity rather than conformity, American 
Judaism encompassed a range of behaviors, and fewer American Jews meticulously adhered to all 
Sabbath regulations. More importantly, however, longstanding Jewish law set pikuach nefesh (saving a 
life) as a higher standard than ritual observance, even mandating violations of the Sabbath in order 
to do so.51 By interpreting this standard broadly, rather than narrowly as the Seventh-day Adventists 
had, the Jewish Welfare Board’s responsa committee—the entity responsible for settling matters of 
Jewish law for Americans in the armed forces—determined that military needs, ranging from 
standing guard to moving men, could fall within this exemption. In fact, the committee, which 
required collaboration and agreement among Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform rabbis, 
concluded that rabbis ought to volunteer for the chaplaincy despite the possibility of desecrating the 
Sabbath because “not to serve in the Army involves more than the failure to observe a mitzvah 
[commandment] but actually a sin of the profanation of the Name [that is, God] because of the 
effect such an evasion would have on the Jewish community.”52 Communal allegiance and an 
insecure minority status compelled military service, even at the risk of violating religious law.  
Therefore in contrast to Adventists who struggled to reach a consensus that their ministers 
could even serve as chaplains during war, Jewish leaders viewed the chaplaincy as both a necessary 
and an important duty. As a minority non-Christian religion within the United States, American Jews 
viewed the chaplaincy as an antidote to religious insecurity. While Adventists considered their non-
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Sunday Sabbath as an obstacle to military administration as well as their own participation in the 
armed forces, Jews assumed their soldiers would be accommodated but, as necessary, used 
interpretations of religious law to authorize Sabbath violations. In this sense, Jews behaved as 
American religious insiders, presuming and receiving aid for their more limited needs much more 
easily than Adventists who, although Protestant, acted as religious outsiders in need of specific 
religious accommodations.  
By emphasizing communal standing over individual needs and the flexibility of religious law 
over stringency, Jews acquired access to state power that enabled influence over religious matters 
that might have impeded Jewish military service. Adventists resisted this pragmatic approach, in part 
because of doctrinal strictness and in part because of lingering misgivings about state authority over 
religion. From the White House, Truman had charged several American Jewish civilians with 
leadership roles within the military. In addition to Frank Weil, who had overseen the Committee on 
Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces, Anna M. Rosenberg was nominated as Undersecretary of 
Defense in 1950. Rosenberg’s path to the Pentagon proved challenging, as the specter of subversion 
hung over the nominee for the nation’s first female—not to mention, Jewish—appointee to the 
Department of Defense. 
It was not easy being saddled with the last name “Rosenberg” in the early 1950s, especially 
when your husband’s name was Julius. To her detractors, Rosenberg’s years of experience in state 
and federal government were irrelevant. The fact that former Army Chief of Staff and then-current 
Secretary of Defense George Marshall recommended her was immaterial. At its most extreme, 
Gerald L.K. Smith, the director of the antisemitic Christian National Crusade, congratulated his 
fellow rumormongers “on the terrific job you are doing in helping keep the Zionist Jew Anna M. 
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Rosenberg from becoming the dictator of the Pentagon.”53 Their “terrific job” was short-lived, but 
lasted long enough to force an investigation of her past. In three unsettling weeks, Hoover’s FBI 
determined that while there was an Anna Rosenberg who had been on the rolls of a John Reed club 
in the 1930s, it was not this Anna Rosenberg. Congress confirmed Rosenberg’s appointment on 
December 21, at which point she assumed her role as Undersecretary of Defense, a position she 
occupied for three critical years in the early Cold War. 
The public outcry surrounding Rosenberg’s appointment fits easily into American narratives 
about Cold War hysteria and Jewish narratives about anti-Semitism and power.54 But it also obscures 
the more significant work Rosenberg accomplished in her tenure at the Department of Defense. She 
was not the “dictator of the Pentagon” as her attackers feared, but she insisted—likely to their 
chagrin—on implementing Truman’s directive to desegregate the Armed Forces and supporting 
legislative efforts to secure the rights of minorities within the military. Military chaplains and civilian 
religious leaders comprised some of her strongest and most vocal supporters. Long after he retired, 
Charles Carpenter, the first Air Force Chief of Chaplains, commented that aside from the Armed 
Forces Chaplains Board, Anna Rosenberg was the “greatest influence in the development of the 
chaplains’ program in all the forces” and she “has been most helpful in strengthening the spiritual 
standards in the service.” To Bishop William Martin, the Methodist head of the National Council of 
Churches, Carpenter elaborated, “Her emphasis, during her visits to all the areas in which military 
personnel are serving, has always been upon the necessity of maintaining spiritual and moral 
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standards as a part of the basic American way of life.”55 The “American way of life” (a phrase Will 
Herberg would expound upon 2 years later) assumed a steady Judeo-Christian or harmonious 
Protestant-Catholic-Jewish foundation. Rosenberg represented a particularly effective intermediary 
in a religiously diverse society precisely because, as a Jew and a woman, she navigated the intra-
Christian divisiveness that threatened fragile interfaith unity. In this way, Rosenberg’s religious 
particularity hailed the state’s embrace of pluralism. 
American Jews ensconced in the military followed the model set by Undersecretary of 
Defense Rosenberg of resolving tension by working for resolutions within the extant system. When, 
in 1955, a Jewish soldier found himself in the same position as Private Gonzales—on the brink of 
court-martial for refusing to perform duties (unloading a truck) on the Sabbath—Private John 
Freeman avoided a trial altogether. Much to his chagrin, an established network of Jewish civilians 
and chaplains assisted him. He was disappointed, for he saw his predicament as “the perfect case, 
perhaps involving a revision of Army Regulation [and] in any case raising an almighty stink.”56 
Ultimately, a Jewish chaplain stationed in the area met with the staff Judge Advocate and 
successfully convinced him to drop charges and transfer Private Freeman to a different unit where 
his religious needs would pose fewer problems.57  
The military had sufficiently integrated American Jews into its command structure such that 
Jewish leaders assumed they could negotiate a solution—a modification of practice along with a 
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mediated resolution—without a trial. Aryeh Lev, one of the key brokers who came to Freeman’s aid, 
insisted that the military accomplished what no civilian institution or organization had the power to 
do. “The official recognition by the military of the three major faiths as equals, and the promulgation 
of regulations reflecting that recognition, seep down from the highest echelons of command to the 
bottom of the military pyramid,” he wrote. “Today, as never before, Jews are accepted in America 
on an equal religious status with Protestants and Catholics.”58 Lev placed his faith in the institutional 
infrastructure of the military, seeing state administrative efforts as critical agents in Jewish 
integration into American society. He also assumed, like many in the military with whom he was 
close, that Protestants represented an undifferentiated mass. Adventists did not, however, think or 
behave like either the mainline or liturgical Protestants who had long comprised mainstays of the 
chaplaincy or like upstart, evangelical Protestants pushing for entry.  
Thus in contrast to Jews, Seventh-day Adventists viewed the court-martial as a necessary 
cost of religious conviction and a litmus test for constitutional guarantees of church-state separation. 
The penalties arising out of convictions at court-martial were real, if typically mild. In Countee 
Johnson’s case, the prosecution’s closing argument declared that religion could not excuse 
disobeying orders. “Gentlemen of the court, we are not all Seventh-day Adventists. We are not all 
even Christians. We have Mohammedans; we have Jews; and we have lots of Christian sects,” he 
declared. “Congress of the United States has a right to pass certain laws governing military personnel 
of the United States….there has been no violation of religious scruples.”59 Despite his efforts, 
Johnson’s defense attorney could not counteract this claim. But he did push for mitigation in 
sentencing, noting that Johnson acted out of genuine religious belief rather than “evil purpose.” In 
this he was relatively successful, and Johnson bore a relatively light cost: confined to base (but not 
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the brig) for 45 days and forfeiture of 55 dollars from one-month’s pay.60 In California, in 1951, 
Marine Private Ralph Thomas Clark was court-martialed after refusing to draw his rifle. Found guilty 
of disobeying a lawful order and conduct prejudicial of good order and discipline, he received 
clemency due to the “firm and sincere belief of the accused in the faith of the Seventh-day 
Adventist, as demonstrated by his demeanor before the court, and the clear cut absence of evil 
motive.”61 In Hawaii in 1964, Stephen Juhrs was docked 40 dollars per month for six months after a 
comparable conviction for disobeying a direct order to report to work on the Sabbath. There too, an 
impregnable gap between SDA apprehension of the problem and the military’s understanding 
existed. In the late 1950s, the Navy reasserted its stance on SDA needs, arguing “the necessity for 
the continued readiness of the units and stations of the Navy does not permit…any further 
administrative procedure that will fully assure Seventh-day Adventists complete freedom for the 
observance of their Sabbath.”62 Nevertheless, after the Juhrs’ conviction, a representative of the 
SDA National Service Organization maintained, “it’s difficult for me to believe that the Navy would 
call working on a tug within the harbor during peacetime essential duties to the extent that they 
would court-martial a conscientious young man who is trying to be a good citizen of his country.”63 
In the case of Adventists, reconciliation between church doctrine and military procedure 
appeared unlikely, if not impossible. When court-martialed for disobeying direct orders, the staff 
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judge advocates generally tried to impanel a non-prejudicial jury, assiduously checking whether the 
members were knowledgeable about or harbored distrust toward the Seventh-day Adventist 
denomination. Yet when Countee C. Johnson stood trial in Anchorage and when Donald Hayes and 
Paul Williams faced court-martial in New Mexico, the Air Force JAG did not deem it necessary, 
providential, or important to query the members about another form of prejudice: race. In these 
cases, the Adventists were black men who had returned to the church or converted while in the Air 
Force.64 In the 1950s, African Americans comprised about 6 percent of the SDA’s North American 
Division.65 Yet Seventh-day Adventism was growing globally, and it counted high rates of black 
membership outside the United States. While the records of these courts-martial do not indicate that 
race played a role in either the arrest or conviction of black Adventists and the church advocated 
vociferously on its members’ behalf without regard to race, in other Cold War contexts, race 
mattered significantly.66 
The experience of African-American Adventists who faced courts-martial for their ritual 
practices suggests that religion, even that of outsiders, could offer a certain protective veil to men in 
the military. If white Adventists probed the willingness of the state to accommodate their faith, 
black Adventists tested both the military and their faith. Less than a decade after the desegregation 
of the armed forces and years before racial equality became a military objective, Countee Johnson, 
Donald Hayes, and Paul Williams felt sufficiently comfortable to assert their religious beliefs and 
disobey direct orders to adhere to the tenets of Seventh-day Adventism. Whether religion 
                                                
64 Verbatim Record of Trial, Special Court Martial of Countee Johnson p. 6; F.H. Hewitt to George Chambers, 
March 18, 1957 and March 29, 1957, Box 10474, Folder: Court-Martial – Air Force – Williams and Hayes, SDA. Neither 
the Johnson trial record nor the correspondence about the court-martial indicate Johnson’s race; however, an obituary 
published in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 14, 2012 demonstrates that he was African American. Williams and 
Hayes were convicted and fined, like other Adventists in the service. 
65 Henry E. Felder, “Black Seventh-Day Adventists and Church Economics,” in Perspectives: Black Seventh-day 
Adventists Face the Twenty-First Century, ed. Calvin B. Rock (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 
1996), 63. 
66 See Hillman, Defending America, 92-108. 
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empowered their actions as racial minorities or their status as religious minorities distracted from 
their race in court, their Church and, for at least a brief moment in the trial, the military saw them 
first and foremost as Adventists.  
The chaplaincy handled most religious issues internally, often by negotiating informal 
agreements before conflicts erupted, but commanding officers always retained the disciplinary 
power of the court-martial. Seventh-day Adventists comprised the majority of courts-martial over 
religious issues; charges always stemmed from disobeying direct orders, even if the root cause lay in 
religious belief. Ritual practices that contravened military policy were not limited to Adventists, 
however; in 1960, a Muslim soldier, Mustafa Yusuf, faced a summary court-martial for “willful 
disobedience of an order to remove his beard.”67 After the conviction and sentencing (fines, a 
reduction in pay, and a required shave), the Chief of the Military Justice System queried the Office of 
the Chief of Chaplains, wondering whether any relevant policies applied to conscripts or other 
soldiers in this situation.68 
The post-court-martial inquiry launched a conversation about the appropriate course of 
action in Private Yusuf’s case, an exchange that roamed far beyond the particularities of the case and 
asserted the importance of protecting religious minorities. First, the chaplaincy asked whether the 
order charging Yusuf to shave his beard was even “valid,” given his religious stance. Noting recent 
policy that allowed draftees to maintain long hair if based on religious rationales (e.g., Sikhs), the 
Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains suggested that the same ought to hold for beards. Similarly, 
the memo offered Army Regulations handling religiously-rooted conscientious objection as an 
analogous standard that required officers to investigate the underlying cause of atypical behavior 
                                                
67 Peter C. Manson, Memo for the Record, January 26, 1960, RG 247 (1954-62), Box 544, Folder 000.3 
(Religious Ministrations in the Army, 1960), NARA II. 
68 Peter C. Manson, Memo for the Record, January 26, 1960. One possible outcome, the memo suggested, was 
an administrative discharge that would enable the soldier to return to civilian life without a blemish on his record. 
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before issuing an order. “A commissioned officer is not expected to blindly follow the letter of 
regulations as a limitation to judgment. He is expected to use existing regulations as a guide to 
determine action in similar, though not identical, cases.” Military hierarchy, the chaplain’s office 
proposed, did not excuse officers from thoughtfully considering a range of motivations, some of 
which might fall under protected categories of action. If religious belief did not constitute a 
sufficient defense for refusing a direct order, then religious ignorance ought not support 
inappropriate commands. Moreover, because the Army “extends itself considerably to observe the 
religious principles and customs of religious minorities,” the institution “should not ignore the 
minorities.”69 The Army could not offer religious rights to majority faiths—including making 
provisions for Catholics to observe fast days, for Jews to access separate kosher rations, and for 
Protestants to avoid training on major holidays—without extending the same basic principles of 
accommodation to minority faiths.  
Mere toleration of minorities was insufficient if unaccompanied by arrangements, specific to 
the needs of particular denominations or faiths, yet the push for broadly expansive religious rights 
derived as much from political concerns as it did from first principles. In the particular case of 
Mustapha Yusuf, the Chief of Chaplains Office concluded that the court-martial was “an 
infringement of his religious rights.”70 The Army’s thorough investigation of the case—which found 
that Yusuf went AWOL for a period of time and was under psychiatric observation—included an 
exploration of the public relations implications, especially any sort of a letter-writing campaign “to 
Washington and abroad” that news of the court-martial might instigate. The concern was distinct: 
                                                
69 Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains response to Peter C. Manson, Memo for the Record, January 29, 
1960, RG 247 (1954-62), Box 544, Folder 000.3 (Religious Ministrations in the Army, 1960), NARA II.  
70 Infringement of Religious Rights in the Case of Private Mustapha Yusuf, January 29, 1960, RG 247 (1954-
62), Box 544, Folder 000.3 (Religious Ministrations in the Army, 1960), NARA II. The Army Chief of Chaplains 
consulted with an imam, Hajj I. Sammsan, of the Universal Muslim Brotherhood of Islam in Detroit and confirmed that 
wearing a beard was a religious duty for observant Muslims. Furthermore, conversations with local personnel indicated 
that the post commander knew that Yusuf retained his beard for religious reasons. 
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Islam “is the religion of a large part of the world essential to the strength of the anti-Communist 
nations,” and letting loose a flap over a beard could damage foreign policy objectives. In addition, 
“if any officer of the Jewish faith was involved in the alleged infringement of the rights of a Moslem, 
it would provide a propaganda weapon of very great significance.”71 The awareness of and concern 
about external domestic and international impressions, therefore, swayed the Army’s approach to 
deviance from military norms.72  
Not all religious issues engendered significant change, however. When turban-wearing Sikhs 
requested a compromise in order to retain their headgear and maintain beards while in the military in 
1960, the Army’s Adjutant General and Deputy Chief of Staff disagreed about the precedent and 
proper outcome. In 1953, the Adjutant General permitted a Sikh inductee to maintain his unshorn 
hair but forbid him from wearing a turban because it did not fit under a military helmet. To 
reconcile the problem, the Deputy Chief of Staff instructed the Office of the Chief of Chaplains to 
determine what, precisely, was religiously required. The chaplains first consulted with an attaché at 
the Embassy of India. He assured them that turbans were religiously mandated. He acknowledged, 
“there is nothing to prevent an individual Sikh from breaking these tenets of his religion if he so 
personally desires, and as a few have done; but this would not be well received by his community or 
religion.”73 At the same time, “under the mistaken impression that Sikhs were a kind of Islamic 
                                                
71 Memo of Record, Subject: Case of Private Mustapha Yusuf, January 27, 1960, RG 247 (1954-62), Box 544, 
Folder 000.3 (Religious Ministrations in the Army, 1960), NARA II. The letter-writing campaign was not completely 
unfounded, as the imam had written to Private Yusuf’s Commanding General. “If the religion of Islam is repugnant to 
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544, Folder 000.3 (Religious Ministrations in the Army, 1960), NARA II. 
72 Jews also had to work out concerns over beards. When a Seminary student wanted to enlist as a chaplain 
with a beard, Aryeh Lev checked with the Army Chief of Chaplains who declined to alter regulations. Aryeh Lev to Ellis 
H. Zirkind, August 18, 1953; Abraham Simon to Aryeh Lev, February 21, 1967; and A.E. Michelson to Abraham Simon, 
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73 Military and Naval Attache, Embassy of India, quoted in “Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 
1961” 131, RG 247 (General Correspondence, 1954-1962), Box 561, Folder 314.7 (1961), NARA II. A Sikh soldier 
served, with his turban on, in World War I. The issue of turbans did not gain traction until the 1960s, presumably 
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sect,” the Deputy Chief of Staff’s office spoke with “an Arab official” at a local Ahmadiyya Fazl 
Mosque, who stated that turbans were “a matter of convenience.”74 To counter this claim, the Army 
Chief of Chaplains Office “was finally able to secure a holographic statement from a local Sikh,” 
whose status in the community they could not verify, but who testified that turbans were “tradition 
and custom.”75 Uncertain about the religious regulations regarding turbans, the Deputy Chief of 
Staff deemed turbans “impractical.”  
At the same time, long hair and beards acquired a different, and somewhat more flexible, 
standard of assessment. If required by religion, the acceptability or prohibition would depend on the 
status of the soldier: the enlistee would have to conform to the military’s clean-shaven standards but 
the draftee would be allowed to keep his hair and beard.76 In this rendering, religious rights were 
fungible, and military coercion fell disproportionately on those who elected to enter the service. 
Implicitly, the Deputy Chief of Staff deemed abrogating the religious rights of conscripts more 
problematic and less fair, even though limiting the religious rights of enlistees would discourage 
religious minorities from joining like other Americans.77 Consultation with religious authorities 
abroad yielded little clarity and, much like the acquisition of knowledge about Adventist practices at 
home, produced few regulatory changes. 
                                                                                                                                                       
because the Sikh-American community grew and a larger number of Sikhs sought assistance in order to serve their 
country..  
74 “Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 1961,” 131, RG 247 (General Correspondence, 1954-1962), 
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Box 561, Folder 314.7 (1961), NARA II.  
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an unequal playing field, and what Amardeep Singh of the Sikh Coalition described in 2014 likely applied in 1961: “For 
all intents and purposes, [the recruit] can't show up at basic training without shaving his beard, cutting his hair and taking 
off his turban, in violation of his religion.” David Alexander, “U.S. Lawmakers Urge Pentagon to Allow Sikhs Leeway in 
Military Attire,” Reuters, March 10, 2014. 
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Here, then, the limits of American religion emerged, for if God was an American, it was not 
a God who pleased or sanctioned the rituals of all Americans. Although the diversifying nation and 
global migrations of religious believers required reconsideration of standard protocols and norms, 
formal policy initiatives proceeded unevenly.78 The chaplaincy could inquire and even advocate, 
thereby bringing unfamiliar religions into closer proximity, but it could not morph unfamiliar and 
seemingly strange rituals into the familiar and easily accepted. Such changes would take time.79 
 
Legitimating Religion: Evangelicals, Mormons, and the Protestant Chaplaincy 
In 1962, the National Association of Evangelicals declared, “evangelicals have been the 
pioneers of advancing Christian unity because they believe that only a spiritually united church can 
confront an unbelieving world. We still deplore the bigotry, intolerance, and human traditions which 
keep Christians from experiencing the spiritual unity for which our Lord prayed.”80 The military’s 
capacious definition of Protestant did not, however, meet their standards. Between 1950 and 1970, 
the number of chaplains endorsed by the NAE tripled, from 40 to 129.81 This was no accident. After 
its initial foray into the chaplaincy during World War II, the NAE set its sights on greater access and 
incorporation, seeking to influence the military from the center of its religious apparatus. Rather 
                                                
78 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 and its opening of immigration to people from Asia, Latin 
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than quibble with the non-Protestants labeled as such, the NAE focused its attention on the groups 
it deemed most threatening—Christian Scientists and Mormons—while trying to insert its particular 
worldview into such Protestant arenas as the Unified Sunday School Curriculum developed for use 
on military bases worldwide.  
  Evangelicals seeking access to and power within the chaplaincy emphasized both getting 
their ministers accepted and trying to block clergy they deemed undesirable. The NAE perceived 
Mormons and the LDS Church writ large the greatest threat to Protestantism, and used the 
education requirement to pursue their simultaneous aims of evangelical influence and restrictive 
Protestantism. Mormons lacked ordained, professional clergy, which made them conspicuous targets 
as they received accommodations from the education standards evangelicals were striving to meet. 
Education waivers for Mormons and Christian Scientists were an open secret, in part because the 
classification of these groups as Protestant riled up evangelicals and fundamentalists who began to 
protest disparate treatment. The NAE carefully monitored the courtesies extended to their rivals. 
One 1966 report, for example, stated “Reportedly, on order from higher authority, the Department 
of Defense has directed that 21 Mormon chaplains be accepted without the requirement of seminary 
training on the theory that ministers in the Mormon Church are not required to attend a theological 
school.” The waiver was not new, but as knowledge of it spread in the postwar decades, it began to 
attract unwanted attention. The same report continued, “The Navy Chief of Chaplains consistently 
recommends disapproval of any candidate who does not meet the full educational requirements. 
Notwithstanding this recommendation to the contrary, three Mormons with no formal theological 
training have been approved for appointment as chaplains by the Navy Department.”82 Why were 
evangelicals so disturbed by the commissioning of Mormon chaplains “without formal theological 
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training”? Rifts between evangelicals and the faiths they deemed “non-Christian” and certainly “non-
Protestant” grew in this period.83 But the procedures enabling Mormons to serve as military clergy 
had only changed slightly in the two decades following World War II. Antagonism alone does not 
explain why education requirements became a point of contention. 
When World War II ended, J. Willard Marriott, the LDS liaison to the military, convinced 
the new Army Chief of Chaplains, Luther Miller (Episcopalian), to eliminate the preferences for 
religious school teachers among Mormon candidates for the chaplaincy. Concerned that vocational 
preferences reduced the pool of men, he wrote, “We feel that a college degree, a two-year mission, 
and a record of continued activity in the organization of our Church are the requirements which will 
make possible the selection of our best men for the Chaplains’ Service.”84 In other words, what the 
military considered a useful screening measure served as a poor filter as it unreasonably eliminated 
high-quality candidates. The military remained noncommittal about these concessions until 1950, 
when the Korean War bolstered the need for chaplains. By December 1950, both the Army and the 
Navy (but not the Air Force) had standardized the waiver of seminary training for Mormons and 
Christian Scientists, allowing them to substitute three years of civilian religious work (e.g., missions, 
teaching, etc.) for seminary study. Nevertheless, as J.P. Mannion, Assistant Director of the Navy 
Chaplains Division, noted, this information was “not stated in the Recruiting Service Instructions or 
other Recruiting Directives…for obvious reasons, we do not publish this information in any 
manner.”85 As with African-American clergy during World War II, the military did not advertise its 
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willingness to bend its own rules. 
While the NAE had initially contested the military’s insistence on college degrees and 
graduate training, it took a different tack starting in the 1950s. The evangelical approach to 
education—and thus the college and ordination requirements—evolved considerably during that 
same period, and fueled its campaign to narrow the definition of Protestant within the chaplaincy. 
By developing middling institutes into noted and accredited educational institutions, evangelicals and 
fundamentalists could more easily supply ministers who met the military’s requirements.86 As a 
result, by 1951, the NAE’s Chaplains’ Commission agreed with Navy Chief of Chaplains Staunton 
Salisbury’s assertion, “‘I want chaplains that are as well-educated as any officer on the ship so that 
the Admiral, if in need, will feel free to visit the Chaplain for advice.’” That the chaplain could reach 
out to and advise a ranking superior was appealing and justified a more rigorous approach to 
educational background.  
More pointedly, the group declared, “Some are of the opinion the educational standards are 
too high but…this Commission feels that the very best we can produce is none too good. At the 
present time let us take the long range view. Beginning now, students may take enough graduate 
theological work so that we, within four years, can adequately supply chaplains for this great mission 
field.”87 Weak educational standards no longer passed muster with the NAE because it had created 
its own wide-ranging network of educational institutions; evangelicals and fundamentalists could 
compete with mainline Protestants as educational equals—in organizational capacity and structure, if 
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not status and prestige. Numerically, the handful of NAE-endorsed chaplains in the mid-1940s had 
ballooned to over three dozen by 1950. Moreover, explicitly classifying the military as a mission field 
represented a theological and instrumental position. The NAE was, by definition and by-laws, a 
proselytizing organization and thus saw the military as a fertile ground for evangelizing. At the same 
time, this framework also transformed the education requirements from obstacle to asset, as 
education became a credential that confirmed the NAE’s place in the American mainstream even as 
it enabled (contra the military’s express policy) access to more Americans and the possibility of more 
converts. 
As the NAE prepared its preachers to meet military norms, the armed forces also made 
slight modifications to its requirements; in 1960, all branches of the military agreed that eligibility for 
the chaplaincy necessitated 90 semester hours of graduate training, no matter the denomination. For 
most faiths, this shift was immaterial. Seminaries required at least that many hours in the classroom 
to become ordained and thus the military’s baseline was sufficiently flexible to warrant adherence by 
all. In the case of Mormons, however, the change was significant. Within five years, only five LDS 
chaplains remained in the armed forces. With tensions in Vietnam escalating and numbers of 
Mormon men drafted increasing, the Church scrutinized their dwindling presence in the chaplaincy. 
In 1965, the General LDS Servicemen’s Committee issued a “Statement of the Chaplain Problem” 
detailing the obstacles LDS men faced in entering the chaplaincy and offering several suggestions for 
resolving them. First and foremost, they proposed that the military recognize their longstanding 
system of education and training, informal as it may have seemed to graduates of divinity schools 
and seminaries, as equivalent to other modes of education. Alternatively, they advocated a series of 
ideas that focused on making LDS chaplains responsible for only LDS men: placing one LDS 
chaplain in a region to serve all branches of the military, granting LDS chaplains traveling privileges 
to extend their reach, or deploying LDS chaplains in areas with high concentrations of LDS men. 
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With this document in hand, the Church approached the Chiefs of Chaplains, senators, and even the 
president to request accommodations—for failure to enable LDS men to serve as chaplains “seems 
contrary to the American way.”88  
Not everyone agreed, however. Even the General Commission on Chaplains and Armed 
Forces Personnel—to which the Church belonged, at least nominally—began to question the 
validity of the Mormon effort to bypass the education requirements. While acknowledging that 
education waivers “must have seemed reasonable to the LDS Church,” the General Commission’s 
Executive Secretary wrote that it “has created serious problems for other religious bodies. Some 
church representatives are so disturbed at this erosion of chaplaincy standards and seemingly unfair 
concession to a single group that they may make a public issue of it.”89 The pre-1960 agreements 
between Mormons and the military mattered little once the perception of uneven and inequitable 
standards flourished. In a letter to President Lyndon Johnson, the General Commission’s Vice 
President elaborated that even Southern Baptists and Lutherans (who contributed to the group as 
auxiliary, rather than constituent, members) “uphold these minimal educational standards.” 
Likewise, Christian Scientists, who did not demand graduate training in general, sent their chaplain 
candidates to graduate school and “now report[] that this requirement is beneficial.” Inadequate 
theological training, moreover, hampered LDS chaplains during the promotion process and 
“disrupt[ed] the delicate balance of church and state relations.” And while training for LDS missions 
equipped men for that task, it did not furnish them with the resources “for effective ministry” in the 
military.90 J. W. Marriott, the head of the LDS Military Relations Committee, deemed the General 
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Commission’s letter “snippy,” and responded with a religious rejoinder of his own:  “The best 
teachers and most inspirational leaders are not necessarily the ones with the most college 
degrees….neither He nor any of his apostles could have met the 90-hour requirement.” More to the 
point, the LDS church only recommended men with college degrees, who, Marriott averred, were 
“not uneducated.”91 Ultimately, however, this was more than an internecine squabble about the 
importance of formal theological training or ordination. It was a contest over the reach of the state, 
and the degree to which the military could impose education standards on religious groups operating 
within its purview. 
Against this backdrop of critique and postwar escalation of an education arms race, the 
Mormon Church also began to adapt its own approach to the military chaplaincy’s education 
requirements. Despite assurances from Army Chief of Chaplains Charles Brown that he would 
continue to grant education waivers to Mormons, in time the Servicemen’s Committee began to 
explore alternatives for LDS men seeking positions as chaplains. While it did not support theological 
training per se, it broached the possibility of a graduate program at Brigham Young University. 
Daniel Ludlow, the Dean of the College of Religious Instruction, appointed a committee of BYU 
faculty who also held commissions as reserve chaplains to study the matter. By 1969, the university 
began offering classes focused on religion and counseling. Two years later, the military and the 
Church met and agreed that coursework focused on clinical pastoral education as well as religious 
texts would satisfy the military’s requirements. While the Church resisted any effort to create a 
program parallel or comparable to seminary training on the grounds that they did not have 
professional clergy, the military “reminded them that any of their career chaplains would be 
professional clergy and as such should be academically equipped to adequately function and 
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compete with their peers.” Despite the LDS emphasis on lay leadership, LDS chaplains operated 
outside the church and inside the military, where their status as officers and role as professional 
military clergy commanded commensurate education. Satisfied that the Church expressed “a willing 
spirit to do what they can do within the[ir] doctrinal position,” the military had found a way to 
uphold education requirements and cease issuing waivers to chaplains.92 From 1972 forward, all 
military chaplains entered the service as college graduates and recipients of graduate religious 
training of some kind.  
For evangelicals in the military, education frustrations extended beyond standards for 
chaplains. In the postwar years—and partially on the recommendation of the Weil Committee’s 
report on morals and welfare in the armed forces—the military encouraged family cohesion and 
built more extensive family housing on domestic and overseas bases.93 In the newly-created Air 
Force alone, almost a million children lived on or near military bases by 1954.94 Similarly, between 
1950 and 1960, the number of family members who moved abroad more than quintupled, to almost 
a half-million.95 As a result, the number of children enrolled in Sunday Schools on military bases 
increased dramatically. By the mid-1950s, 85,000 children sat on the registers of on-base Protestant 
supplementary schools. As chaplains acquired additional responsibilities as teachers in and directors 
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of supplementary religious education for military dependents, they sought guidance in implementing 
curricula. Air Force Chief of Chaplains Charles Carpenter identified the need for a standardized 
curriculum that would allow children to move from installation to installation without repeating or 
missing key principles or information.96 
With the approval of the Armed Forces Chaplains Board, a military-civilian committee 
comprised of Army, Navy, and Air Force chaplains alongside representatives of denominational 
publishing houses convened to devise what became known as the Unified Protestant Sunday School 
Curriculum. Protestants, the military asserted, shared four basic principles: justification by faith; 
priesthood of all believers; sufficiency of scripture; right to private judgment.97 Much like the 
chaplaincy itself, the Sunday School program needed to find a way to bridge Protestant differences 
while systematically but flexibly educating children who moved frequently. Rather than craft entirely 
new materials, the committee opted to mix and match existing books, lesson plans, and materials 
available from commercial presses. Its 1953 prospectus, the group’s first, included Sunday School 
units on the Bible, the Church, and Jesus from ten different denominational sources. Each service 
branch made its own decisions about implementation, with the Army and Navy granting chaplains 
the choice about using the pre-packaged plans and the Air Force forcing compliance through 
mandatory adoption by 1960.98 Over time, the military dispensed with the variety inherent in the 
initial curriculum in favor of a more cost-effective bidding system. In 1962, for example, the 
Southern Baptist Sunday School Board won the curriculum and textbook contract because “all bids 
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fulfilled the requirements, and this one was by far the lowest in cost.”99 
Yet this victory by Southern Baptists did not thrill NAE in part because the Armed Forces 
Chaplains Board (AFCB) still set the requirements and in part the Southern Baptist Convention 
continued to endorse its chaplains through the National Council of Churches. Not yet comfortable 
with overt mixing of religion and the state, the NAE pushed to dislodge the Unified Protestant 
Sunday School Curriculum. That the Southern Baptists had recently earned the rights to develop the 
material was irrelevant because evangelicals considered the issue not religious education per se, but 
Sunday School lesson plans that did not account for their doctrinal particularity. The Southern 
Baptists still had to craft a curriculum sufficiently generic to suit all Protestants. They were 
frustrated, watching as the chaplaincy became, from their perspective, “more regimented, [with] a 
greater emphasis…on uniformity.”100 This was fundamentally a problem for evangelicals who 
resisted coercive religious camaraderie, especially when it revolved around a “Church-centered and 
morals-centered rather than Christ-centered” theology.101 Their objection took an ideological turn as 
well. According to a letter sent to the Army Chief of Chaplains, the high school text, Jesus and the 
Kingdom of God, “contained statements ‘contrary to our United States concept of individual freedom 
and economic way of life.’”102 The Cold War demanded a particular strand of anti-Communist 
Protestantism, a requirement the military’s own materials failed to heed. Implanted in Sunday 
Schools, military Protestantism excluded them because, as the group protested to the Army Chief of 
Chaplains, the curriculum not only “lack[ed] ‘evangelical appeal’” but in doing so, ostracized “the 
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‘conservative Evangelical’ aspect of the Christian faith.”103 They sought pure sectarianism, not 
denominationalism.   
In the wake of a spate of court cases deeming government-backed religion in schools—no 
matter how generic—unconstitutional, evangelicals thought they had an ally in the courts. Citing 
Engel v. Vitale (1962), which outlawed a New York regents-written prayer to “Almighty God,” and 
Abington v. Schempp (1963), which proscribed Bible readings in public schools, an editorial in the 
evangelical Christianity Today lambasted the Unified Sunday School Curriculum as equally suspect. 
“Surely it is clear,” the magazine argued, “that this is a case in which a religious curriculum is 
prescribed and religious materials promoted by high military authority.” While the goal of consistent 
curricula was laudable, the publication noted, such “desirability cannot justify violation of religious 
freedom.”104 It suggested that religious groups serve as the providers of all religious materials with 
the AFCB acting only as an information clearinghouse, thereby allowing each chaplain, each Sunday 
school, and each family the ability to select preferred ideas and instructions. The NAE succeeded in 
getting Representative John B. Anderson (R-IL) to enter the editorial into the Congressional Record 
where he asked members of the House who concurred with his “concern at this derogation of the 
religious liberty guaranteed by the first amendment” to “call for the discontinuance of the 
mandatory prescription” of the curriculum.105 If Anderson’s plea echoed beyond the walls of the 
chamber, it faded to silence quite quickly. 
Ironically, the NAE could have had an ally in their pursuit of more differentiated Sunday 
Schools had the organization discussed matters with their perceived antagonists. Mormons also 
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sought to provide the children of LDS servicemen with the full complement of religious education 
available in civilian wards. Frank C. Kimball, the vice-chairman of the LDS Military Relations 
Committee, succinctly identified the military’s curriculum and programming conundrum: “trying to 
bring about a suitable philosophy which is acceptable to most people and, they think, offensive to 
none.” Lest chaplains “lose track of any denominational difference and succumb to the pressure for 
uniformity,” he argued, the Church needed to provide ample resources to secure Mormon 
leadership, training, and fellowship in the armed forces.106 
Assisting LDS personnel who lived far from civilian Mormon communities presented an 
acute problem. Edgar B. Brossard, the President of the New England Mission, asked Chaplain 
Albert Northrop (United Methodist) to grant Mormons use of the chapel space at Loring Air Force 
Base in Maine. Fifty Mormon families lived there, 180 miles away from the closest Mormon church 
in Bangor, and they wanted to use the base chapel for additional services and schooling. Framing the 
request in diminutive terms, the Mormons promised “if approval is granted to this group, it will be 
understood that scheduling of services will not interfere with any of the activities of the three major 
faiths….Supervision and manning of these services will be furnished by the membership, and no 
special funds or support will be required.”107 Northrop was amenable to their request, in that he 
knew LDS Sunday services already met in the Chapel Annex and he acceded to offering space for 
religious school once a week, “provided it is for a limited time only.” He went on to explain the 
restriction as necessary because a more frequent or lengthy program “would imply a denominational 
education program. The chaplains’ policy is very positive in statements prohibiting the establishment 
of Denominational Schools. The reason is obvious when it is realized that there are well over 200 
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organized and recognized groups that could claim this privilege.”108 Northrop’s reservations 
anticipated the response Mormon inquiries to the Chiefs of Chaplains would garner. Then-Deputy 
Air Force Chief of Chaplains Robert Taylor “was most sympathetic, but he was unable to give us 
much help” because “the military services are beset with many requests from various religious 
denominations for the use of chapels on military posts” and, as a result, regulations capped access to 
chapel space.109 If the military understood fine-grained religious distinctions as invidious, so too was 
the erasure of difference deleterious.  
Compulsory “General Protestantism” so rankled the Mormon Church that by April 1960, it 
compiled a nine-point memo alleging religious discrimination. “Data and Documentation Relative to 
Denial of Religious Freedom to LDS Servicemen” highlighted a range of abuses, from limits on 
denominational services and prohibition of LDS Sunday schools to uniform Protestant Sunday 
schools and the stringent qualifications to become chaplains.110 What had been a mere annoyance 
during previous periods of war became a major predicament as the Cold War defense establishment 
infused American society. The provenance of the problem, the document reiterated, lay in 
taxonomy. “Latter-day Saints are arbitrarily classified as general Protestants, though our doctrines, 
practices, and beliefs are wholly at variance with those of all Protestant churches.”111 The National 
Association of Evangelicals surely would have agreed, but neither those who claimed Protestantism 
nor those who denied it made headway with the state’s sorting scheme. And rather than work 
together to find a more satisfactory solution to their conjoined problems, the NAE and the LDS 
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Church fought over and through the chaplaincy and military religious programming writ large. The 
religious pluralism enshrined in the structure and operation of the military chaplaincy over the past 
four decades teetered on the brink of collapse, disrupted by believers discontent—for different 
reasons—with the military’s brand of ecumenism. While Mormons hankered for recognition 
through demarcation, evangelicals coveted power through exclusivity.  
Frustration over the unsatisfactory meaning of Protestantism mounted for Floyd Robertson 
and other members of the NAE’s Chaplains Commission. Not only did the military continue to 
exclude evangelical literature from Sunday Schools, but Chaplains’ Conferences also desisted from 
proclamations in Jesus’ name while speakers on the dais publicly ridiculed evangelicals.112 Meanwhile 
career officers felt snubbed and devalued as partners in religious programming because the 
compulsory curriculum failed to attend to their beliefs. Robertson pled his case to Air Force Chief 
of Chaplains Edwin Chess, imploring him to recognize that while “the matter has been camouflaged 
with a great deal of verbiage,” an unfair and unmanageable mixing of religion and the state 
remained. “Any system that permits the favoring of one religious literature to the exclusion of all 
others (even if it is for a very good purpose) can just as easily be employed to discriminate against 
individuals in the same way at the operational level when those in charge choose to do so,” he 
pointed out.113 Correcting course, the NAE contended in the 1960s, meant eliminating the 
preference for unified Protestantism. Only by moving away from the cooperative ecumenism built 
over the past half-century and by parting matters of faith from matters of governance could religious 
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liberty flourish in the armed forces. 
Evangelicals were not alone in their effort to rethink the place of particularism. At the same 
time Robertson registered his discontent, two Navy chaplains, Reeve Brenner (Jewish) and Francis 
Sampson (Catholic), engaged in an epistolary spat about Sampson’s invocation of Jesus at a 
benediction at a 1965 training conference dinner. Indeed, although the NAE’s Floyd Robertson 
alleged “I do not think our Jewish friends expect this type of restraint” in regards to avoiding explicit 
references to Jesus as savior,114 Chaplain Brenner, a Reform rabbi, in fact expected conformity to 
military policy to limit sectarian prayer to worship. After learning through the military grapevine that 
Sampson was upset that Brenner had confronted him, the Jewish chaplain sought to clarify and 
smooth over the potential conflict with a ranking officer. Sampson, who would become the Navy 
Chief of Chaplains in 1967, was not offended by Brenner’s complaint, but felt his brash, youthful 
manner was “excessively aggressive, tactless, and over-inclined to take offense from a matter that 
was obviously not intended to give offense.” Moreover, Sampson acknowledged that he tried to 
avoid infelicitous impressions by “omit[ting] the terminal phrase of the invocation, ‘in Christ’s name 
we ask it’” in front of Jews. Nevertheless, upon further reflection, he decided not to continue that 
practice, because “we are told by Christ to make all our petitions in His name. Every non-Christian 
certainly knows that a Christian has the right to pray publicly or privately (as the Jew or member of 
any other creed has the same right) according to his beliefs.” Analogizing his prayer to the cross he 
wore on his uniform, Sampson asserted that symbols did not intentionally offend viewers or 
listeners and the Jewish chaplain—like any other “Jew, Mohammedan, Buddhist, or any non-
Christian” ought not see his insignia or his benedictions in that problematic light.115  
Unsurprisingly, Brenner disputed Sampson’s representation of prayer. It was, the Jewish 
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chaplain pointed out, far more active than a passive glance at a piece of metal affixed to a uniform. 
Casting the senior chaplain as severe and insensitive, Brenner questioned his reasoning and maturity, 
given that “for the Jew the worship of Jesus is idolatry. And inasmuch as invocations are 
pronounced on behalf of those assembled for all to respond Amen such a prayer induces in the 
heart of the traditional Jew, the impression that he has sinned.”116 Most importantly, Brenner urged 
Sampson to consider the context of the military, claiming “one violates the noble tradition of the 
Chaplaincy asking Jews in a group to rise with bowed heads for a prayer pronounced in Christ’s 
Name, or any similar sectarian or denominational phrasing.”117 Just as other chaplains used more 
neutral terms such as “Father, Eternal, or God,” so too could Chaplain Sampson adhere to these 
less offensive terms or, at the very least, warn Jews that he would adopt sectarian language. 
Floyd Robertson and Reeve Brenner would have agreed on one thing: those with religious 
power could wield it to suit their preferences. But the two men would otherwise have talked past 
one another. What Brenner saw as both personal offense and a violation of the tradition of military 
pluralism, Robertson would have viewed as a victory for religious specificity and the legitimacy of 
making space for overt Christianity. Sampson likewise viewed state recognition of Catholics as 
permission to offer its religious teachings in public prayers in public spaces. Although Chaplain 
Sampson found Chaplain Brenner’s insistent claims unpersuasive, he also stood at remove from 
Floyd Robertson and other evangelicals’ sense of tyranny. After all, Catholics enjoyed their own 
Sunday School curriculum alongside dedicated chapel space, clearly-demarcated worship times, and a 
robust chaplain quota. Explicit permission to offer sectarian prayers in public, rather than religious 
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service, arenas would be a long and protracted contest.118 Nevertheless, by the mid-1960s, the five-
decades-long effort to mold an acceptably multi-religious state institution was at stake. The conflict 
over the Unified Protestant Sunday School curriculum was only the beginning of an effort to bring 
sectarianism back into the state. 
 
Translating Religion: Chaplains as Ethnographers, Ambassadors, and Brokers in Vietnam 
Chaplain Meir Engel’s death presented a problem for the U.S. Army. Felled by a heart attack 
while deployed in Saigon in 1964, the Tel Aviv-born rabbi played an essential role in the American 
military operations in Vietnam. Charged with organizing a Buddhist military chaplaincy, Engel 
acquitted himself well, receiving posthumous honors from the Vietnamese government. His loss 
troubled the military because there was no ready replacement. He had acquired this duty because he 
was Jewish and thus removed from the “animosity and suspicion” that characterized that 
relationship between Buddhists and Christians in Southeast Asia.119 Engel’s multiple identities—an 
immigrant from Palestine, an American-trained rabbi, a career military chaplain, and a mediator 
between the United States and Vietnamese militaries—was unique, but the state’s decision to 
mobilize him as a pivotal broker within the military was not.   
In the postwar American military, within the imperial horizons of a new global power, 
chaplains served as critical intermediaries in the state’s effort to develop religious relationships and 
cultural understanding in imperial arenas abroad. After a March 1965 War Games revealed 
significant gaps in American understanding of Vietnamese culture and religion, the Navy assigned 
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Chaplain Robert L. Mole (Seventh-day Adventist) to “assist naval personnel in II, III, and IV Corps 
to [acquire] a better understanding of Vietnamese culture, traditions, and religion in order to 
improve some of the cross-cultural tensions.”120 Prior to Operation Silver Lance, the Navy and 
Marine Corps had relied on a combination of local missionary intelligence and the Army’s Area 
Handbook for Vietnam, a 507-page volume that outlined the sociological, political, economic, and 
military conditions that U.S. forces could expect to encounter. Written by a team of civilian 
researchers affiliated with the Foreign Area Studies Division of the Special Operations Research at 
American University, the book claimed to offer basic background material without favoring any 
particular set of policy objectives. Its anonymous forward asserted that it was neither “official” nor 
“definitive” and lacked either the “expressed or implicit” approval of the Army. Comments and 
concerns, however, could be directed to the Chief of Staff for Military Operations, rather than the 
government contractors.121  
Whatever its formal status, the Navy found the Handbook less than helpful in preparing its 
Marines to engage respectfully with foreign populations and deemed it inadequate for teaching its 
men how to avoid alienating local allies. The decision to deploy a chaplain as an investigator and 
translator of religious culture and customs in Vietnam was especially important in the wake of the 
Buddhist revolt that toppled the Diem government in 1963.122 The Catholic leader’s crackdown on 
the majority religion within Vietnam made American sensitivity and delicacy imperative as a growing 
number of US troops entered Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s. In fact, as Marine combat units 
arrived in Da Nang in March 1965, Lt. General Victor Krulak, commander of the Fleet Marine 
Force, Pacific, worried “we can win everything in Vietnam but the people, and suffer an abysmal 
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defeat.”123 Chaplain Mole’s task was to mitigate this concern, first through investigation and 
ultimately through new training materials. 
Mole was a puckish minister, a chaplain who took pride in his Adventist faith and his 
mastery of tricks and treats. After a two-year tour at Camp Pendleton, as the base’s first Adventist 
chaplain, he informed his SDA superiors that “no servicemen has been court-martialed here” 
because of proper counsel and attention to “potential trouble areas.” He recommended increasing 
the number of Adventist chaplains as a means of early intervention to stave off courts-martial and 
similar dilemmas faced by the faithful.124 At the same time, a certain jest matched his earnestness. 
Writing from the South China Sea in 1962, he joked, “At times I think I ought to apply for an 
evangelistic budget as I conduct meetings seven days a week – but suppose I ought not broadcast 
this lest someone accuse me of ‘sabbath-breaking.’”125 Humor characterized his approach to work. 
At the height of Cold War espionage, he delighted in sending missives in the form of “molegrams” 
and signing his letters “Friend Mole” or “‘The’ Mole.” While deployed in Asia, he asked a church 
secretary to send a poinsettia to his wife at her job at the Washington Sanitarium, to be delivered 
with a note “say[ing] only ‘From a Serviceman.’” He explained that it was a gift for her birthday and 
chuckled, “she does not expect such silliness at that age.” Ever the scrupulous accountant, he 
instructed his contact to “let me know the amount so I can keep my books balanced as unlike the 
Federal government I do not have an unlimited time to settle all items.”126  
Deployed to Saigon in 1965, Mole left his post at Camp Pendleton to study Vietnam in situ. 
Confident that his language studies (Arabic and Japanese) as well as his missionary experience (in 
Lebanon and Cyprus) conditioned him to learn about new cultures and handle unexpected 
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challenges, he told a reporter that his “on-site research mission” did not represent an effort to 
“Americanize the Asians.” Rather, he insisted, “We’re trying to help them reach their own goals. Of 
course, religion in the basic value decider of all humanity.”127 With a clear assumption about the 
importance of religion in the lives of all people in place, Mole began his mission. To prepare for his 
expedition, he spent a month in DC pursuing academic research and making contacts with relevant 
government sources before undergoing three weeks of counter-insurgency training stateside. While 
awaiting clearance to begin “on-the-spot research” in Vietnam, he moved to Okinawa to read and 
ready himself for observations and interviews in Southeast Asia.  
On the last day of August 1966, Mole arrived in Vietnam, excited to consult with chaplains 
and local missionaries. They took him to “a number of isolated and semi-isolated posts” from which 
he could speak to and watch local people. In a late-September signature molegram, the chaplain 
reported interviewing and surveying 350 missionaries, 225 Naval Advisors, over a thousand Special 
Forces personnel, researchers, and civilian government employees to collect basic impressions and 
observations of Vietnamese culture and religion.128 Over time, he recognized the drawbacks inherent 
to his short term of study as well as hindrances to his ability to accumulate useful data. Although he 
never doubted the accuracy or utility of his local Western sources, he quickly deduced that his 
language skills were not up to par and requested a future assignment that would allow him time to 
acquire new linguistic proficiencies off-duty. French, he determined, would produce deeper and 
more reliable information. 
Despite his limited access to local knowledge, Mole pushed forward, focused on the task of 
relaying what he understood of Vietnamese religion to American soldiers in terms they would 
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comprehend. Along with Chaplain Richard McGonigal (United Presbyterian), a minister with a 
master’s in sociology, Mole wrote a reference book, The Religions of Vietnam in Faith and Fact, that 
undergirded two lectures, “Religions in Vietnam” and “Religiously Based Customs in Vietnam,” 
given to all pre-deployment personnel. Complete with flip-charts, discussion questions, and model 
simulations, these materials highlighted the United States’ dual approach to operations in Vietnam 
combining military force and personal engagement. The latter, leaders hoped, would forestall the 
former. But to succeed, ground troops had to be able to convince Vietnamese people that 
Americans wanted to help them, and that demanded culturally and religiously respectful encounters 
between American troops and indigenous communities. Just as the Eisenhower-era People-to-
People program attempted to promote anti-Communist foreign policy goals by spreading American 
culture overseas through more intimate connections and enlist Americans in soft diplomatic work 
through investment in music tours, gardening exchanges, medical missions, and letter-writing 
campaigns, so too did the military’s Personal Response Project hope to cultivate “lasting friendship 
and willing cooperation of the Vietnamese people” by “engender[ing] in Marines a genuine concern 
and a deep respect for the Vietnamese as our friends, allies, and fellow human beings.”129 As 
Chaplain Warren Newman (Disciples of Christ), the officer in charge of training Marines in 
communication tactics, noted, “As they [Marines] learn the tactical principles of an infantry sweep of 
an area, they can also be introduced to the principles of courtesy and respect which are appropriate 
in dealing with Vietnamese village chiefs, elders, and religious officials.”130 Chaplains assumed a new 
role in-country as they became the mediators between culturally ill-equipped American military 
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personnel and Western-power-weary local Vietnamese populations. 
These instructional bulletins attempted to do more than depict differences in religion and 
culture. In contrast to the U.S. Army Handbook, which merely described religions, the PRP resources 
discussed the implications of such differences and provided practice situations or simulations for 
chaplains and unit commanders to do with their men. One of the earliest asked “Do You Know 
About Time Concepts in Vietnam?” The worksheet then contrasted the “circular time” central to 
Taoism, Confucianism, Hinduism and Buddhism with “linear time” endemic to the Judeo-Christian 
tradition and the American Way of Life. While the former revolved around a twelve-year repeating 
calendar that possessed “neither end nor beginning,” the latter understood time as “a non repeating 
straight line with a beginning, an end and fixed important historical events.” These explanations 
reflected differences between Eastern and Western religious traditions, but the Personal Response 
Project overlaid them with subjective characterizations of respective civilizations. As a result of 
linear time, Americans strove to improve themselves and society. The emphasis on forward motion 
resulted in a litany of goods ranging from the concrete—a “high protein diet [and] vaccinations”—
to the more nebulous—a “sense of urgency and necessity of immediate productive action.” In 
Vietnam, however, the “endless circle” of time impeded a rush to advancement and progress. In 
fact, given the spiritual calendar and the adverse material conditions of “diet, diseases, and 
climat[e],” the cultural education series asserted, “it is to the credit of the Vietnamese that this nation 
has achieved so much as it has.”131 
Not all materials centered on condescending contrasts between the United States and 
Vietnam. In “Cross-Cultural Understanding can bridge the geographical distance,” Marines learned 
that cultural “booby traps” could be as dangerous as the physical ones planted by the Viet Cong. To 
                                                
131 “Do You Know About Time Concepts in Vietnam?,” U.S. Navy Personal Response Project, Series A-6, Box 
10445, Folder: Robert Mole, SDA. 
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avoid linguistic land mines, it was imperative that “Americans and Vietnamese know and understand 
each other as human beings with the same basic needs” precisely because “citizens of the East and 
West are joined together as partners in a mutual struggle for survival.”132 The Unit Leaders Personal 
Response Handbook amplified this point in lessons and discussion questions centered on interpersonal 
relationships, friendships, and the fundamental equality between humans. While a Corporal Smith, 
for example, declared local villagers to be “animals” because they lived in huts without walls, the 
Sergeant Major challenged him, arguing that a closer look showed more signs of similarity than 
difference. A chair hauled twenty miles to a clean hut, a photograph of a child, a set of tools with 
which to fix the home—all of these symbolized how “everybody likes staying alive and they like 
being left free to run their own life. In this sense, you bet your life we’re equal.”133 A mix of free-
market capitalism and cross-cultural awareness was intended to create a potent motivational brew. 
As the United States’ military ties to Vietnam grew stronger, so too did the need to better 
understand Buddhism and religious festivals. Tet, most well known in the United States as the name 
of the late January military campaign 1968, became the subject of a number of posters and 
brochures. The holiday, which marks the Vietnamese New Year and celebrates the beginning of 
spring, melds family, spirituality, and national customs. One sign included a handy list for 
servicemen to learn about “Vietnam’s special holiday.” They should know, the bullet-points 
explained, that Tet “marks change of year” and was a “special occasion to venerate ancestor spirits”; 
was “when household God gives yearly account of family activities to heavenly emperor”; was an 
“opportunity to gather as families. Renew friendships: pay all debts”; included “many secular and 
religious features.” At the bottom, it proclaimed, “Respect your Vietnamese friend. Wish him a 
happy new year!” and helpfully added the appropriate phrasing in Vietnamese and in English 
                                                
132 “Cross-Cultural Understanding can bridge the geographical distance,” U.S. Navy Personal Response Project, 
Series A-15, Box 10445, Folder: Robert Mole, SDA. 
133 Unit Leaders Personal Response Handbook, 71-72. 
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transliteration, “‘Chuc Mung Nam Moi’ (Chook Mung Nahm Moyee).” Subsequent pages elaborated 
on the meaning and importance of traditions and expectations, including reunification with family, 
settling spiritual and actual debts, offering gifts to family Gods, visiting friends with gifts.” To make 
clear how Americans should make sense of the one-to-seven day holiday, the document concluded, 
“TET combines many of the secular features of American holidays and the religious features of 
Christmas, All Souls’ Day, etc., with concepts of animism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism. 
Each may contribute conflicting features and ideas, but all combine to make a valid holiday for our 
Vietnamese allies.”134 Fit into an American religious and patriotic holiday scheme, the Personal 
Response Project attempted to vindicate a festival season foreign to Americans and legitimize 
fraternal activities between servicemen and Vietnamese villagers and Popular Forces.135 
Impending war in Vietnam made the American state more sensitive to Eastern religious 
practices, rituals foreign to most U.S. personnel. In turn, the chaplaincy increased its awareness of, 
interest in, and sensitivity toward Buddhism, albeit a sensibility derived from and intertwined with 
American foreign policy goals. For Chaplain Robert Radasky (Russian Orthodox), the program’s 
success rested on the chaplain’s investment. “After chaplains took steps to learn the culture, they 
were able to reflect an assurance about the situation which in effect counteracted casual rumor.” 
Radsky confirmed that religion suffused Vietnamese daily life, which made the chaplain into an 
important resource “even before official action provided him with the tools.”136 Familiarity with 
religion as a structuring agent in everyday circumstances, he argued, proved helpful even without 
                                                
134 “Tet,” U.S. Navy Personal Response Project, Series A-6, Box 10445, Folder: Robert Mole, SDA. 
135 That the military viewed fraternization as potentially helpful underscored the nature and challenge of guerilla 
warfare. Whereas any contact with civilians in Nazi Germany and Japan was presumed to taint military operations, in 
Vietnam it offered the possibility of aid. There is no evidence that the military tried to explain Japanese Shinto to 
personnel in the hopes it would enable mutual understanding, most likely because Shinto was seen as sustaining imperial 
Japan and because World War II combat did not depend on hamlet-level intimacy.  
136 Robert M. Radasky, End of Your Report, August 22, 1966, p. 2 quoted in Bergsma, Chaplains With Marines in 
Vietnam, 124. 
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Buddhism-specific knowledge. 
Whether the program accomplished its goals to improve the understanding and empathy of 
American troops was debatable. Chaplain William Asher (American Baptist) discovered plenty of 
chatter about the Personal Response Program, but not all of it positive or persuasive. “The 
‘Program’ meets with varying degrees of success of acceptance depending upon command attitude, 
proximity to combat, and an understanding of what the ‘Program’ is all about. Some Marines discuss 
it seriously, some with tongue-in-cheek, and some with animosity.” Countering rancor was difficult, 
if not impossible, because “the problems of learning to know and respect people, when some of 
them are incognito Viet Cong, are numerous. Once a Marine sees a buddy killed by fire from a 
‘friendly’ hamlet, he’s not been receptive to the ‘Program.’ And the unscrupulous ‘friendly’ 
Vietnamese makes it difficult to trust any of them.”137 With his Marines’ concerns seeping into his 
evaluation, Chaplain Asher could offer only a mixed review.  
Chaplain Ronald L. Hedwall (Lutheran) had even more disappointing news. When he 
reported, “the program never got off the ground,” a reader scrawled sarcastically in the margins 
“Great! Just Great!!!” The chaplain also underscored missing variables in any “civic action,” 
“personal response,” or humanitarian program: first, “the tool for all of these would be a knowledge 
of the language,” and, second, men have “been highly trained to kill, and not trained at all to assist.” 
Yet while Hedwall identified and admonished key weaknesses in program design, he also touted 
increased compassion and concern for the Vietnamese among his men. Words failed to capture this 
shift, for “social pressures insist that they be vocally anti-Vietnamese, no matter what their own 
private attitudes and actions are.” But their behavior spoke of another story, of trained killers 
observing, engaging with, and caring for the Vietnamese they encountered.138  
                                                
137 William Asher, Personal Narrative Report, 1966-67, pp. 3-4, FJC.  
138 Ronald L. Hedwall, “Experiences and Observations in Vietnam,” p. 2, 3, 10, 9, August 22, 1967, FJC. 
Hedwall was a keen observer of human nature. He recognized, for example, that Marines sought and expected 
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Unsurprisingly, then, units responsible for activities other than killing, such as hospital 
companies, found the Personal Response program more successful. Elden H. Luffman, a Southern 
Baptist chaplain assigned to Chu Lai in fall 1967, encountered Vietnam as part of hospital and 
combat units. He found the former ideal for the Personal Response Program because “Americans 
are unselfishly ministering to the sick and wounded bodies of the Vietnamese people” and thus 
more apt to build relationships. In contrast, “using the Personal Response Program as another 
tactical weapon for winning the war leaves much to be desired.”139 After moving several hours north 
to a Marine Regiment based in Quang Tri, Chaplain Luffman saw the potential for success as well as 
the limits of the program. On the one hand, he was pleased to find “a tremendous Personal 
Response Program going.” There, as a result of the previous chaplain’s cooperation with two 
Vietnamese Army chaplains, one Catholic and one Buddhist, the Marines created positive 
encounters by teaching conversational English and playing basketball. From this, he concluded that 
successful “‘personal response’ must be experienced rather than taught in a classroom.”140 On the 
other hand, when the First Marines left Quang Tri for the inland Khe Sanh Combat Base, they were 
cut off from civilian populations and “all Vietnamese became the same—the enemy….It is difficult 
to promote a favorable attitude towards a people who are the same as those who are constantly 
shooting at you.”141 
The recognition and affirmation of religion sought by American Buddhists arrived to a 
degree through looming war in SE Asia. However the very importance of cross-cultural 
understanding and the increasing likelihood of out-and-out war ultimately took the Personal 
                                                                                                                                                       
appreciation from the Vietnamese, a response they would not receive. Thus, he suggested, “the men need to be made 
aware that because of the historical situation, and perhaps because of the culture too, their personal response to the 
needs they see around them are not going to be matched by an overwhelming change in the attitudes of the Vietnamese 
toward them. Not at first, and not immediately” (9). 
139 Elden H. Luffman, “Experiences and Observations in Vietnam,” 1968, p. 1, FJC. 
140 Luffman, “Experiences and Observations in Vietnam,” 2-3. 
141 Luffman, “Experiences and Observations in Vietnam,” 3-4. 
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Response Program away from chaplains and placed it in the hands of other commanding officers. 
Marine Chaplain David J. Casazza (Catholic) thought this was wise because “the comment I heard 
over and over again was ‘so what’?” Since chaplains were men, not miracle-workers, he continued, 
“I don’t believe we ought to throw in all our chips on this one bet…[Chaplains] are giving their 
share of the lectures but without sincere command interest the program will fail.”142 The chaplaincy 
could try to unsettle American views of Vietnamese people and promote them as equals, in religious 
and human terms. But the impact of Chaplain Mole’s research and program development depended 
less on religious leadership and more on a combination of circumstances and settings, social 
pressures and command influence. 
 
Conclusion 
Cold War constructions of religious unanimity created new administrative and governance 
problems in overseeing and managing religion in the military. Faith, so often relegated to the private 
sphere as a result of key religion cases decided by the Supreme Court, could not be siphoned off to a 
side corridor or the family home. Rather, in the military, religion was always public and always on 
display. It was symbolic and substantive, and thus ripe for contest and controversy. While 
Adventists, Mormons, and Buddhists pressed the chaplaincy, the military, and the nation to stretch 
the American God to include them, evangelicals toiled to bring their vision of a Kingdom of God to 
the chaplaincy, the military, and the nation. Hence while chaplains often absorbed the military’s 
recognition of multiple legitimate paths to God, civilians spoke in a different register, seeking to 
impose their understanding of religion on the military. 
Meanwhile, in Vietnam, some looked to Americans as agents of divine will, some as grantors 
of aid, and still others as emissaries of colonization. American claims to handle Vietnam in an anti-
                                                
142 David J. Casazza, End of Tour Report, p. 6, 1967-8, FJC. 
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colonialist frame (unlike the French they relieved) notwithstanding, the United States was growing as 
an imperial power. War loomed, and in Vietnam, the military chaplaincy, much like the state it 
served, would face its greatest test of morality and legitimacy.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Claiming Conscience: 
Moral Objection and Religious Obligation in the Vietnam War 
 
It started with a pair, two Vietnamese bodies ablaze in protest. An elderly Buddhist monk, 
73 years into his life, took his last breaths while burning in lotus position on a busy Saigon boulevard 
in June 1963 and, two months later, a young monk, barely into the third decade of his life, doused 
himself in kerosene and extinguished his life in Phan Thiet.1 Then there were three, a trio of 
Americans who ignited themselves to speak out against war in the 1965. In March, flames danced on 
the body of an 82-year old German-Jewish emigré in Detroit after she took a match to her skin. 
Eight months later, the sun set as a 31-year-old Quaker torched himself below Robert McNamara’s 
Pentagon window and, a week later, a 22-year-old Catholic Worker followed suit, searing himself as 
the sun rose at the United Nations’ New York plaza.2 
Thich Quang Duc, the septuagenarian monk, knew what he was doing; self-immolation was 
not abhorrent in Buddhism. Rather, as even the United States’ Personal Response Project materials 
explained, the Vietnamese understood these human burnt offerings as “‘murder by oppression.’” 
His fire, quite literally, spoke. The venerable monk’s body bellowed with “courage, frankness, 
determination, and sincerity,” protesting the religious persecution of the American-backed Diem 
regime. Like the Buddha giving himself to a hungry lion to save her cubs from cannibalism, the 
                                                
1 “Fire Suicide Proves Point,” The Boston Globe, June 12, 1963; “2d Buddhist Sets Fire to Himself, Dies: Viet 
Monk Protests Religious Bias,” Chicago Tribune, August 5, 1963. 
2 “Woman, 82, Sets Herself Afire in Street as Protest on Vietnam,” NYT, March 18, 1965; “Hate of War Led to 
Fiery Death,” The Boston Globe, November 4, 1965; “Torch Suicides: Sinful at Worst, Futile at Best,” The Washington Post, 
November 15, 1965. 
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monk liquidated himself to safeguard the future of Buddhism in Vietnam.3 Senator Frank Church 
(D-ID) discerned the message quite well. Reconfigured in terms more resonant with his Presbyterian 
faith, he viewed the “grisly scenes” of burnt Vietnamese flesh, captured on television and published 
on American newsprint, as the fate of the Christians who marched into the great stadiums of the 
Roman Empire.4 Martyrs of the first and the twentieth centuries, both vanquished while struggling 
to liberate their faith from imperial (and imperially-supported) overlords. 
Norman Morrison, too, understood his suicidal political speech as a form of religious 
preservation, incinerating himself “‘at the cruel edge of [the] five-faced cathedral of violence’” to 
convey the depth of his Quaker pacifism in the wake of an escalating war. “He was no fanatic,” his 
friend Allan Brick explained; rather, he was “just a religious man.”5 The images and words of war’s 
suffering gave way to slaughter. What some clergy classified as sin, Morrison believed to be ritual 
and righteous sacrifice.6 
In those years, the long 1960s, there were other fires to fight as well. In Alabama, Bull 
Connor’s fire hoses and police dogs attacked African Americans and their white allies fighting for 
civil rights. To segregationists, if not the protesters themselves, the controlled burn of brush fires 
among black Americans was turning quickly into a ferocious forest fire, an inferno uncontainable 
with fire hoses. In California, flames engulfed Watts as African-American residents revolted against 
police maltreatment, systemic unemployment, and discriminatory funding of schools and housing. 
In Washington, DC, the city ignited as word spread that an assassin’s bullet snatched Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s life, and citizens already denied home rule spoke through fire—burning homes and stores. 
                                                
3 Robert Mole, “Vietnamese Self-Sacrifice Customs,” 18-19, FJC. 
4 Tad Szulc, “Kennedy Warns the Diem Regime U.S. Will Oppose All Divisive Actions,” NYT, September 13, 
1963. Senator Church was a skeptic about Vietnam. Declassified documents show, for example, that he resisted the 
(literal) party line on the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin, wondering whether the incident was real or fake.  
5 “Hate of War Led to Fiery Death,” The Boston Globe, November 4, 1965. 
6 “Torch Suicides: Sinful at Worst, Futile at Best,” The Washington Post, November 15, 1965. 
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Meanwhile, a world away, across an ocean, napalm and Agent Orange incinerated Vietnamese 
villages, indiscriminately targeting civilians and soldiers alike. And in response, draft cards burned, 
set aflame at rallies and set afire by the Catonsville Nine. The fire next time had arrived. 
“Do I really want to be integrated into a burning house?” asked African-American novelist 
and social critic James Baldwin in his 1962 meditation on race, rights, freedom, and faith.7 He 
possessed a keen awareness of the inherent complexity of religion and politics, particularly as applied 
historically and globally: “In the realm of power, Christianity has operated with unmitigated 
arrogance and cruelty…[and] in the realm of morals the role of Christianity has been, at best, 
ambivalent.”8 Alerted to the growing quagmire in Vietnam, other Americans began to consider and 
reconsider the relationship between religion and politics. Yet if America was a firescape, with moral 
questions crackling in its midst, religion often presented more questions than answers. The 1960s 
were a time of national and international ruptures—of interconnected domestic and global struggles 
for freedom—and the Vietnam War riveted and ripped apart the nation. Long and intransigent, the 
war pillaged American bodies, ravaged Vietnamese soil, and devastated both nations. In the interest 
of containing Communism and advancing democracy, the United States spent a quarter century, 
billions of dollars, and thousands of lives chasing Northern Vietnamese soldiers and Viet Cong 
guerillas through jungles and over mountains.9 None of these expenditures—of time, capital, or 
humanity—produced victory, however. Whether or not the 1973 cease-fire and the 1975 fall of 
Saigon represented military defeats or diplomatic stalemates, and whether or not the loss of 
perspective—both political and moral—was gradual or immediate, military intervention in Southeast 
                                                
7 James Baldwin, “Down at the Cross: Letter from a Region in My Mind,” in The Fire Next Time (New York: 
The Dial Press, 1963, 1969), 108, emphasis original. The essay was originally printed in The New Yorker on November 17, 
1962. 
8 Baldwin, “Down at the Cross,” 59-60. 
9 Vietnamese casualty estimates vary but military and civilian deaths combined to total approximately 3.8 
million people. Christian Appy, Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1993), 16. 
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Asia polarized the United States. 
But fiery demonstrations were neither the only way to push back against state power nor the 
singular story of the cleavages of the Vietnam War era. Quieter battles, too, raged over the same 
issues but primarily were disputed through words and ideas informed by allegiances to God and to 
country that no longer conjoined as easily as they had in the past. For military chaplains, moral 
fracturing was real and religious reckoning constant. Enmeshed in the armed forces and ever 
cognizant of the demonstrations and protests raging around them, clergy in uniform—or those 
contemplating wearing them—shipped out to Vietnam where they spent twelve-month tours 
measuring, doubting, and accepting their value. In an end-of-tour report, for example, Chaplain 
Leonard L. Ahrnsbrak (Assemblies of God) confided, “As the gigantic footfalls of the Viet Cong 
mortars stomped their way up the ridge line toward our positions, I had to ask myself why in the 
name of common sense I was there rather than in a nice civilian church in the city of the Golden 
Gate.” As the booming sounds fell away the minister regained his composure. Hearing the voice of 
a Marine, and the words “‘Padre, I’m glad you are with us’ reaffirmed the necessity of having been 
there.”10 The voice of the plaintive soldier alone on a bombarded ridge who confirmed the minister’s 
decision to serve as a chaplain occupied a critical place in the debates and decisions about the 
chaplaincy in this period. While some religious leaders rejected the chaplaincy altogether as an 
instrument of the military involved in an immoral war, others deliberated whether their faith dictated 
that religious obligation to men overrode moral objection to war. For those chaplains, and for the 
religious groups supporting them, the central question of the Vietnam War was whether God and 
country could align or must diverge. In other words, should chaplains occupy a prophetic role or a 
pastoral one? Vietnam pushed clergy to assess how to reconcile pure fidelity to God with complex 
responsibility to man.   
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The assumed co-mingling of religion and morality had long defined the chaplaincy. Who but 
clergy and what but religion could provide a moral foundation for citizen-soldiers and commanding 
officers? Thus the chaplaincy—an institution built upon and committed to moral monotheism in the 
first half of the twentieth century—became the engine of the military-spiritual complex in the 
postwar period. But these visions and roles assumed a clear and easy alignment of ethics and faith 
with religion and state. Vietnam exposed the fault-lines in these presumptions. When war provoked 
moral turmoil and signaled immorality, were clergy bearing rank and insignia sanctifying profane 
militarism and absolving the state of improper conduct? As the Vietnam War wracked the nation, 
the military chaplaincy became a critical arena of conflict, a venue through which religious groups 
contested American politics, argued about moral priorities, and reconsidered their relationship to the 
state. At the center of these debates lay claims about the meaning and consequences of 
conscience—on individual, national, and global scales. For decades, the military made morality the 
centerpiece of the chaplaincy, but the moral indoctrination promoted by and in the Armed Forces 
could not withstand the pressure of politics. As Vietnam polarized the country, chaplains and 
religious groups questioned the object of religious and ethical imperatives. To whom were chaplains 
obligated? For what causes or what reasons should clergy serve? 
As military chaplains wrestled with their religious obligations and moral priorities during a 
controversial war, so too did the chaplaincy itself change. As an organization staffed by volunteers, 
the chaplaincy depended on the cooperation of religious groups, a relationship not all 
denominations or clergy sought or considered valuable in the midst of a questionable war. As Jews, 
Catholics, and mainline Protestants disputed the legitimacy of the Vietnam War, they protested 
through words and boycotts. Yet when they declined to enter the military, spaces opened for 
religious groups that sought greater involvement with the state. For the NAE and its clergy, the 
obligation to serve God and the desire to serve country aligned perfectly with the openings created 
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by those whose conscience saw a conflict between honoring God and working for country. As a 
result, Vietnam instigated a demographic shift in the religious composition and tenor of the military 
chaplaincy from more liberal and ecumenical to more conservative and sectarian space, a 
transformation that heralded the reshaping of the nation’s religious politics in the decades to follow. 
At the same time, the growing imperative to diffuse escalating racial tension coupled with a need for 
more chaplains led the military to invest in the recruitment of African-American chaplains and 
helped open the chaplaincy to women. Moral turmoil over the Vietnam War thus reordered 
relationships between religious groups and the state, redefined the legal meaning of religion, and 
reconfigured religious access to power within the nation. 
 
Moral Claims and the Vietnam War 
By the late 1960s, Chaplain John J. O’Connor (Catholic) found the growing American 
opposition to war disheartening. A Navy chaplain since 1952, the priest had already completed a 
tour of duty in Vietnam in 1965. When departing Southeast Asia, he reflected on the excruciating 
choices he waded through as a supervisory chaplain based in Da Nang. “How do you keep close 
enough to the field hospital, where all casualties are brought, to be of any use to the dying, and at 
the same time tramp through the hills and valleys to meet the spiritual needs of the living?,” he 
asked. “Do you turn to your all-knowing supervisory chaplain, ensconced virginally in the antiseptic 
halls of a crystal-palace headquarters? What if you are the supervisory chaplain and you live in a tent 
in a field hospital?”11 Present for some of the earliest—and most confusing—troop build-ups, 
O’Connor agonized over how to provide religious coverage to the Third Marine Division. As the 
Army had already discovered, fighting in Vietnam did not resemble conventional warfare and units 
                                                
11 John J. O’Connor, “A Point of View in Vietnam” (1965), emphasis original, FJC. 
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often dispersed over miles of treacherous terrain.12 Ministering to scattered personnel challenged 
the chaplains sent to Vietnam who learned, as O’Connor did, that few resources existed to 
guide them. 
As O’Connor completed his meditation on his efforts and experiences in Vietnam, the anti-
war movement was gaining strength. In spring 1965, the priest’s tasks in Vietnam were new, as were 
most aspects of American intervention. That winter, President Lyndon B. Johnson unleashed 
Operation Rolling Thunder, a torrent of bombing campaigns north of the 17th parallel and, in 
March, sent in the first U.S. ground troops—the Marines Chaplain O’Connor worked alongside. 
Although Congress had not declared war, the American public began to view the dual commitments 
of resources and people as something rather close to war. Dissent gathered strength on college 
campuses and spread outward across the nation.13 Religious groups joined the fray, and within the 
year the National Council of Churches, the American Roman Catholic Bishops, and the Synagogue 
Council of America, among many other groups, had passed resolutions calling for the pursuit of 
peace through negotiation, mediation, and diplomacy in place of bombs, mines, and guns. In 
addition to troop withdrawals, these statements encouraged debate and heightened scrutiny of 
policymakers to ward off the “grave danger that the circumstances of the present war in Vietnam 
may, in time, diminish our moral sensitivity to its evils.”14 
Ever sensitive to the moral questions of war, a chaplain not surprisingly announced in 1966 
the formation of the National Emergency Committee Clergy Concerned About Vietnam (later, 
                                                
12 Herbert L. Bergsma, Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam, 1962-1971 (Washington, DC: History and Museums 
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13 On the demographics, nature, reach, and development of the antiwar movement, see Melvin Small, 
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14 “Statement of the American Roman Catholic Bishops, Meeting in Washington DC, November 1966, in 
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Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam, or CALCAV).15 Prior to Yale College Chaplain William 
Sloan Coffin’s statement, a number of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clergy had gathered to 
develop a national network of chapters that would enable local clergy to engage cooperatively in the 
public politics of dissent. In particular, CALCAV advocated that the United States negotiate a 
settlement with Vietnamese leaders and withdraw troops from what they then called Indochina. The 
ecumenical organization strove to occupy a middle ground between religious pacifism and radical 
activism as well as to link the antiwar and civil rights movements. Above all, its “religious, 
ecumenical, and nonpacifist nature made it more resistant than most antiwar groups to the public’s 
negative attitudes” and thereby helped legitimized dissent as a religious and political necessity among 
moderates.16 Among the many outgrowths of CALCAV was Vietnam: Crisis of Conscience, written by 
Robert McAfee Brown (a navy chaplain during World War II), Abraham Joshua Heschel, and 
Michael Novak and published in 1967. To provide policymakers a rationale for pursuing a 
negotiated settlement, the book offered a moral argument to convince political leaders and the 
American public that diplomacy, rather than force, offered the best option for extricating the United 
States from Southeast Asia.17 
The book, which sold 50,000 copies within the year, exerted the opposite effect on Chaplain 
                                                
15 The name of the organization underwent multiple changes, from Clergy Concerned to Clergy and Laymen 
Concerned and finally to Clergy and Laity Concerned. A 1972 resolution by the local Ann Arbor, Michigan affiliate 
helped instigate the latter change. As Mollie Babize wrote, “While a minor change grammatically, this is – to some of us 
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Staff, August 11, 1972, DG 120, Series I, Box 1, Folder: CALC Steering Committee, 1972, Files of Trudi Young, SCPC.  
16 Mitchell K. Hall, Because of Their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to War (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), 175-6. 
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O’Connor, who seemed to view its antiwar claims as a personal rebuke.18 After all, he too 
understood the conflict as a harrowing moral crisis. But unlike Brown, Heschel, and Novak, he 
viewed the commitment of ground troops to Vietnam as rational, humane, and necessary. He wrote 
his 1968 book, A Chaplain Looks At Vietnam, as a direct retort to Vietnam: Crisis of Conscience, a text he 
viewed as “misleading.”19 American intervention, he asserted, reflected “much more justice and 
sincere concern about the peoples of Vietnam and all of Asia and all the world than self-
aggrandizement, or arrogance of power…much—very much—more anguished determination to 
achieve a just, enduring peace than to protract war.”20 O’Connor, who had completed graduate work 
in ethics at Villanova and was in the midst of doctoral work in political science at Georgetown, 
agreed with many of his opponents that “war is obviously an evil,” but unlike the Berrigan brothers, 
he did not equate that evil with the sin of hatred.21 As he explained to Navy Chief of Chaplains 
James Kelly, before the rear admiral participated in an event with Heschel, “as far as I’m concerned, 
the Rabbi’s arguments are strictly emotional. He wants wars to end. Who doesn’t?”22 Indeed, for 
O’Connor, Vietnam in particular—rather than war in general—was the key moral dilemma. And he 
viewed the war as lawful, in that it was not, in the parlance of Vatican II, total war or war “aimed 
indiscriminately” at the obliteration of land or populations. Likewise, he separated the morality of 
engaging in war from the morality of particular means of warfare; while he was willing to 
acknowledge not all methods were appropriate, proportionate, or acceptable, he never doubted 
either the legitimacy or the justness of American action on behalf of South Vietnam. War could be 
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bitter, distressing, horrific, and terrifying without being immoral.  
Indeed, according to Chaplain O’Connor, the moral quandary posed by Vietnam centered 
on the question of obligation: moral obligation to what and to whom? “What binds us,” he asked, 
offering a litany of options to consider: “International laws? Treaties? Pacts? Our word of honor? 
Private agreements between heads of states? Our real or alleged responsibilities as a world power? 
Self-interest? Public pledges to ‘defend freedom’ wherever threatened? A ‘moral’ obligation to 
defend the weak from the strong, the oppressed from the oppressor? A divine mission to contain 
Communism, or to lead the world?”23 These were the questions everyone ought to be addressing, 
dissenters and proponents alike. His intent, he maintained, was not to disavow conscientious 
objection but to plea for all to gird their claims with facts and parse the nuances of obligation 
accordingly.  
For all his unwavering public support of the morality of intervention in Vietnam, in more 
private moments, Chaplain O’Connor conveyed a more subtle position. Toward the end of his 1965 
tour of duty, he challenged the very nature of a prosaic and instructive end-of-tour report. “The 
night has a thousand eyes. Vietnam has ten thousand faces. Every chaplain sees a different 
face,” he wrote. “To write of ‘the war’ in Vietnam as viewed by ‘the’ chaplain, or to write of 
‘the’ chaplain’s ministry in the war in Vietnam would be to do a reader a disservice. I can write 
accurately of only one war in Vietnam, of very few of her faces, and of the way I personally 
attempt to function.” In language lush and contemplative, O’Connor confessed the absence of a 
singular war about which anyone could exalt or complain. His experience might be illuminating, but 
it was unique. When excoriating his antiwar opponents, however, this calm complexity disappeared 
in order to promote obeisance to national leaders. 
In his fidelity to the chain-of-command, O’Connor exemplified his status as both a Catholic 
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priest and a military chaplain, loyal to the hierarchy of the Church and the American state. Bothered 
by assertions that Lyndon Johnson acted with either “malice or stupidity,” he retained confidence in 
the sincerity of American military and foreign policy leaders, believing them to have spoken and 
acted legally, honestly, and thoughtfully. So long as the president hewed to international law and 
treaties and thus acted honorably, there was no reason to doubt the validity of military engagement. 
“Safe legal grounds,” the future Navy Chief of Chaplains conjectured, yielded “reasonably safe 
moral grounds” from which to operate. Blind to the dubious logic of this claim—slavery, after all, 
was simultaneously legal and immoral—O’Connor trusted his superiors to relay “the facts” about 
U.S. involvement and intervention in Vietnam accurately. Although he would later regret publishing 
the book, critique American involvement in Nicaragua, denounce excessive military spending, and 
counsel against military intervention abroad from his perch as Archbishop of New York in the 
1980s, in 1968, O’Connor was “convinced that the administration has opted to accept the tragedy of 
war as the only available road to meaningful peace.”24 In contrast to the skeptical Americans who 
flagged evidence suggesting the dubious legality of war, O’Connor unconditionally accepted the 
administration’s military goals and information channels. In this way, he echoed the position taken 
by other chaplain leaders. Gerhard W. Hyatt (Lutheran—Missouri Synod), who became the Army’s 
Chief of Chaplains in August 1971, told a reporter, “A man of discernment has to give his 
government the benefit of the doubt.”25 Based on this view, Chaplain O’Connor addressed the 
challenge of conscientious objection to Vietnam not as unacceptable, but as simply unnecessary 
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because the war itself was, in his mind, unavoidable. The Communist foe, dedicated to the 
overthrow of democracy and capitalism, complicit in the ruthless obliteration of Vietnamese lives, 
had to be stopped. 
Other religious voices concurred that the war was essential and moral, if challenging to 
reconcile with biblical mandates to not murder. The National Association of Evangelicals agreed 
that “the major issue is one of freedom” and “the price of freedom is always high.”26 Army Chief of 
Chaplains Francis L. Sampson (Catholic) explained that violence was evil, but since “the 
commandment against killing…is actually a prohibition against murder,” it did not apply to war.27 
Even the evangelical periodical Christianity Today referenced the tension between violence and faith 
felt by God-fearing Americans: “Chaplains and lay leaders alike say the major issue raised constantly 
concerns the morality of war and the killing and maiming that goes on in war. In short,” the article 
asked, “can a serviceman serve God and country?” Interviews revealed that, with a few exceptions, 
most “searched and struggled deeply” to arrive at personally and spiritually acceptable answers.28  
Although Chaplain O’Connor latched onto the morality of Vietnam with full fervor, other 
chaplains expressed less certainty.29 In advance of major press conferences and speeches in the 
1960s, the Navy Chief of Chaplains queried his command about relevant topics and solicited 
opinions about religious work in the armed forces. By the end of the decade, antagonism toward the 
war in Vietnam had so pervaded American society that even Chief of Chaplains James W. Kelly 
(Catholic) surveyed navy chaplains about whether they “consider[ed] American participation in the 
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war in Vietnam to be morally right or wrong.”30 
Officially, chaplains repeatedly asserted that Americans in uniform knew why they were 
fighting in Vietnam and apprehended the import of this duty. Preston Oliver (Presbyterian US) 
bracketed the festering antiwar movement by declaring “our men in Vietnam are not too much 
involved with these issues” because “they are busy doing a job, and they do not feel it is their 
business to second-guess the rationale behind our mission.” Moreover, he credited this approach as 
a manifestation of high morale in which Marines “believe what they are doing, hard though it is, is 
right and necessary.”31 Helping the Vietnamese, Chaplain Loren Lindquist (Congregationalist) 
insisted, enabled Americans to tolerate the brutal conditions of combat. Improving “the future 
welfare of the Vietnamese gives meaning and purpose to their service—a belief based on experience 
and fact that communist aggression is sinister and real.”32 Similarly, Chaplain Beryl Burr (Methodist) 
stated unequivocally “the serviceman knows why he is in Vietnam. He sees a people oppressed—
and in some instances depressed—and he feels a necessity within himself to try to make life a little 
better.”33 Certain that an attitude of friendly neighborliness demanded interference and intervention 
on the part of the United States, Burr accounted for high morale and muscular dedication as part 
and parcel of boosting the welfare and future of Vietnam. As a battalion chaplain, Roy Grubbs 
(Church of God) offered the Navy Chief of Chaplains some grist for a news conference prior to the 
Tet Offensive in January 1968. Grubbs portrayed Marines as stalwart political saviors, full of respect 
for the South Vietnamese as “creature[s] of God” harassed by the North Vietnamese army and the 
Viet Cong guerillas who fail to “recognize the essential dignity of each human being.” In this 
Manichean duel, the Marine “is very much aware of this threat to the peace and security of both 
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South Vietnam and the entire free world.”34 
Yet, letters, surveys, and end-of-tour reports furnish a slightly different—a more textured 
and even knotty—perspective than that of military personnel engaged in a simple fight for freedom 
over tyranny. At a 1967 nuclear training course for military chaplains, the clergy carried on “a free 
and open—and heated!—debate about the Vietnam war.”35 In Vietnam, Chaplain Frederick Arneson 
(Lutheran) detected complexity among his congregational flock: “The truth is, we may not be 
unanimous in our motives for being in this country, but we are here – we did not stand idly by 
and talk.”36 United by a sense of action, the group cohered, but not because they all agreed on 
intentions and purposes for getting on the planes and ships that brought Americans to Vietnam in 
1968. When explaining the necessity of chaplains clambering aside Marines in the field, Chaplain 
Leonard L. Ahrnsbrak (Assemblies of God) disrupted the depiction of Marines as a lock-step parade 
of stoic, well-trained, unwavering freedom fighters. “The Church is concerned with man’s struggle 
with himself, his fears, life and death,” the chaplain commented, “and during operations men do a 
good amount of struggling in this regard.”37 Neither the mandate to kill nor the prospect of death 
felt natural or easy, even among those drilled to obey instructions and follow the lead of 
commanders. Regular encounters with death, Chaplain Paul Pearson (United Methodist) speculated, 
explained his early observation that the troops his unit replaced “seemed to be bitter and hostile.”38 
Mines and snipers, not to mention mosquitoes and cobras, tested the dignity and resolve of battle-
hardened and battle-weary troops; even if the soldiers and Marines entered Vietnam with clarity of 
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conviction, their tours of duty could still snatch that dedication from them.  
The very anxieties and uncertainties described by Pearson also justified the need for 
deploying chaplains with troops in Vietnam. With death ever present, end of life care warranted 
religious oversight. Chaplain John J. Scanlon (Catholic) had an eventful tour by the time he was 
reassigned to a Medical Battalion. During his first few days in-country, he had learned to steer clear 
of heavy vehicles when riding through rice paddies. Thereafter, he acquired an array of practical 
knowledge: how to avoid being a sitting duck in a Viet Cong shooting gallery, how to continue a 
service after a chapel collapsed in the gushing rain, how to counsel men through the monsoon 
killing seasons, how to fashion an altar out of used artillery ammo boxes, and how to stay hydrated 
in oppressive heat when caught between hill fires. When reassigned to a medical battalion after nine 
months in the field with the First Marines, he shuddered and shivered, approaching his new duty 
with “fear and trembling.”39 His concern was warranted as the relative quiet was a mirage. It was 
hectic and exhausting, for “the dead and dismembered (a highly abstract term), the seriously 
wounded and the slightly wounded, the neuro-psychiatric cases, dismembered emotionally and 
mentally—the inevitable product of violent killing, those afflicted by diseases native to this 
country—all these, as well as the doctors and corpsmen, form the congregation of the Field Hospital 
Chaplain.” The physical exhaustion of combat seemed elementary compared to “the strain of 
absorbing so much human hurt,”40 a task understood as fundamental to the work of chaplains.  
Although chaplains attempted to alleviate physical and emotional pain with prayer and 
counsel, many soldiers and Marines self-medicated with drugs, finding more solace and comfort 
through regular opiate use than through daily worship. The easy availability of narcotics in Vietnam 
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in turn created more work for chaplains, as addiction and drug-related problems skyrocketed.41 Few 
chaplains possessed any expertise in substance abuse. Peter J. Cary (Catholic) admitted as much 
when he wrote in his end-of-tour report that “drugs were readily available, according to the hearsay, 
some of which are exotic varieties not commonly found in the United States.” Unable to even 
identify the type of drugs his Marines inhaled or ingested, Cary struggled to find effective ways to 
reach his men. The uneven application of Navy Regulations made discipline even more challenging 
because “the almost universal response of the ‘pot-smoker’ is that smoking marijuana is no worse 
than getting drunk, in fact better because there is no hang-over.”42 Other chaplains developed a deep 
knowledge of the intricacies of drug manufacturing and trafficking, however. Dell F. Stewart 
(Catholic) learned that Da Nang locals mixed marijuana with opium before rolling the drugs into 
extra-long cigarettes. This was a potent mixture, he declared, “definitely habit forming because of 
the opium.” Moreover, a single search-and-seizure operation in one mess hall unveiled a daily haul 
of more than 7,200 joints, a far cry from the 200 reported by an informant, and easily moved by an 
informal network of American and Vietnamese food purveyors and garbage collectors.43 
Coverage of drug-addled soldiers increased in 1971, and a trio of Navy chaplains crafted a 
plan for Chaplains’ Relevance within Emerging Drug Order team, or CREDO as it came to be 
known. To counter the effects of “youth drug culture,” the program sought to boost chaplains’ 
confidence in offering drug counseling sessions and make appropriate referrals. The larger goal was 
to build “a supportive, non-threatening place where the drug involved Navyman may make the 
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initial moves toward health through self-initiated inquiry.” Assuming that “despair” prompted most 
drug use, the program channeled the chaplains’ longtime responsibility for morals and morale to 
emphasize the spiritual “inner life” as an antidote to narcotics. Recovering “the worth and personal 
dignity of the individual” would not only help rescue those mired in drug culture but also enable 
peers to help one another. Whether or not the amalgam of 12-Step programs and therapeutic 
religion addressed the burgeoning drug issues in Vietnam, CREDO (Latin for “I Believe”) 
nevertheless charged chaplains with addressing an ever-expanding set of problems.44 
Equipping men to handle life in the killing fields similarly required the influence of 
chaplains, according to John J. Glynn (Catholic). He arrived in Chu Lai in June 1965 and served with 
Marine combat and medical battalions where, he asserted, chaplains brandished moral restraint. 
Over the course of his year in Vietnam, he noticed that the assigned clergyman “is most likely the 
only voice in his unit who will appeal to his men to show consideration for the native population 
solely on the basis of charity and human dignity.”45 Chaplain Richard McGonigal (United 
Presbyterian) observed that Vietnam placed an inordinate amount of responsibility on young 
officers. “In a minisecond, these men must be D.A., judge, and jury for the lives of helpless civilians 
and the enemy.”46 Without the chaplain’s guidance, then, Marines might fail to treat the Vietnamese 
as people, which would hinder “our ultimate goal in Vietnam, the right of people to live as they 
choose – in freedom and with human dignity.” Drawing on Catholic social teachings that 
emphasized humans made in God’s image as the moral foundation of society, Chaplain Glynn 
transformed military and political operations into religious and moral work. The political aims of 
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U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia—warding off Communism and implanting democracy, by 
whatever means necessary—depended on moral conduct, and in this rendering, chaplains provided 
critical instruction and influence. The chaplain reminded his men of “what is often difficult to see in 
the midst of war – the value of the individual life, Marine or Vietnamese.”47 Men of the cloth might 
summon what men in fatigues could not: moral courage, the audacity to behave ethically during a 
nightmare—or so the military and chaplains hoped.48 
What Glynn characterized as principled duty, other religious leaders scorned as warped 
loyalty. Any support for an immoral war risked elevating mechanical patriotism over prophetic 
leadership. Yet the dichotomy between obligation and objection was rarely that simple or clear. 
 
Objection to War 
More than many other chaplains, veteran Rabbi Roland Gittelsohn (Jewish) understood the 
plight of conscientious objectors. A former pacifist turned padre in World War II, he knew Judaism 
did not compel conscientious objection. But when asked by Vietnam-era draft boards to 
“authenticate the assertion by young Jews that Judaism validated their refusal to participate in 
military activity,” he did so easily.49 As the retired Marine chaplain told his Boston congregation in 
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1970, he felt no uncertainty precisely because “Judaism gives even higher priority to responsibly 
motivated conscience than to government and law.” Successful abstention from service in the armed 
forces—measured by a government-approved classification as a conscientious objector—depended 
on claims of conscience. But what exactly counted as conscience, and what its sources and 
foundations needed to be, rattled antiwar activists and local draft boards alike. By 1964, competing 
definitions and derivations of conscience landed in the Supreme Court. Through several Vietnam-
era draft cases, the judiciary redefined conscience, slowly removing its ties to formal religion and 
crafting a generous interpretation open to believers, agnostics, and atheists alike.     
Neither objection to war, nor objection to state conscription, was new in 1965. American 
anti-war convictions and anti-draft positions were as old as colonial military campaigns and as time-
honored as the Selective Service system. But circumstances had changed, and resistance to imperial 
endeavors took on new urgency in a world ordered by Cold War lenses and colonial frames. 
Consensus on the morality and legitimacy of the Vietnam War hardly existed within the political 
elite, much less the citizenry as a whole, and few religious groups achieved unanimity within their 
ranks. Even the National Association of Evangelicals’ Chaplains Commission, which generally 
supported American military endeavors, described their men as “appalled at how complex the 
problems are at all levels.”50 Combat in Vietnam could be equally correct and mysterious, as “only 
eternity will reveal how the wrath of man has been used to praise Him in Vietnam.”51 
While the American state remained cagey about the soul’s role in buffering patriotic 
obligations, the definition of “conscientious objection” nevertheless evolved over the twentieth 
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century. In the Selective Service’s initial rendition, conscientious objection required belonging to a 
historic peace church such as the Mennonites and Quakers. Intended to ease the work of local draft 
boards, this simplistic metric failed. Plenty of individual citizens held conscientious beliefs about the 
ethics of war that stemmed from faith but not from pacifist faiths.52 By World War II, the state 
accommodated those who “by reason of religious training and belief, [are] conscientiously opposed 
to participation in war in any form” by providing two options: military service in non-combatant 
roles or civilian public service duties (generally in conservation camps, prisons, or mental 
hospitals).53 Severing the tie between individual conscience and church (or synagogue) membership 
enabled conscientious objectors to fulfill a commitment to the state through alternative means. 
Revised again in the postwar period, the Selective Service Act of 1948 (amended in 1951 as the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act) exempted religious objectors from service provided 
they opposed all wars. Moreover, the law defined religion as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a 
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.” This 
emphatically and explicitly excluded “political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely 
personal moral code.”54 By the time the United States entered Vietnam in 1954, then, lawful 
conscientious objection required a commitment to a total rejection of war stemming from an 
individual’s faith in a “Supreme Being.” Relatively capacious in its description of religion and 
categorically strict in its articulation of enmity to combat, the Selective Service guidelines became a 
political battleground as draft calls expanded, inductions soared, and resistance to American 
militarism surged.  
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Faced with specific conditions governing the possibility and plausibility of registering with 
the state as an objector, several Americans took to the courts. Seeking accommodation for less 
religiously-determined opposition to war and lacking support from either Selective Service Director 
Lewis Hershey or Congress, Arno Sascha Jakobson, Forest Britt Peter, and Daniel Andrew Seeger 
refused to be inducted in the military. When petitioning for conscientious objector status, each 
offered an explanation that skirted an affirmation of belief in a Supreme Being, thereby triggering 
the rejections that produced lawsuits. The Supreme Court consolidated the three cases into what 
became known as U.S. v. Seeger. Heard in November 1964 and decided in March 1965, Seeger 
centered on how much latitude draft boards ought to grant to definitions of a Supreme Being.  
To what degree did a conscientious objector need to believe in an entity that resembled a 
religious God? In a unanimous decision, the Warren Court accepted Seeger’s position as sincere and 
thus his status as a state-sanctioned conscientious objector warranted. The justices also offered what 
it deemed an “objective” test to which the Selective Service could subject prospective objectors: 
“does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in 
God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?” So long as draftees’ convictions 
stemmed from a way of thinking and worldview that paralleled the roles of religious doctrine and 
creed, they could validly object to participation in the American military. Rooted in the recognition 
that in 1948, when the Selective Service Act passed, “we were a nation of Buddhists, Confucianists, 
and Taoists, as well as Christians,” the Court “attribute[d] tolerance and sophistication to the 
Congress, commensurate with the religious complexion of our communities.”55 Accounting for the 
diversity of the American religious landscape led the Court to define religion broadly in the realm of 
draft law. 
But applying a broad definition of faith nevertheless clung to religion as a necessary 
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condition of conscientious objection. Indeed, the Seeger decision underscored that no litigant “comes 
to us an avowedly irreligious person or as an atheist,” which, the accompanying footnote pointed 
out, would produce “quite different problems.”56 Into that void leapt Elliot Ashton Welsh II. Faced 
with a 1964 Selective Service form that read “I am by reason of my religious training and belief, 
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form,” Welsh crossed out “my religious 
training.” His local draft board, the appeals board, and the Department of Justice officer refused to 
sanction his revised statement as a defensible interpretation of the law; by 1966, Welsh was 
convicted for refusing induction and sentenced to three years in prison. This case presented the 
court with a far more vexing case than Seeger because Welsh waffled about the degree to which his 
beliefs emanated from a religious perspective. Over the course of his dispute with state officials, he 
held strongly to a fundamental principle that “‘war, from the practical standpoint, is futile and self-
defeating and that from the more important moral standpoint it is unethical.’”57 When challenged 
about whether he understood this perspective as religious, Welsh acknowledged that it did not 
conform to a conventional use of the adjective, and thus did not claim it as such. But, the Court 
observed, in his “long and thoughtful letter” to the Appeal Board, he stated that his antiwar articles 
of faith were “‘certainly religious in the ethical sense of the word.’”58 Thus the Court’s conundrum: 
were ethics the equivalent of or part and parcel of religion? Or were ethics something like religion 
but not entirely the same? Or perhaps ethics sufficiently differed from religion so as to make them 
set apart and distinct? 
In the five years following Seeger, the Warren Court had become the Burger Court, and the 
latter lacked the unanimity on the nature of religious objection to the draft that characterized the 
earlier decision. Nevertheless, a plurality of the justices agreed that Welsh deserved conscientious 
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objector status because, “the central consideration in determining whether the registrant's beliefs are 
religious is whether these beliefs play the role of a religion and function as a religion in the 
registrant's life,” and Welsh complied with this standard.59 Writing for four members of the court, 
Justice Hugo Black explained this conclusion by pointing out that the statute “exempts from military 
service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would 
give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.”60 
According to this rubric, morals, ethics, and religion stood synonymous and equal, all justifying—in 
comparable if not identical ways—state classification as a conscientious objector. Morals, ethics, and 
religion, in the Court’s equation, did not fall under the “essentially political, sociological, or 
philosophical” views or “merely personal moral code” that the draft law excluded. 
But this perspective acquired only four votes. Justice John Harlan arrived at the same 
result—that Welsh was entitled to conscientious objector status—through altogether different logic. 
According to Harlan, morals and ethics, however sincerely held or fervently believed, neither fell 
under the same category as religion nor could be camouflaged as religion. He deemed the position 
held in Seeger “a remarkable feat of judicial surgery” and Black’s opinion “a lobotomy” for 
unfastening theism from religion; these moves reflected “an Alice-in-Wonderland world where 
words have no meaning” instead of recognizing that Congress elevated religious objection over non-
religious objection.61 However, denying conscientious objector status to those opposed to all war for 
non-theistic reasoning, he wrote, “runs afoul of the religious clauses of the First Amendment.”62 For 
Harlan, Welsh presented an Establishment clause issue: the question was not how far to stretch the 
                                                
59 Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970), at 340.  
60 Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970), at 345. Welsh was a 5-3 decision because Justice Harry Blackmun did not 
participate as he joined the court almost 6 months after oral arguments and 6 days before the decision was handed 
down. 
61 Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970), at 352, 355. In a footnote, Harlan argues that the very elasticity of Black’s 
definition of religion avoided an Establishment clause problem. 
62 Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970), at 346. 
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definition of religion, but rather (and in line with religion-state jurisprudence of the era) whether the 
state treated religion and secular beliefs and behaviors equally and consistently. To act non-
preferentially, neither Congress nor the Selective Service could use a religion test to enable 
conscientious objection.63 Adhering to the stance that “legislation must, at the very least, be neutral” 
and allowing for a long history of state-granted exemptions from conscription, Harlan accepted that 
the “prevailing opinion's conscientious objector test…cures the defect of under-inclusion,” thus 
enabling all Americans to access conscientious objector status, regardless of creed.64 
In dissenting from the view that Welsh deserved conscientious objector status, Justices 
Byron White (joined by Potter Stewart and Warren Burger) diagnosed Welsh’s anti-war beliefs as 
constituting “a personal moral code” that, like Justice Harlan contended, was not religion and thus 
expressly violated Congressional directives. But the force of such a non-religious position propelled 
the dissent in the opposite direction; if Welsh prompted any First Amendment concerns, the case 
tended toward Free Exercise, rather than Establishment, clause matters. The exclusion of Welsh 
(and other non-theistic objectors) from draft immunity was constitutionally meaningless because 
“nothing in the First Amendment prohibits drafting Welsh and other nonreligious objectors to war.” 
In a bit of curlicue logic, the dissent decided that Welsh had no standing to challenge the draft law 
on religious grounds because the statute did not recognize the non-believer as a participant in a 
draft-exempt group and thus triggered no First Amendment problem.65 If Welsh’s not-quite-
                                                
63 A multitude of religion-state cases in the 1960s pushed the Court to adopt positions that required legislative 
neutrality or non-preferentialism between religion and secular positions. See, for example, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 
488 (1961) [no test oaths for public office]; Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962) [no school prayer, however generic]; 
Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963) [denying unemployment benefits to someone fired for religious beliefs requires a 
compelling government interest]; Abington Township v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203 (1963) [no school-sponsored Bible readings]; 
and Epperson v. Arkansas 393 U.S. 97 (1968) [no prohibitions on teaching evolution]. 
64 Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970), at 362, 366-7. 
65 Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970), at 370. The dissent analogized “If the Constitution expressly provided that 
aliens should not be exempt from the draft, but Congress purported to exempt them and no others, Welsh, a citizen, 
could hardly qualify for exemption by demonstrating that exempting aliens is unconstitutional. By the same token, if the 
Constitution prohibits Congress from exempting religious believers, but Congress exempts them anyway, why should 
the invalidity of the exemption create a draft immunity for Welsh?” (369). 
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religious conviction did not itself deny Welsh standing or allow for the lower court’s legal judgment, 
then attention to the purpose of exemptions highlighted the necessity of religious dispensation. 
White argued that Congress’ constitutional mandate to “raise and support armies” existed pursuant 
to the constitutional directive to permit free exercise of religion; as a result, religious amnesty 
became necessary lest conscription force believers, contra their free exercise rights, to participate in 
combat. Protecting the faithful from mandatory service represented a compelling government 
interest; enabling the non-religious to avoid compulsory service, in contrast, did not. While the 
dissent did not carry the court, it attempted to shelve ambiguity as merely persnickety rather than 
engage with the increasingly blurry lines of anti-war sentiment. 
Indeed, additional legislation and executive orders during the 1960s continued to recalibrate 
the nature of the draft. Curtailed student deferments, limited to four-year degrees and 24th birthdays, 
replaced generous student deferments. Graduate and professional degrees no longer offered an 
escape hatch for the committed pacifist or the privileged resister.  
Yet for many Americans, Vietnam represented war-mongering on an unprecedented scale 
and a quandary that wholesale religious objection could not resolve. Religious groups, too, weighed 
in, condemning certain forms of state-sanctioned violence or moments in imperial interventions. 
Most American faiths expressed distaste for war—it was horrible, nasty, abhorrent, unfortunate, and 
detestable. But with the exception of explicitly pacifist faiths, denominations struggled over the 
boundaries of appropriate and acceptable war. There were cases, most notably World War II, in 
which war was necessary and thus religiously justified. But Vietnam teetered on the narrow edge of a 
rocky cliff, its grasp on legitimacy far more slippery than earlier military endeavors including Korea. 
What many Catholics considered an unjust war, others—the faithful and the skeptics alike—deemed 
an unwarranted military campaign. Their objection was not, as the draft law permitted, to all wars 
but to this particular war. They promoted a position of selective conscientious objection: their 
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conscience, their moral instincts, their ethical scruples, stipulated draft resistance, but only when the 
aims or conduct of war violated certain standards.66  
The Boston Beit Din, or rabbinical court, similarly acknowledged that it could not make a 
“definitive finding” on Vietnam, since it “[did] not consider itself competent to do so as a judicial 
body.” Yet it engaged in ten months of study, querying Jewish sources as well as Congressional and 
executive branch documents and domestic and international journals, to arrive at a Jewish legal 
answer to the question of conscience. Rabbinical courts long functioned as communal sources of 
authority on religious dilemmas, ranging from ritual practice to business dealings to interpersonal 
relations. Matters of national policy and politics, however, rarely entered their orbit. Indeed, as the 
responsum writer, Rabbi Samuel Korff, plainly stated, “the U.S. Government quite obviously was 
not represented as a party before us.” But, as in the rest of American society, “this nightmare of 
Vietnam” raised doubts and uncertainty about heretofore assumed congenial relationships between 
religion and politics. What did the imperative to seek peace require? What constituted conscientious 
objection and was it allowed? And finally, in light of the prevailing antiwar rhetoric and draft cases 
before U.S. courts, “does Judaism make a distinction between religion and morality?”67 
The Beit Din determined that the national judiciary (i.e. the Supreme Court) held the 
ultimate power to determine the legality of war, but individuals and communities retained the power 
to question and judge state action. Conscientious objection, when used as a means to confront the 
morality of state behavior (be it on matters of war or civil rights or any other question of justice) was 
therefore necessary. Indeed, dissent symbolized a robust, secure nation, not a fragile, weak one. 
                                                
66 Catholic just war doctrine (jus ad bellum) focuses on seven related criteria: rightful cause; proper authority; 
comparative justice; peaceful intent; last resort; likelihood of success; and proportionality. Just war theory also sets 
parameters for behavior during war (jus in bello): discrimination; proportionality; minimum necessary force; fair treatment 
of prisoners of war; no evil means (rape, nuclear weapons, etc). Jean Bethke Elshtain, ed., Just War Theory (New York: 
NYU Press, 1991) 
67 Samuel I. Korff, “A Responsum on Questions of Conscience,” January 14, 1970, 10-11, 2, 4, available online: 
http://www.utzedek.org/files/Boston%20Beit%20Din,%20Conscientious%20Objection%20Responsa.pdf. 
  359 
 
Following the lead of a memo written by political scientist Leonard J. Fein, the Jewish court agreed, 
“there is no a priori reason to indulge the absolute morality of total conscientious objection and to 
forbid the relative morality of selective conscientious objection.”68 Jewish law, therefore, supports 
both forms of conscientious objection. On the matter of war specifically, the court adopted a 
nuanced stance. On the one hand, drawing on biblical sources, it recognized that it was wrong to 
“stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor” and that “man is his brother’s keeper.”69 On the other 
hand, the court appreciated the fallibility of the state, noting that the government’s authority to 
conduct war “is not a mandate to violate the basic principles of justice and morality.”70 In elegant 
language that co-opted rhetorical political currency of the 1968 election, the court wrote “the ‘silent 
majority’ that does not demonstrate against injustice, poverty, and hunger should not be forged into 
an instrument for the silencing of the minority whose concern is demonstrated through an 
expression of protest.”71 
Religion without morality could lead to idolatry, which in turn led the court to conclude that 
religion and morality were inseparable. But just as “every religious experience sharpens the moral 
awareness of the individual,” so too did “every response engendered by moral persuasion give 
expression to a religious grounding of moral values.”72 In this way, the righteous acted religiously 
even without grounding their beliefs and actions in a deity. For a religion rooted in conduct—ritual, 
practice, and behavior—this seemingly twisty logic was perfectly straightforward: noble deeds need 
not originate in religion to be religious.  
With support and encouragement from religious leaders, conscientious objection began to 
                                                
68 Korff, “A Responsum on Questions of Conscience,” 21-2. 
69 Korff, “A Responsum on Questions of Conscience,” 38-9. The quotes are from Leviticus 29:16 and Genesis 
4:9, respectively. 
70 Korff, “A Responsum on Questions of Conscience,” 35. 
71 Korff, “A Responsum on Questions of Conscience,” 40. 
72 Korff, “A Responsum on Questions of Conscience,” 53. 
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infiltrate the ranks, much to the dismay of many chaplains who had to advise those who Army 
Chaplain Jack Brown (Southern Baptist) deemed “reluctant” soldiers.73 Regulations stated that those 
seeking discharges on grounds of conscience had to undergo an interview with a chaplain, after 
which the chaplain would write a report that commented on “the sincerity of the individual in his 
belief and an expression of his opinion as to whether the individual’s objection to military duty is 
based on religious beliefs.”74 The shift to acting like a local draft board was often uncomfortable. 
Chaplain Ronald L. Hedwall (Lutheran) felt ill-equipped to address the qualms lodged by an African-
American soldier who, based on his own inquiries, had “adopted the view that we, as a nation, were 
wrong in being involved; and that he, as a Negro, had no business being involved.” He understood 
the history of American intervention in Vietnam “in quite an opposite way” than the chaplain had 
been instructed, which left Hedwall “greatly handicapped in my ability to counsel him.” And this 
was not an isolated incident, but rather an opening volley. Chaplains, Hedwall told his superiors, 
needed improved resources and more familiarity with anti-war positions and perspectives in order to 
best handle resistance in the field.75 Although a Presbyterian chaplain maintained, “no chaplain can 
decide whether the protesting soldier is right or wrong in his decision,” Chaplain Brown spared no 
spite in addressing dissent in his midst.76 He disapproved of the “negative influence” of the antiwar 
movement infecting combat-ready units, and found it difficult to offer neutral counsel. “I have little 
patience with men I consider cowards,” he wrote in his journal on May 11, 1968. A few months 
later, all he could do was exclaim: “Gracious! … What a demanding ministry” in reference to those 
who threatened to renounce their citizenship, write to their congressmen, and inhabit a “defector’s 
                                                
73 Jack Brown, Another Side of Combat: A Chaplain Remembers Vietnam (Nashville, TN: Cold Tree Press, 2006), 65-
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74 Army Regulations 635-20, January 5, 1966; Office of the Chief of Chaplains, “Historical Review, July 1965-
December 1966,” 43. 
75 Ronald L. Hedwall, Experiences and Observations in Vietnam, August 22, 1967, 2, FJC. 
76 Chaplain H in “The Military Chaplaincy: Captive or Free?” 1968, xii, I-249, Box 15, Folder 93, AJHS. 
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attitude.”77  
Despite his aggravation with wrestling with conscientious objectors, Chaplain Brown also 
recognized that reconciling deep Christian faith with violence, killing, and war was neither effortless 
nor obvious. Prior to arriving in Vietnam, he too had thought about these disjunctures, and he wrote 
an article on “The Question of Jesus and War” to address how Christian Americans could resolve 
this dilemma. Lessons from the Bible provided a clear, if not always well-marked, trail for coming to 
terms with religion and war. Tracing moments of anguish and anger—of Cain’s outcry “Am I my 
brother’s keeper?” and of Jesus’ admonition to aid the downtrodden—Brown found a script for the 
necessity of military intervention. In contrast to the Boston rabbinical court which complicated the 
message embedded in the story of Cain and Abel by seeing protest as a form of safeguarding, the 
Southern Baptist minister framed the vexed war as an instance of “defending with whatever means 
is necessary against those who strike my brother, whoever and wherever my brother might be.” 
Unmoored from political boundaries or geographic proximity, confronting the communist menace 
could be understood as innocent filial protection. Citing Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, Brown further 
argued “the privileges of freedom and peace” created an obligation to fortify those “same blessings 
of freedom” and to “protect his brother from greed, covetousness, and aggression” worldwide. Not 
only could the United States aid Vietnam, but it also should do so. And with obligation came 
sacrifice—most often through the lives and bodies of virile American men—and this sacrifice, in 
turn, demanded absolute respect, not protest. The emphasis on respect and sacrifice enabled Brown 
to make a place for the “patriotic pacifist,” the religious believer who refused to bear arms but 
willingly accepted noncombatant service. This was responsible pacifism, a position distinct from the 
reams of draft dodgers, antiwar protesters, draft card burners, and Canada-bound dissidents who 
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engaged in “irresponsible citizenship.”78 Through lenses both religious and political, the chaplain 
carefully distinguished the righteous from the sinful, the accountable from the culpable, and the 
patriotic from traitorous. 
Bob Cohoon was one of those men whom Chaplain Brown would have considered a 
nuisance, if not a full-fledged derelict. Stationed in San Antonio when he realized he could not 
continue to serve in the military, he requested a discharge on the basis of conscience. A meeting 
with his commanding officer, in which he “spoke freely, confident that as an American citizen I still 
possessed the rights of free speech and freedom of religion,” failed to yield a discharge, at which 
point he went AWOL. A responsible soldier, he felt the need to explain his status, telling his fellow 
members of the San Antonio Committee for Peace and Freedom that “the Army suppresses anti-
war activities” and “I was being denied my rights of free speech and freedom of religion by Army 
harassment, restrictions and by the common manipulation of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice…. a soldier might be tried for treason or mutiny for mearly [sic] being associated with a 
peace group.” What Chaplain Brown took to be cowardice, if not national and spiritual betrayal, 
many in the anti-war movement saw as unusual strength of spirit. As J. Harold Sherk, a Mennonite, 
explained, conscientious objection (CO) “may require moral stamina of an unusual kind, not only 
because it is a minority position, often misunderstood and sometimes despised, but because the 
CO’s call to the service of God and humanity may lead him to unusual hazards.”79 
These hazards could extend to chaplains themselves. While clergy chose to enter the service 
as chaplains, they too occasionally questioned the morality and legitimacy of the war effort. Chaplain 
Harry Schreiner (Jewish) wanted to catalog unmitigated devotion among his charges, but even so, 
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occasional exceptions clouded his pronouncement that there was “no appreciable change” in 
soldiers’ diligence. He admitted that “isolated cases among draftees…of doubt” existed and 
acknowledged that exchanges with newly inducted chaplains “reveal[ed] that a minority of the above 
have serious doubts about our situation in Vietnam. They are disturbed by the ‘credibility gap’ in 
govt. circles including the President. They question the moral issues in respect to our involvement in 
V[ietnam].”80 Chaplain Stephen Levinson (Jewish) was one of those rabbis who agonized about how 
to handle his service obligation in light of his growing moral aversion to Vietnam. As soon as the 
Central Conference of American Rabbis validated selective conscientious objection, he requested a 
discharge because of the “deep, personal distress” the war provoked.81  
While some Jewish chaplains struggled with the specific dilemmas kindled by the ongoing 
inferno in Southeast Asia, Chaplain James R. Forte (Presbyterian USA) identified why simultaneous 
allegiance to God and country could be far more precarious than chaplaincy boosters declared. 
“Jesus Christ knows no national boundaries. The military establishment knows only national 
boundaries. And the chaplain is part of that establishment.”82 To be an officer in the U.S. military 
was to obey a human and a governmental commander-in-chief, and yet God—the ultimate authority 
to a member of clergy, if not also the faithful laity—observed no such state loyalties. Theological 
anticommunism notwithstanding, an omniscient and omnipresent God might inspire the Geneva 
Convention protocols but hardly obeyed the DMZ or dispersed napalm. This was the essential 
problem facing a skeptical or uncertain chaplain in the Vietnam War-era. As the valence of good—
or at least necessary and worthwhile—war slipped away, the once conjoined dual loyalties to faith 
and to nation, no longer overlapped or coincided quite so smoothly. 
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Selective Conscientious Objection  
The Commission on Jewish Chaplaincy (CJC) was in a bind. It barely mustered 81 percent of 
the 73-chaplain quota it promised to supply to the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
Already 12 rabbis short, the group knew it would lose an additional 14 men as they completed their 
terms of service in the remainder of 1966, thus bringing the total of Jewish chaplains owed to the 
Armed Forces to 26.83 And the war in Vietnam was escalating, protests against the war increasing, 
and rabbinical students at Yeshiva University (YU), the Jewish Theological Seminary (JTS), and 
Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion (HUC-JIR) growing more resistant to military 
service. After all, as future members of clergy, the men who intended to be American rabbis had no 
obligation to enlist; as students and then as ordained rabbis they stood outside the reach of the 
Selective Service. The CJC, a subgroup of the Jewish Welfare Board, saw the situation differently, 
however. Since 1950, the CJC, in conjunction with the three main seminaries of the Orthodox, 
Conservative, and Reform movements, had operated its own internal draft to provide the military 
with adequate rabbinical representation. Working together, the three major Jewish movements each 
furnished one-third of the military’s Jewish chaplaincy quota and thereby ensured that Jewish 
military personnel—whether conscripts, enlistees, or officers—could reasonably access Jewish 
chaplains.  
Vietnam broke this system. By the mid-1960s, more and more rabbinical students were filing 
statements of conscientious objection to war, and thus conscientious objection to serving in the 
military in any capacity, even as noncombatant chaplains. Orthodox rabbinical students instigated 
the clamor for change. The burden of the chaplaincy fell disproportionately on young, single, fit 
men—for the CJC’s draft followed the contours of the Selective Service in separating men by 
marital and parental status and relied on military physicals to vet the health of men. Most Orthodox 
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YU students were married and relatively unaffected by the draft. As a result, the very small 
proportion of YU students who fell within the draft’s scope became some of its most vocal 
opponents. By winter 1968, YU pulled out of the CJC draft, and the Conservative Movement’s 
Rabbinical Assembly (RA) followed suit. In 1966, the RA had proclaimed, “the American rabbinate 
cannot shirk its responsibility in providing chaplains.” But just two years later, at its annual 
convention in March 1968, the organization took a radically different position. No longer concerned 
with “shirking responsibility,’ it adopted the report of its internal Committee on Chaplaincy, which 
asserted, “the present system of drafting men into the military chaplaincy is morally untenable and 
practically unworkable.”84 With a mere 66 Jewish chaplains in the military and 15 to be released over 
the summer, only the three campuses of HUC-JIR retained its commitment to the draft and to the 
responsibility to serve Jewish personnel.85 The Reform Movement’s reluctance to remove its 
students from the chaplaincy would, in the words of the Rabbinical Assembly, produce “a sharp 
crisis of conscience with which we must reckon.”86 
Although the number of seminarians was not huge, they were vocal, passionate, and 
enmeshed in a much larger, national debate about the viability of the chaplaincy, about the feasibility 
and ethics of “selective conscientious objection,” about the tension between objection and 
obligation on the part of religious leaders, and about the meaning of freedom within a democracy. 
They were at once part of the mainstream and sitting at its periphery. They tangled with values and 
ideas as Americans, Jews, and future rabbis—at times expressing common feelings and at times 
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proffering atypical arguments. They grappled with collusion in the violence of war as students within 
a Jewish movement whose political orientation was generally anti-war but whose communal 
commitments demanded sacrifice. Overall, then, they questioned and debated the role of the military 
chaplain, wondering whether they could accept a position that, for fifty years, the American Jewish 
community had seen as a badge of American religious legitimacy.  
The HUC debate over conscientious objection and the military chaplaincy hinged on the 
meaning of morality. When announcing new registration procedures in 1965, Nelson Glueck, the 
president of HUC, stated that the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR) “makes it a 
moral obligation for all eligible graduates of the College-Institute to serve in the Chaplaincy of the 
American armed forces.” Whereas the Conservative movement’s Rabbinical Assembly had initially 
framed the chaplaincy as a responsibility to American Jewry, the Reform movement’s CCAR insisted 
that duty to serve Jewish personnel in the military represented an ethical imperative.87 A 1966 CCAR 
memo further elaborated, “We are all mutually obligated to provide sufficient Jewish chaplains for 
the needs of our men and women in the armed forces….All personal desires must inevitably bow to 
this obligation and need.” The appeal to need was not vacuous. Marine Chaplain Richard Dryer 
reported traveling extensively over the Da Nang-Chu Lai-Phubai area in order to serve “mobile and 
widely scattered” Jewish personnel who, despite grueling “combat patrols and similar missions,” 
achieved a 90 percent attendance rate at services and classes held by the itinerant chaplain. An 
additional Marine Jewish chaplain, Dryer noted, would be “a double boon” as it would enable more 
and better outreach to Jewish men as well as free up the Christian chaplains who had been pitching 
in.88 Thus while the CCAR’s position may not have reflected the outlook of all rank-and-file Reform 
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rabbis, it nevertheless raised the stakes of resisting the charge to enlist as chaplains. From the 
CCAR’s perspective, the obligation to staff the military chaplaincy stemmed not from patriotic 
commitment but from moral command and communal obligation. 
The CCAR’s stance echoed that of Protestants embroiled in comparable disputes about the 
moral dilemmas engendered by the military chaplaincy within their own denominations.89 Rabbi 
Bertram Korn—a World War II chaplain and head of the CCAR’s Chaplaincy Committee—
informed HUC students that “chaplains are not propagandists, and they do not give religious 
sanction to war. Rather, they respond to the realities of life and the needs of Jews – which is the 
responsibility of all rabbis.” Similarly, an editorial from the General Commission on Army and Navy 
Chaplains, the parallel entity to the Commission on Jewish Chaplaincy, asserted that the role of the 
military chaplain “does not constitute or imply an endorsement of war in general or of any wars in 
particular.” Rather, it continued, “as morally responsible men, chaplains are not permitted to ignore 
the larger context in which they serve. It is to be expected that chaplains will be alert and sensitive to 
conditions of needless inhumanity and unlawful acts of war which might compromise their nation or 
undermine their own integrity and witness as ministers of the Gospel.”90 That the military employed 
the chaplain did not, according to this logic, mitigate the chaplain’s own religious training, 
ordination, and beliefs. The chaplain’s uniform did not obstruct loyalty to religious creed or moral 
standards; in fact, the chaplain served watch, guarding the military from itself, from proclivities 
toward reckless and unnecessary violence that threatened both God and country. 
Rabbinical students did not find this line of argument compelling. In 1965, the CCAR 
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Chaplaincy Committee received its first petition “in a number of years” for an exemption from the 
Chaplaincy Draft on the grounds of conscientious objection. From the LA campus of HUC, Louis 
Feldman wrote that he was “completely opposed to the use of military force under any 
circumstance” and that he believed it was “morally wrong to accept a noncombatant position in the 
armed forces” because “such noncombatant roles…make the combatant soldier possible.” As an 
institution, the military was “immoral” and Feldman could not, in good conscience, acquiesce to 
serving it or its members.91 Less than a year later, Richard Lavin filed his claim for CO status, noting 
that his politics and his religion were indivisible, and “paramount in my religious convictions is a 
belief in the dignity and holiness of human life.” As a result, he argued, “the presence of such a 
clergyman in the military identifies those forces with a sanctity that does not exist. His presence is a 
manifestation of the myth of the ‘holy war.’ His function, as a chaplain, can only serve to perpetuate 
that myth.”92 Military chaplains, these students asserted, provided moral cover for an immoral 
military, a role they could neither inhabit nor endorse. 
For most rabbinical students, however, the question of conscientious objection to war was 
more nuanced. Few held absolute pacifist positions, but many found American intervention in 
Vietnam intolerable, immoral, and shameful. As the HUC-NY students stated in February 1968, 
“the specific problem with which we are faced is a rather intractable compulsory chaplaincy system” 
given that “many rabbinic students doubt the morality of serving as a chaplain in or during the Viet 
Nam war or doubt the advisability of having a compulsory chaplaincy system at all from either a 
moral or expedient point of view.”93 Jerold Levy, a rabbinical student set to graduate from the HUC 
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in the spring 1968—right as the war in Vietnam reached its apex—asserted that HUC’s mandatory 
chaplaincy requirement amounted to nothing less than Jewish and American institutional trampling 
on individual freedom and conscience. He accused Rabbi Korn and the Chaplaincy Committee of 
“stifl[ing] our most deeply held—one might say, religiously held—convictions against involvement in 
this immoral war; we should subject ourselves to the obedient political silence required of officers in 
the armed forces; we should rather than provide true religious leadership.”94 The particularity of 
Vietnam, not a universal opposition to war, weakened and then dissolved the Jewish commitment to 
the chaplaincy. Although American rabbis had eagerly entered the American military chaplaincy 
since World War I, Vietnam—“this immoral war,” in Levy’s words—demanded a new form of 
religious leadership, an obeisance to God rather than country, and a resistance to unyielding military 
might.  
Participating in the chaplaincy not only represented a potential collusion with an immoral 
government, but also an abrogation of the rabbi’s ability to lead through criticism and dissent. HUC 
students analyzing the chaplaincy recognized that “any participation in demonstrations, rallies, 
meetings, or counseling sessions which were aimed against the policies of the United States 
Government would be a violation of the oath taken at the time one receives one’s commission.” Air 
Force Chaplain Nathan Landman disagreed, arguing, “there is no such thing as ‘absolute freedom’ of 
the pulpit.” Rather, he asserted, “the preacher has to take into consideration the audience to whom 
he is preaching. He has to be dedicated to meeting their spiritual needs and enlarging their spiritual 
horizons….When a chaplain preaches on the politics of Vietnam to men in uniform, the best he can 
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do is demoralize their own performance.”95  
Even as Jewish chaplains debated the latitudes afforded and the restrictions policed by the 
military, the question of freedom of conscience continued to plague the CCAR and the Jewish 
community writ large. On the “delicate and explosive” issue of the chaplaincy, Rabbi Stephen 
Passamaneck wondered whether the CCAR was “willing to put our morality where our mouth is.” 
Given that “coercion and conscription are indeed anathemas to a group of Rabbis who profess 
severally and collectively the absolute moral and religious value of personal freedom for all men,” 
Passamaneck continued, “how can we deny this freedom absolutely to our own members?”96 
Meanwhile The Jewish Advocate editorialized, “One of the positive factors that has emerged from the 
national anguish over the Vietnam War is the nagging recognition that if democracy is to flower 
fully, individual freedom must be expanded.” Thus, the paper asserted, the nation needed to 
recognize “selective but genuine conscientious objection” to war in part because only voluntary 
spiritual leadership could nourish soldiers and a nation in crisis.97 
By the late 1960s, the viability of “selective conscientious objection” as a moral, political, and 
military standpoint wracked the nation, and American Jews actively engaged in the debate. Rabbi 
David Max Eichhorn, a retired Army chaplain who led the CJC, rejected selective conscientious 
objection as ignoble and destructive; pacifists, he noted, supported the chaplaincy  “while the 
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pseudo-pacifist, the ‘selective’ COs try to destroy the chaplaincy.”98 Most American Jews, in 
contrast, found the idea of selective conscientious objection more palatable and understandable the 
total conscientious objection. Even Rabbi Bertram Korn, a tireless advocate for the chaplaincy who 
viewed conscientious objection skeptically, hinted at the need for a less categorical stance. In 1965, 
when the CCAR received its first petition for CO status from Louis Feldman, Korn responded to 
the rabbinical student by allowing for his convictions but nevertheless requesting that he consider a 
series of questions before committing himself to the CO position. First, he asked, “If the equivalent 
of Nazis were to arise in Europe or in America someday and attempt to wipe out the Jews by force, 
would you be willing to let that force have its way without opposing it in any physical fashion 
whatsoever?” Second, he queried, “If the Arab states were again to attack Israel and you were a 
resident there, would you refuse to take up arms against them while they made every possible effort 
to drive the people of Israel into the sea and exterminate them?”99 In attempting to suss out the 
veracity and extent of Feldman’s convictions, Korn invoked both the recent past and present day, to 
considerations of Jews as victims and Jews as fighters. Couched in the rhetoric of Arab nationalism 
and in the biblical language of Pharoah’s efforts to extinguish the Israelites in the Red Sea, Korn 
pressed the rabbinical student to assess whether his moral objection to war extended to all times and 
places, to the Holocaust and the nascent state of Israel, to specifically Jewish causes as well as 
American ones. Could an American Jewish rabbi really abhor participation in all wars?  
For Korn, the answer was, undoubtedly, no. Indeed, for Korn as well as for other vociferous 
advocates of the chaplaincy—many of whom served as chaplains in a “good war,” World War II—
the commitment was not to the American nation, to American empire, or to American force. The 
allegiance—religious and moral—was to k’lal Yisrael, or to the Jewish community within the United 
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States. As Aryeh Lev wrote, the military granted Judaism its standing in tri-faith America and 
thereby “accorded it the respected status which is now has in the total American community.” 
Abdicating the chaplaincy to address the problem of Vietnam was, he argued, “like using a cap gun 
to explode an iceberg.” Not only did it represent an ineffective solution, but it would harm only 
American Jews, not the government: “To remove Jewish chapels and chaplains from that service is 
to take from the Jewish GI a very important source of comfort, self-expression, and hope. Such a 
step would in no way affect the policies of our government in Vietnam.”100  
But the late 1960s were a time of “impossible polarization.”101 Appeals to Jewish community 
could not, as a rule, overcome the students’ opposition to an immoral war. Even chaplains in the 
field were not immune: one navy chaplain found himself more and more distressed by the war and 
could not countenance a position other than selective conscientious objection. On that basis, he 
requested a release from the service.102 On the question of moral obligation, HUC students and 
leaders continued to volley back and forth: to individual conscience or to the American Jewish 
community. HUC held on to the chaplaincy draft and commitment to service for months to follow, 
over and against the “semi-yippy” students who seemed to enter the seminary in greater numbers 
each year. The draft deferments accorded to clergy may well have increased the proportion of 
protesting students, for seminaries stood as prospective shelters for those seeking a means of legal 
draft-dodging. The CCAR’s Chaplaincy Committee rejected the Reform movement’s inclination to 
dissolve the chaplaincy draft, asserting that they would “not be stampeded into the rejection of our 
moral duty.” But their verbal protests could not compete with the ever-increasing moral opposition 
to war: over the course of 1968 and 1969, more and more HUC students would file for CO or 
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selective CO status. In 1969, the CCAR extinguished the draft.103 For Bertram Korn, Sylvan 
Schwartzman, Aryeh Lev, and the other defenders of the military chaplaincy, there was perhaps one 
final, if small, victory. In 1969, Peter Rubinstein, the HUC-NY student who led the student 
movement against the chaplaincy, decided, after much “thinking and soul-searching” to accept a 
commission as a Navy chaplain.104 
For prospective chaplains, selective conscientious objection offered an avenue through 
which they could retain fidelity to faiths that did not proclaim pacifism as well as to beliefs that did 
not condone wanton violence. In this way, they could withstand the pressure to consecrate state 
behaviors they found unacceptable. As the NAE reported, somewhat derisively, “The Methodist 
Church has many church leaders with rather strong pacifist leanings who do not feel ministers 
should serve in the chaplaincy where the preaching of such doctrine would be restricted.”105 But as 
clergy, chaplains held envious positions from the perspective of other selective conscientious 
objectors. Freed from the noose of the draft, anti-war ministers, priests, and rabbis could simply 
choose not to volunteer for military service.  
Draft-eligible laymen, in contrast, lacked an administrative escape route (though the road to 
Canada aided some). Guy Gillette (Humanist) refused to comply with his draft notice, declining 
induction in the armed forces, and Louis Negre (Catholic) sought an honorable discharge from the 
service. Both viewed Vietnam as an abhorrent overreach of state power; their aversion to soldiering 
was not universal but particular, aimed at U.S. campaigns in Southeast Asia. The court consolidated 
the two cases, but neither man found the relief he sought. Written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the 
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8-1 majority opinion in Gillette discerned neither a religious preference nor an alternative 
interpretation of the statutory language that granted exemptions only to those “conscientiously 
opposed to participation in war in any form.” Plain in its declaration and simple in its meaning, the 
law clearly stated “that conscientious scruples relating to war and military service must amount to 
conscientious opposition to participating personally in any war and all war.”106 Even if selective 
conscientious objection emerged from a religious belief, moreover, the Selective Service standard of 
opposition to all war still applied to every draft-age American male, regardless of his religious 
affiliation or lack thereof. Indeed, in the interest of equity and fairness to all, it was imperative to 
maintain a system in which “the relevant individual belief is simply objection to all war, not 
adherence to any extraneous theological viewpoint” lest the “more articulate, better educated, or 
better counseled” prevail where the less sophisticated, poorly educated, or poorly advised might 
fail.107 The very malleability of selective objection voided its legal plausibility as a matter of public 
policy.  
While the court focused on the need to maintain the integrity of the draft and the 
democratic impulse at the heart of mass conscription, antiwar activists—religious and secular—
hewed to selective conscientious objection as an utterly reasonable and appropriate approach to the 
exigencies of Vietnam. It remained possible, they felt, that other wars, like some past wars, would 
meet their moral standards. Justice William Douglas’ meditative dissent embraced the religious cause 
at the heart of Gillette’s plea: “I had assumed that the welfare of the single human soul was the 
ultimate test of the vitality of the First Amendment.”108 Although Douglas lacked company, his 
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dissent also pointed to the ultimate power of selective conscientious objection. He concluded with a 
quote from Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), another wartime case that permitted Jehovah’s 
Witnesses (and any others) to desist from the pledging allegiance to the flag every morning at school. 
In writing “freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much…. the test of its 
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order,”109 Douglas 
presaged the larger implications of selective conscientious objection for the Selective Service system.  
“The existing order” could not remain, and the inability legally to accommodate selective 
conscientious objection ultimately dismantled the Selective Service draft as it had doomed the Jewish 
seminaries’ internal chaplaincy draft.110 The state had long been able to contain conscientious 
objection by bracketing pacifism because, as an outgrowth of historic peace churches, the categorical 
refusal to serve in the military (and, to a lesser extent, in combatant roles) made no distinction in the 
origins, methods, aims, or outcomes of war. But selective conscientious objection operated 
according to a radically different logic, deriving its legitimacy from parsing, distinguishing, and 
evaluating war’s causes, means, and ends. In this way, it challenged one of the fundamental domains 
of the modern state—the ability and need to wage war. 
 
Caught in the Crossfire: The End of the Military Chaplaincy?  
The angst surrounding the morality of the war, the military and the chaplaincy reached a 
fever pitch by the early 1970s. In 1966, the Military Chaplains’ Association resolved that chaplains 
who served in Vietnam were “unanimous in their agreement that they, with the men they are 
committed to serve, are where they ought to be, that our mission is just and that the need of the 
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people there for our support, military, financial, and humanitarian, is real and urgent.”111 However, 
in response to growing questions about the efficacy and morality of Vietnam, the United 
Presbyterian Church asked whether the military chaplaincy was “captive or free.” Could a church 
committed to peace and reconciliation support a military ministry? It was an unscientific survey, but 
it offers a telling snapshot of the concerns and priorities of the men sufficiently concerned to reply. 
Of the 23 chaplains who responded, most agreed that they retained freedom of the pulpit in the 
service—or at least maintained a position as “unfettered” as civilian pastors serving at the will of 
their congregations in circumstances “when such questions as conscience versus tact arise.”112 
Indeed, Chaplain B, an infantry chaplain in Vietnam, emphasized that he had “preached against the 
war, even the war in Vietnam” without any repercussions from his superiors whom, he noted, 
attended his services.113 Chaplain L similarly insisted that clergy played a pivotal role as patriotic 
questioners and critics. Commanders “worth their salt at all do not want ‘yes men’ as religious 
teachers,” he stated, and in his estimation, his role in the armed forces lent a moral voice and a 
moral force to military endeavors. He would “raise unholy hell,” for example, were he to witness 
uncontrolled or unscrupulous treatment of prisoners. Whether he would be in a position to observe 
such action, he did not say. 
Chaplain E suggested that there might well be a limitation on a chaplain’s freedom of speech 
but if so, it was “self-imposed” because military ministers limited their controversial stances to 
conversations within the armed forces. “My own persuasion is near pacifism, although I believe war 
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is justified under certain conditions. I have presented this view from the pulpit, along with other 
controversial subjects, and in no way am restricted.”114 He saw his intellectual opponents in nuanced 
terms—as “thoughtful people” who nevertheless condoned American action in Vietnam—and used 
the contrast between his position and theirs to show that the military allowed for heterogeneous 
points of view. From Chaplain F’s perspective, “All war is immoral, but…to wish war away does not 
make reality, incorruptibility, or morality.” As a result, he suggested, “chaplains minister to their men 
in all circumstances with the desire to act as God’s reconciling agent.” Here was a new definition of 
the chaplaincy and of obligation: military clergy stood at the interface between God and country, 
loyal to God and to soldiers’ reckoning with God. If this meant feuding with commanders, then so 
be it, as vulnerability stood at the core of “standing for the gospel.”115  
Not all chaplains found the military as hospitable or open to difference. Chaplain K sounded 
a more cautious note, recognizing that the cost of criticism could be one’s career: “a man can be 
given a bad efficiency report because he is not gung-ho about the killing aspects of war.”116 These 
comments echoed those of Army Chaplain Samuel Stahl (Jewish) who found the military hostile 
toward his opinions and lamented that he lacked freedom of the pulpit. “We can not freely apply 
Jewish insights to the Vietnam situation and other crises of equal gravity because we have donned 
the uniform,” he fumed. “I am constantly frustrated by these military limitations on free speech.”117 
Among chaplains who found the military restrictive, many sought to change the institution rather 
than forego their work. Chaplain H encouraged the United Presbyterian Church to help reform the 
military chaplaincy, or at least press the Department of Defense to refine how and when it used 
chaplains. Though he did not clarify exactly what these modifications ought to include, Chaplain J 
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minced no words in coaxing the church to alter or even abolish the chaplaincy. “Will it be God first 
or nationalism first?,” he roared. Fearing the United States had embraced “American Shinto,” a term 
coined by historian Martin Marty to refer to a form of idolatrous nationalist self-worship from 
which there was no escape, the chaplain wanted his church to intervene to reform or detach itself 
from the chaplaincy.118 
As religious voices questioning the legitimacy of the Vietnam War grew more insistent in the 
late 1960s, so too did the possibility of separating the chaplaincy from the state gain traction. In 
previous decades, the push to unyoke religion from the military generally came from the 
constitutionally-minded. In contrast, concern over the prospect of state-sanctioned clergy providing 
moral cover for immoral action propelled the drive for a civilian chaplaincy. Colonel Irving 
Heymont understood that rabbis rejected military pulpits because it was impossible to wear officer 
stripes without supporting the war—even if “grudging, tacit, or perfunctory.” Civilian rabbis, he 
suggested, could provide an alternate means of meeting Jewish servicemen’s spiritual needs. As a 
career military officer who oversaw a Displaced Persons camp in Landsberg, Germany after World 
War II, Heymont was familiar with the challenges of providing for religious and communal needs. 
Yet by the advent of Vietnam, he also recognized the moral complexity of deploying clergy in 
uniform.119 Most chaplains, like those featured in the Presbyterian survey, were quick to spot the 
pragmatic obstacles: would churches want this work, would denominational bodies have the 
financial resources to commit to this project, would soldier-parishioners respect and respond to 
non-uniformed clergy, would civilian chaplains be able to function in a military environment? More 
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philosophically, Chaplain A wondered, would an alternative civilian chaplaincy “make for a better, 
freer, more creative and responsible ministry?” He advocated studying the issue in more depth but 
cautioned that altering internal military structures, identities, and administration might be more 
productive.120  
Yet as draft dodging and desertion peaked,121 a growing public chorus questioned the 
chaplaincy’s existence. Robert McAfee Brown—World War II navy chaplain, theologian, CALC co-
founder, and Stanford professor—recommended a comparable distancing of the chaplaincy from 
the military. “Surely the time has come,” he wrote in a 1971 essay, “for the military chaplaincy to be 
divested of both the symbolic and actual accouterments that render its ministry ambiguous, so that a 
genuine chaplaincy to the military can emerge.”122 Chaplains could not lumber along in a military 
echo-chamber, Brown argued. They needed to inhabit a new role as prophets, as the conscience of 
the nation, capable of raging against immorality and scorning depravity carried out in the name of 
patriotism. He was not alone in his outcry. Sociologist Gordon Zahn similarly argued that military 
chaplains faced an impossible conundrum: an ineluctable “role tension” that constrained the advice 
and actions of clergy in uniform. Questions of morality during war animated Zahn, who served in 
Civilian Public Service camps as a Catholic conscientious objector during World War II. Based on 
his study of the chaplains in Britain’s Royal Air Force and his encounters with the American Military 
Ordinariate, he characterized as a “scandal” the chaplaincy in which ministers could scarcely imagine 
counseling soldiers to disobey immoral orders to kill. As a result, in 1969, he used a Commonweal 
article to float the idea of radical restructuring the chaplaincy, severing it from the military hierarchy, 
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structure, and oversight and placing it wholly under the jurisdiction of civilian authorities.123  
Zahn’s public critique prompted the General Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains, the 
Jewish Welfare Board, and the Military Ordinariate to collaborate on a study of the viability of a 
civilian chaplaincy. The interfaith committee contemplated the option over 2 years, ultimately 
publishing their findings as a working paper written by Reverend Dr. Arthur C. Piepkorn—a former 
chaplain and professor at a Lutheran seminary—in a special 1972 issue of The Chaplain, the General 
Commission’s quarterly magazine. The study assumed that the chaplaincy might be dismantled 
because of two distinct reasons: first, if challenged in court by strict separationists and/or secular 
antagonists, the chaplaincy might not pass constitutional muster, and second, ecclesiastical 
authorities might withdraw their support for the institution if they felt it was mismanaged or they 
lacked adequate jurisdiction over their clergy. The group dismissed both possible scenarios as 
unlikely to occur soon, but predicated its investigation on the latter as a more likely possibility.124 
Indeed, six years before Zahn published his piece, the two concurring opinions and dissent in 
Abington v. Schemmp (1963) tipped the hand of the Court. In contrast to the mandatory Bible readings 
and Lord’s Prayer recitations the justices deemed unconstitutional, the existence of and federal 
support for military chaplains did not contravene the Establishment clause. In fact, Justice William J. 
Brennan argued, “hostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusal to provide chaplains and 
places of worship for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the State from all civilian opportunities for 
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public communion.”125 The constitutionality of the chaplaincy was judicially, if somewhat obliquely, 
secure. In contrast, a cascade of concerned believers fulminated against the chaplaincy. In June 1971, 
12,000 Catholic members of the National Association of Laymen publicly requested that the Church 
strip the military of its priests because of “‘repeated instances of silence on the part of Catholic 
chaplains in the face of moral atrocities.’”126 
Indeed, the critique lodged at the chaplaincy by its most vocal religious critics in the Vietnam 
era zeroed in on the oddity and vulnerability of faith in the military: that the state created and 
managed the chaplaincy as a means of providing what the military dubbed “religious coverage” and 
instilling morality in the armed forces. If the first irked the secular or separationist critics, the second 
inflamed indignant conscientious objectors to the Vietnam War. In a trenchant appraisal of the 
denunciation of the military chaplaincy, the study recognized that secular condemnation 
notwithstanding, “the fact remains that the most vocal antagonists of the military chaplaincy at the 
present are within the religious bodies of the nation.”127 The Chaplain’s feasibility paper explained this 
position clearly and respectfully. Even if chaplains maintained freedom of pulpit in the military, anti-
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about religion, as distinguished from the teaching of religion, in the public schools” (307). Finally, in his dissent, Potter 
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necessarily interact in countless ways” and too strict an interpretation of the Establishment clause would inevitably 
conflict with the Free Exercise clause. To counter those who might deem the military chaplaincy an Establishment 
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war critics surmised that their judgment on and assessment of war had to become “irremediably 
faulty” when clergy were ensconced in military units, lived in military-built barracks, and reported to 
military commanders. Thus, they contended, “to save the chaplains (and the religious bodies which 
supply and endorse them) from this almost inevitable moral corrosion[,] the denominations must 
divorce the chaplaincy from military control altogether.”128 In other words, the religiously-
committed proponents of a civilian chaplaincy asked, how could instruments of the state challenge 
the military apparatus of the state? How could clergy occupy their prophetic mantle if enmeshed in a 
state project? How could churches avoid implicitly sanctioning an immoral war if their ministers 
wore army, navy, and air force uniforms? What Brown, Heschel, and Novak deemed A Crisis of 
Conscience was, when applied to the chaplaincy, a crisis of authority: who controlled religion in the 
armed forces—God or country? Denominational bodies or the military? 
Over 88 pages, the study carefully imagined what a civilian chaplaincy would look like. 
Taking the role of civilian clergy who served members of the armed forces and their families as a 
starting point, it extrapolated how it could work on a larger scale. If “quasi-civilian” clergy already 
pitched in, could their efforts be scaled up? Could these ministers, priests, and rabbis mobilize 
during an uprising at home or in combat arenas abroad, and if so, how would they reach military 
personnel? The thought experiment went poorly, determining that such a regime would be 
disastrous and few religious organizations had the capacity to meet the needs of the military. On a 
financial level alone, the costs would exceed 47 thousand dollars per chaplain—a sum few faiths 
could afford to donate to the government.129 Logistically, only military posts in or adjacent to major 
cities would access sufficiently diverse religious groups to meet the religious needs of personnel, and 
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Navy ships presented a “most acute problem.” It remained unclear whether non-military preachers 
could reach and connect with men (and a growing number of women) in uniform. There were some 
potential upsides as a shift to a civilian chaplaincy might have overcome the hurdles of age, physical 
fitness, and education the military faced in recruiting an adequate supply of clergy and it might have 
reduced the amount of time chaplains spent on non-essential religious duties. Nevertheless, 
commanding officers would acquire significant administrative challenges for uncertain, if any, 
benefits. Civilians, moreover, would lack access to “the unchurched, the dechurched, the irreligious, 
the skeptical, the agnostic, and the atheists.” While the article conceded that the military chaplaincy 
did not exist to convert Americans, it recognized that religious groups used it as “at least an ancillary 
justification” for supplying clergy to the armed forces.  
This parade of pragmatic obstacles was likely sufficient to bury the possibility and probability 
of adopting a civilian-driven and run chaplaincy program. Yet the study’s most potent—albeit 
somewhat buried—critique was historical. It mentioned that the last time civilian clergy played a 
significant role in military environments was World War I, and that precedent boded poorly for the 
future. The experience of “auxiliary” chaplains aiding the American Expeditionary Force in France, 
the study reckoned, “is not reassuring. The system collapsed in all but utter chaos.”130 Indeed, the 
very pandemonium of uncoordinated and overwhelmed civilian religious services outside the 
purview of military command led General John Pershing to bring in Charles Brent to design and 
direct a reformulated military chaplaincy. Would Vietnam shred that legacy? 
But this was also what made the chaplaincy powerful: as a state-sanctioned religious 
institution, it lived within the structure of the military it served. Access to American personnel was 
fundamental to its mission, as the experience with Vietnam POWs demonstrated.  
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Who but military chaplains could attend to the religious and counseling needs of POWs 
returning from their forced residence at the notorious “Hanoi Hilton” and other North Vietnamese 
prisons? In 1973, President Richard Nixon fulfilled a 1968 campaign pledge to end the war in 
Vietnam—for Americans. A ceasefire for U.S. troops went into effect on January 28, the day after all 
parties—the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong—signed the Paris 
Peace Accords. At the same time, a select group of Army, Navy, and Air Force chaplains reported to 
Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines on orders to initiate and support Operation Homecoming, 
the culmination of diplomatic negotiations which led North Vietnam to repatriate 591 prisoners of 
war. Over two months, flights carrying 40 men at a time brought American POWs back—first to 
the military and then to their families.   
Mediating the culture shock of returning POWs could take a distinctly religious form. By 
1973, when Navy Chaplain Edward Roberts (Catholic) led Mass, he did so in English, leading one of 
the first returnees to exclaim, “‘You won’t believe it.’”131 In the years between when some of the 
Americans had been captured and when they attended Mass again, Vatican II had changed the very 
nature of the ritual elements that had comforted many men in prison. The captured Catholic men 
had kept their faith by reciting the prayers they knew in Latin, but the Second Vatican Council 
revised the liturgy to encourage lay participation in part by allowing prayers to be offered in the 
vernacular. While POWs exemplified the lay participation the Catholic Church sought, their ritual 
rendition no longer conformed to contemporary practices. As a result, Chaplain Roberts found that 
he “had to explain the new Mass before Mass.” And when he tried to offer a service familiar to his 
POW parishioners, he found “every time I’d try to start I couldn’t go very far and they came right 
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through with the whole thing in Latin.”132 The initial religious disconnect enabled more extensive 
conversations about faith and worship, meaning and ritual, between the chaplain and his men, but it 
also presaged challenges of reintegration into a world that kept moving while POWs waited under 
North Vietnamese control. 
Acculturating to American life was complex, and if, as Natasha Zaretsky has argued, the 
campaign to release American POWs “link[ed] captured men to their families and transform[ed] the 
POW story into a domestic drama,”133 chaplains played instrumental roles in the unfolding story. 
They were the bearers of the gospel and, quite often, of bad news too—of family deaths, marital 
troubles, and financial woes that transpired while POWs were in captivity.134 In what became the 
iconic image of family reunification, 15-year-old Lorrie Stirm sprinted toward her father, Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert L. Stirm, with outstretched arms, with the rest of her family in close pursuit. For six 
years, ever since the Air Force pilot was shot down, she and her family—her three siblings and her 
mother—had wondered whether they would ever see him again. Taken by Associated Press 
photographer Slava “Sal” Veder at Travis Air Force Base on March 17, 1973, “Burst of Joy” was 
printed by newspapers across the nation and won the Pulitzer in 1974. What the image could not 
capture, however, were the mixed emotions of the returned POW. With his back to the camera and 
his uniform representing all returning military men, his facial expression remained hidden. But more 
importantly, the photograph could not convey the experience of encountering his wife, from whom 
he had received a “Dear John” letter a mere 72-hours prior, on the same day he left Vietnam and re-
entered American territory. And it was a chaplain who, as the designated intermediary, delivered the 
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note.135 
The hypothetical civilian chaplain certainly would have been able to lead the religious 
services conducted for POWs upon their arrival at Clark Air Force Base. But the ability to receive 
orders directing chaplains and then transporting them to the Philippines as the Paris Peace Accords 
were being signed would hardly have been likely, if even possible. The task of relaying and mediating 
what one chaplain called “rather difficult sorrows” fell to chaplains precisely because they operated 
as extensions of the military infrastructure and could partake of military channels of information. A 
waiting wife might have confided in her local pastor, but sending news to her deployed, missing, or 
captured husband required working through the military.  
 
Onward Christian Soldiers: The Demographic Consequences of Obligation in Vietnam 
Vietnam did alter the chaplaincy, changing its contours and demographics. But many 
changes resulted from religious groups, rather than the state. While liberal Protestant, Catholic, and 
Jewish clergy debated the morality of accepting commissions as chaplains, evangelical Protestants 
viewed the Vietnam-era chaplaincy as a grand opportunity to increase their numbers, find new 
believers, reach Vietnamese Christians, and relay their faith to a larger American public. By June 
1968, at the height of the Vietnam conflict, the National Association of Evangelicals tallied 118 
chaplains across the three service branches—43 more chaplains placed in the service than three 
years prior, more than double the size of 1960, and almost forty times the number who served in 
World War II. Hence while the Army’s 66 NAE chaplains may have represented a mere three 
percent of the roster, it reflected an unparalleled two-decade surge.136 
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When Army Chaplain John W. Schumacher (Grace Brethren) received word that he would 
return to Vietnam for a second tour in 1969, all he could recall was his impression upon leaving Bien 
Hoa two summers prior. Contemplating the ultimate sacrifice made by so many Americans in 
uniform, he remembered gazing out the airplane window and “vow[ing] quietly to myself, ‘Never 
again.’”137 Friends and family suggested he resign his commission. Having already spent a year in 
Vietnam, they argued, he had fulfilled his commitment and need not put himself in harm’s way 
again. His community had, in fact, intuited a breach in authorized, though not guaranteed, policy. 
The Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains attempted to grant three years between tours in combat 
zones, but manpower needs, rather than intended promises, determined duty assignments. For his 
part, Schumacher strove to apply his spiritual sensibilities to the irritating news, focusing on seeing 
the unexpected change of plans as part of God’s plan for him and thus reducing his fear and 
frustration.138 The chaplain never rendered a decision on the acceptability or morality of U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam; rather, he operated according to a sense of duty, a belief in God and the 
chain of command, and a single principled stance: “it is right for a clergyman to be with soldiers in 
time of war.”139  
Assigned to a MACV outpost in Kontum City, Schumacher lived in a former French military 
camp not far from the Cambodian and Laotian borders. There he led services for American soldiers 
and the Special Forces personnel residing one compound over. He also developed a relationship 
with Father Phan Tan Van, the Vietnamese priest who had once written English propaganda for the 
Viet Minh and was expected to acquire the local bishopric when the holdover French bishop retired. 
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Over meals and prayer sessions, Chaplain Schumacher learned that Father Van “genuinely loved the 
Lord” and together, the American chaplain and the Vietnamese priest, provided for servicemen and 
orphaned children alike.140 Despite this budding relationship, Schumacher discovered “there was 
little advising [he] could do” for his South Vietnamese chaplain counterparts. The MACV command 
system used personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics advisors to pursue their missions, 
expecting that the assigned command chaplain could handle religious guidance for their local 
counterparts. Yet Schumacher desisted: all the Vietnamese chaplains he met were Catholic or 
Buddhist.141 Although the evangelical Protestant chaplain enjoyed regular camaraderie with the 
neighborhood priest and argued “every assignment presented ministry opportunities in abundance,” 
he did not seek or try to intervene in the work of non-Protestant Vietnamese chaplains. Whether his 
refusal to advise these clergy emanated from a sense of religious futility or a position of religious 
respect is unclear, but Schumacher’s mission field—reaching out to and successfully converting a 
drug-addled wounded Marine, for example—accompanied him throughout his military career. 
No matter their duty location, evangelical chaplains were pleased when they could provide 
data that vindicated successful ministry. At the Naval Training Center in Orlando, Florida, Chaplain 
Charles E. Dorr (Baptist) counted more than 800 men “indicat[ing] their desire to receive Christ” 
over 11 months—and those were merely the ones who followed through. Baptisms had always been 
part and parcel of chaplains’ work though proselytizing was forbidden. Nevertheless, the NAE 
found many “rewarding opportunities in terms of souls won for Christ” within the armed forces.142 
In the realm of baptisms, effective pastoral work still respected denominational bounds. As Chaplain 
Conrad Walker (Lutheran) explained, he baptized hundreds of soldiers at the Fort Benning chapel 
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and in the water-moccasin-laced Chattahoochee River. But before every ritual dunking, he tried to 
determine the appropriate family tradition to follow. In the case of a soldier who lacked Christian 
parents, a “Holy Roller” grandmother provided the key. With a Pentecostal and a Catholic as 
witnesses, the young man committed himself to Christ.143 This was evangelical military ecumenism in 
action: baptism of the new convert and the newly recommitted shared by Christians of many creeds 
and communities. 
As more and more NAE-endorsed chaplains found a home in the military, the organization 
became increasingly candid about its approach to the chaplaincy. Patriotism undoubtedly 
encouraged many to seek appointments, “but his primary reason for being in the chaplaincy is the 
same as any other missionary who has found the Lord’s will for a ministry in a given situation….the 
military is one of the world’s greatest mission fields.”144 In Southeast Asia, evangelical soldiers and 
chaplains alike “maintain[ed] a faithful witness for the Lord” and amassed “a great harvest of souls 
as a result.”145 Within an evangelical frame, combat arenas and domestic environments resembled 
youth ministries: preaching and teaching, studying and witnessing, advising and serving all created 
moments ripe for personal evangelism which, if carefully conducted, could pass as standard 
chaplaincy activities. A young sergeant visited Chaplain Walker with concerns about a marital rift 
stemming from his wife acting under the influence of voodoo. After a successful parachute jump—
despite a voodoo curse placed on the military minister—the “leapin’ deacon” reconnoitered with the 
101st Airborne soldier and informed him “it was time we went to prayer in Jesus’ name to wash out, 
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yes, flush out, any further influences of voodoo curses and such.”146 Visits and prayers followed, and 
soon after the theoretically ill-fated jump, the sergeant’s wife also restored her faith as a Christian. 
Likewise, in a report from Vietnam, Chaplain Arthur Guetterman (Conservative Baptist) jotted 
“today I held four services and 10 men trusted Christ.”147 Mission accomplished and missionary 
success went hand-in-hand. 
Transforming conversion in the heat of battle did not necessarily lead to an enduring church 
commitment, as many chaplains, evangelical and not, discovered. For every soldier who found God, 
there were equal numbers who neither embraced the divine nor expressed any interest in renewed 
religious fervor. As Catholic Chaplain John O’Connor remarked, while the “wishful-thinkers [say] 
that there are no atheists in foxholes, we find the same number of ‘practical’ atheists on the beaches, 
in the hills, the jungles, the foxholes of Vietnam that we find on Broadway, or in a recruit training 
center, or an ASW carrier.”148 Likewise, when Chaplain Kenneth Gohr wrote a series of talking 
points for a Navy Chief of Chaplains’ News Conference, he offered a similar answer to a question 
about whether men became more religious in dangerous situations like Vietnam. “There is little 
evidence of ‘Foxhole Religion,’” he remarked. “As a rule, the men who were ‘religious’ back home 
are religious out in Vietnam and the converse is also true.”149 Evangelical chaplains acknowledged 
these same experiences but viewed them as challenges rather than predetermined outcomes. A year 
with medical and line battalions in Vietnam persuaded Chaplain Kevin L. Anderson (Southern 
Baptist) to devote a portion of worship services to asking “men to make a definite response or 
commitment to Jesus Christ. I do not mean the use of high pressure or overly emotional appeals, 
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but an appeal which gives a man a chance to think seriously, ‘How is my life related to Jesus Christ?’ 
and, ‘Will I commit myself to Him?’” Anderson, who served as a typist in the Army before attending 
seminary and enlisting as a Navy chaplain, wanted his men to be born-again, but also wanted that 
experience to be deep and meaningful. Yet the chaplain who considered himself “more Marine 
green than…Navy blue” tempered his passion for Christ with the knowledge of his own 
weaknesses, recognizing that he “was never able to set up a good program to give further assistance 
to those who made commitments to Christ.”150 If war dramatized the battle cry for Christianity, it 
also conspired to corral conversion and baptism as milestones unmoored from day-to-day habits. 
The chaplaincy’s longtime emphasis on ecumenism and service to all remained vital to the 
mission in Vietnam but nevertheless bothered many chaplains affiliated with the NAE. In 1965, the 
mid-November torrent of rain was so constant and so heavy that the Division Chaplain’s supply and 
office tents were on the verge of being washed out. Making light of the situation, the assistant 
division chaplain cracked that they could “put[] 2 Protestants, 2 Catholics, and 2 Jewish chaplains 
aboard an ark.”151 In stark contrast to the chaplains who reveled in the interfaith cooperation of the 
chaplaincy, the group ducked promoting an anticipated 1967 tri-faith Air Force meeting—a staple of 
chaplaincy programming—by objecting to it and swaying an Advisory Committee to abandon plans 
for chaplains to run and promote it.152 But such clear sectarian victories were scarce. In 1971, Floyd 
Robertson was pleased to report that while the military continued to commend ecumenical services 
and schools, the Chiefs of Chaplains allowed clergy to recuse themselves from these events when 
they deemed participation “‘contrary…to the tenets of the church he represented or to his own 
                                                
150 Kevin L. Anderson, End of Tour Report, July 19, 1968, p. 2, FJC; Kevin Anderson, interview by Paul 
Zarbock, March 15, 2007, transcript, UNCW Military Chaplain Interview Project, available online: 
http://library.uncw.edu/web/collections./oralhistories/transcripts/649.html. 
151 Connell J. Maguire, End of Tour Report, 1966, p. 2, FJC. 
152 Floyd Robertson, “Report: Commission on Chaplains and Service to Military Personnel, National 
Association of Evangelicals,” April 3, 1967, SC-113, Box 171, Folder: Commission on Chaplains, Wheaton. 
  392 
 
conscience.’”153 The dual roles of military responsibility and doctrinal commitment created conflicts 
for many of the evangelical chaplains who knew that their personal faith could collide with the 
beliefs of the personnel they served. One chaplain, for example, reported declining to marry a 
couple because the airmen’s fiancée was a divorcée; he also refused to baptize the dying infant of 
another soldier. In both cases, the expected religious actions contravened his denomination’s 
principles and his personal precepts; nevertheless, he realized that as a staff officer, he was bound to 
find another chaplain or, if necessary, civilian minister to perform these duties.154 Concerns about 
diluting the strength of religious messages suffused objections to ecumenical policy. The problem 
was not transecting denominational allegiances—evangelicals were, on the whole, quite interested 
and invested in transdenominational Protestantism—but in mollycoddling those who did not share 
their emphasis on salvation by Christ.155 
Yet for every chaplain who extricated himself from an uncomfortably ecumenical situation, 
still others found themselves marginalized. One senior chaplain, who lamented the paucity of 
evangelical chaplains in senior leadership positions such as directors of the Armed Forces Chaplains 
Board or division heads in the Offices of the Chiefs of Chaplains, commented, “the chaplaincy 
climate is completely dominated by the ecumenical philosophy. Those of us who stand for other 
things are viewed as somewhat ‘crack pot’ and certainly ‘very peculiar.’ But you know that. The 
question is, ‘where do we go from here?’” The answer, the same chaplain asserted, was acquiring 
power within the system. “‘Since the chaplaincy is such a closed ecclesiastical system I see no 
remedy, or change of climate, until such time as evangelicals infiltrate the top policy making 
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positions.’”156 
Although evangelical chaplains often felt they were fighting a rising tide of ecumenism, they 
had allies, bridges, and fellow travelers in their errand into the wilderness as well. As plans for 
Campus Crusade for Christ’s EXPLO ’72 moved forward, for example, Navy Chief of Chaplains 
Francis Garrett (United Methodist) promoted it, describing the weeklong festival aimed at high 
school and college students as “a springboard for a strategy to help fulfill the Great Commission in 
this generation.” He would be attending and expected 5000 or so military personnel to join him in 
Dallas; chaplains could use their budgets and Chapel Funds to sponsor delegations and help key 
laymen attend.157 Three thousand soldiers attended one-day spiritual retreats at Fort Hood, and 
Chaplain Carl McNally (Baptist), expected to make the 150-mile trip to Dallas for Explo ‘72 with at 
least 300 of them in tow. Indeed, the Holy Spirit had begun infusing the military—at least the 
officers and enlisted men, if not yet the chaplaincy itself.158 By 1972, bibles and revivals, Christian 
coffeehouses and Jesus rallies, touring evangelists and “‘bombing’ North Vietnamese villages with 
the Gospel” had become commonplace. A four-star general could proclaim, “the United States is 
not neutral about God…so I have no bashfulness about expressing my convictions for the Lord” 
and follow through with early-morning prayer breakfasts and on-base Bible-study groups.159 Given 
the increasingly hospitable environment, even the end of the draft could be promoted as an 
advantage rather than a problem. An April 1970 report foreshadowed that if Nixon followed 
                                                
156 Floyd Robertson, “Report: Commission on Chaplains and Service to Military Personnel, National 
Association of Evangelicals,” September 16, 1970, SC-113, Box 171, Folder: Commission on Chaplains, Wheaton. 
157 Floyd Robertson to the Membership of the Christian Servicemen’s Fellowship, April 1972, SC-113, Box 
171, Folder: Commission on Chaplains, Wheaton. For more on Explo ’72 and Campus Crusade for Christ, see John G. 
Turner, Bill Bright and Campus Crusade for Christ: The Renewal of Evangelicalism in Postwar America (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2008). 
158 Anne Loveland, American Evangelicals and the U.S. Military, 1942-1993 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1996). 
159 General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., quoted in “Bibles in the Barracks – God and the Military,” Christianity Today, 
March 31, 1972. 
  394 
 
through with his pledge, “the termination of the draft will affect the recruitment of chaplains by 
removing many of the uncertainties about career status and making it possible to maintain more 
consistent promotion policies.”160 
While evangelicals looked for opportunities to help individuals become born again, there was 
another preacher commanding the nation to be born again. When the evangelical chaplain asked 
“where do we go from here?” he was—quite possibly unintentionally—quoting Martin Luther King, 
who asked that question of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1967. From a podium 
in Atlanta, King pointed out that black men were dying at twice the rate of others while fighting “an 
unjust, evil war in Vietnam.”161 And while white evangelicals were the most vocal group to enter the 
chaplaincy in large numbers during the Vietnam War era, they were not the only group to do. The 
numbers of African-American clergy ballooned as well. In the Army, seventeen active-duty black 
chaplains in 1963 more than tripled to 55 in 1971 and climbed to 65 by 1973.162 
Army and Navy chaplains alike recognized the need for black chaplains and for a better 
racial climate in the armed forces. The most volatile situations generally arose from subtle, rather 
than overt, racism according to Chaplain Peter Cary (Catholic). In his end of tour report, he wrote, 
“smoldering unrest and the complaints of the Black Marines at the Leadership Council meetings 
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were usually directed to that not so clearly seen or provable area.”163 Army Chaplain Claude Newby 
(LDS) observed flaring racial tensions as well, though he claimed the environment degraded 
dramatically between his two tours. “Where in 1966-67 and early 1969 infantrymen were 
infantrymen without regard to race or color, by 1970 even they showed evidence of succumbing to 
civilian and rear-area trends, of dividing into us and them.”164  
Racial enmity extended far beyond combat areas. Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman (National 
Baptist) had completed a tour of Vietnam by the time he deployed to Germany in 1971. There, the 
minister, who two decades later would become the Army’s first African-American Chief of 
Chaplains, saw black and white soldiers literally killing one another. Racial animus led to more 
memorial services for fallen soldiers in Germany than it did in Vietnam in 1971-2.165 At Fort Hood, 
Texas, where black soldiers refused to serve as supplemental riot control for the 1968 Democratic 
National Convention and racial slurs triggered race riots, several chaplains began offering Sunday 
morning gospel services.166 Ostensibly “designed to appeal to people of all ages and backgrounds,” 
the Special Song Service for Thanksgiving brought in several music groups and choirs that 
“specialize[d] in black Gospel music.”167 Likewise, Chaplain Elvernice Davis (United Methodist) 
started a regular Sunday service centered on the gospel hymns with which many black soldiers would 
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have been familiar.168 These small efforts notwithstanding, most black soldiers and Marines found 
the military a hostile space, a problem the inclusion of a few good chaplains could hardly erase.169 
Religion dangled a means of contesting racial discrimination, as the case of the LDS Church 
reveals. In 1974, Private Paul R. Armstrong alleged “the policies of the Mormon institution are racist 
to an extent that it has an effect on the ‘racial harmony’ on this post.” Mormons did not allow 
African Americans to hold the priesthood until 1978, and in 1974, Armstrong tried to use religion to 
attack this racist practice. “If the Army does not want to be described as a racist organization,” he 
wrote, “it should not go along with the racist policies that are imbedded in other institutions.” In 
filing a formal complaint, he requested that the military remove Mormon services and chaplains and 
asked for the incorporation of “Black Muslim, Buddhist, and other non-western services” on base.170 
Armstrong attempted to use religion as a cudgel against racism. However, the Army argued that its 
hands were tied because it used membership, rather than leadership, as the standard against which to 
assess racism. Had the LDS Church forbade black members, it would have been in violation of 
Army regulations. But “the Army does not judge qualifications of persons who desire to enter the 
ministry of various denominations” and could hardly justify intervention in such internal religious 
matters.171 The army nevertheless continued to ask the LDS Church, like all religious groups, to help 
supply “minority clergymen,” thus exerting a subtle, if unintentional, pressure to open the 
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169 Part of the problem was the paucity of black officers, which meant few black soldiers saw commanders of 
their own race and few envisioned the military as a viable career path. In 1974, the black officer rates were 4.2 percent in 
the Army, 2 percent in the Air Force, 2 percent in the Marine Corps, and 1.1 percent in the Navy. Moreover, southern 
whites dominated the officer ranks, placing minority servicemen at the whims and wills of those raised as the powerful in 
the Jim Crow South. David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 
1975, 2005), 205, 209. 
170 Equal Opportunity Complaints Information Work Sheet, completed by Paul R. Armstrong, 1974, MS 164, 
Box 85, Folder 9, Utah. 
171 Information Paper, “Racial Discrimination Complaint Against the LDS Church,” May 28, 1974, MS 164, 
Box 85, Folder 9, Utah. This line of argument is somewhat disingenuous since the LDS priesthood was open to all white 
males, thus blurring the lines between membership and leadership. On race relations in the LDS Church, see Armand L. 
Mauss, All Abraham’s Children: Changing Mormon Conceptions of Race and Lineage (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois 
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priesthood to African Americans.172 
The overarching need to diffuse racial tension led some commanders to request black 
chaplains which, in turn, prompted both the Army and Navy to recruit more black chaplains as well 
as assign them to units most in need. Sent to Washington to improve human relations and 
recruiting, Chaplain Thomas Parham (United Presbyterian) insisted that the Navy learn about the 
African-American community and commit itself to improving housing options for personnel. As the 
second black chaplain in the Navy, Parham was forced to resign during postwar demobilization. In 
1951, he rejoined the Navy as the only black chaplain on active duty and the first black chaplain to 
garner sea duty—on a mostly white ship. In 1966, when Parham earned his Captain’s bars, he was 
the first black officer to achieve the rank.173 But his singular experience notwithstanding, the 
inadequate number of black chaplains remained an obstacle to overcome. As Army Chief of 
Chaplains Gerhard Hyatt proclaimed in March 1974, “the Army has set out to win the battle against 
racial discrimination” and “the Army chaplaincy must bring to bear the resources of religious faith” 
to improve race relations, but it had a ways to go in implementing a truly multicultural military 
ministry.174  
 
Conclusion 
The last Army chaplain left Vietnam on March 28, 1973, the same day the final group of 590 
POWs was released and three months before the last American draftee was inducted.175 By the early 
1970s, the Vietnam War had so strained the military that the chaplains assigned to the Navy Chief of 
Chaplains office dressed in civilian clothes “four days a week to minimize the image of military 
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presence in Washington.” Chief of Chaplains Frances Garrett emphasized collegiality in an attempt 
to redirect the emphasis of the chaplain corps toward spiritual identity, unity, and professional 
growth. He even applied principles of “participatory management” to the production of the Navy 
Chaplains’ Manual, in which he sought cooperation and consensus from the entire corps, top to 
bottom. Over the course of his tenure, from 1970 to 1975, the United States pulled out of Vietnam, 
and the chaplaincy lost a quarter of its strength.176 
The boom and bust cycle of the chaplaincy population was typical of the roller coaster of 
mobilization and demobilization that characterized the American approach to war in the twentieth 
century. But the tenor and demographics of the chaplaincy changed during and as a result of the 
Vietnam War. As volunteers in the armed forces, clergy chose whether to participate in the military. 
Growing distrust of the government fused with mounting qualms about the morality of American 
involvement in Vietnam to disrupt the recruitment, induction, and experiences of chaplains. For 
those who viewed the Vietnam War as fundamentally immoral, the very nature of a state-supported 
religious institution thrust hard against the pull of religious obligation to serve men. But for those 
who deemed the Vietnam War acceptable, or at least necessary if still problematic, abdication of the 
chaplaincy by some of its most stalwart contributors—ecumenically-minded white, liberal 
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews—created new opportunities. Evangelical interest in and pursuit of 
the chaplaincy undoubtedly proliferated in the 1960s, in part because unfilled quotas created space, 
in part because they saw an untapped mission field, and in part because the military provided access 
to influence and power. However, the need to supply more chaplains to men in the field also 
pressured the Army, Navy, and Air Force to muster new religious recruits, and its search broadened 
and diversified the chaplaincy ranks as well.  
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In addition to seeking more black chaplains, the military formally opened its religious 
program to women in the early 1970s. Top-down decision-making broadened the racial diversity of 
the chaplaincy and transformed the all-male chaplaincy into a mixed-gender space. Admiral Elmo 
Zumwalt Jr. became Chief of Naval Operations in 1970; his policy directives, known as Z-grams, 
revamped the racial and gender dynamics of the Navy.177 As he commented about his efforts to alter 
the Navy, “there's a good deal of indecision as to whether I am a drooling-fang militarist or a 
bleeding-heart liberal.”178 Whatever the reception of his approach, in 1970, his “Equal Opportunity 
in the Navy” required squadrons to appoint a minority individual as a special assistant for minority 
affairs and insisted that the Navy fight housing discrimination. Two years later, he issued Z-gram 
116, “Equal Opportunities and Rights for Women in the Navy,” which not only rescinded 
restrictions on women serving aboard ships and eliminated discriminatory promotion and 
assignment patterns, but also ordered the chaplain and civil engineers corps to accept applications 
from and commission women, “thereby opening all staff corps to women.”179 Just as Truman used 
an executive order to desegregate the armed forces, so too did Zumwalt use policy prerogatives to 
integrate women. 
Eleven months after Zumwalt’s Z-gram, Dianna Pohlman Bell (Prebyterian) entered the 
Navy chaplaincy, and Alice M. Henderson (AME) followed in the Army in 1974.180 The 
incorporation of women was not always easy, as Chaplain Pohlman recalled. While she found 
Catholic chaplains quite supportive, perhaps, she conjectured, because priests were accustomed to 
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working with nuns, Protestants “really had a difficult time with me….they had never experienced a 
woman colleague before.”181 When Chaplain Henderson arrived at Ft. Bragg, she faced obstacles 
prosaic and profound. The quartermaster had no uniform for her, unaccustomed as he was to 
finding fatigues for female bodies. At the same time, she was a curiosity on base and though her 
novel presence led to lots of attention, she had to prove herself ready for the responsibilities of 
being a chaplain—something her commanding officer reported she had done quite well.182 
Improving the gender composition of the chaplaincy corps required more than top-down 
initiatives and local support for female clergy, however. Women still had to meet the education 
requirements of the chaplaincy, and not all faiths and denominations ordained women, which in turn 
limited the number of potential female military chaplains. In 1970, women constituted about three 
percent of American clergy which meant the military recruited from a very small pool of candidates. 
Even among those who trained female clergy, numbers were low. The (Northern) Presbyterian 
Church allowed women to attend seminary and become full clergy in 1956 but, prior to 1970, never 
graduated more than nine female ministers a year.183 In 1972, when the Navy chaplaincy opened its 
doors to women, for example, only the Reform movement’s Hebrew Union College and the 
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Reconstructionist movement’s Rabbinical College trained women as rabbis.184 And because nuns are 
not ordained like priests and are not empowered to celebrate Mass or perform sacraments, the 
Catholic Church could not endorse any sisters as chaplains. 
By the late 1970s, Navy Chief of Chaplains John J. O’Connor took on the task of finding an 
adequate number of women to commission as chaplains. To John Willard Marriott, then the head of 
the LDS Military Relations Committee, he wrote, “I am not being an alarmist, but unless each 
church provides an adequate share, the majority of the women chaplains will come from a very few 
churches. That would be neither desirable nor equitable.”185 Charged by his country to build a 
chaplain corps composed of men and women, the Catholic priest implored religious groups to 
elevate women to positions of leadership and encourage them to enter the officer corps. “Let me 
urge you to seek aggressively these women clergy within your church to provide them with [the] 
opportunity to consider the Chaplain Corps as a career,” he continued. “In today’s world, equal 
opportunity without regard to race or sex is a reality quickly coming into sharp focus….the 
implications for ministry under that concept is an opportunity to be grasped; a service to be 
rendered.”  
Although the Catholic Church would not abide by his request, O’Connor was both priest 
and chaplain. His loyalties to God and country, pressed to the limit in Vietnam, required him to 
move deftly between them as the Navy’s ranking religious officer. His was a role that demanded 
fidelity to faith and loyalty to the state. In asking religious groups to provide and endorse female 
candidates to the chaplaincy, he sublimated his religion’s order to his country’s needs. It was not a 
violation of Catholic doctrine to encourage the participation of women; rather, Chief of Chaplains 
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O’Connor—who would become Archbishop of New York after leaving the chaplaincy—used the 
same approach he had to reconciling morality with the Vietnam War by modeling conscientious 
deference in setting aside sectarian preferences for the good of the service. 
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EPILOGUE 
The Military Chaplaincy and Religious Politics After Vietnam 
 
Peggy Liebe was very upset, and she hoped President George H. W. Bush would help. Just 
that morning, she heard a Navy chaplain speak on her local Christian radio station. Quite alarmingly, 
he mentioned that “they have to allow Satanists a place to perform their worship rituals.” This news 
was “disturbing” and, frankly, unbelievable. Surely, she wrote, her president—“being a Christian”—
could understand why this turn away from God was so troubling. It was, she concluded, a “great 
tragedy” that the founders lacked the “foresight to state ‘Christian religion’” in the First 
Amendment. After all, “how could they have known of the Eastern cults and demonism that would 
invade this country?”1 
Although the President did not respond, the Navy Chief of Chaplains did. Alvin D. 
Koeneman (Lutheran) was, like the forty-first president, a Christian, but his answer may not have 
satisfied Liebe. He informed her that “Navy policy is to accommodate the doctrinal or traditional 
observances of the religious faith practiced by individual members when they will not have an 
adverse impact on military readiness, individual or unit readiness, unit cohesion, health, safety, or 
discipline.” When commanders made decisions about religious practices, they also accounted for 
“the impact any particular practice may have on the morale and welfare of those in their command.” 
As a result, it was possible to forbid any “practice [which] would be detrimental to good order and 
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discipline” and officers “are not required to provide a place for satanists to worship.”2 But, to 
Liebe’s likely dismay, this meant they also retained the discretion to assist members of the military in 
pursuing matters of faith. 
While the case of Satanists was extreme, the issue of American religious boundaries was not. 
Over the twentieth century, the question endured of what the state recognized as religion and what 
it excluded. As the demographics of the United States shifted in response to more open and flexible 
immigration laws and as the population of the military changed in response to the end of the draft, 
the chaplaincy continued to re-evaluate what ministry it provided and how it handled minority 
religions. The chaplaincy served as a bellweather of religious diversity and the politics of religion in 
the United States. Yet as the military puzzled its way through a new and fluctuating spiritual 
landscape, it often acted inconsistently. While it accepted the sacramental use of peyote (provided it 
was inhaled more than 24 hours prior to duty), protected Wiccan religion, and welcomed Muslim, 
Buddhist, and Hindu clergy into the chaplaincy,3 it stumbled trying to codify regulations allowing 
Sikh turbans and Muslim beards, understand the concerns of atheists and humanists, and untangle 
eruptions of Protestant division. 
Long before American Muslims became a subject of scrutiny—first during the Persian Gulf 
War and then after September 11—the military encountered Islam as a religion in its ranks. In 1976, 
a message arrived in Washington from the USS Mitscher, a ship in a destroyer squadron then 
deployed in the Mediterranean. A sailor claimed to be an Orthodox Muslim, which 
“present[ed]…problems aboard ship.” Namely, how could the ship accommodate five daily services, 
Friday noon Sabbath services, dietary needs to abstain from pork “or non-kosher meat,” and fasting 
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during Ramadan? The ship’s officers announced that there would be no special meals but “authority 
given to purchase tuna fish at local commissary with cans stored in [his] locker,” daily prayers could 
be conducted “provided there is no interference with assigned military watches/jobs [and] exchange 
of watches is permitted,” and private prayer space would be designated.4 The accommodations met 
with approval, granted in bureaucratic language that supported judicious adaptations—sensitive to 
both religious obligations and the duties of the armed forces. “To the maximum extent permissible, 
a member should be permitted the freedom to adhere to his religious persuasion as long as it does 
not hinder or restrict the effective fulfillment of the command’s and the Navy’s mission.”  
The feedback also noted that “diversity of religious persuasions preclude promulgation of 
general standards” such that the Navy needed to tailor responses to individual and military needs. 
When mission goals and readiness hindered religious practice, the memo suggested, “alternative 
administrative measures not involving punitive action” were warranted. This leniency did not, 
however, justify violations of orders, for which judicial proceedings could ensue.5 The resolution was 
classic. It deflected possibly strife through a rhetorical commitment to religious diversity and an 
offer of flexible provisions combined with reminder that duty demands superseded religious 
obligations. One year later, Navy Chief of Chaplains John O’Connor congratulated Chaplain Victor 
Ivers (Catholic) for “being on the cutting edge of things” by arranging the first Muslim service at 
Great Lakes Naval Training Center.6 Although American Muslims did not acquire their first chaplain 
until 1993, when the Army commissioned Imam Abdul-Rasheed Muhammed, the military had been 
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working with Muslims for several decades prior.7  
In 1984, Congress used its leverage—funding appropriations—to direct the military to study 
“military regulations with regard to religious practices.” More specifically, “to promote the free 
exercise of religion by members of the Armed Forces to the greatest extent possible,” the 
Department of Defense needed to study “ways to minimize the potential conflict between the 
interests of the members of the Armed Forces in abiding by their religious tenets and the military 
interest in maintaining discipline.” The Armed Forces Chaplains Board would appoint three 
representatives to the eight-member committee which Congress charged with “mak[ing] the 
maximum effort to ascertain the views of the broadest spectrum of religious organizations.”8 
Charged with submitting a report by February 1, 1985, the committee contacted about 140 religious 
groups to interview as part of their data collection effort.9 The conversations usually included 
national representatives of the religion as well as a service member of the religion, which enabled the 
military to learn more about religious practices as well as obstacles to performing them. 
If studying religion and religious experiences in the armed forces revealed a number of 
challenges, it nevertheless concealed a group striving for access. Like their counterparts in the 1920s, 
atheists felt continually rebuffed by the state. In 1979, Petty Office Michael Hagen asked the military 
to create an Armed Forces Atheist Council. In writing to the Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, he 
accused the military of “hav[ing] an established  Judeo-Christian chaplaincy for I have no figures 
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indicating that Muslims or Buddhists, much less Atheists, have received a commission and 
acceptance into the Chaplain Corps.” Alleging that “by virtue of a chaplain’s mandatory 
indoctrination in a seminary, by military guidelines, he is not qualified to adequately meet the needs 
of atheists.” The military concurred. But while Hagen viewed the absence of support for atheist (as 
well as agnostic and humanist) personnel as a problem, the Navy was content to agree that there 
existed “a basic incompatibility” between the chaplaincy and an atheist council. It was, to their 
minds, a contradiction in terms that merited no further action, or at most delegating this 
responsibility to officers outside the chaplaincy.10  
At least one chaplain found the resulting news coverage dispiriting. Jim Bank (Unitarian 
Universalist) wanted to make sure that all chaplains understood the depth and range the 
“commitment to religious pluralism in the military requires.” As a clergyman trained in a 
denomination that included theists and humanists and as a military chaplain, Bank felt obligated to 
support all individuals “in achieving religious wholeness as they—not we—see it.” Aiding atheists 
hardly fell outside his duties. In fact, from Banks’ perspective, arguments about incompatibility 
failed because they were predicated on a false premise of who categorized religion. After all, he 
anticipated Muslim and Buddhist chaplains entering the corps and they would be required to 
minister to “those of Western religious traditions” even as Judaism and Christianity represented 
“deviating views” theologically.11 Atheism strained the limits of the chaplaincy, but atheists did not 
disappear. Rather, they have continued to advocate for representation, counseling, and guidance on 
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their terms.12 
This skirmish over atheists went unresolved, but it highlighted a brief moment in which 
liberal and conservative religious voices agreed that a broad spectrum of religion—restricted as it 
may have been to theism—was fundamental to the operation of the chaplaincy. As Floyd Robertson 
of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) had insisted in 1975, “religious liberty is a two-
way street. When I defend the right of out chaplains to be evangelical I must at the same time 
defend the right of those so disposed to be just as liberal as they choose to be.”13 He understood 
that within the military orbit, religious rights could not be curtailed to satisfy particular theological 
orientations.  
Many of Robertson’s evangelical and fundamentalist colleagues disagreed, philosophically 
and theologically, and tried to push more particular or sectarian visions into military space. Bill 
Garman of the Associated Gospel Churches described the non-sectarian Vacation Bible School 
planned by Chaplain Patrick J. Hessian (Catholic) as reflecting “deplorable un-American, 
discriminatory conditions in the Army Chaplaincy.”14 But Robertson countered that the future Army 
Chief of Chaplains had every right to act in accordance with his faith. Mutual non-infringement was 
the best policy, he argued, because it not only safeguarded the chaplaincy from accusations of 
religious discrimination but it also allowed evangelical chaplains to pursue their visions without 
                                                
12 In summer 2013, Jason Heap applied to be a humanist chaplain, which elicited a fiery response from those 
who thought the chaplaincy ought to retain a theistic orientation. John Burnett, “Should Military Chaplains Have to 
Believe in God?” NPR, July 31, 2013. 
13 Floyd Robertson to Billy Melvin, July 21, 1975, SC 113, Box 152, Folder: Commission on Chaplains—
Current Files, Wheaton. 
14 Bill Garman to Bob Jones, Jr., May 7, 1975, SC 113, Box 147, Folder: Commission on Chaplains—
Permanent File, Wheaton. In a report forwarded to the NAE, Garman lambasted an optional chaplains conference for 
allowing dancing, hugging, and ecumenical prayer while not enforcing a strict dress code or forbidding discussions of 
topics like masturbation. Russell Shive to Billy Melvin, June 12, 1975, SC 113, Box 147, Folder: Commission on 
Chaplains—Permanent File, Wheaton. 
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interference or restrictions.15 
Other faiths had reason to be less sanguine about the evangelical commitment to religious 
equality, however. There was, as sociologist Kim Hansen has called it, a burgeoning “culture war in 
the chaplain corps.”16 By the late 1980s, the NAE was especially concerned about the “General 
Protestant” service. It had never been an ideal arrangement, given “the wide divergence in customs 
and style of worship among the genuine Protestant faith groups.” But, the organization asserted, 
“the problem has been greatly exacerbated in more recent years due to the fact that non-Protestant 
chaplains like the Mormons and Christian Scientists are classified as Protestant.”17 The classification 
scheme was not new, but the potential opportunity to alter it appeared greater. By the late 1980s, the 
NAE focused on increasing its influence which, despite a growing number of evangelical chaplains 
in the service, still felt weak to them. According to Floyd Robertson, the NAE Chaplains 
Commission’s “participation in major policy decisions of the military chaplaincy has been limited. It 
now seems appropriate, desirable, and in some ways necessary for the commission to assume a more 
effective leadership role in matters that pertain to the Chaplaincy as a whole as well as those which 
impact on our own chaplains.”18 The military was again a mission field, and the target extended 
beyond individual service members to the organization as a whole. 
A flurry of position papers on the “Protestant Problem” yielded little clarity—at least in 
terms of tackling intractable differences among groups the military classified as Protestant. But the 
                                                
15 Floyd Robertson to James C. Lont, October 26, 1977, SC 113, Box 147, Folder: Commission on Chaplains—
Permanent File, Wheaton. 
16 Kim Hansen, Military Chaplains and Religious Diversity (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 165-202. 
Hansen’s study demonstrates that chaplains disagree about the degree to which evangelicals had or lacked power in the 
military. Charges of evangelical take-overs grew in the 1990s, in part because of evangelical officers who were not 
chaplains. Michael Weinstein, who founded the Military Religious Freedom Foundation to fight evangelical influence, 
publicized the evangelical tenor of the Air Force Academy. Michael Weinstein and Davin Seay, With God On Our Side: 
One Man’s War Against An Evangelical Coup in America’s Military (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2006). 
17 Floyd Robertson, Semi-Annual Report of the Commission on Chaplains, March 7, 1988, SC 113, Box 85, 
Folder: Chaplains Committee Pre-1992, Wheaton. 
18 Floyd Robertson, Semi-Annual Report of the Commission on Chaplains, October 4, 1988, SC 113, Box 85, 
Folder: Chaplains Committee Pre-1992, Wheaton. 
  410 
 
NAE’s goal was clear: it sought recognition—and military validation—as a major faith group, 
distinct from mainline Protestants and akin to Catholics and Jews. This would grant control over 
worship services, Bibles, schools, and the environment writ large. Moreover, they claimed, a new 
system would allow NAE chaplains “to best serve their own constituents. At the same time it would 
in no way detract from nor hinder them in their responsibilities to provide for ministry to those of 
other faith groups.”19 As evangelicals perceived it, they were exemplars of pluralism. While they 
dismissed ecumenism as too homogenizing, they could point to their own organization, the NAE, as 
a model of a pluralist religious space that neither erased nor was trapped by denominational 
difference.  
The NAE was pleased that new Army regulations eliminated the use of “Major Faith 
Groups” on the “valid” grounds that “the government may not recognize any faith group as major 
vs. minor.” But it still failed to resolve the Protestant problem. “Protestant as used in the military as 
become meaningless because it is without definition,” the 1990 semi-annual report declared. The 
category was “meaningless…stripped of identity by random late-comers.”20 The derisive yet 
defensive reference to “random late-comers” underscored the sectarian impulse motivating the 
NAE, an urge that contradicted the military’s emphasis on constructing a non-sectarian religious 
space. Debates over religious difference and legitimacy, so constant and yet so varied over the 
twentieth century, shifted once more.  
While the NAE failed to convince the military to fulfill its desires, it had powerful civilian 
allies in Congress. The 2014 National Defense Authorization Act included an important and quite 
significant amendment to the U.S. Code: “If called upon to lead a prayer outside of a religious 
                                                
19 Floyd Robertson, “The ‘General Protestant’ Problem,” August 21, 1989, SC 113, Box 85, Folder: Chaplains 
Committee Pre-1992, Wheaton. 
20 NAE Chaplains Commissions Semi-Annual Report, October 2, 1990, SC 113, Box 85, Folder: Chaplains 
Committee Pre-1992, Wheaton. 
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service, a chaplain shall have the prerogative to close the prayer according to the traditions, 
expressions, and religious exercises of the endorsing faith group.” Labeled as a “protection of the 
religious freedom of military chaplains,” Section 529 of this funding bill dictated by statute what 
internal military policy had resisted for years and what religious groups had debated for decades: 
could chaplains pray in denominationally specific forms outside worship services, or, in common 
parlance, could chaplains conclude a public prayer in Jesus’ name. The answer, for now, is yes. 
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